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2ABSTRACT
This thesis, is an examination of Nguyen Ai Quoc’s (Ho Chi Minh’s) role in transmitting 
communism to Vietnam in the period between the First and Second World Wars. As the Third 
International (Comintern) provided the theory and much of the organizational support for this 
task, it is also a study of the Comintern’s changing policies towards revolution in colonial 
countries. It has grown out of research in the Moscow archives of the Comintern, which first 
became available to researchers in late 1991-1992. It also makes extensive use of the French 
colonial archives at the Centre d’Archives d’Outre-Mer in Aix-en-Provence.
This study begins with Nguyen Ai Quoc’s appearance in Paris in 1919, when he lobbied the 
Paris Peace Conference for greater Vietnamese freedom and was then drawn into the political 
world of the French left. It follows his first contacts with the Comintern in Moscow (1923- 
1924), through his two-year sojourn in Canton during the Communist-Guomindang United 
Front, when he established the first training courses for Vietnamese revolutionaries. Chapters 
IV and V cover his return to Asia in mid-1928, his founding of the Vietnamese Communist 
Party in 1930, and the 1930-31 insurrectionary movement in Vietnam. Chapter Six deals with 
his June 1931 arrest and his long period of political inactivity in Moscow, from mid-1934 until 
the autumn of 1938. The final chapter covers his return to southern China and his efforts to 
regain his influence in the Vietnamese communist movement from 1939 to 1941.
The thesis concludes that, with the benefit of the documentary evidence now available, it is 
necessary to readjust the perception of Nguyen Ai Quoc as an influential communist during his 
early political career. Initially he received little financial support from Moscow and he never 
became a member of the Comintern Executive Committee. Nor did he exist entirely within the 
world of the Comintern. Although the latter was an essential force in the creation of 
Vietnamese communism, there were other factors which shaped its growth, including family 
and regional ties, as well as Chinese and French left-wing politics.
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6ABBREVIATIONS
AOM Archives d’Outre-Mer
BNTS Ho Chi Minh: Bien Nien Tieu Su [Ho Chi Minh: A Year-by-year Biography]
CC Central Committee
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CYL Communist Youth League
ECCI Executive Committee of the Communist International
FEB Far Eastern Bureau
GMD Guomindang
ICP Indochinese Communist Party
MAE Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres
NCLS Nghien Cuu Lich Su [Historical Research]
NXB Nha Xuat Ban [publishing house]
OMS Otdel Mezhdunarodnoi Sviazi [International Communications Section]
RC Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Docmnents of Modem History
SHAT Service Historique de PAnnee de Terre
SLOTFOM Service de Liaisons avec les Originates des Territoires de la France d ’Outre-Mer
SMP Shanghai Municipal Police Files
SPCE Service de Protection du Corps expeditionnaire
VNQDD Vietnam Quoc Dan Dang
VNTNCMDCH Vietnam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi 
A Note on the Use o f Place Names
I have retained the English forms of Canton for Guangzhou, Swatow for Shantou and Whampoa for 
Huangpu, as these terms are so strongly associated with the events of the first united front in China, 
and/or occur frequently in the documents from which I cite. Otherwise I have converted all Chinese 
place names to the Pinyin form, unless the older form occurs in a direct quote. I refer interchangeably to 
Tonkin or Bac-ky, Annam or Trung-ky, and Cochinchina or Nam-ky throughout the text. The use of the 
administrative terms imposed by the French does not imply a recognition of the French divisions of 
Vietnam, but simply reflects the terminology which was current during the colonial period.
7Introduction
The Double Myth
Nguyen Ai Quoc, introduced to the world as Ho Chi Minh in 1945, became the symbol of 
Vietnamese communism in the years after he took power as his country’s first president. 
During the American war with Vietnam he came to represent the treacherous ‘double-face’ 
of Asian communism -- to Lyndon Johnson Ho Chi Minh was his personal enemy. This 
persona was in part the creation of Cold W ar propaganda, which portrayed Ho as a power- 
hungry zealot who used and then betrayed non-communist nationalists.1 Ho is still held 
personally responsible by many overseas Vietnamese for all the suffering which war and 
communism brought to Vietnam.
This anti-communist portrait of Ho Chi Minh is the mirror image of the myth fostered by 
the Vietnamese communists: Ho as the wise and prescient father of independent Vietnam, 
a monk-like figure who devoted his life to his nation. After 1945 the Vietnamese 
communists began to use Ho Chi Minh as a device to create a party history o f  unity and 
impeccable decision-making. At the outset Ho himself seems to have encouraged his 
portrayal as an austere nationalist patriot (accurate up to a point). This use o f Ho as a 
legitimizing and unifying figure became more marked after 1947, when it became clear that 
the French were going to fight for their colony and that the US government questioned the 
Viet M inh’s nationalism. The preface o f a Ho Chi Minh biography which appeared in 
Paris in 1949 referred to him as a ‘symbol o f popular hopes’; his heart was said to ‘beat in 
the same rhythym as the heart o f the people’. His teachings were full of Tofity and 
humanitarian concepts’; at the same time they were ‘extremely simple’.2 Yet a Nhan Dan 
article o f 25 March 1951 made an important distinction regarding H o’s role. It described 
President Ho as ‘the soul o f the Vietnamese revolution and the Vietnamese resistance,’ 
while referring to Truong Chinh, then leader of the communist party, as the revolution’s, 
‘builder and commander’.3
1 This characterization is in part drawn from the story of Ho Chi Minh’s supposed betrayal of 
nationalist leader Phan Boi Chau in 1925. I discuss this episode in Chapter III.
2 Tran Ngoc Danh, Tieu-su Ho Chu Tich (The Biography o f Chairman Ho), (Paris: Chi Hoi Lien-Viet 
tai Phap, 1949), p. 6.
3 Cited in Thai Quang Trung, Collective Leadership and Factionalism, (Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, Singapore, 1985), p. 20.
By 1964, when the Vietnamese communists were being drawn deeper into confrontation 
with the USA, Ho Chi M inh’s role as a unifying figure in party history became especially 
important. As we now know, 1963 was marked by considerable tension within the party 
over the correct international line to pursue. So the February 1964 article in Nghien Cuu 
Lich Su (Historical Research) which emphasized Nguyen Ai Quoc’s 1930 role as the 
unifier o f the communist party carried an important message. The message was that 
compromise and unity are valued political virtues, endorsed and personified by Ho Chi 
Minh.4 At the same time, the party was presenting itself as inherently infallible, thanks to 
the wisdom o f Ho Chi Minh. Ironically, by 1964 Ho’s personal political authority may 
well have been much reduced.3 In 1973, when a fifth edition of Truong Chinh’s biography 
o f ‘Chairman H o’ appeared, it included a long section on Ho Chi M inh’s ‘revolutionary 
policy’ and another on his ‘virtue and conduct’.6 But it would not be until the collapse of 
the Soviet bloc in 1989 that the Vietnamese would make an effort to systematize ‘Ho Chi 
Minh Thought’ as part o f their guiding ideology.
Review o f  the Literature
Both stereotypes o f Ho Chi Minh — Machiavellian apparatchik or nationalist saint — have 
in my view become deadweights which impede the search for the historical figure. Most 
writers on Vietnamese communism, for example, exaggerate Ho’s early importance within 
the international communist brotherhood. Jean Lacouture, whose 1967 biography has been 
until recently the standard work by a sympathetic author, pictures Quoc as an intimate of 
French leftist intellectuals such as Boris Souvarine.7 Yet French and Russian documents 
tend to present Ho as a supplicant in these relationships. Souvarine, moreover, may not 
have had much contact with Ho until 1923, as he spent very little time in France after his 
imprisonment in 1920 and 1921, until his removal from the French party in 1924.8 William 
Duiker describes Ho as ‘the recognized spokesman for the Eastern question and for 
increased attention to the problems of the peasantry’ by the close o f the Fifth Comintern
4 Nguyen Nghia, ‘Cong cuoc hop nhat cac to chuc cong san dau tien o Viet-Namva vai tro cua dong chi 
Nguyen Ai Quoc’ [‘The Unification of the First Communist Organizations in Vietnam and the role of 
Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc], NCLS, no. 59, February 1964.
5 Judith Stowe, ‘Revisionism in Vietnam’, paper for AAS Conference, Washington DC, March 1998; 
author’s conversation with Hoang Minh Chinh, Feb. 1995: Chinh claims that by 1963 Ho Chi Minh 
had been made politically ineffective (bi vo hieu hoa).
6 Truong Chinh, Ho Chu Tich, Lanh Tu Kinh Yeu Cua Giai Cap Cong Nhan va Nhan Dan Viet-Nam 
[Chairman Ho: Beloved Leader o f the Workers and People o f Viet Nam], (Hanoi: N.X.B. Su that, 
1973),p. 66.
7 Jean Lacouture, Ho ChiMinh, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 33.
8 Branko Lazitch, A Biographical Dictionary o f the Comintern, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 
1973), p. 378.
9Congress in 1924.9 He was, however, a rather junior spokesman on colonial issues, who 
did not even represent an Asian communist party. Charles McLane suggests that after his 
return to Moscow from China in 1927, Quoc may have reviewed policy for Southeast Asia 
with Comintern leaders, ‘conceivably even with Stalin h im self.10 Yet there is no evidence 
that Quoc did more than deliver a report to the Krestintem and confer with his superiors in 
the Executive Committee during his 1927 stay in Moscow. Charles Fenn claims that Ho 
was one of two delegates to the Seventh Comintern Congress in 1935 who supported the 
popular front strategy.11 In fact Ho did not have a vote at the Congress, and the policy had 
been carefully prepared in advance by Georgy Dimitrov, with Stalin’s support. Quoc’s 
early effectiveness as a propagandist is also sometimes exaggerated. An official biography, 
printed in the party paper Nhan Dan on 17 May 1970, the year after his death, claimed 
that the anti-colonial newspaper Le Paria which he edited in Paris had ‘created a 
revolutionary gale which swept through Indochina and many other countries’. This is in 
my view a vast overstatement o f the role which Paria played in the early twenties.
Anti-communist writers tend to accept a variant o f this view of Nguyen Ai Quoc’s 
influence. Ton That Thien in his essay, ‘Truths and Lies: Ho Chi M inh’s Secret 1923 
Voyage to Russia and his Disgrace in the Comintern’, expresses no doubt about Quoc’s 
importance within communist circles. He maintains that a speech by Quoc at the Second 
Congress o f the French Communist Party (FCP) in 1922 so impressed the Comintern agent 
Dmitry Manuilsky, that Quoc was invited on the spot to prepare himself to participate in 
the Fifth Comintern Congress in Moscow.12 The reality, as represented by documents in 
the French and Comintern archives, was a bit more complicated. As I will show in Chapter 
II, Quoc had planned to spend only three months in Moscow when he first arrived, and did 
not expect to attend the 1924 Fifth Congress. According to Lacouture, Quoc attended an 
important Anti-imperialist Congress in Brussels early in 1928, where he is said to have 
mingled with Nehru and other nationalist leaders.13 However, that meeting was held in 
February 1927 when Quoc was still in Canton. On close inspection, it is interesting to see 
how many times Quoc (and later Ho Chi Minh) is credited for deeds which he was not in a 
position to have accomplished, either because he was not present or was not sufficiently 
influential.
9 William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh, (Hyperion: New York, 2000), p. 102.
10 Charles B. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, An Exploration o f Eastern Policy under 
Lenin and Stalin, (Princeton: Princeton Univ., 1966), p. 137.
11 Charles Fenn, Ho Chi Minh, (New York: Charles Scribner’s, 1973), p. 59.
12 Ton That Thien, ‘ Verites et mensonges: le voyage clandestin de Ho Chi Minh en Russie en 1923 etsa 
disgrace Au Komintern en 1933-1939 in Ho Chi Minh, L Homme et son heritage, (Paris: La Voie 
nouvelle, 1990), pp. 51-2.
13 Lacouture, op. cit., p. 48.
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One of the most curious of these cases is the attribution to Nguyen Ai Quoc o f an essay 
entitled ‘The Party’s Military W ork among the Peasants’ made in the 1970 re-edition of 
the Comintern manual, Armed Insurrection. The original was published by the Comintern 
in June 1929 under the pseudonym A. Neuberg, although an earlier work with a similar 
title by Alfred Langer had been published in 1928 in Germany. Scholars such as William 
Duiker and Huynh Kim Khanh have used this essay to explain Quoc’s views on the 
peasantry and the Nghe Tinh uprising o f 1930-31.14 In the introduction to the 1970 
reprint, Erich Wollenberg, who claims to be one o f the original authors, identifies Ho as the 
author o f the final chapter, on peasant insurrection.15 Wollenberg also claims that it was 
the Red Army Staff which sent Quoc to China in 1924. This identification o f Quoc as a 
specialist in military affairs occurs from time to time in western publications, but is not 
confirmed by any documentary evidence that I have seen. Within the Comintern he 
worked as a translator, propagandist and specialist in political mobilization. When he 
returned from China to Moscow in June 1927 he reported on the peasant movement in 
Guangdong province, but in a concrete, descriptive manner quite unlike the critical style o f 
the later essay. In Berlin in 1928 he also composed a popularized account o f Peng Pai’s 
peasant movement. But he was not present in China during the Nanchang uprising, the 
Hai-Lufeng soviets or the Canton insurrection, all o f which are analyzed in the 1929 essay. 
According to Comintern documents, the Military Commission o f the Comintern’s Eastern 
Secretariat assigned the Lithuanian A. Gailis (known as Tom when he worked in China) 
and another man, Y. Zhigur, who had worked in military intelligence in southern China 
from 1926-7, to study the problem o f tactics for an armed insurrection. That decision was 
made at a meeting on 22 March 1928, when Quoc was in Berlin.16 Gailis’s book on this 
topic was being printed as o f 20 June 1929 in Moscow.17 Thus the 1970 claim that Quoc 
authored the final essay would seem to have been an attempt to increase his posthumous 
reputation as a communist theoretician. (The essay in fact presents a standard Comintern 
view of 1928, and while it is not unlikely that Quoc shared many o f its ideas, he would 
hardly have been in a position to take such an authoritative tone on the failings o f  the 
Chinese party.)
14 William Duiker, The Communist Road to Power In Vietnam , (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1996 
ed.), pp. 21-23; Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism: 1925-1945, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ., 
1982), p. 168-170.
15 A. Neuberg, Armed Insurrection, (London: NLB, 1970), trans. By Quentin Hoare from the German 
edition of 1928 and French edition of 1931.
16Titarenko, Leutner et al., VKP, Komintern IKitai (dokumenti), [The Soviet Communist Party, the 
Comintern and China], (Documents), vol. Ill 1927-1931, part 1), (Moscow: Russian Center, 1999), 
p.355, Protocol of a Meeting of the Eastern Secretariat’s Military Commission.
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Early western biographies of Ho ( e.g. Lacouture, Fenn) were necessarily impressionistic, 
due to the lack o f sources. Ho himself made a fetish o f covering up his past. The 
biographical information he supplied over the years amounts to a variety of anecdotes and 
conflicting dates rather than a real record of his life. The biography published in Paris in 
1949, which first appeared in Chinese, was printed in later Vietnamese editions under the 
title, Nhung Mau Chuyen ve doi hoat dong cua Ho Chu Tick [Glimpses o f  Chairman H o ’s 
Life] . Although the author’s name is given as Tran Dan Tien, it is believed, in fact, to be 
an autobiography.18 But the book is constructed as a series o f edifying vignettes recalled 
by his comrades, with a loose approach to dates. While it is based on fact, its omissions, 
embellishments and insistence on Nguyen Ai Quoc’s proletarian virtue make it an element 
in the construction o f his myth rather than a serious record. A  Russian biography by 
Yevgeny Kobelev is the work o f a publicist rather than a scholar.19 It draws heavily on the 
writing o f Vietnamese biographer Hong Ha, who must also be classified as a publicist, 
given his casual attitude towards sources.20
Biographical information on Ho’s youth and his first years in Paris, uncovered in the 
French archives by Nguyen The Anh, Thu Trang Gaspard, and Daniel Hemery since the 
publication o f Lacouture’s work, has added to our appreciation o f the origins o f H o’s 
nationalism.21 In particular, Hemery’s 1992 article, ‘Jeunesse d ’un colonise, genese 
d ’un exil, Ho Chi Minh jusqu’en 1911’ shows the importance o f his father’s career and 
disgrace as a mandarin in the young Ho’s development. The most recent biography, 
however, a 577 page work by William Duiker, fails to take into account Hemery’s 
research. Duiker follows the basic narrative o f H o’s life presented in Hanoi publications. 
While he includes countervailing views from time to time and uses some Comintern 
documents, he echoes Kobelev in over-stressing H o’s importance within the Comintern. 
He does not make use o f newly available information on Comintern structures.
17 Titarenko et. al., op. cit, p.572-574, Letter from Berzin and Sudakov to Shiffes.
18 Tran Dan Tien, Nhung mau chuyen ve doi hoat dong cua Ho Chu Tick, (Hanoi: NXB Chinh tri Quoc 
Gia, 1994). The attribution of the 1949 Paris edition to Tran Ngoc Danh, a Moscow-trained militant, is 
curious. As Danh was expelled from the ICP in 1949, the attribution may have been a way of quelling 
rumours of dissent within the party.
19 Yevgeny Kobelev, Ho Chi Minh, (Moscow: Progress, 1989), trans. from 1983 Russian edition.
20 Hong Ha, Ho Chi Minh v Strane Sovetov [Ho Chi Minh in the Land o f Soviets], (Moscow: Polit. 
Literatury, 1986); trans. from Vietnamese edition titled, Ho Chi Minh tren dat nuoc Lenin [HCM in the 
Land o f Lenin], (Hanoi: NXB Thanh Nien, 1980).
21 See Nguyen The Anh, ‘How Did Ho Chi Minh Become a Proletarian? Reality and Legend,’ Asian 
Affairs, vol. 16, part II; Thu Trang Gaspard, Ho Chi Minh a Paris (1917-1923), (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
1992); and Daniel Hemery, ‘Jeunesse d’un colonise, genese d’un exil, etc.’, Appproches Asie, no. 11, 
1992.
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Other aspects o f the study o f Vietnamese communism have, in the West, been less subject 
to myth-making than the career of Ho Chi Minh. There have been several serious western 
studies of its orig ins,, as well as two studies o f the intellectual origins o f Vietnamese 
radicalism.22 One work which concentrates on the Comintern role is Charles M cLane’s 
1966 book, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, An Exploration o f  Eastern Policy under 
Lenin and Stalin,23 McLane examines both the rhetoric o f support for revolution and the 
actual evidence o f Comintern involvement. Within the limitations o f the materials 
available in the 1960s, mainly Comintern publications such as the weekly International 
Press Correspondence (Inprecor), as well as Soviet journals and academic works, he does 
a careful job o f evaluating the Comintern’s role. (He is not able to provide much detail of 
the internal workings o f the Vietnamese party, as he uses neither Vietnamese language 
materials nor the French archives.)
McLane’s analysis holds up better for the period up to 1930-1 than for the following years, 
perhaps because until 1928 debates at Comintern meetings were published almost in full. 
He misconstrues greater secrecy in the Comintern after 1930 as inaction in the East. 
Moreover, M cLane’s discussion of the Popular Front era from 1936 is somewhat erratic: he 
fails to differentiate the Trotskyist-oriented front established in 1933-34 from the later 
‘United Democratic Front’, which the Vietnamese began to implement in 1937 (with only 
moderate success). A more coherent account o f the internal skirmishing which 
accompanied the creation of the latter front is Daniel Hemery’s Revolutionnaires 
vietnamiens etpouvoir colonial en Indochine,24 a well-documented study o f southern 
Vietnamese radical politics from 1932-1937.
In addition to his biography, Duiker has written two works which explore the development 
o f Vietnamese communism: a monograph, The Comintern and Vietnamese Communism, 
and The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam?5 Both o f these make use of the French 
colonial archives, but were too early to take advantage of the documents now available in 
Moscow. The latter book, updated in 1996, gives a clear outline of the main events in Ho’s 
evolution as a communist, but lacks a full analysis o f the development of Comintern policy 
from 1920 to 1930.
22 David Marr, Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945, (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1971) and Hue-Tam Ho 
Tai, Radicalism and the Origins o f the Vietnamese Revolution, (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard, 1992).
23 Charles B. McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, An Exploration o f Eastern Policy under 
Lenin and Stalin, (Princeton: Princeton Univ., 1966).
24 Daniel Hemery, Revolutionnaires vietnamiens et pouvoir colonial en indochine, (Paris: Francois 
Maspero, 1975).
25 William Duiker, The Comintern and Vietnamese Communism, (Athens: Ohio Univ., 1975), and op. 
cit.
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Huynh Kim Khanh’s Vietnamese Communism: 1925-1945, looks at a shorter period in 
more depth25. While somewhat dated now, it also incorporates material from the French 
archives and Hanoi publications. Khanh created the image o f Vietnamese communism as a 
hybrid plant, with communism grafted onto the stock of Vietnamese nationalism. He- 
provides the first documented description o f Nguyen Ai Quoc’s eclipse between 1931 and 
1938, a phenomenon which is still disputed by other writers such as Ton That Thien, who 
reject the idea that anyone out o f Comintern favour could have survived Stalin’s purges in 
Moscow.27 (Thien relies heavily on Hong Ha, without acknowledging Hanoi’s interest in 
maintaining the myth o f communist infallibility.) A drawback of Khanh’s book is that he 
makes too rigid a distinction between Moscow-trained ‘proletarian’ communists and what 
he sees as the local brand o f revolutionary nationalists. His allegation that from 1935 until 
1941 ‘the strategies, tactics and revolutionary activities o f the ICP were decided more often 
by non-Vietnamese communists than by the Vietnamese revolutionaries’28 is not supported 
by Comintern evidence.
The Primary Sources
With the opening of the archives o f the Communist International (Comintern) in 1992, it 
has become possible to sketch in more of the facts of the pre-1945 period in H o’s career. 
My thesis covers his years o f political activism, from 1919 when he first emerged in Paris 
using his pseudonym, Nguyen Ai Quoc (Nguyen the Patriot); to 1941, when Vietnamese 
contacts with the Comintern effectively ended. It is based on archival research in what 
was formerly the Institute o f Marxism-Leninism in Moscow, now the Center for the 
Preservation and Study o f Documents o f Modem History, as well as research in the Centre 
d ’Archives d’Outre-Mer in Aix-en-Provence. I have limited my study to what we can 
discover in these documents, without trying to create a seamless narrative. I augment these 
archival sources with Vietnamese memoirs and, where possibile, compare the official 
Vietnamese version o f communist party documents with those versions available in the 
Russian and French archives. It should be noted that for the period up to 1941, with the 
exception o f memoirs, almost all the communist party documents in the Vietnamese 
archives and those reprinted in Van Kien Dang [Documents o f  Party History] and Ho Chi
26 Huynh Kim Khanh, op. cit.
27 Ton That Thien, op. cit., pp. 67-72. Thien also uses two anecdotes from the memoirs of former 
Comintern staff members which refer to Nguyen Ai Quoc, but neither of them is accurate in my 
opinion.
28 Huynh Kim Khanh, op. cit., p. 188.
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Minh Toan Tap [Ho Chi M inh’s Collected Works] have been collected from the French and 
Russian archives. (See Bibliography for details.)
The most important documents on Vietnam in the Russian Center Archives are the record 
series o f various secretariats and committees o f the Comintern, collection no. 495. From 
1920 to 1935-6, the main repository o f documents on Vietnam is the record series (opis) of 
the Eastern Secretariat, no. 154. This body was formed in a March 1926 reorganization to 
replace the Eastern Section (Vostochnyi Otdel), but the 495/154 series incorporates 
documents from both bodies. After the Seventh Comintern Congress, personal secretariats 
replaced those organized on a geographical basis. Thus Vietnamese documents from 1936 
to 1940 can be found in the record series o f Georgy Dimitrov’s Secretariat, no. 74, and 
Dmitry Manuilsky’s, no. 10a. I had the good fortune to do preliminary research in the 
Moscow archives in 1992 and again in early 1994, before the files o f Manuilsky’s and 
Dimitrov’s Secretariats were closed to researchers at the end of that year.
In addition, I have made use o f the collections of some of the organizations which worked 
parallel to the Comintern, such as the Krestintem and the Profintem. There are also 
separate record series for individual Congresses and Plenary Sessions. Comintern 
personnel files for Vietnam are kept in a special inventory (201), but these are only 
available on special request, which may well be refused. (I obtained some biographical 
information on Vietnamese communists from this inventory in 1992.) A valuable source on 
the Comintern in China are the five volumes o f documents jointly published in Russian and 
German editions by the Russian Center, the Institute o f the Far East in Moscow, and the 
Free University o f Berlin. These documents have been selected from the Comintern and 
Soviet party archives. They cover the years 1920 to 1931, and further volumes are 
planned. (See Bibliography for full information.) The book Organizational Structures o f  
the Comintern (in Russian) by Grant Adibekov et.al. is another useful source on the 
personnel and dates of the ever-changing committees within the Comintern bureaucracy.
One would like to think that it is now possible to sweep away the politicized history and 
propaganda associated with the name of Nguyen Ai Quoc. But every document presents its 
own new problems o f interpretation. On the positive side, the events mentioned by the 
Comintern documents are often confirmed or illuminated by documents in the French 
archives. But on the other hand, the Comintern documents are not always easy to identify 
in terms o f author, point o f origin or date. Party members writing from the field back to 
Moscow, Nguyen Ai Quoc in particular, tried when possible to avoid using names in their
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reports. Sometimes it is possible to tell both when a document was written and when it was 
received in Moscow, but this is by no means always the case.
Then there is the issue, not unique to Russia, o f which documents are being made available 
to researchers. There is no way o f knowing how much documentary material remains in 
classified files which once belonged to the NKVD-controlled departments within the 
Comintern. It would be over-confident to claim, based on files currently available in 
Moscow, that ‘we now know’ the full truth o f the Comintern’s relations with the 
Vietnamese communists. We have no documentary evidence, for example, o f a Comintern 
investigation into Nguyen Ai Quoc’s actions in China up to his 1931 arrest. Yet we know 
from collateral documents that he was excluded from the 1935 Seventh Comintern 
Congress and that he was ‘politically inactive’ during his 1934-38 stay in Moscow. Thus 
one can surmise that there was some sort o f investigation and that somewhere a classified 
record o f the proceedings exists. In his own statements to the Comintern Nguyen Ai Quoc 
gave partial, sometimes contradictory, information about his background. On enrolling in 
the International Lenin School in 1934, for example, he supplied the minimum o f facts, 
listing his professional speciality as, ‘none’. In 1938 he listed his birthdate as 1903 on a 
biographical questionnaire, taking approximately ten years off his age.29
The organization o f the French colonial archives in Aix-en-Provence has been described in 
many other works. However, the collection o f the Service de Protection du Corps 
Expeditionnaire (SPCE) has been less used than some of the others (SLOTFOM and GGI), 
in part because many o f its files have only been declassified in the 1990s. The SPCE kept 
files, mostly based on Surete documents, on individual communists and nationalists. This 
material includes several valuable ‘declarations’ or confessions made to the French police 
by imprisoned communists, as well as the reports o f police informers. While both types o f 
source need to be treated with scepticism, I have opted to make use o f them. One can take 
advantage o f  the candour which disillusioned communists sometimes demonstrated when 
captured by the French and often it is possible to cross-check versions o f events from two 
different confessions. This is especially true in 1930 and 1931, when dissension over 
tactics in the communist party seems to have reached an acute level. As for paid 
informers, they may well exaggerate the importance of their contacts and inside knowledge 
to their employers. But those who retained the trust o f the Surete over a number o f years 
must have been judged to have supplied more accurate information than otherwise.
29 His personnel forms are in 495/201/1. The most likely date for his birth is 1892 or 1893, supplied by
his sister when she was questioned by the French in 1920. (SPCE 364, Note conf. 711, Hue, 7 May
1920.) Ho’s official Hanoi birthdate is 1890.
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One of the most successful Surete informers, Nguyen Cong Vien aka Lam Due Thu, 
proved his worth by not only supplying monthly reports on Quoc’s activities in Canton 
from early 1925 onwards, but by also frequently passing on original documents and letters. 
Much of the value o f his reports for historians derives from the fact that he was covering 
relationships among communists and non-communists which, by the 1950s, had become 
politically dangerous to both sides, and thus were rarely even hinted at by either left or 
right. He presents a picture which is quite different from the Cold War-era view of rigid 
divisions between communists and non-communist activists in southern China in the 
1920s.
Thesis Goal and Structure
The object of this study is not to destroy Nguyen Ai Quoc’s reputation, but to define, in as 
factual a way as possible, what he actually did accomplish in his years with the Comintern. 
I have chosen to focus on his role in transmitting communist doctrine to Vietnam because 
his career is the connecting thread of Vietnam’s relationship to the Comintern. My study 
covers a full cycle in this relationship, from the period when the Comintern first attempted 
to foster nationalist revolutions in the colonies, through the era o f internationalist class 
struggle from roughly 1928 to 1935, and back to an emphasis on nationalist resistance at 
the start o f World W ar II. Quoc’s years o f greatest influence were those when nationalist 
united fronts were the order o f the day. He spent much of the 1930s in the political 
wilderness, however, and for this reason I will devote some space to those leaders who 
eclipsed his authority, including Tran Phu, Ha Huy Tap, Tran Van Giau, Le Hong Phong, 
and Nguyen Van Cu. All except Nguyen Van Cu studied in Moscow. In order to better 
understand the interplay between Moscow’s policies and events in Vietnam, I have tried to 
re-examine some o f the key debates and documents which formed Comintern policy for 
colonial countries. The most important o f these was the discussion of Lenin’s Theses on 
National and Colonial Questions in 1920, the year that Nguyen Ai Quoc joined the French 
Communist Party. Another key debate took place from 1928 to 1929, one which the 
literature on Vietnamese communism generally misinterprets. This concerned the change 
to more radical policies for the world communist movement, which overrode the tactics for 
colonial countries which Lenin had set out in 1920. In order to analyze the radicalization 
o f Vietnamese communism in the late twenties, it is necessary to establish the chronology 
o f the Comintern’s switch to the ‘class-against-c lass’ polices of the so-called ‘Third 
Period’ of post-1918 capitalism.
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In Chapter I (1919 to mid-1923), I address the problem of who Nguyen Ai Quoc actually 
was when he turned to communism in Paris. It seems important to clear away some o f the 
misapprehensions created by later portrayals o f Quoc as a simple working man when he 
first came to the Surete’s notice. His family ties and friendships had a great influence on 
his political career. Chapter II (late 1923-to late 1924) covers his arrival in Moscow to 
attend a peasant conference and his subsequent assignment to work in Canton. I use this 
chapter to discuss the development o f Comintern policies for colonial countries, which 
grew out o f Lenin’s 1920 Theses on National and Colonial Questions. Chapter III 
(November 1924 to m id-1927) tells the story o f Quoc’s work in Canton with the CCP- 
GMD united front, and the beginnings o f the Vietnamese communist movement in the 
Thanh Nien training courses.
Chapter IV (mid-1927 to the end o f 1929) covers the change o f policy which began at the 
Comintern’s Sixth Congress in the summer o f 1928, and which was cemented by the 
removal o f Bukharin and his allies from the Comintern by the summer of 1929. Nguyen Ai 
Quoc’s role in these years is far from clear, but is perhaps less central than has often been 
assumed. For this reason I discuss some of the other influences on Vietnamese 
communism which came into play at this time, in particular the role o f the Nanyang 
Committee o f the Chinese Communist Party. In Chapter V (1930 to mid-1931) I cover the 
founding o f the Vietnamese Communist Party and Nguyen Ai Quoc’s role in reorganizing 
the communist movements in Malaya and Thailand. His relation to the political upheaval 
o f 1930-31, in particular the Nghe Tinh Soviet movement, is one o f the main issues 
discussed in this section.
Chapter VI (mid-1931 to autumn o f  1938) covers the longest period. This was a period 
when Quoc remained outside the leadership o f the Vietnamese party. It stretches from his 
1931 arrest in Hongkong and his return to Moscow in 1934, to his return to political 
activity in the autumn of 1938. Important events in the life of both the Vietnamese party 
and the Comintern occurred in the intervening years, so I give some space to the continued 
development o f the relationship between the Comintern and the Vietnamese communists, 
as well as to the change of policy which occurred at the Seventh Congress in 1935.
Chapter VII, the final chapter (autumn o f 1938 to the end of 1941), is the story o f Quoc’s 
efforts to regain his leadership o f the Indochinese Communist Party. In this chapter I 
discuss the nature o f the alliance between the Chinese and Soviet governments from 1938 
to the summer o f 1941, as well as the political developments within Vietnam which led to 
the uprisings in the autumn of 1940, both in north and south Vietnam. The coalition
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between nationalist and communist Vietnamese created in Guangxi province in 1941 and 
the acceptance o f that policy at the ICP’s Eighth Plenum that May are the final topics of 
this chapter. Although the Comintern would continue to exist until 1943, after 1941 it no 
longer had a real guiding role in Vietnamese communism.
CHAPTER I
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Paris: The Emergence of Nguyen Ai Quoc (1919 -  1923)
1. 1919: The Path to the Paris Peace Conference
In the summer o f 1919 the French security police started sending urgent appeals for 
information to their colonial administration in Hanoi.1 A mystery agitator had appeared in 
Paris, just as France was catching its breath after four gruelling years o f war. He seemed to 
have a wide circle o f acquaintances among the disparate community o f Vietnamese — 
intellectuals as well as workers and soldiers conscripted from Indochina during the war.
He was a complete enigma: no one had any idea who he was or where he had sprung from. 
His name could not be found among the immigration records for entering Indochinese. 
While the relentless security police, the Surete Generate, were awaiting information from 
Indochina, the Ministry o f Colonies wasted no time in assigning its own agents to 
investigate the newcomer to the Paris political scene.
He signed himself ‘Nguyen Ai Quoc ', ‘Nguyen the Patriot’, or literally, ‘Nguyen who loves 
his country’, usually with the designation, ‘for the Group of Vietnamese Patriots’. He 
behaved with considerable aplomb for a young man who could not have been more than 30 
-  he called unannounced on deputies to the French parliament, delegations to the Paris 
Peace Conference and newspaper editors. In September 1919 no less a dignitary than the 
Governor General o f Indochina, Albert Sarraut, recently returned from the colony, gave 
him an audience.2
What was most shocking to the French authorities was his message. He was sending out an 
official-sounding petition, ‘The Demands of the Vietnamese People’ to participants in the 
Peace Conference, a political forum o f 27 delegations which was to carve out a new world 
order. Although very few non-French participants would have known precisely where 
Vietnam was, it seems that many delegations at least took the time to acknowledge receipt 
o f the petition. An aide to Woodrow W ilson’s representative, Colonel House, sent a polite 
note on June 19 to that effect, as did a Nicaraguan diplomat.3 The Peace Conference had 
attracted a fringe o f political activists from around the world, from Ireland to Korea, all 
promoting their own claim to nationhood. Although the French were surprised by the 
Vietnamese initiative, it is not difficult to see why the Vietnamese nationalists thought the
1 AOM, SPCE 364, e.g. tel. officiel, Saigon, le 22 juillet 1919/Chef Surete a Directeur S.G., Hanoi.
2 AOM, SPCE 364, envoi 25 S.R., 19 janvier 1920, NAQ letter of 7 Sept. 1919 to Sarraut.
3 AOM, SPCE 364, envoi no. 270 S.R. Paris du 29 novembre 1921 (cumulative report).
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time for change had come. The Russian and Habsburg empires had already crumbled; 
President Wilson was promising an end to the old world o f secret diplomacy, in which 
European royalty and heads o f state could decide the fates o f distant peoples.
The Vietnamese Demands called on the victorious Great Powers to honour their promise of 
a new era o f Taw and justice’ for subject peoples. They appeared in a brief article on page 
3 of the socialist newspaper VHumanite on 18 June. From our vantage point, these 
demands appear to have been far from extremist. They called for:
1. General amnesty for all native political prisoners;
2. Reform o f Indochinese justice, by granting the natives the same judicial guarantees 
enjoyed by Europeans;
3. Freedom of press and opinion;
4. Freedom o f association;
5. Freedom of emigration and foreign travel;
6. Freedom o f instruction and the creation in all provinces o f technical and professional 
schools for indigenous people;
7. Replacement o f rule by decree by rule by law;
8. Election o f a permanent Vietnamese delegation to the French Parliament, to keep it 
informed o f the wishes o f indigenous people.
They were signed, ‘for the Group of Vietnamese Patriots, Nguyen Ai Quoc’.
As soon became clear, the French Republic and its colonial authorities had no thought of 
renouncing their power over the lives o f Algerians, Cambodians or Vietnamese. After a 
war which had drained the treasury and laid waste much o f northern France, the resources 
o f the colonies would play a larger role than ever in French economic planning. The 
French were thus caught off balance by the audacity of this native, one o f their own 
subjects, who had appeared so unexpectedly in the midst o f their victory celebrations. It 
did not seem to occur to them to treat his appeal for Vietnamese rights as anything other 
than subversion. They referred to it in their bureaucratic communications as ‘libel’.4 They 
were concerned enough to stake out his residence and tail him throughout Paris for the rest 
o f 1919 and off-and-on until 1923, as their reports in the French Overseas Archives amply 
demonstrate. In reaction to the beginning o f the campaign for Vietnamese rights in June, 
the body overseeing Vietnamese troops in France set up a Service de Renseignements
4 AOM, SPCE 364, Pierre Guesde, note pour m. le Ministre, piece annexe no. 2, Paris le 12 octobre 
1920
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politques, ( S.R.), under Pierre A rnoux.5 Their informers infiltrated Nguyen Ai Quoc’s 
circle of acquaintances and reported on his conversations.6 They confiscated letters and 
articles which he tried to send to Vietnam. In doing so, they convinced the youthful 
activist that the only way to deal with the colonial power was by subterfuge.
By the autumn o f 1919, French intelligence gathering was producing an initial picture o f 
the mysterious Vietnamese. A cable sent from Hanoi to regional centers on 8 September 
1919 passed along the following, only partially accurate, information from the Parisian 
police:
Nguyen Ai Quoc claims to be from Nghe A n’s Nam Dan region, lives with Phan 
Van Truong, seems to have completed studies in England, where he lived for ten 
years, runs a group o f Vietnamese patriots in existence for a long time but with no 
legal basis, has replaced Phan Van Truong and Phan Chu Trinh in this function.
Please communicate information you may possess or gather on this native.7
Another Vietnamese informer in Paris code named ‘Edouard’ provided the clue that Quoc’s 
real name was Nguyen Van Thanh, which was close to the name he had received from his 
father on reaching maturity: Nguyen Tat Thanh, ‘Nguyen who will succeed’. But the rest 
of what Edouard told the police turned out to be disinformation, probably spread by Quoc 
himself. (His claims that Quoc came from Danang and lived on money provided by his 
wealthy family proved to be false.)8 By December 1919 the French had mounted a daily 
watch on number 6 Villa des Gobelins. This was an apartment on a quiet, residential cul- 
de-sac in southeastern Paris, where the man calling himself Quoc had been living with the 
lawyer Phan Van Truong and the exiled scholar Phan Chu Trinh.
In Vietnamese anti-colonial circles these two men were already respected figures, even 
venerated in Trinh’s case. Phan Van Truong had been imprisoned at the outset o f the war 
in 1914, on charges o f coordinating support for anti-French uprisings in Indochina. Phan 
Chu Trinh was also implicated in these plots and contacts with the Germans, for which he 
was held in the Cherche-Midi Prison in central Paris. The charges against the two men had 
to be dropped for lack o f evidence after a year, when the key Vietnamese witness suffered 
or staged a mental breakdown and entirely ceased speaking.9 But at least one French 
official continued to believe in their guilt.i0 In Phan Van Truong’s case, this belief may
5 See Historique de AOM, SLOTFOM in C.A.O.M.
6 These reports form the bulk of AOM, SPCE files 364 and 365
7 AOM, SPCE 364, tel. officiel Hanoi 8 septembre 1919, no. 869 S.G.
8 AOM, SPCE 364, S.R. decembre 1919, Paris
9 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, ‘Les Dossiers rapportant a la question Allemagne’.
10 AOM, SPCE 364, 28 decembre 1920: Pierre Guesde felt it was ‘regrettable’ that the case ended in 
a non-lieu.
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have stemmed from the reputation which his family had as hard core rebels. Two of his 
brothers had been sentenced to exile and hard labour for their involvement in the 1913 
bombing plot which killed two French army commanders in Tonkin. (The plot was one of 
several attributed to Phan Boi Chau’s partisans around this time.) Truong’s trips to England 
in 1913, where he was believed to have been in contact with a Joseph Thanh, an emissary 
o f the royal pretender Cuong De, contributed to the suspicion.11 The French also feared 
Truong’s formidable intellect -  trained as an interpreter in Hanoi, he had mastered the art 
o f blistering political argument during his legal studies in Paris.
Phan Chu Trinh had come to Paris in 1911 after being amnestied for his purported role in 
encouraging the 1908 tax revolts in Central Vietnam. He had spent much o f his first years 
in Paris working to release his comrades still in prison on Poulo Condor. His Complete 
Account o f  the Peasants ’ Uprising in the Central Region, an expose o f the heavy-handed 
French reaction to the revolt, had been translated into French by Commander Jules Roux. 
(Roux, an active socialist, intervened on Trinh’s behalf during his imprisonment.)12 The 
French were wary o f Phan Chu Trinh’s influence among the forty-odd Vietnamese students 
in pre-war Paris, and had hoped to isolate him from the ‘reformist’ Asians who used to 
gather in the Latin quarter.13 Their efforts failed, however. In 1912 Trinh and Phan Van 
Truong started a Vietnamese club which met in cafes and Chinese restaurants in 
Montparnasse. They may have indulged in little more than exile talk -  Trinh always 
maintained his innocence with regard to the anti-French conspiracies of Phan Boi Chau and 
Cuong De. To prove his loyalty he had even handed over to the Ministry o f Colonies a 
letter he received from Cuong De in 1913.14 The testimony against him could have been 
fabricated by the military government then administering Paris. But his own interpreter 
testified in 1915 that ‘Phan Chu Trinh received funding directly from Germany from the 
German government, which was brought to him by two emissaries o f Cuong De, Truong 
Duy Toan and Do Van Y .’ 15 Had an uprising occurred in Vietnam, the Germans were 
expected to contribute more funding via their consuls in China, the informer said. One 
suspects, though, that the characterization o f Trinh as a talker and writer rather than as an 
organizer of plots was closer to the truth o f the matter. The Administrative Director of the 
Indochinese Instruction Group in Paris, o f which Phan Chu Trinh was formally part, made 
the following prophetic comment in a report to his superiors: ‘One might ask what would
11 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, Gouvernement Militaire de Paris, Proces Verbal d’lnterrogatoire, piece 
56, p.4
12 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, letter of Ct. Roux, 20 Feb. 1915
13 AOM, SPCE 372, 1911-2, see letter of J. Foures
14 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, Declaration de Cao Dac Minh, 22 mai 1915, p. 5
15 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, Proces Verbal dTnterrogatoire de Nguyen Nhu Chuyen, p. 3
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happen, if  among the students or pupils in Paris there were a young Indochinese, a man of 
action as Phan Chu Trinh is a man o f the word, and if  this young Indochinese had relations 
with the Chinese or Japanese ... or with some Indian reformer, a partisan o f extreme 
methods.’16
The true nature o f Phan Van Truong and Phan Chu Trinh’s involvement in anti-French 
plots remains extremely ambiguous. The case against them ended in a non-lieu when the 
informer fell mute. After his release from prison in July 1915, Phan Chu Trinh’s 
government stipend was cut off -  he was forced to start earning his living as a retoucher of 
photographs. These experiences and continued harrassment by the French police left him 
with a deep bitterness towards the ruling elite o f the mother country.17 Phan Van Truong 
was conscripted to work as an interpreter at the Toulouse Arsenal, and after his 
demobilization in 1918 he started a legal practice. Towards the end o f the First World War 
the two men started a new Vietnamese grouping, this time named the ‘Vietnamese Patriots’ 
Association’.
Nguyen Ai Quoc’s relationship to these two older men was puzzling to those outside their 
inner circle. The man using that name was young enough to be Phan Chu Trinh’s son and 
lacked his distinguished scholarly credentials. Compared to Phan Van Truong he was an 
unpolished provincial. With hindsight, later observers have drawn the conclusion that 
Quoc was the messenger and front-man for the two better-known activists. The Trotskyist 
intellectual Ho Huu Tuong wrote in his memoirs that Phan Chu Trinh was responsible for 
the ideas put forth by the Group of Patriots, while Phan Van Truong and later others 
translated them into French. Nguyen Ai Quoc, he said, then passed the articles on to the 
newspapers. Tuong himself had not had any contact with the original group, however.18 
But one Vietnamese informer had come to a similar conclusion in 1919. ‘Agent Jean’ told 
Inspector Amoux that Quoc was, ‘no more than an intelligent figure-head whom they 
surround with mystery to make him appear more venerable. Because Phan Van Truong 
and Phan Chu Trinh have already been pursued by the law, Quoc is now given the leading 
role.’19
16 AOM, SPCE 372, folder 1911-1912, letter of J. Foures 5 Aug. 1911.
17 see AOM, SPCE 371, note de 1’Agent Desire, 21 fevrier 1924
18 Quoted from Ho Huu Tuong, Bon muoi mot nam lam bao (Forty-one Years in Journalism), by 
Dang Huu Thu in Than The va su nghiep nha each mang Nguyen The Truyen, (Melun, France: 5 
Boulevard des Carmes, Melun, 1993), p. 29.
19 AOM, SPCE 364, Declaration de Jean, 3 nov. 1919
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Yet most French police records depict the enigmatic Quoc behaving as a social and 
intellectual companion o f his two elders, certainly as more than an errand boy. The 
Controller o f Indochinese Troops in France, Pierre Guesde, remained convinced of Quoc’s 
importance as a political activist by the close of 1919. The records compiled by Guesde 
and his informants show Quoc to have been a dedicated campaigner for Vietnamese rights, 
whose sense o f mission made up for what he lacked in formal education. They reported that 
he had frequent contacts with Irish, Chinese and Korean nationalists who had come to 
Paris to lobby the Peace Conference. Notes on his conversations with fellow Vietnamese 
show that he was well-informed about the issues facing his homeland, albeit strongly 
influenced by the views o f Phan Chu Trinh. In December, for example, Agent Edouard, 
apparently a Vietnamese official o f the Ministry o f Colonies, turned in an eleven-page 
report on an evening spent at 6 Villa des Gobelins. The first part documents a tete-a-tete 
with Nguyen Ai Quoc. They discussed the newly-returned Governor General o f Indochina, 
Albert Sarraut, soon to become Minister for Colonies, and his plans for reform.
‘Quoc by and large approves of M. Sarraut’s policies in Indochina,’ Edouard wrote, 
‘especially the development o f French language education and the extension o f the railway 
system, which will permit the forests o f Annam and Laos to be exploited.’ He continued 
his paraphrase o f Quoc’s comments:
M.Albert Sarraut, Quoc says, has created a university and a lycee in Hanoi. This is very 
well, but it is only the beginning o f an immense task. For the 20 million inhabitants of 
Indochina, we need not just one lycee, but 20 or 30 lycees, even more. They need 
compulsory primary education, to allow the masses to become educated, because it is the 
mass of the population which composes the people and not the elite ... People have 
always cited the lack o f credits to explain the problem of educational development in 
Indochina. They will use this reason again to prevent M. Sarraut’s successors from 
continuing the work he has begun.’20
When Phan Chu Trinh turned up to join the conversation, he and ‘Edouard’ continued to 
discuss the future o f colonial policy in Indochina and what the natives could ‘demand’ of 
the new Governor General, Maurice Long. Nguyen Ai Quoc intervened to complain that 
the natives would never get anywhere by asking for concessions. ‘Why have our 20 
million compatriots done nothing to force the Government to give us our human rights?
We are men and we should be treated that way. All those who refuse to treat us as their 
equals are our e n e m i e s . h e  told them.21 Phan Chu Trinh rebuked Quoc for being hot­
headed: ‘What do you want our unarmed countrymen do to against the Europeans and their
20 AOM, SPCE 364, Paris, 20 dec. 1919, pp. 1-2
21 AOM, SPCE 364, loc. cit., p. 6
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weapons. Why should people die uselessly without any result?’ he asked.22 Trinh’s point 
of view, inherently critical o f Phan Boi Chau’s conspiracies, is one which Quoc eventually 
adopted as his own, like his mentor’s views on modem education and economic 
development. Trinh’s remedy, to demand their human rights, ‘gently, but firmly and with 
the greatest possible tenacity’ was one which Quoc would soon leave behind, however.23
To come to a balanced picture of who the future Ho Chi Minh was when he turned up in 
Paris, in my view one must start with this contemporary evidence which the Suret 
provided. One can then work backward through the sparse information which is available 
for the missing years in his early life, from his 1911 departure from Vietnam until his 
emergence in 1919 as Nguyen Ai Quoc. After weighing this evidence, I believe that there 
is a case to be made that Quoc had already gained considerable political experience by 
1919, that he had been consciously preparing himself during those years to play a role in 
liberating his nation from French rule. While Phan Van Truong was clearly the author of 
the French text o f the Demands submitted to the Peace Conference, and probably did much 
of the writing o f articles submitted to the French press in 1919 in the name of Nguyen Ai 
Quoc, Quoc himself may well have been one o f the moving forces behind the campaign 
for Vietnamese rights which was launched that June. This is, in fact, the explanation given 
in Nguyen Ai Quoc’s purported autobiography: the idea of presenting the Demands was 
his, the author says, but Phan Van Truong composed the French text, as Quoc himself 
could not yet write fluently in French.24 Nguyen Ai Quoc seems already to have been 
introducing techniques o f political organizing to the Vietnamese community which went 
beyond the writing o f open letters and manifestos.
One of the best clues as to Quoc’s pre-1919 experience is his contacts with the Korean 
delegation at the Peace Conference. Agent ‘Jean’ reported that Quoc had taken many of 
his ideas from the Korean independence movement.25 The Korean National Association 
based in the United States had started its pro-independence campaign as soon as Woodrow 
Wilson announced his Fourteen Points in January 1918. Their petition for liberation from 
Japan was submitted on 12 May 1919, a bit less than a month before the Vietnamese appeal 
appeared in Paris. A  Chinese newspaper published in Tianjin, the Yishibao,, printed an 
interview with Nguyen Ai Quoc in Paris on the 18 and 20 September 1919, which 
explained that Quoc had exchanged ideas with the Korean delegate during a trip he had
22 AOM, SPCE 364, Paris, 20 dec. 1919, p. 6
23 AOM, SPCE 364, loc. cit., p. 6
24 Tran Dan Tien, op. cit., p. 32
25 AOM, SPCE 364, note deJean, 1 Jan. 1920
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made to America.26 The article, which seems to have been written by a US-based Korean 
or Chinese, identified Quoc as the Vietnamese delegate to the Peace Conference, who had 
come from America. The introduction to the interview read:
The American correspondent relates th a t , on the recommendation o f Kin-Tchong- Wen 
and Kim-Koei-Tcho, representatives of the provisional Korean government, 
he was able to obtain an interview with Nguyen Ai Quoc. The latter is a man o f thirty, 
with a bold and youthful appearance; he knows English, French and Chinese; knows 
characters well enough to be able to converse in writing. When he was put in touch with 
the Korean delegate Kim during his time in America, he was thus able to speak about the 
question of independence and to convince himself that, as the situation is different in the 
two countries, they could not have identical action program s.27
In this interview Quoc makes clear that the publication o f the Vietnamese Demands was 
the beginning o f a publicity campaign rather than a single approach to the Peace 
Conference. The French summary o f the interview says: ‘His demarches at the Conference 
having failed, he continued his efforts by approaching various political figures, and 
managed to interest a number o f deputies in his cause.’28 And further, Nguyen Ai Quoc is 
quoted as saying: ‘Besides the demarches I have made to members o f parliament, I have 
tried to gather support from all over. The Socialist Party has shown itself to be unhappy 
with Government actions and has willingly given us its support. This is our only hope in 
France. As far as our action in other countries goes, it is in your country (America) that we 
have had the most success.. . ,29
The French Service de Renseignements in Beijing had forwarded translations o f these 
articles to Paris, along with the following explanation:
In my note no. 9 o f 5 June I brought to your attention the Chinese newspaper Yi Che Pao , 
[Yishibao] which in its multiple forms has for several years waged a campaign damaging 
to French interests and to those o f Indochina itself. Last April it published some 
Vietnamese manifestos. Moreover, during the recent anti-Japanese incidents in Beijing 
caused by the negotiations over Tsing-Tao, this paper published several articles 
announcing that France was linked to Japan by secret agreements concluded since the 
w a r .. . .30.
The extent o f the Vietnamese connection to Yishibao can be judged by the fact that Cuong 
De himself had published various articles there, which were similar in tone to the
26 Thu Trang Gaspard quotes extensively from this interview in Ho Chi Minh a Paris, 1917-1923, 
(Paris: Editions l’Harmattan, 1992).
27 AOM, SPCE 372, note no. 12 du S.R. de Pekin
28 Ibid., p. 3
29 Ibid., p. 4
30 Ibid. This French note mentions that the Beijing edition of Yishibao was ‘under the direction of 
American missionaries’ until it was closed down.
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Vietnamese Demands. Copies o f these articles were found on the walls o f the Chinese 
workers’ barracks in Marseille in June 1919.31 Nguyen Ai Quoc told Agent ‘Jean’ that he 
had an arrangement with the Korean delegation in Paris to send copies o f his (or Phan Van 
Truong’s?) writings for publication in the Tianjin paper.32 There seems to have been a 
degree of coordination between what was happening in Paris and the Phan Boi Chau- 
Cuong De circle in China.
One of the difficulties with this view o f Nguyen Ai Quoc as an experienced political 
activist in 1919 is that, according to most chronologies of his early years, he had arrived in 
Paris from London in 1917 and lived there unremarked by the authorities until the Peace 
Conference campaign. He was not known to have played an early role in the Group of 
Vietnamese Patriots. Another probable reason why doubt has been cast on his importance 
within the Group o f Patriots is the fact that his family history and links to Phan Chu Trinh 
and Phan Boi Chau were little known until 1992. It seemed highly unlikely that the kitchen 
boy and manual labourer which communist propaganda has created o f the early Ho Chi 
Minh could metamorphose so quickly into a spokesman for the patriotic cause. I will 
discuss these issues below.
As far as his date o f arrival in Paris goes, there is no better or more convincing record than 
that o f the French police, who decided that he had arrived in June 1919 from London.33 
Their note says that Quoc arrived in 1919 from London on the 7 o f June; that he first lived 
at 10 rue de Stockholm, then at 56 rue M. le Prince, then at 6 Villa des Gobelins. One can 
assume that if  the Korean press account of his meeting in America is accurate, it was 
unlikely to have occurred during his one documented stopover in New York when he was 
still working as a ship-board cook. That was in December 1912, when he wrote to the 
Resident Superieur in Hue in an attempt to send money to his father. Although the letter 
was postmarked New York, he gave his address as the Poste restante in Le Havre and 
described himself as a sailor.34 At that point Quoc had not yet had time to learn English 
and had only been out o f Vietnam for a year-and-a-half. In my opinion it is more likely 
that the encounter with the Korean representative in America occurred in 1917 or 1918, 
when Korean nationalist groups in America were becoming increasingly active. For while
31 AOM, SPCE 364, Note pour M. le Ministre, pi6ce annexe no.2. Paris 12 octobre 1920, signe: 
Guesde
32 AOM, SPCE 364, envoi 49/SR, 12 March 1920
33 AOM, SPCE 364, envoi de SR 19, Jan. 1920. Thu Trang and most other Vietnamese authors 
accept that Quoc settled in Paris in 1917. The evidence from Michel Zecchini which she cites 
seems to be transposed from 1921, as Zecchini talks about helping Quoc move to Impasse 
Compoint, which happened in 1921. (Gaspard, op. cit., pp. 71-75).
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we have no concrete proof that he was in France in those years, Quoc him self told the 
Comintern in 1938 that he had worked for a wealthy family in Brooklyn in 1917 and 1918. 
This Comintern document gives his date o f arrival in France as 1919. This information 
might seem suspect, since other dates which he provides in this questionnaire are clearly 
wrong — he gives his own birthdate, improbably, as 1903 and his mother’s death as 1910.35 
Yet he may have been camouflaging an element of truth amidst a collection o f false 
statements. A remark made to the US peace activist David Dellinger in 1969 reinforces 
the notion that his stay in America came after 1916. Ho Chi Minh told Dellinger that when 
he was in America, he heard Marcus Garvey speak in Harlem.36 Garvey, the leader o f the 
‘return to Africa movement’, did not arrive in the U.S. from his native Jamaica until 1916. 
In 1917 and 1918 he spoke frequently in Harlem on issues of racism, which had flared up 
in the US following the 1915 reappearance of the Ku Klux Klan. Nguyen Ai Quoc 
published an article about the Ku Klux Klan in 1924 which described the practice o f 
lynching in the American South -  his information could have been drawn from Garvey’s 
speeches or the US press o f the time.37
If Nguyen Ai Quoc had been seeking out Korean nationalists in 1917 or 1918, the question 
arises: was he simply involved in the casual political tourism of a young man, in search of 
new experiences as he made his way around the world? Or had he gone abroad with a 
purpose? Was he, in 1911 or 1917, already part o f an organized movement to gain 
autonomy for Vietnam? For the French authorities, these questions were partially 
answered when in the spring o f 1920 they finally tracked down his brother and sister. They 
began to sketch in the picture o f someone whose past and family connections made him 
highly suspect.
His sister and brother had both, it transpired, been sentenced to hard labour during the War 
for abetting Phan Boi Chau’s partisans. His sister recalled learning in 1915 that Quoc had 
gone to London.38 His brother mentioned that Quoc had been enrolled at the prestigious 
Quoc Hoc School in Hue in 1909, but that he had dropped out that same year, after his 
father lost his post as a district ch ie f . Quoc had then gone south to Phan Thiet, where he 
worked as a teacher itro giao) at the private Due Thanh school, founded by a colleague of
34 AOM, SPCE 15, 1-2; printed as Document No. 9 in appendix to Daniel Hemery, ‘Jeunesse d’un 
colonise, genese d’unexil, Ho Chi Minhjusqu’en 1911, Approches Asie, no. 11, 1992.
35 495, 201, 1, p. 132. His mother’s death occurred in 1901.
36 David Dellinger, ‘Conversations with Ho’, Liberation, Oct. 1969, pp. 3-4
37 Inprecor, no. 74, 1924, pp. 827-828.
38 AOM, SPCE 364, Note conf. 711,7 May 1920
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Phan Chu Trinh .39 Both brother and sister remembered that Quoc had injured one ear in a 
childhood accident. (The scarred upper portion of Quoc’s left ear would become the French 
key to his identity over the years.)40
Having established the connection between their mystery agitator and the family o f Nguyen 
Sinh Huy, the French were able to dig out other, pre-1919, reports which shed light on 
Nguyen Ai Quoc’s evolution. Both he and his brother had been singled out for reprimands 
from the Director of the Quoc Hoc School, because o f their hostile attitude towards the 
French during the disturbances in Hue o f 1908.41 This fit with the intelligence supplied by 
Agent ‘Edouard’, who had told the Surete that Nguyen Ai Quoc had been in Hue during 
1908 and seemed unable to forgive the French their actions then. ‘He claims that with his 
own eyes he saw the Vietnamese coming empty-handed to the Residence Superieure to 
protest against the heavy labour contribution.... and that the crowd was fired on to disperse 
it.’42
These reports also establish the importance o f his father’s career in Nguyen Tat 
Thanh’s/Nguyen Ai Quoc’s development. Although his father had achieved the rank of 
Pho-bang, a second-rank laureate, in the national examinations o f 1901 at the same time as 
Phan Chu Trinh, he had had no overt involvement in the ferment which led to the tax 
revolts in 1908. In 1909 he was appointed District Chief in an area being opened for 
agricultural development in Binh Dinh province.43 But within only a few months he 
became involved in a scandal. He was accused of caning a man in his jurisdiction who 
died some time later, ostensibly from injuries received during the beating. In September 
1910 Nguyen Sinh Huy was demoted four grades in rank by a provincial commission, 
which left him without a source o f income. Huy himself claimed that the man’s death was 
unconnected to the beating.44 But the Surete in Hue reported that Huy was guilty o f 
brutality under the influence o f alcohol.45 By January 1911, when Huy requested 
permission to travel to Saigon-Gia Dinh to make his living, the Surete refused, on the 
grounds that he was ‘strongly suspected o f complicity with Phan Boi Chau, Phan Chau 
Trinh and others.’ Their representative in Hue, noted: ‘His son, who two years ago was 
living in a compartment in Dong-Ba [in Hue], disappeared suddenly. He is believed to be 
in Cochinchina. Nguyen Sinh Huy may be going to join him and to confer with Phan Chau
39 AOM, SPCE 364, Declaration de Nguyen Tat Dat a la Surete de Hue, March 1920
40 AOM, SPCE 364, e.g. Extrait d’un cablegramme, 5 Dec. 1919.
41 AOM, SPCE 364, note conf. 291, Hue 13 Feb. 1920
42 AOM, SPCE 364, note conf. -  Edouard, 17 Nov. 1919, p. 3.
43 Daniel Hemery, op cit., p. 116.
44 AOM, SPCE 364, lettre de Nguyen Sinh Huy au Resident Superieur de l’Annam, Jan. 1911
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Trinh.’46 Rather than wait for his request to be turned down, however, Huy went directly to 
the Vietnamese mandarins in Hue for a laissez-passer and managed to sail from Danang on 
February 26. The Resident Superieur in Hue claimed to have information from the Court, 
‘that his [Huy’s] reasons for going to Cochinchina were not pure. He is believed to have 
gone there as a messenger, carrying news from his daughter’s friends. What gives his 
voyage an even more serious nature is the fact that it follows immediately trips to Hue and 
Quang Ngai made by this woman, known as Miss Bach Lien, who has lived for years in a 
village in Nghe An.’47
Whether Nguyen Sinh Huy had sympathies with the reform movement o f Phan Chu Trinh, 
or the more violent resistance o f Phan Boi Chau, before his disgrace in 1909-10 is not 
known. We do know that he maintained a clean dossier with the French until that time.
Nor do we know how strongly his disgrace affected his youngest son. As Daniel Hemeiy 
has pointed out, however, it narrowed the choices open to Nguyen Tat Thanh, bringing his 
elite education in Hue to a halt.48 The fact that Tat Thanh went to teach at the Due Thanh 
school, patterned on Phan Chu Trinh’s ideas o f modem education in French and quoc ngu, 
would seem to show that he was already involved with the reformist movement in 1909. 
The school’s founder had even established a fish sauce factory alongside the school, in line 
with Phan Chu Trinh’s prescription for indigenous commercial development. By going to 
Due Thanh to teach, the future Nguyen Ai Quoc was identifying himself with the 
philosophy o f Phan Chu Trinh, who had been deported as a criminal. His father, who had 
witnessed the growing impotence of the Chinese-educated scholars under French rule, may 
well have influenced his son’s decision to follow this path.
By early 1911, Nguyen Tat Thanh had moved south to Saigon, where his brother claimed 
he enrolled in a school for training mechanics 49 If French suspicions were correct, his 
father arrived in March and may have met Phan Chu Trinh before the latter sailed for 
France at the end o f the month. The amnestied scholar would have brought welcome news 
o f the scholars detained on Poulo Condore, a group of whom came from Nghe An. Both 
Daniel Hemery and Thu Trang Gaspard suggest that Nguyen Tat Thanh and his father may
45 AOM, SPCE 364, note de Delegue a l’Interieur De la Susse.
46 AOM, SPCE 364, note de la Surete de l’Annam, 8 March 1911
47 AOM, SPCE 364, Note 571 S, Hue, 5 May 1911, signed H. Sestier; there was a small group of 
activists in Quang Ngai which maintained contact with Phan Boi Chau’s partisans via Siam, see 
David Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, p. 232.
48 Hemery, op. cit., p. 118
49 AOM, SPCE 364, Declarations de Nguyen Tat Dat, March 1920
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have discussed with Phan Chu Trinh a plan to send the young man abroad to study.50 Tat 
Thanh had to make his way to Europe as a kitchen boy on the Latouche Treville, since his 
father was in disgrace and he had no hope o f getting government sponsorship for the trip, 
as Phan Chu Trinh had. But there is no reason to believe that Quoc went abroad planning 
to spend the next years as a sailor and manual labourer.
In September, after Nguyen Tat Thanh’s July arrival in Marseille, he did something which 
was entirely consistent with the behaviour o f a follower o f Phan Chu Trinh. He sent a 
formal letter to the French President, requesting admission to the ‘Colonial School’, an 
elite training institution in Paris which had been established to turn out colonial 
administrators. ‘I am completely without resources and eager to learn. I would like to 
become useful to France in relation to my compatriots, and would like at the same time to 
help them profit from the benefits o f Instruction,’ he wrote, clearly with the aid o f a 
Francophone.51 One can read his ‘desire to become useful to France’ as ambition to 
become a ‘Confucian mandarin, expressly serving the interests of the colonial power,’ as 
does Nguyen The A nh .52 On the other hand, this desire is redolent o f Phan Chu Trinh’s 
tactics of critical collaboration, which called on Vietnamese to master the best o f  France’s 
cultural and democratic traditions for their own ends. At this stage the future Nguyen Ai 
Quoc seems to have hoped that he could appeal to the noblest instincts o f the French 
administration, and that he might be judged on his own merits, rather than as the son o f a 
disgraced mandarin. But the request was referred back to the new Resident Superieur in 
Hue, who pointed out that the would-be scholar had not exhausted the educational 
possibilities o f the colony.53
This rejection did not end Quoc’s quest for an education, but changed the way in which he 
would obtain it. We do not know for certain whether he was able to enroll formally in 
some other institution, in England for example, or whether he picked up his knowledge o f 
English and colonial politics via informal contacts. The imperative to earn a living seems 
to have left him with no recourse but to sail the seas for the next few years. By October
1911, he was sending money to his father from Ceylon.54 The letter cited above from New 
York was sent in December 1912. At that time he wrote to to the Resident in Hue, saying
50 Hemery, op. cit., pp. 118-9; Thu Trang Gaspard, Nhung HoatDong cua Phan Chu Trinh tai Phap 
1911-1925, (Paris: Sudestasie, 1983), p. 91
51 Daniel Hemery, op. cit., printed as Document no. 6, from Fonds de TEcole Coloniale, carton 27 
dossier 11, letter of 15 Sept. 1911
52 Nguyen The Anh, ‘How Did Ho Chi Minh Become a Proletarian? Reality and Legend,’ Asian 
Affairs, vol. 16, part II, p. 165
Hemery, op. cit., Document no. 8, Fonds de la Resident Sup. De l’Annam, r. 28, 6971, 25 May
1912.
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that he would like to send a monthly payment to his father, but that he had no idea what his 
address was. ‘I don’t know what to do, beyond turning to you, the obliging protector o f our 
country,’ he said.55 The tone taken towards the French administrator seems to have been 
dictated in part by the Confucian self-abasement required in a petitioner, but also by 
prudence. In view o f notes which he wrote not long afterwards to Phan Chu Trinh; one can 
assume that his gratitude to France was feigned.
In 1913 or early 1914 Nguyen Ai Quoc appears to have given up seafaring and settled in 
England. He reported in an undated postcard to Phan Chu Trinh in Paris, that he ‘had 
found a place to study their language and for a month-and-a-half had been working only 
with Westerners, speaking their language all the time.’ ‘Living here is not any different 
from France,’ he wrote, ‘and I hope that in four or five months when I meet Uncle I will 
speak and understand a lot o f English.’56 He gave his London address as the Drayton Court 
Hotel, W est Ealing, London, an inn located at the junction where the Great Western 
Railway left London. It is easy to suppose that he was able to find work as a helper in the 
kitchen o f a busy railway hotel. (There is no contemporary evidence that he worked as an 
assistant to l ’Escoffier at the Carlton Hotel, as is claimed in the Tran Dan Tien book.) In 
another card, this time addressed from 8 Stephen St., Tottenham Court Rd., London, he 
showed that he was keeping up with current events in Asia. ‘The five great powers are in a 
struggle. Nine countries are making war. I am reminded suddenly o f what I said to you a 
few months ago, about the storm that was threatening. Destiny is saving more surprises for 
us and it is impossible to say who will win this. The neutrals are still undecided and the 
belligerents cannot guess their intentions. In these circumstances, if  someone sticks his 
nose into the business, he will be forced to choose sides... We should stay calm.’57 By 
this time, apparently before Phan Chu Trinh’s arrest in August 1914, Nguyen Ai Quoc had 
learned enough English to feel that he could offer opinions about world politics as seen 
from London.
54 AOM, SPCE 364, Lettre de Nguyen Tat Thanh au Resident Sup. De l’Annam, 31 Oct. 1911
55 See note no. 34
56 Copy of postcard on display at Ho Chi Minh Museum, Saigon; Thu Trang Gaspard cites this card 
in NAQ a Paris, pp. 57-8, giving Hong Ha (Thoi Thanh Nien cua Bac Ho) as her source; she 
translates the word Toy (literally, ‘Westerner’) to mean Frenchmen, whereas in the context I assume 
it refers to Englishmen.
57 Thu Trang Gaspard, Ho Chi Minh a. Paris, p. 60. This letter apparently comes from the French 
archives, but as Thu Trang did her research before the colonial archives had been organized in their 
present system she does not always give coherent references. She mentions in her earlier work, 
Nhung HoatDong cua Phan Chau Trinh tai Phap, (Paris: Sudestasie, 1983), p. 100 that she 
‘presented’ this letter to Hong Ha. Alain Ruscio in Ho Chi Minh: Textes gives source as AOM, 
SLOTFOM III, 29, p.21.
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A portion of another note was quoted during the interrogation o f a Vietnamese witness 
during Phan Chu Trinh’s trial. The witness, Cao Dac Minh, said that it was a letter written 
by Tat-Thanh in answer to a letter from Phan Chu Trinh. The note may have been written 
after Trinh’s arrest. As the witness explained: ‘After deploring the evils suffered by his 
countrymen, Tat Thanh assures Phan Chu Trinh that, ‘after him, he will continue his 
work.’58
During the French investigation o f wartime Vietnamese-German links, other information 
came to light which showed that not only Tat-Thanh, but Vietnamese known to be linked to 
Cuong-De, had been living and studying in London in 1914. One known as Joseph Thanh, 
later identified as Lam Van Tu from Cochinchina, sailed from Hongkong to Singapore in 
1913 with Cuong De and two other southern Vietnamese, who later turned up as the 
Prince’s couriers in Europe. One of the southerners, Tmong Duy Toan, was the former 
editor o f a mildly nationalist publication, Luc Tinh Tan Van ( News o f  the Six Provinces). 
He was said to have stayed with Phan Chu Trinh during his trips to Paris.59 The other 
courrier, Do Van Y, a school teacher from My Tho, settled in France and was in regular 
touch with Joseph Thanh in 1914, when the latter was living in England. The French 
authorities confiscated at least four undated letters from Joseph Thanh to Do Van Y 
written in 1914, two o f them sent from Gower St.60 Other letters were addressed from 
Constantine Rd. in Hampstead and 3 Conquest Rd., Bedford. They show that Joseph 
Thanh was expecting to receive money from Cuong De. As we have seen, Phan Van
i
Tmong was implicated in the activities o f this circle at his trial.61
Spurred by the French to investigate Joseph Thanh and his contacts, the British Home 
Office reported to Paris that Joseph Thanh and Tat-Thanh were brothers aged 18 and 19, 
and that Tat Thanh was living and studying in Bedford. The two had been enrolled at the 
Regent St. Polytechnic, where they had made the acquaintance o f a student named Gourd, 
an Englishman whose parents lived at 12 Constantine Rd., Hampstead. The report noted 
that Tat Thanh ‘is on friendly terms with a daughter of the Gourd family’ and that as a 
result Mrs. Gourd helped him find an apprenticeship at the Igranic Electric Company in 
Bedford. ‘.. .Nothing in their outward habits would give rise to the suggestion that they are
58 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, Proces Verbal d’information (interrogation de Cao Dac Minh), 22 May 
1915.
59 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, Proces verbal d’interrogation, 8 April 1915, Interrogation of Nguyen 
Nhu Chuyen, p. 3
60 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, Gouvemement Militaire de Paris, Traductions d’Extraits de lettres et de 
carte-lettres.
61 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, Interrogation of Nguyen Nhu Chuyen, p. 4
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engaged in any conspiracy,’ the document concludes.62 Later the Surete decided that the 
‘two brothers’ were sumamed ‘Lam’, and reported that Lam Van Tu or Joseph Thanh had 
returned to Cochinchina.63 Without the network o f Vietnamese informers which the 
French later developed, one has room to doubt that the Home Office got very far in 
establishing the exact identity o f these men and what they were-doing in England. There is 
no reason to suppose that Joseph Thanh and Tat-Thanh were brothers, as ‘Thanh’ was part 
o f Tat-Thanh’s personal name, not a family name. But it seems unlikely that there were 
two different Tat-Thanhs in England. This convoluted web of interconnections leaves one 
with the strong suspicion that Nguyen Tat-Thanh was part o f an informal group which was 
the western equivalent of the Eastern Studies movement. In his supposed autobiography 
one o f the ‘narrators’ claims that Quoc and he, as well as other Vietnamese in England, 
were part o f a secret organization (presumably Vietnamese) known as the ‘Overseas 
Labour Association’ {Hoi Lao-dongHai-ngoai).64 As long as he sailed the seas, his brother 
and sister’s links with the conspiracies o f Phan Boi Chau would have made him a natural 
candidate for liaison agent o f Cuong De. Was Cuong De in 1914 using money raised 
from Vietnam (and perhaps the Germans) to support Vietnamese students in the West?
Was it pure coincidence that Nguyen Tat Thanh showed up in London around the same 
time as Joseph Thanh and the Prince?
Towards the end of 1916, Nguyen Ai Quoc’s ‘autobiography’ relates that he returned to 
France to meet Phan Van Truong and Phan Chu Trinh. Another attempt at rebellion had 
just failed -  the flight o f the young emperor Duy Tan had ended in his exile to the island o f 
Reunion. ‘Now that King Duy Tan has risen up, as well as the people o f Thai-Nguyen and 
many other places, what should we do?,’ Quoc asked his compatriots, in the book’s 
simplified language. The writer continues: ‘But after that no one knows what Anh Ba 
(Quoc) did next.’65 The last years o f the war would have been a logical time for an 
English-speaking Asian nationalist to try to build contacts in the U.S., however. Both 
Chinese and Korean nationalists were receiving support from influential people there. Still, 
in spite o f the evidence from Yishibao, Nguyen Ai Quoc’s passage to America in 1917-18 
remains in the realm o f conjecture — the next confirmed sighting o f Nguyen Ai 
Quoc/Nguyen Tat Thanh is in Paris in 1919.
62 PRO: FO 372/668F; this document is cited by Nguyen The Anh, op. cit.
63 AOM, SPCE 364, Paris 19 Nov. 1919, Note 2157: Note foumie par M. Petette de la S.G.
64 Tran Ngoc Danh, Tieu su Ho Chu tick, (Paris: Chi Hoi Lien Viet tai Phap, 1949), p. 24
65 Both the 1949 and subsequent versions of this book include this reference. See Tran Dan Tien, 
op. cit., 1994 ed., p. 29. As the Thai Nguyen rebellion did not begin until August 1917, the author 
seems to be telescoping events for dramatic effect.
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This excursion through the French archival records should offer some ideas of how the 
person who emerged as Nguyen Ai Quoc at the Paris Peace Conference arrived on the 
political scene. When he told Agent ‘Jean’ in January 1920 that he had undertaken a study 
of colonial policies o f the Airiericans, the English, the Spanish and the Italians, his claim 
does not seem entirely far-fetched.66 His ties with-both Phan Chu Trinh and Phan Van 
Truong probably dated back before the War; one can guess that the three men’s affinity 
was in part due to the fact that they all had friends and relatives languishing in French 
prisons or exile. While Phan Chu Trinh and Nguyen Ai Quoc would have political 
disagreements over the next years, these never destroyed the bond o f responsibility which 
the two showed towards each other. And as for Phan Van Truong, his relationship with 
Quoc seemed stronger than ever by the time they separated in 1923.
2. The Radical Solution (1920-1923)
The Paris Peace Conference closed in January 1920, with the inauguration o f the League 
o f Nations. Nguyen Ai Quoc and his compatriots were not among those who had cause to 
celebrate: it was the end of their hopes that the western democracies would recognize their 
claim to independence. With the collapse o f their campaign at the Conference they seem to 
have lost some of their cohesion as a militant group. As 1920 wore on, money became 
scarce. For a time Quoc was apparently supported by an inhabitant o f 6 Villa des Gobelins 
known as Khanh Ky, who had set up a small business trading in photographic supplies in 
the occupied Rhineland. (The French guessed that he may have been engaged in currency 
speculation.) Phan Van Truong set up a legal practice in Mayence in the latter part of 
1919, and defended both Vietnamese and French soldiers who were being tried in military 
courts. His money was reported to have come from his legal work in commercial disputes 
between French and Germans.67 Phan Chu Trinh also contributed to the group’s funds by 
earning 30 francs a day as a retoucher of photographs.68 But an employee o f the Ministry 
o f Colonies, a Mr. Phu Bay who was probably Agent ‘Edouard’, reported at the same time 
that these men were almost all suffering from bronchitis or tuberculosis, as ‘they lack the 
means to lead a healthy or comfortable life’.69 He did not view them as a serious threat to 
the peace o f Indochina.
Nguyen Ai Quoc was revealing fmstration in his conversations with the informers who 
sought him out. In early January 1920 he complained that Indochina was unknown in other
66 AOM, SPCE 364, notes de Jean, 4 May 1920
67 AOM, SPCE 364, envoi du 12 mars 1920, signed Jean
68 AOM, SPCE 364, rapport de Jean, 8 Jan. 1920
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nations. When he spoke with international political figures, he said, he discovered that 
they either had no knowledge o f Indochina or supposed that it was a small frontier province 
between India and China. ‘We need to make a lot of noise in order to become known,’ he 
told Agent Jean; ‘Korea is now well-known to all nations, because the Koreans have raised 
their voices.’ He added, though, that he would wait a while to see what sort o f policies the 
new Governor General Maurice Long would implement.70 He tried to raise the cause of 
Vietnamese freedom at a meeting critical o f the peace settlement in the Orient, at which 
the socialist deputy Marius Moutet spoke, along with Professor Felicien Challaye and 
representatives of the Korean and Chinese communities. Inspector Pierre Amoux himself 
was in the audience o f around 1,000, which included a large number o f Chinese. He 
reported that Nguyen Ai Quoc had distributed copies of the ‘Vietnamese Demands’ in the 
hall, but had failed to be recognized by the chairman when he requested the right to speak. 
‘Nguyen Ai Quoc’s attitude,... his way o f insisting on taking the floor, seem to have 
provoked a mixture of good-will and mockery among the audience and the speakers,’ 
Amoux wrote smugly.71 Soon after, Quoc organized a meeting where he spoke in the name 
o f the ‘Group of Vietnamese Revolutionaries’. His talk, titled ‘The Social Evolution of the 
* Far Eastern Peoples and the Demands o f the Ancient Nation o f Annam’, attracted around 
70 people, who applauded enthusiastically at the end.72 But the absence o f Vietnamese 
discouraged him from repeating his effort. When Jean suggested to him that the mention o f 
a group o f Revolutionary Vietnamese had frightened his compatriots away, he grew 
defensive. It appears that there was not an official group with that name, but that Quoc had 
hoped to gain publicity by using it. ‘We need fights and foolishness to get attention,’ he 
told the ever-present Jean.73
Quoc was reported at this time to be spending long hours in the Bibliotheque St. Genevieve 
next to the Pantheon. Part o f his publicity campaign included the intention to publish a 
book on the French record in Indochina, which he planned to call Les Opprimes. In order 
to give the work more weight, he had decided to use long extracts from French authors.
The Surete compiled a list of thirteen books on Indochina which they believed he had 
consulted, including Phan Chu Trinh’s report on the events of 1908 as well as works on 
agriculture and the financial regime established by France.74 He spoke o f raising the 
money to print his book by finding a socialist to hire him as domestic help, but as of
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September, he was still looking for funding and hoping that Marcel Cachin at VHumanite 
would take care o f the printing.75 His political activity was interrupted by a hospital stay in 
August, when he received treatment for an abcess on his right shoulder.76 Whether this was 
the first sign o f a tubercular infection is unclear. By the next year, however, he was being 
turned out o f his job in a photographic shop on the grounds that he had tuberculosis.77
As the French grew more certain that Nguyen Ai Quoc and Nguyen Tat Thanh were one 
and the same, they began to strategize as to how best to control him. In France they could 
minimize his contacts with other Vietnamese, and by the autumn o f 1920 they had 
determined to keep him there. The Director of the Indochinese Surete in Hanoi, Rene 
Robin, requested that Nguyen Ai Quoc be denied a passport. He suggested that the 
authorities overseeing the Indochinese in Paris persuade Quoc to admit his true name, by 
telling him that he could only obtain a ticket for passage to Vietnam by producing authentic 
proof of his identity. But Quoc would not succumb to the Surete’s pressures: he had 
already been summoned to the Prefecture o f Police on 20 September, where he had been 
photographed and interrogated. After the questioning he went straight to the Human Rights 
League to complain o f police harrassment.78
The Hanoi authorities were convinced that Quoc would not risk returning to Indochina, 
where he would be subject to the the penalties o f the Annamite code against clandestine 
immigration. But they feared that he might try to go to another country, where he ‘would 
completely escape us and we would have to expect surprises from such a determined 
individual... ’ ‘ A Nguyen Ai Quoc unmasked and kept under surveillance by the 
Metropolitan police -  we can not wish for better than that,’ wrote a M. Lacombe to Paris.79 
Pierre Guesde, who relished his role as ‘General Controller of Indochinese Troops in 
France’, took a particularly hard line on Nguyen Ai Quoc and his immediate circle. By the 
end o f 1920 he had opened 250 files on suspect Vietnamese in France, but he considered 
the group from 6 Villa des Gobelins to be the most dangerous.80
Why Guesde found Quoc and his circle so threatening is at first difficult to understand.
The Surete had already frightened away the less determined adherents to his cause, he was
almost destitute and his health was beginning to trouble him. Yet by November of 1920 it
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was becoming clear that some o f the Vietnamese were making common cause with the 
more radical faction in the French socialist party. That month Quoc and a Tran Tien Nam 
attended a meeting organized by the Socialist Revolutionary Party to celebrate the third 
anniversary o f the Soviet Republic. On November 3, Phan Chu Trinh, Quoc and three 
others then living at Villa des Gobelins went to a meeting o f the ‘Committee for the Third 
International’ organized by the Socialists of the 13th arrondissement. Then on the 19th of 
the month Quoc received an invitation to a meeting from the ‘extremist fraction’ o f the 
13th Section of the Socialist Revolutionary Federation o f the Seine. At this meeting a vote 
was taken on whether the Federation should join the Third International based in 
Moscow.81 The Surete did not report the result o f that vote, but it seems fairly certain that 
Quoc’s mind had been made up on this issue by the time he boarded a train on 24 
December 1920 to journey to Tours for the Congress o f the Socialist Revolutionary Party. 
He was representing the 13th Section, his neighbourhood branch, as well as the 
‘Indochinese Socialist Group’.82 It was at the Tours Congress that a majority o f the 
delegates formalized their decision to join the Russian Bolsheviks in the Third or 
Communist International, to leave behind the Second, Socialist International whose 
reputation had been tarnished in the eyes o f many radicals by its weak response to 
nationalist chauvinism during the First World War. Quoc’s participation at this Congress 
made him one o f the founding members o f the French Communist Party.
An article which Quoc wrote for VHumanite before the Congress gives some idea o f the 
strength o f his views at the time. (This may, again, have been written with Phan Van 
Truong’s help. All the same, a friend in the 13th Section said his draft required some 
stylistic improvements. Whether the ornate version in the French archives is the edited 
version is unclear.) Quoc called his article ‘Colonial Policy’. It reflects his exposure to 
Lenin’s ‘Theses on National and Colonial Questions’, which had been unveiled at the 
Second Comintern Congress in July 1920 and printed in VHumanite on the 16th and 17th o f 
that month. Lenin’s analysis of imperialism, inherent in these Theses, provided Quoc with 
a theoretical framework for his visceral hatred o f colonialism.
The hydra o f western capitalism has for some time now been stretching its horrible 
tentacles towards all comers o f the globe, as it finds Europe too restricted a field of
80 AOM, SPCE 364, 28 Dec 1920
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action, and the blood of the European proletariat insufficient to satisfy its insatiable 
appetite, English, German and French capitalists are all equal, as are their crimes, but for 
the fact that the capitalists of other countries at least have the modesty not to dress up 
their egoism with the pompous phrase o f ‘Civilizing Mission’. But behind the three 
colours of liberty, equality and fraternity, France introduces alcohol, opium and 
prostitution to all o f her colonies and sows misery, ruin and death along with her ill- 
gotten riches.
In the face of these hateful practices, does the Socialist Party have a colonial policy 
which is truly socialist? No, not yet has the party tried to aid any o f the colonies to free 
itself by revolutionary means. This inactivity would have carried on if  the rightist war 
had not laid bare the lies and hypocrisy o f bourgeois democracy and if  the Russian 
Revolution had not violently stirred up the energies of the Proletariat o f the Universe.
Since the majority o f the Party decided to join the Communist International and Lenin 
presented his Colonial Theses to the Second Congress, our comrades have begun to talk 
about the colonies.. . 83
Quoc’s intervention at the Tours Congress was less heavy-handed, but raised the same 
criticism o f the Socialist Party. When Deputy Jean Longuet tried to protest that he had 
spoken out on the colonial question, Quoc asked him not to interrupt. Still, he sounded a 
more diplomatic note than in his Humanite article. In closing his short speech, he called 
on all members o f the Socialist Party, right-wing as well as left-wing, to come to the aid of 
Indochina. He got a warm response from the hall, where cries of ‘Down with the colonial 
sharks!’ could be heard among the applause.84
Quoc’s speech is less well-known than the picture snapped o f him by one of the delegates. 
It shows a smooth-faced Vietnamese looking like a well-dressed schoolboy in suit and tie, 
standing among the seated, bewhiskered French delegates. One right-wing press account 
described him as a prize circus attraction presented by the P.T. Bamum o f the Tours 
Congress, Deputy Marcel Cachin. But Quoc’s contemporary Paul Vaillant-Couturier, 
gave him a glowing review: ‘his intervention was admirable in its concision, describing the 
agony of a nation of 20 million people,’ he commented.85 In later years Quoc would 
apparently make a point o f keeping a low profile during doctrinal debates in the Comintern. 
But it seems unlikely that, as he later claimed, he came to Tours Congress without a clear 
understanding o f what the issues separating the radical and moderate socialists were. After 
all, he had been attending political meetings and reading the left-wing press in Paris for a- 
year-and-a-half by the time he arrived in Tours.
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At Tours Nguyen Ai Quoc gave his allegiance to a force which would dominate the rest of 
his life. The world communist movement would become both his family and his chief 
employer. But in the winter o f 1921 it did little to alleviate his personal problems or raise 
the spirits o f his Vietnamese collective. From the 14 o f January until the 5 of March Quoc 
-was in the Cochin Hospital to have his shoulder abcess removed. When he left hospital, he 
refused to pay for his treatment on the grounds that he had no income.86 At 6 Villa des 
Gobelins he found Phan Chu Trinh in deep depression. His only son, Dat, recently 
returned to Vietnam from France to cure his tuberculosis, had died. Trinh's friends reported 
that he was not the same after this tragedy.87 He himself would not get permission to 
return to Vietnam until 1925. At the same time, some o f the habitues o f Villa des Gobelins 
claimed to be unhappy with Quoc’s high-visibility radicalism. Khanh-Ky and Tran Tien 
Nam blamed the problems they were having with the police on Quoc’s behaviour, a Surete 
report said. Tran Tien Nam was reported to have said that only Phan Van Truong, Phanh 
Chu Trinh and a Vo Van Toan shared Quoc’s extremist opinions. He also claimed to be 
unable to comprehend why these men would ‘give their entire confidence to a compatriot 
o f whose true name and origins they were ignorant’.88 Meanwhile Khanh-Ky, the group’s 
main breadwinner, complained that he could not pay off the rent which had been allowed 
to accumulate during the last years o f the w a r.89 Both Phan Chu Trinh and Quoc started 
to look for new living quarters after this. As a result, Quoc had no alternative but to cut 
back his political activities and start earning his own living. In July he moved across the 
Seine to northwestern Paris, a hotel at 9 Impasse Compoint. He found work as a photo 
retoucher next door to the hotel at 40 francs per week, the wage paid to apprentices. With 
his frugal life style, this was enough to cover food and his 40 francs monthly rent. At the 
end o f July the Surete reported that he was leading a quiet life, going out only rarely to visit 
his friends at Villa des Gobelins.90
Quoc’s journalistic efforts seem to have been receiving only luke-warm support from his 
socialist friends. The draft pamphlet on French colonialism which Quoc had completed in 
1920 was still without a publisher. Marcel Cachin gave evasive replies about the 
possibility o f having it published by VHumanite -  he explained that the paper’s circulation 
had dropped since the Socialist schism at the Tours Congress and that he could not afford 
to pay an advance.91 Still Quoc did publish the odd article: one in Charles Rappoport’s
86 AOM, SPCE 364, Deveze, 28 March 1921
87 AOM, SPCE 364, Pierre Guesde to Gov. Gen. in Hanoi, Feb. 1921
88 AOM, SPCE 364, signed Deveze, 27 Dec. 1920
89 AOM, SPCE 364, Devize, 29 April 1921
90 AOM, SPCE 364, note of 29 July 1921.
91 AOM, SPCE 364, Deveze, 12 Jan. 1921
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monthly Revue Communiste o f 14 April 1921, and another in L 'Action Coloniale o f 10 
June. The first of these, buried on page 133, was a variation on what was to become his 
constant refrain -  the failure o f communist parties to act on the colonial question. This 
inactivity was astonishing, he wrote, ‘especially now that there is no longer an internal 
debate in the purified party ... ’. His article in Action Coloniale made a comparison 
between the relatively liberal colonial policy o f Japan in Korea and French policies in 
Indochina. The Japanese had decreed in August 1919 that their colony would have 
autonomy and that her citizens would enjoy equal rights with Japanese. ‘The French 
government’, Quoc wrote, ‘still has the naivete to believe that in Indochina, to win the 
attachment o f the natives, it is enough to dupe them indefinitely with official discourses...’
In the summer of 1921, as the Group o f Vietnamese Patriots seemed to be drifting apart, M. 
Deveze’s informers reported frequent, noisy discussions at 6 Villa des Gobelins. In early 
July, the two Phans and Quoc held a ‘violent discussion’ from 9 in the evening until the 
early morning hours.92 In September more o f these exchanges were recorded. In October 
Phan Chu Trinh moved out to rue Pemety. We have no way o f knowing what the group 
discussed or whether there were major political disagreements among them. The break-up 
o f their communal living arrangement and their future political course must have provided 
plenty o f meat for arguments, however. But it was clearly not the case that Nguyen Ai 
Quoc had a serious falling out with his two colleagues, as has often been assumed in the 
past.93 Although Phan Chu Trinh’s letters o f 1922 and 1923 make clear that he disagreed 
with Quoc’s attachment to Marxism, he maintained an open-minded interest in Quoc’s 
activities and often attended political meetings with him. Phan Van Truong seems to have 
taken greater offence at Trinh’s behaviour, which became somewhat erratic after his son’s 
death.94 But Truong himself remained, in the eyes o f the Surete, a political extremist. As 
late as February 1922 they still suspected that Nguyen Ai Quoc may have been acting on 
his behalf, as his ‘conscious or unconscious agent’.95
The topics of debate among the Vietnamese activists probably included the invitation to 
join an Intercolonial Union, from a Malagasy lecturer at the School o f Oriental Languages, 
with the elegant name of Stephany Oju Oti.96 Stephany was already involved with the 
journal Action Coloniale. The Union held its inaugural meeting in October 1921, after 
several months o f preparation. A number o f the other members were supporters o f the
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Third International, and the Union was openly affiliated with the French Communist Party. 
The new organization defined its function as the study of colonial politics and economics, 
but it also came to play the role of a mutual aid society. Quoc attended the first meeting 
with Phan Van Truong and a nephew who had moved into 6 Villa des Gobelins. He spoke 
with his usual vehemence against French colonial policy and bureaucrats. (The Surete, 
also true to form, had an anonymous informer there, most likely Nguyen Van Ai known as 
Agent de Villier.)97 Quoc joined the executive committee, along with six others, lawyers 
and small businessmen, from Reunion, Dahomey, Guadeloupe, the Antilles, Martinique 
and Guyana. He was made one o f the treasurers who collected the members’ dues every 
four months. The Union was soon dependent on him to man their office in the heart o f the 
Latin Quarter at rue du Marche des Patriarches. The group also relied on him to get out 
their newspaper, Le Paria , which started to appear in April 1922.98
The Intercolonial Union became Quoc’s new base, replacing the Group of Vietnamese 
Patriots and the perhaps non-existent ‘Revolutionary Group o f Vietnamese’. (The Group 
o f Vietnamese Patriots joined the Union en masse.) Aside from the communist party, he 
now had an officially recognized organization, one with legal statutes and dues-paying 
members, to back his journalistic efforts and even to provide an office. Le Paria began 
with a subscription list o f 103 names99, and soon reached a print run o f 2,000 copies. (In 
April 1923 it had to be temporarily cut back to 1,000 copies and a single sheet, as 
advertising revenues were nonexistent.)100 By June 1922, Quoc claimed to have found 150 
Indochinese subscribers -  but three of these belonged to the Service de Renseignements in 
Marseille.101 Some issues o f the simple, mimeographed paper did get back to Vietnam — 
two subscriptions came in from Vietnamese interpreters at the Residence Superieur in 
Hanoi. Quoc suspected, however, that these too were from the intelligence services.102 He 
was soon spending less time on photo-retouching, and more on his journalism and political 
life. In 1922 he chose to ignore his current employer’s threats and attended a May Day 
demonstration, with the result that he lost his job .103 After that he made some money by 
painting decorations on fans and window blinds, but he may also have received a subsidy 
for his work at the Paria. Journalism would become both his profession and cover during 
his years as an underground communist agent.
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By 1922 Nguyen Ai Quoc had become a full-time communist publicist, with colonial 
questions and Indochinese independence as his fields of interest. He attended the French 
CP’s First Congress in Marseille in December 1921, as well as the second, held in Paris in 
October 1922. On the latter occasion he may have been noticed by one o f the guests from 
Moscow, Dmitry Manuilsky.104 In April 1922 he attended a meeting o f the newly-formed 
Committee for Colonial Studies which the French CP had established at its First 
Congress.105 He may by this time have developed friendships with Chinese student 
activists in Paris, where in 1921 Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping collaborated to publish a 
Chinese language paper known as Youth from a flat near the Place d ’ltalie, not far from 
Villa des Gobelins. Quoc is said to have introduced some of the better French speakers 
among the Chinese into the French CP, including the two sons of CCP leader Chen 
Duxiu.106 We do not know if Quoc belonged to their Communist Youth League at this 
point. By 1921 the Chinese communists in France had established their own links to Berlin 
and Moscow. As a large proportion o f the two-thousand Chinese students in France were 
involved in work-study schemes, many lived in the provinces or in working-class suburbs 
o f Paris such as Billancourt.107 Quoc, on the other hand, was heavily involved with his 
fellow colonial subjects and French CP activities.
How effective Quoc was as a propagandist is difficult to judge. There is little evidence 
regarding the circulation o f Paria within Vietnam, especially before 1925. Getting his 
message out to his countrymen was becoming increasingly complicated. The number of 
Vietnamese troops and workers in France was dropping off -  by June 1920 there were 
19,000 Indochinese left, down from 60,000 the previous July. By 1926 there would be 
only 2,670 officially resident in France.108 The Ministry o f Colonies and its Marseille 
watchdog, Leon Josselme, had become adept at intercepting mail which went by sea 
(although they could be deceived by items hidden inside other publications). Quoc’s 
audience was more and more one o f left-wing Europeans and colonial fellow-travellers. 
Thanks to Albert Sarraut’s image as a reforming Governor General, some Frenchmen who 
might otherwise have been sympathetic to Quoc’s exposes felt that his criticisms o f French 
policy were over-stated. In November 1921, a search of Quoc’s room by the Service de
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Renseignements produced a revealing (but undated) letter from an official o f the Human 
Rights League, Gabriel Seailles. He was writing to acknowledge a copy of the 
‘Vietnamese Demands’ which had been sent to the League’s Central Committee. Their 
response was based on consultations with Sarraut’s office. ‘They say that you haven’t 
taken into account the reforms accomplished by M. Sarraut,’ Seailles wrote. ‘There must 
be a misunderstanding here. Your proposals are formulated in too general a manner. It 
would be in your interest to communicate your complaints with more precision.’ In any 
case, the writer believed, reform of the colonial justice system had already been carried out; 
liberty o f the press had been granted; liberty o f education was something which Sarraut 
was occupying himself with.109 In reality Sarraut’s reforms were slow to take shape, and 
the freedoms which Vietnamese enjoyed remained those o f second-class citizens. In 
March 1926 a list of demands presented at a public meeting in Saigon by Nguyen An Ninh 
repeated several o f the key points from the Group o f  Patriots’ 1919 petition.110
Phan Chu Trinh, himself frustrated at being unable to return to Vietnam, came to the 
conclusion in early 1922 that it was time for Nguyen Ai Quoc to return home. Trinh had 
been given employment as a photographer at the Colonial Exhibition in Marseille, thanks 
to his supporters in the Socialist Party. But the letter which Trinh wrote to Quoc in 
February 1922 reveals that he had no rosy illusions about French intentions towards his 
country, or about his own potential to bring about change. Quoc’s knowledge would be 
wasted, the old scholar believed, if  he remained in France. The time had come to take the 
lessons of Marxism-Leninism back to Vietnam to try them out. He wrote in a spirit of 
reconciliation:
Because o f our disagreements you have called me a ‘conservative and backwards 
Scholar’... I’m not the least bit angry about this label, because I read French poorly 
and I can’t understand perfectly the works produced in this civilized land. I am an 
exhausted horse who can no longer gallop; you are a fiery stallion... But I’m sending 
this letter because I hope you will listen and prepare your grand design. From East to 
West, from Antiquity to the present day, no one has acted as you have, in staying 
abroad on the pretext that your country is full o f traps... To awaken the people, so that 
our compatriots will engage in combat against the occupiers, it is indispensable to be 
there... Following your method you have sent articles to the press here to incite our 
compatriots to mobilize their energy and spirit. But this is vain. Because our 
compatriots can’t read French or even quoc ngu; they are incapable of understanding 
your articles!111
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Whether the old-fashioned Phan Chu Trinh had any influence on Quoc is hard to tell -  but 
one senses that after his criticism, Quoc worked harder than ever to keep the colonial issue 
in the public eye. Intelligence reports in 1922 describe him as ‘indefatigable1. ‘Nguyen Ai 
Quoc is engaged in active communist propaganda in Vietnamese circles in Paris,’ Pierre 
Guesde wrote to Hanoi in July; ‘and he is putting all his energy into attending meetings in 
the capital and the suburbs.’112 Guesde noted that Quoc had been admitted into the 
Freemasons. He listed the meetings which Quoc had attended within the last week:
1. Two meetings of the Directing Committee of the Socialist Party-Communist;
2. A public meeting organized by the Communist Party in Bagnolet, to support the Russian 
revolution;
3.Two meetings of the Club du Faubourg, Salle Printania, Ave. de Clichy;
4. An evening at the Masonic Lodge at 94 Ave. de Suffren.
In addition, he made approaches to the editorial offices of various newspapers, notably 
/ 'Humanite, Journal du Peuple and La Bataille Syndicaliste.
Not long afterwards the Vietnamese activists and Quoc started to examine ways o f 
approaching the non-intellectual members o f their community. Articles in Paria and 
VHumanite were a means to draw in educated Vietnamese, but Phan Chu Trinh was right 
to point out that these would reach only a small proportion o f their potential supporters.
The views o f the Comintern and the French communist party on mass organizing may also 
have influenced their actions. In February and May 1923 the core group o f Vietnamese 
activists began to discuss new initiatives. They had been joined towards the end o f 1921 
by a young northern intellectual named Nguyen The Truyen, who quickly became one of 
Quoc’s closest collaborators. The son o f a district official from Nam Dinh, Truyen had 
received a French diploma in chemistry, but clearly had a stronger interest in writing and 
journalism. In 1922 he had become the latest resident of 6 Villa des Gobelins and at the end 
o f the year began to work on Le Paria.113
In February 1923 Phan Van Truong, Quoc and Tran Tien Nam discussed recreating the old 
‘Fraternal Association’ which Truong and Phan Chu Trinh had started in 1912. The goal 
would be to unite the poorer Vietnamese manual workers in France, who as Truong said,
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‘were badly paid, badly nourished, badly housed and sometimes scorned by their 
employers... 14 Phan Van Truong was advised not to take the presidency of the group, as
his political notoriety might scare off potential members who would be frightened of 
reprisals. At a recent gathering o f the Intercolonial Union, in fact, Truong had given a talk 
on Vietnam, in which he stated that ‘national liberty o f self-determination could exist only 
when all peoples had understood the necessity of communism, which would end the 
exploitation of man by man and place all races on an equal footing.’115 At an April 
meeting, Phan Chu Trinh was proposed as president, but Phan Van Truong protested, 
saying that he categorically refused to work with his former collaborator.116 How this 
difficulty was solved is not clear.
In May Quoc himself sent out a subscription advertisement for a new quoc ngu bi-monthly 
newspaper, to be called Viet Nam Hon (The Soul o f  Vietnam). His announcement 
promised ‘Asia, Europe, India and America all summarized in one paper. Women and 
children will be able to understand.’ It would be a paper ‘in our language, which my 
brothers will be able to read.’ The first issue was to be 100 copies. The subscription forms 
were to be returned to 3 rue du Marche des Patriarches, the offices o f Le Paria.117 This 
may be a sign that Quoc had taken to heart the reproaches o f Phan Chu Trinh regarding his 
elite-oriented journalism. He seems to have run out o f time for this new project, however. 
On 13 June 1923 he would suddenly disappear from his home in Paris, and would not be 
spotted again by the French authorities until the autumn, when his name would appear in 
the Moscow press. Nguyen The Truyen would become the editor o f Vietnam Hon.
How his voyage to Moscow was organized and who was the instigator is not known. The 
idea that he was spotted by a Comintern talent scout such as Manuilsky at the French 
Party’s 1922 Congress is plausible, but it does not appear, as the next chapter will show, 
that he went to Moscow as someone who had already been picked out for long-term 
Comintern service. It is equally plausible that he and the members of the Intercolonial 
Union desired direct contact with the Comintern so that they could provoke more action 
within the the FCP on colonial issues. Quoc himself may have initiated the trip in order to 
explore ways o f getting back to Indochina with Comintern support. (The next chapter will 
explore Quoc’s early contacts with the Comintern.) But it would appear that the 
Vietnamese patriots in France were preparing some kind of concerted action. By June the 
Surete had heard that Phan. Chu Trinh was trying to return to Paris from Castres, where he
114 AOM, SPCE 365, Note de l’Agent de Villier, 27 Feb. 1923
115 AOM, SPCE 365, Note de la Prefecture de Police, 18 Feb. 1923
116 AOM, SPCE 365, note de 1’Agent de Villier, 4 April 1923
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had gone after his unannounced departure from the Colonial Exhibition in Marseille.118 
Trinh wrote to Quoc to ask for a loan o f 340 francs to pay for his travel and living expenses 
until he could find work in Paris. But as Quoc himself was short of money, and none o f the 
other Vietnamese was inclined to advance this sum, it may be that Quoc and Trinh missed 
this last chance to meet.119
Quoc’s departure from Paris was a carefully organized operation. In early June he put out 
the word that he would be going on an eight-day holiday in the Savoie region with the Club 
du Faubourg. He had confessed to the concierge at 6 Villa des Gobelins that he would 
have liked to go to the Swiss Alps, but that he didn’t want to face the humiliation o f being 
refused a passport. Then on 15 June, Agent ‘Desire’ reported that on the 13th Quoc had 
left his residence without any baggage. His friends seemed to think that his holiday would 
be a brief one. The office hours at the Union were covered by Monnerville from 
Martinique; at a meeting o f the Paria group at the end of June, none o f the six people 
present, including Phan Van Truong and Nguyen The Truyen, volunteered to get the paper 
ready for the printer. ‘They decided to wait for the return o f Nguyen Ai Quoc for that,’ 
reported Desire.120 At the end o f the summer Phan Chu Trinh wrote to Nguyen Van Ai, 
a.k.a. Agent de Villier, to accuse him of foul play in Quoc’s disappearance. (Ai had 
become a vital member o f the Paria collective, but his role o f informer had somehow 
become known to Trinh.)
Even though Nguyen Ai Quoc is young and he doesn’t act on mature reflection, this is 
not important because he really has the heart o f a patriot. He left his family and 
travelled to Europe and America, working miserably to educate himself, without any help 
from anyone... If he makes mistakes or not, that is not the question, because all the 
Vietnamese repect his ardent heart.. .Let those who want to follow him follow, and those 
who don’t can leave him alone to get on with his work.
Why did you betray him, with your cowardly and underhand methods? He trusted you 
like a brother... why did you try to make trouble for him? I ask you for the truth, where 
did you incite him to go?121
It was Albert Sarraut himself who signed the secret telegram to the Governor General in 
Hanoi sent October 11 1923, to inform him that Nguyen Ai Quoc’s trace had been picked 
up in Moscow. Bloncourt, his colleague from Dahomey, had paid his passage with funds 
from the Intercolonial Union, an informer revealed.122 By November the rumour began to
117 AOM, SPCE 365, envoi S.R. Paris no. 695, 30 May 1923
118 AOM, SPCE 372, telegramme n. 244, De Guesde, 20 March 1923.
119 AOM, SPCE 365, envoi S.R. Paris 728, 14 June 1923
120 AOM, SPCE 365, notes de Desire, 15 June and 6 July 1923
121 AOM, SPCE 372, signe Trinh, envoi du S.R. Paris, 5 Sept. 1923
122 AOM, SPCE 365, Paris, Colonies a Gouvemeur General a Hanoi, signe Sarraut, 11 Oct 1923
48
get around that Quoc would soon be returning to Paris.123 Phan Van Truong was booked to 
return to Vietnam in mid-December, but he put off his departure once in the hope that 
Quoc would return with news from Moscow, the French believed. Finally on 23 
December, apparently having given up waiting, Tmong sailed, carrying with him a number 
o f issues o f Le Paria124. Quoc and the two Phans had seen the last o f each other.
In Nguyen Ai Quoc’s new political life opening before him in Moscow, the basic elements 
would remain those which had served him in his months of campaigning in Paris. One o f 
these was the Marxist-Leninist framework for his attack on colonialism. I will discuss this 
in detail in the next chapter. But one should remember that alongside this radically modem 
outlook he retained the ethos o f Confucian patriotism and duty which had driven his 
father’s contemporaries to oppose the French. Quoc was moving into the Comintern 
world of internationalism, yet he remained rooted in the traditions o f Vietnamese 
nationalism -  the family and regional ties which linked him to Phan Chu Trinh, to Cuong 
De and Phan Boi Chau in China and perhaps, still, to his father, who had become an 
itinerant eccentric, wandering from pagoda to pagoda in Cochinchina.125 When he left 
Paris his ties to the leftists Phan Van Tmong and Nguyen The Tmyen were as strong as 
ever, and he would rely on such connections when he became a Comintern agent based in 
Canton.
Was the Nguyen Ai Quoc o f 1923 someone with firmly fixed political ideas? I would 
argue that in many respects his world view was already formed by his teenage experiences 
with the French, his failures at the Paris Peace Conference, and his early exposure to 
Lenin’s theories on imperialism. Yet he had also begun to demonstrate the tactical 
flexibility o f a pragmatic politician. Although he joined the Freemasons, for example, in 
an effort to broaden his contacts in influential segments o f French society, he later accepted 
the Fourth Comintern Congress recommendation that party members cut their links to the 
Masons and the French League o f Human Rights.126 This lack of ideological rigidity, 
which some would come to see as a Machiavellian streak, was a trait which undoubtedly 
helped Nguyen Ai Quoc survive his long years with the Comintern.
123 AOM, SPCE 365, note de l’agent Desiree, Nov. 1923
124 AOM, SPCE 365, folder 1923, no. 992/S.R., Paris, 26 Dec. 1923
125 AOM, SPCE 365, Saigon 13 Nov. 1923
126 AOM, SPCE 365, note conf. no. 479 S.R., folder 1922
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The Comintern Recruit (1923 -  24)
1. First Contacts in Moscow
Nguyen Ai Quoc reached Petrograd (now once again St. Petersburg) by ship on 30 June 
1923 from the North Sea port o f Hamburg. In Berlin the Comintern network had provided
at a time when the first revolutionary illusions o f the Bolshevik leaders had passed. The 
command economy of war communism had led to widespread peasant discontent in 1921; 
all attempts to ignite a revolution in more developed European countries had failed. When 
a second effort at German revolution was made in October 1923, just months after Quoc’s 
arrival in Moscow, it was met by indifference among the German working class.
Trotsky’s stirring promise of 1919, that the ‘hour o f the proletarian dictatorship in Europe’ 
would be the hour o f liberation for the ‘colonial slaves of Africa and Asia’, 2 may have 
sounded somewhat hollow to impatient colonial activists by the end o f 1923. Moreover, 
Lenin, the undisputed leader and prophet of the October Revolution, had been incapacitated 
by a stroke in December 1922. So it was that Quoc arrived in the communist capital when 
fundamental assumptions about the path to world communism were being questioned and a 
leadership crisis was just beginning. This period from the end of the Civil War in 1921 
until Stalin’s consolidation of power in 1929 became what Stephen Cohen calls ‘the great 
discussion period in party history’ .3
The official reason for Quoc’s invitation to Russia was the first International Peasants’ 
Conference, which opened in the Kremlin’s Andreyev Hall on October 10, 1923. This 
conference marked the founding o f the ‘Peasant International’ or Krestintem, a body 
which was to bring together leaders o f left-wing agrarian parties and peasant associations 
from Europe, Asia and America. It was designed to function as a legal organization 
including non-communists, but its Moscow connection was never very well-disguised. 
Listed among the speakers bringing greetings o f solidarity on the second day o f the 
meeting was a ‘Miguel-al-Kvak’ from Indochina.4 (The Russian transcription o f
1 Photostat copy in 495,201,1, Ho Chi Minh’s personal file.
2 Leon Trotsky, Manifesto o f the Communist International, in John Riddell, ed., Founding the 
Communist International, Proceedings and Documents o f the First Congress, (New York: Pathfinder 
Book, the Anchor Foundation, 1987), pp. 227-8.
3 Stephen Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), p. 124.
4 Kooperativnoe Delo, [Cooperative News], Moscow newspaper, 14 Oct. 1923.
him with a Russian travel document in the name of Chen Vang.1 He was coming to Russia
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Vietnamese names does not always convey the Vietnamese sounds closely, but this one is 
particularly fanciful.) Quoc did not waste his speech o f greeting on formalities: he 
launched directly into a quick exposition o f the situation of the peasants o f the French 
colonies. ‘You are peasants and farmers o f Europe and America. You are exploited as 
proletarians,’ he told the delegates. ‘But we others in the French colonies are doubly 
exploited, as proletarians and as conquered races,’ he said. ‘A white owner can come and 
make a request to the government, and whole villages will be expropriated, villages which 
our fathers and ancestors inhabited and which we still cultivate.’5 He made sure that the 
anti-war resolution passed by the Congress raised the issue o f colonial oppression, by 
writing an amendment which demonstrated th a t , ‘the peasants of the colonies constitute a 
very important factor in questions o f war and peace... .’.6 Quoc was elected to the 
Krestintem Presidium of 11 people at the opening session, along with one other Asian, the 
Japanese Ken Hayasho.7
The Krestintem’s founding reflected the turn towards compromise with the Russian 
peasantry which was at the heart o f Lenin’s New Economic Policy (NEP). Instituted in 
March 1921, the NEP replaced grain requisitioning with a tax in kind and gradually came 
to encompass a return to market forces and capitalism in agriculture, trade and small scale 
manufacturing. By August of 1923 the policy had succeeded to the extent that the Russian 
capital managed to host a well-publicized agricultural exhibition to demonstrate the 
country’s return to economic normalcy. Foreign left-wing leaders who attended the 
exhibition were invited to stay on for the peasant conference.
The Krestintem’s creation was also a direct result of the evolving united front policy o f the 
Communist International. The reaffirmation o f the worker-peasant alliance in Russia which 
the NEP signalled was accompanied by a gradual change in the Bolsheviks’ attitude 
towards allies abroad. The European working class having proved to be a disappointment, 
the Russians were prodding the Comintern to look to the ‘world peasantry’ as comrades in 
the march towards the socialist future. At the Bolsheviks’ Twelfth Party Conference in 
April 1923, Bukharin had advanced the idea that the peasantry of colonial countries was a 
‘gigantic reservoir of revolutionary infantry’.8 The Comintern had formed an Agrarian 
Commission in 1923, following its IV Congress at the end o f 1922. The Commission’s 
task was to ‘oversee and concretize the slogan o f the worker and peasant government
5RC, 535,1,2, p. 18.
6 Ibid., pp. 68-9.
7RC, 535,1,1, p. 45.
8 Stephen Cohen, op.cit., p. 149.
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within the various parties’.9 This slogan signified the Bolsheviks’ acceptance o f reality: 
in a hostile world socialist Russia needed more allies than just the proletariat o f the 
capitalist West. Although the workers were still seen in classic Marxist terms as the 
leading force o f revolution, it was now acceptable to revise M arx’s injunction and to call 
on ‘Peasants and workers o f the world’ to unite.10 The Comintern’s Agrarian Commission 
organized the International Peasants’ Conference in October which brought Nguyen Ai 
Quoc to Moscow.
Nguyen Ai Quoc arrived in Russia expecting to remain for three months. ‘For one reason 
or another, my departure was put off from week to week, and then from month to month,’ 
he wrote in 1924 to an unnamed comrade.11 His immediate goal when he arrived in 
Moscow seems to have been to draw attention to the failures o f the French Communist 
Party’s Committee for Colonial Studies, which later became its Colonial Commission. He 
in fact made a detailed report on these failings in July 1923 to the Indonesian Commission 
of the Comintern’s Eastern Section, which I will discuss below.12 Composed o f Grigory 
Voitinsky, Voja Vujovic, and Boris Souvarine, the Indonesian Commission seems to have 
been thought the most appropriate to consider the affairs of a colony neighbouring Java.13 
Voitinsky helped to found the Chinese Communist Party in 192014 and would become the 
Comintern representative in Shanghai in April 1924.15 Like Mikhail Borodin, he had lived 
for several years in exile in the United States. Quoc maintained a cordial relationship with 
Voitinsky until at least 1927, when both had to leave China.
From Quoc’s communications with the Comintern in Moscow it is clear that he requested 
help in returning to Indochina via China as soon as he arrived in the Russian capital. In a 
rather bad-tempered letter which he addressed to anonymous ‘camarades’ in March 1924 
(the handwritten date is unclear, but his reference to a nine-month stay would make the
date roughly March), he wrote, ‘ it was decided when I arrived in Moscow that after a
stay o f three months I would leave for China to try to establish contacts with my country. 
But here it is the ninth month o f my stay and my sixth month o f waiting, and a decision 
about my departure still has not been made.’ He continued: ‘I don’t think it is necessary to
9 G.M. Adibekov, E.N. Shakhnazarova, K.K. Shirinya, Organizatsionnaia Struktura Kominterna, [The
Organizational Structure o f the Komintern], (Moscow: Rosspen, 1997), p. 79.
10 This slogan was printed on the Krestintem’s stationery.
URC, 495,154,594, p. 4; letter of 11 Sept. 1924.
12 The written version of this report is in 495,154,594.
13 Adibekov et al., op. cit, p. 73.
14 Hans J. Van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1991), p.
61.
15 C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Missionaries o f Revolution: Soviet Advisers and
Nationalist China, 1920-1927, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1989), p. 6.
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t.
speak here o f revolutionary and nationalist movements, old or recent; o f the existence or 
non-existence o f workers’ organizations, o f the agitation of secret and other societies, 
because I have no intention o f submitting a thesis to you; I want only to make you feel the 
necessity of studying EVERYTHING in a precise manner, and if  NOTHING should 
exist, to create SOMETHING,’ (emphasis in original) Among the four goals of his trip he 
listed ‘to establish relations between Indochina and the International’, and ‘to try to 
organize a base for information gathering and propaganda’. He requested a budget of one- 
hundred U.S. dollars per month to cover local travel, correspondence, subscriptions, food 
and lodging; in addition he asked for the money for his voyage from Russia to China.16 It 
would not be until after the Fifth Comintern Congress in June 1924 that a concrete 
recommendation would be made to send Quoc to Canton.17 There are probably several 
reasons why the Comintern and its Eastern Section were slow to assign Quoc a specific 
task. For a start, the form which Russian aid to Sun Yatsen would take was only 
gradually worked out following Mikhail Borodin’s arrival in Canton in the autumn of 1923. 
The military officers who would become instructors to the Guomindang army did not 
arrive in China until June, July and October of 1924.18 Moreover, as the buildup to the 
Fifth Congress began, Comintern decision-makers were obviously preoccupied with the 
post-mortem o f the German uprising, and as was often the case, had more pressing matters 
than Indochina to deal with. It is also likely that the Comintern bureaucracy used Quoc’s 
extended stay in Moscow to size him up and investigate his political links.
2. The Development o f  Comintern Policy fo r  Colonial Countries
By the time Nguyen Ai Quoc arrived in Russia, the Comintern had grown from a loose 
federation o f communist and other left-wing party representatives into a permanent 
bureaucracy selected in Moscow, one increasingly influenced by internal Russian politics. 
Starting with the Fourth Congress (5 November to 5 December 1922) the Comintern 
Executive Committee was chosen by its own congresses instead of by member parties. The 
aim was to turn the Comintern into a ‘truly centralized, united party’.19 At its founding in 
1919, the Russian comrades had been less obviously dominant in decision-making, even 
though of the fifty-two activists attending that meeting, only seven were able to come 
from outside Russia. Three east Asian socialists living in Russia attended the First 
Congress: Liu Shaozhou and Zhang Yongkui o f the Alliance o f Chinese Workers, and a
16RC, 495,154,594, letter numbered 26, 353e, date illegible.
17 See letter of 11 Sept. 1924 in 495,154,594, discussed below.
18 Wilbur and How, op. cit., p. 7.
19 Adibekov et al., op. cit., pp. 63-4.
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Korean known as Comrade Kain representing the Korean Workers League.20 There was 
also a group o f central Asians representing territories of the former czarist empire. 
Bukharin pointed out in a Pravda article that support for the oppressed colonies in their 
liberation struggle was one o f the things which distinguished the new Communist or Third 
International from the Second, socialist democratic one. ‘It is no accident that at the first 
congress of our Communist International for the first time we heard a speech in the 
Chinese language,’ he wrote.21 Yet the three East Asians, all resident in Russia, were only 
allotted consultative votes, while the ‘United Group o f the Eastern Peoples o f  Russia’ 
collectively received just one full vote.22 The Asians’ junior status at the 1919 congress 
reflected the belief that revolution in Europe was imminent and therefore more important 
than the colonial liberation struggle. As Trotsky said in his Comintern Manifesto, 
addressed to the ‘proletariat o f the entire world’: ‘The liberation of the colonies is possible 
only together with the liberation o f the working class in the imperialist centers. The 
workers and peasants, not only o f Annam, Algeria and Bengal, but also o f Persia and 
Armenia, will gain the possibility o f an independent existence only when the workers of 
Britain and France have toppled Lloyd George and Clemenceau and taken state power into 
their own hands.’23
The first programme for what the Comintern called the ‘colonial and semi-colonial 
countries’, was drawn up at its Second Congress in 1920. This programme, drafted by 
Lenin, became the Theses on National and Colonial Questions. (The early draft was what 
Quoc would have read in THumanite in July 1920.) It was hotly debated in the colonial 
commission at the Congress but eventually accepted, with extensive revisions, as the 
official Comintern line. Since this programme embraces the key political issues of 
Nguyen Ai Quoc’s communist career, it seems important to explore the debate it 
provoked within the Comintern. This debate, in various forms, would recur at intervals 
within Asian communist parties until at least the 1970s.
The Lenin who drafted these theses had grown more cautious than the Lenin o f 1917. 
Although his programme was not a precise set o f guidelines for action, it was the source o f 
the theory o f the united front, which, was successfully put into practice by both Chinese 
and Vietnamese communists at the start o f World War II. It was after reading the Theses in 
the summer of 1920 in I'Humanite that Nguyen Ai Quoc claims to have become a
20 Riddell, op. cit., pp. 204-6 and 221-2.
21 Pravda, 6 March 1919, cited in Riddell, op. cit., pp. 307-8.
22 Riddell, op. cit., pp. 180-1.
23 Ibid., p. 227.
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convinced Leninist.24 When they were published in their amended form after debate in 
the Congress’s Colonial Commission, accompanied by a somewhat contradictory set 
written by the Indian communist Mahendra Nath Roy, they left plenty o f room for differing 
interpretations. Yet they would remain an important element o f Marxist-Leninist dogma 
over the years. Although a new, more radical programme for colonial countries was put 
forward by Otto Kuusinen at the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928, he still felt the need to 
claim that his theses were an outgrowth of Lenin’s 1920 programme, which he said still 
had full validity as ‘the guiding line for further work of the communist parties’.25
Lenin’s theses establish the importance o f the colonial countries in the world scheme of 
revolution. They are a logical development o f his analysis of world capitalism, On 
Imperialism, published in 1917. As the source o f raw materials and cheap labour for 
western capitalism, the colonial countries were crucial to its power, Lenin theorized. If  the 
western working class could ally with the oppressed people of the colonies to help them 
achieve independence, he reasoned, they would strike an important blow against the 
enemies o f communism.
A second key aspect o f the Theses was the idea that during a first, national bourgeois stage 
o f the colonial revolution, communists would have to work with and even within the 
nationalist parties, as there was not a large enough colonial proletariat to bring about 
revolution on its own. Only after the goals of the bourgeois revolution had been attained — 
national independence and an end to feudalism in the countryside -  could the socialist 
revolution begin, led by the working class. Lenin allowed that if the workers in the newly- 
liberated colony were aided by developed states where communism had been established, 
they might be able to by-pass the capitalist stage of development and move directly to 
socialism. This would seem to be an echo o f the ‘separate path’ theory of the Russian 
Populists.
There were both Asians and Europeans at the Second Congress who were uneasy with the 
idea that communists should work with bourgeois nationalists in their countries’ 
independence movements. The social democrats o f the Second International were looked 
on as unreliable reformists, too willing to compromise with the capitalist ruling classes. 
Their support o f their governments’ war aims during the First World War was seen by the
24 See ‘Comment J’ai Choisi le Leninisme,’ ‘How I Chose Leninism’, in Ho Chi Minh\ Action et 
Revolution, ed. Colette Capitan-Peter, (Paris: Union Generale d’Editions, 1968) -  article written in 
April 1960 for the Soviet journal, Problems o f Asia.
25 Jane Degras, The Communist International, 1919-1943, Documents, vol II, (London: Frank Cass and 
Co. Ltd., 1971), p. 530.
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more radical socialists who formed the Third International as a betrayal o f internationalist 
ideals. Eventually the delegates persuaded Lenin to change the phrase, ‘bourgeois 
nationalist movements’ to ‘national revolutionary movements’.26 Other phrases were 
inserted into the final version of the Theses to soften Lenin’s united front tactics enough to 
make them palatable to the delegates. For example, in article 11a, which calls for 
communist parties ‘to support with deeds’ the revolutionary liberation movement in ‘the 
states and nations that have a more backward, predominantly feudal, patriarchal, or 
patriarchal-peasant character’, the following condition was added; ‘The form the support 
should take must be discussed with the Communist Party o f the country in question, if  there 
is such a party.’27 Yet there was no disguising the fact that Lenin had made it acceptable 
for communists to dispense, albeit temporarily, with Marxist class warfare in these 
‘backward’ nations. The Dutch communist ‘M aring’ (Henk Sneevliet) seems to have been 
instrumental in swaying the delegates. His experience of organizing in Java during the 
First World War, when radical socialists joined the nationalist Sarekat Islam party to fight 
the Dutch, became a model for Comintern tactics in China. His approach was purely 
pragmatic: bourgeois and communist forces had to work together in colonial countries, 
because the communists would be insignificant on their own.28
The Supplementary Theses on National and Colonial Questions written by M.N. Roy 
were also accepted by the Second Congress’s Colonial Commission in amended form.
The emphasis o f Roy’s theses on differences between the colonial bourgeoisie and 
working class is in open contradiction to Lenin’s platform; Lenin apparently preferred to 
leave a degree o f latitude for differing interpretations, rather than alienate a valuable ally 
from Britain’s largest colony. Roy’s distance from Lenin is clear from his article 7:
‘There are to be found in the dependent countries two distinct movements that grow further 
apart from each other every day. One is the bourgeois-democratic nationalist movement, 
with a program o f political independence under the bourgeois order, and the other is the 
mass action of the ignorant and poor peasants and workers for their liberation from all sorts 
o f exploitation. The former endeavors to control the latter and often succeeds to a certain 
extent. But the Communist International and its affiliated parties must struggle against this 
and help to develop class consciousness in the working masses o f the colonies.’ In some 
versions of this article the following sentence is included as a compromise: ‘For the
26 See Riddell version of the Theses, article 6, in Workers o f the World and Oppressed Peoples, Unite!, 
Proceedings and Documents o f the Second Congress, 1920, vol. 1, (New York: Pathfinder Press, 
1991), p. 285.
27 Ibid., pp. 287-8..
28 Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924, (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1953), 
p. 53.
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overthrow o f foreign capitalism, the first step toward revolution in the colonies, the 
cooperation of the bourgeois-nationalist revolutionary elements is useful.’ 29
Maring, who chaired the Colonial Commission at the Congress, was able to smooth over 
what might have been viewed as-a glaring contradiction. He claimed that Comrade Lenin’s 
and Comrade Roy’s theses ‘mean the same thing’. ‘The difficulty lies only in finding the 
correct approach to the relationship between the revolutionary-nationalist and socialist 
movements in the backward countries and colonies,’ he said. ‘In practice this problem 
does not exist. It is essential there to work together with the revolutionary-nationalist 
forces, and we are doing only half the job if  we deny this movement and pose as doctrinaire 
M arxists.’30 The pragmatic Maring was, however, ignoring the problems inherent in his 
solution. Allen Whiting points out that this compromise only papered over the cracks 
which would later destroy the united front in China: ‘The complicated verbiage o f the 
prolific resolutions served as a convenient screen, covering the conflict between Lenin’s 
tactics for revolution and the Asian’s hatred o f those they considered their native 
exploiters. With this conflict unresolved, the “united front” tactic in China faced not only 
suspicion from the Right but confusion on the Left.’31 Inevitably united fronts based on 
Lenin’s Theses would be only temporary phenomena. They did not erase the philosophical 
differences between those who saw the development of communism as an organic process 
which would take time to complete and those who, like Lenin in 1917, wanted to force the 
pace o f change.
3.. Nguyen Ai Quoc and his Place in the Comintern
In spite o f the Comintern’s increasing attention to the peasantry, when Nguyen Ai Quoc 
arrived in Moscow in July o f 1923, his report on anti-imperialist activities in France was 
highly critical o f the organization. While China’s republicans were being courted by 
Russian diplomats and special envoys, the more distant colonies of France had clearly not 
attracted Russia’s interest. In the end, Quoc’s Comintern-sponsored return to Asia became 
possible as a result of and within the framework of the Russian mission to Republican 
China. To all appearances, when he arrived in Moscow Quoc was speaking still as a 
representative o f the Intercolonial Union in Paris, and may have composed his report 
jointly with his colleagues there. He complained that the Second Congress Theses on 
National and Colonial Questions had stirred up the expectation in the colonies that the
29 Riddell, Workers o f the World., vol. 1, p. 220-1; see his note 6 on various renditions of this article.
30 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 258.
31 Allen S. Whiting, op. cit., p. 54.
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Third International would bring about their emancipation. But so far these Theses were 
just ‘decorations on paper’, he wrote. On the other hand, the Theses had caused the 
imperialists to redouble their efforts in propaganda, obscurantism, and repression, he 
reported, without producing any action on the part of the French or British parties.32 
Opportunities to support colonial movements such as a strike in Martinique and a revolt in 
Dahomey had passed without any action, he said. ‘It is not without irony and not without 
sadness that my unfortunate Dahomian brothers, in the darkness o f their civilizing prisons, 
read the eighth of the 21 Conditions [for Comintern admission], which states that “Each 
party undertakes to carry out systematic propaganda in its country’s army against the 
oppression o f the colonial population; and that it must support the liberation movement in 
the colonies with actions as well as words.’”
The death o f Lenin in the bitterly cold January o f 1924 opened the way to a period of 
factional struggle in the Comintern. Joining the crowds who waited hours in the cold to 
view the dead leader, Quoc suffered from frostbitten fingers and nose.33 This show of 
devotion can not have harmed his political fortunes. In the next months and years he 
managed to avoid being identified as an acolyte o f Leon Trotsky, whose influence in 
Kremlin politics had begun to wane as Lenin withdrew from active political life. Many of 
Quoc’s colleagues and patrons in the French party, including Boris Souvarine of the 
Comintern’s Indonesian Commission and Jacques Doriot, who later became Quoc’s patron 
when he ran the FCP’s Colonial Commission, would not fare so well. Quoc should have 
learned a valuable lesson about political survival from his first autumn in Moscow, when 
he would have witnessed Trotsky’s last successful political campaign. This was the 
campaign for Workers’ Democracy.
Lenin himself had begun to advocate the democratization o f the party in 1921 at the 10th 
Party Congress. But the sailors’ revolt at Kronstadt, the start o f the NEP and his own 
illness all conspired to torpedo his project. Trotsky began to promote this course in an 
October 8 1923 letter to the Central Committee in which he decried the practice of 
appointing party secretaries from above. His initiative received the backing o f 46 well- 
known party members, who wrote a letter supporting his initiative to the Central 
Committee. Faced with wide-spread support for an idea which was clothed in Lenin’s 
mantle, the ruling triumverate of Grigory Zinoviev, Lev Kamenev and Josef Stalin 
consented to the formation o f a committee on workers’ democracy. Trotsky was one o f the 
authors o f the final resolution which appeared in Pravda on December 7, 1923. The text
32 RC, 495,154,594, hand-written report of July 1923.
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called for an end to the ‘bureaucratization’ o f the party, and for free discussion and open 
election of governing officials.34
Within the Poliburo, however, Trotsky was isolated. The ‘Workers’ Democracy’ campaign 
never went beyond resolutions (until it suited Stalin to revive the idea o f electing party 
secretaries); by the time the Fifth Comintern Congress was held in June o f 1924, Trotsky 
was becoming an invisible man. Although he was once again elected to the Presidium (but 
as a candidate member) and contributed an eloquent manifesto on the ‘Tenth Anniversary 
o f the Outbreak o f W ar’,35 this founding member o f the Comintern barely made an 
appearance during the course o f the Congress. Boris Souvarine, who had been 
instrumental in publishing Trotsky’s pamphlet on workers’ democracy, The New Course, 
in French, would be voted out o f the French party at the close o f the Congress. Perhaps it 
was at this stage that Quoc developed his reputation for abstaining from doctrinal debates, 
which the German communist Ruth Fischer recalls in her memories o f Comintern life.
She told Jean Lacouture that, ‘he was temperamentally far more inclined toward action 
than toward doctrinal debates. He was always an empiricist within the movement.’36 
Fischer’s reminiscences, like those o f other Comintern veterans who wrote about Quoc 
after his rise to power, should be viewed cautiously, however. In her book Von Lenin zum  
Mao, she claims that Quoc arrived in Moscow in 1922 to attend the Fourth Comintern 
Congress. As there is no documentary or other evidence to support this, we can assume 
that she has got her facts wrong.37 In any case, as early as 1924 Quoc would have learned 
that to be on the wrong side of an ideological wrangle could mean not only the end o f his 
career as a communist, but also o f any hope o f winning support for Vietnam’s 
independence. His already well-developed secrecy probably made it easy for him to 
conceal his feelings about issues which didn’t directly concern Vietnam.
Quoc’s response to the political pitfalls o f Comintern life was to put his head down and 
charge towards his own carefully circumscribed objective. He concentrated on his efforts 
to goad the Comintern into greater action on colonial issues. In February and again in 
March 1924 he wrote to Zinoviev requesting an interview. In 1920 the latter had become 
the chairman of the Comintern Executive Committee’s ‘Small Bureau’. (At this point 
Quoc was not working in the Comintern offices, he wrote, because o f his frostbitten
33 RC, 495,18,282, p. 5a, letter of 5 Feb., 1924.
34 Max Eastman, Since Lenin Died, (London: The Labour Publishing Company, 1925), pp. 37-8.
35 Jane Degras, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 107-113.
36 Jean Lacouture, op. cit., p.44.
37Lacouture, op. cit., pp. 42-3, citing Ruth Fischer, Von Lenin Znm Mao, (Dusseldorf: Diedrichs, 1956).
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fingers and nose.)38 Apparently Zinoviev passed on these requests to the new head of the 
Eastern Section, Fyodor Petrov (F.F. Raskolnikov), who had been named to replace Karl 
Radek on 8 March 1924.39 (Radek was made a scapegoat for the failure in Germany, but 
became head the Sun Yatsen Academy until 1927.) On 20 May 1924 Quoc addressed a 
three-page typewritten proposal to Petrov. His proposal outlined the rationale for a 
Federation o f Asian Communists. The weakness o f the eastern peoples, he wrote, was 
caused by their isolation from one another.
‘How useful for the Annamites to learn how their brother Hindus are organizing to 
struggle against English imperialism, or how the Japanese workers unite to combat 
capitalism, or how the Egyptians are making sublime sacrifices to demand their liberty,’ 
he enthused. ‘The eastern peoples are generally sentimental; and one example is more 
valuable to them than one hundred propaganda lectures,’ he noted. Quoc suggested that 
the University of the Toilers o f the East, where Asians o f 62 different nationalities were 
studying, should become the base for the creation of a Federation. He was eager to 
organize a preparatory commission before the next Comintern Congress, which was to 
open in June .40
His ideas do not seem to have been acted upon, at least until he himself went to Canton and 
helped to organize the League o f Oppressed Peoples in 1925.41 The Comintern must have 
viewed its own structures in Moscow as sufficient for bringing Asians into contact with 
each other. Thus Vietnamese communists, without their own communist party, remained in 
an ambiguous position, with several directions in which they could look for guidance. 
Vietnamese resident in France could join the French Communist Party; French 
communists seemed to assume that the Vietnamese communists would look for direction 
to the French party’s Colonial Commission, in spite o f the fact that it worked in a half­
hearted way. Within the Comintern’s bureaucracy, however, from 1923 until 1926 
Indochina was grouped in the confusingly named ‘Middle Eastern Section’ o f the Eastern 
Section, which also included India and Indonesia. As the Vietnamese communist 
movement developed, there would be continued confusion about who was responsible for 
guiding it. As it turned out, the rapid growth of communism in China between 1923 and 
1927 became perhaps the major source o f inspiration for Vietnam’s embryonic communist
38 RC, 495,18,282, pp. 5a, 5b and 21b, letters of 5 Feb 1924 and 15 March 1924.
39 Adibekov et al., The Organizational Structure o f the Comintern, p. 74.
40 RC, 495,18,282.
41 The Comintern did hold a Conference of the Toilers of theFar East from 21 Jan. -  2 Feb. 1922, with 
participants from 40 nationalities, but no obvious follow-up. See Riddell, Workers o f the World, vol. 
1, p. 494, n. 20.
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movement, as it did for communist movements in the rest o f Southeast Asia. A number of 
Vietnamese exiled in China would become members o f the CCP before the Vietnamese 
party was founded.
One can surmise that informal contacts among Comintern workers and students at the 
University o f the Toilers o f the East in Moscow became a forum for exchanging 
information and ideas. But with the exception o f Quoc, the Vietnamese did not have this 
opportunity before 1925 or 1926, when the first Indochinese students, sent from Paris, 
were formally enrolled.42 Founded in 1921 to train communist cadres, the University by 
1924 was educating Asians from within the borders of the Soviet state and growing 
numbers o f foreigners. An enrollment list o f East and Southeast Asians for that year 
showed 67 Koreans, 109 Chinese, six Malays or Indonesians, and 16 Mongolians.43 There 
is no formal record of Nguyen Ai Quoc having studied there before 1936, although Russian 
author Yevgeny Kobelev cites a 15 March 1924 interview with Quoc from the Italian 
communist newspaper L ’Vn ita, in which Quoc describes his studies at the University.44 
M.N. Roy also claims that Quoc studied at the school.45 As Quoc’s first formal attachment 
in Moscow was to the Krestintem, it is possible that he received some sort of training in 
peasant organizing during his first stay there.
Nguyen Ai Quoc received a pass as a ‘non-staff worker’ for the Comintern offices in April, 
1924.46 One of his main occupations in Moscow was preparing reports on Vietnam and 
writing short articles for the communist press. He may have revised the manuscript which 
he had begun in France, which was at last published as Le Proces de la Colonisation 
Francaise by the Librairie du Travail in Paris in 1925. The typewritten French 
manuscript o f what appears to be another brochure by Quoc on Indochina is in the 
Comintern archives, but there is no sign that it was published. It included a brief section on 
Vietnam’s history and geography, as well as chapters on the confiscation of Vietnamese 
land by the unscmpulous French administration 47 Another of Quoc’s journalistic efforts in 
Moscow was his 1924 article, ‘Lenin and the Peoples o f the East’. He wrote one version, 
an eight-page article explaining Lenin’s views on imperialism and colonial liberation,
42 Anatoly Sokolov, ‘Podgotovka Vietnamskikh Revolyutsionerov v Kommunisticheskhikh Vuzakh 
Sovietskoi Rossii v 20-30 godakh’, [‘Training of Vietnamese Revolutionaiies in the Communist 
Institutes of Soviet Russia in the Twenties and Thirties] in Traditsionnyi Vietnam, [  Traditional 
Vietnam], (Moscow: Vietnamskikh Tsentr, M.S.U., 1996), p. 145.
43 RC, 532,1,12
44 Yevgeny Kobelev, Ho Chi Minh, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1989), p. 69.
45 M.N. Roy, The Men I  Knew, (Bombay: Lalvani Pub., 1968), p. 138.
46 RC, 495,201,1
47 RC, 495,154,595, draft brochure is only document in file.
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which has far more substance than the emotional paean which was printed under this title 
in Pravda on 27 January 1924 following Lenin’s death. But the condensed version gives a 
faithful reflection of Quoc’s obsessions at this stage o f his life. ‘Accustomed to being 
treated as backwards and inferior beings, they [the Asian peoples] see in Lenin the 
personification of universal brotherhood,’ he wrote. \ . .They feel veneration for him which 
is akin to filial piety.’48 Lenin’s Theses and the Comintern’s promises to colonial peoples 
were perhaps the first sign which Quoc had seen that anyone in the West would take his 
views o f French oppression seriously.
4. The Fifth Comintern Congress
When the Fifth Comintern Congress opened in Moscow in June 1924, Quoc felt obliged to 
maintain his pressure on the West European communists to pay more serious attention to 
their colonies. All three of his recorded interventions at the Congress are narrowly focused 
on the need for more action on colonial issues. Quoc apparently retained the passion and 
self-assurance of his early years in Paris. He was, however, given only a consultative 
vote.49 Barely thirty years old, he was not shy about lecturing the elite o f world 
communism on their shortcomings -  he intervened at length during the extended debate on 
national and colonial questions. He was harsh on the English and French parties: ‘All that 
our parties have done in this domain is equal to zero,’ he chided. ‘In French West Africa 
military conscription is carried out via completely unbelievable methods o f compulsion, 
and our press says nothing about this. In Indochina the colonial powers have become 
slave-traders and sell the natives o f Tonkin to planters in the Pacific Islands; they have 
raised the length o f military service for indigenous people from two years to four; they are 
handing over a large portion o f the colony to a consortium o f sharks... and our press 
maintains a stubborn silence.’50 He suggested several measures which, he said, could be 
immediately implemented — a colonial forum in the newspaper L ’Humanite, intensified 
propaganda and recruitment among colonial peoples, sponsorship o f colonial students at 
the University o f the East in Moscow, organization of the colonial workers in France, and 
obliging party members to take an interest in the colonial question.51
48RC, 495,154,596, the longer version is pp. 14a-22; the condensed is pp. 23-5.
49 RC,495,154,577, p. 36. Undated report on ICP apparently prepared by Vera Vasilieva before the 
Vllth Comintern Congress.
50 Pyatyi vsemirnyi kongress III Kommunisticheskovo internatsionala, [Fifth World Congress o f the 
III Communist International], vol. 1, (Leningrad: Stenograficheskii Otchet, 1925), p. 655: 22nd 
Session, 1 July 1924.
51 Ibid., p. 657
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Quoc’s final intervention, during a debate on the agrarian question, was obviously carefully 
planned. He spoke as a specialist on the peasants of the French colonies, not just on 
Indochina. His own research and articles by his Parisian colleagues for Le Paria were 
probably the basis for his speech. He did not waste time with the ideological niceties: such 
questions as percentages o f poor, middle or rich peasants and landlords. In his view, the 
95% of the French colonial populations who were peasants were ‘absolutely exploited’.52 
Land confiscation by French capitalists was at the root of their exploitation. In Vietnam, 
he said, ‘When the French conquered this colony, the war drove peasants out o f their 
villages. As a result, when they returned home, they found their land had been occupied by 
concessionaires, following the victorious army. They handed out land which for centuries 
had been populated and worked by the natives.’53 He painted a dark picture o f abuse, worst 
o f all for the peasants of Equatorial Africa, where ‘the old folk, women and children are 
imprisoned, mistreated, tortured, starved, martyred and sometimes murdered’.54 Quoc 
equated liberation from the colonial yoke with the proletarian revolution. ‘It is up to the 
International to help these miserable peasants to organize. It is up to them to show the path 
to proletarian revolution and emancipation,’ he implored.55 One wonders how much his 
memories o f Central Vietnam in 1908 influenced his view of French oppression -  the 
injustice which he had witnessed as a teenager must still have motivated him, as it had in 
Paris. In fact, when he reported to the Profintem in July, 1924 about the situation o f the 
Vietnamese proletariat, he spoke o f the ‘brutal repression and bloody cruelty’ o f the 
French in 1908.56 The timing o f the bourgeois-democratic revolution or relations between 
workers and peasants do not seem to have overly concerned him in 1924.
The Fifth Congress, while it marked Quoc’s real debut on the Comintern stage, was not 
itself a major forum for debate on colonial issues. The widening rift between Trotsky and 
the ruling triumverate in Russia, along with the post-mortem o f the aborted 1923 revolt in 
Germany, overshadowed other issues. And as the dangers o f factionalism within the 
Comintern grew, increasing attention was paid to ‘bolshevik discipline’. The slogan of 
‘Bolshevisation’ made its first appearance at this congress -  the Comintern’s member 
parties were now required to become disciplined parties, ‘permitting no fractions, 
tendencies or groups’.57 They were to be restructured on the model of the Russian 
Bolshevik party. The central organs o f the member parties of the Comintern would be
52 Ibid., 25 Session: 3 July 1924, p. 759.
53 Ibid., p. 759.
54 Ibid., p. 761.
55 Ibid., p. 762.
56 See discussion below of report to the Third Profintem Congress, RC, 534,1,40.
57 Jane Degras, op. cit., p. 154..
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answerable to their own rank and file, but also to the ECCI. The ECCI would be 
responsible for vetting their programmes and all programmatic documents.58
Signs o f the conflict within the Russian party surfaced in the Congress discussion on the 
tactics of united front, which Zinoviev called ‘the most debated question in our ranks’. 59 
Zinoviev himself gave a bleak appraisal o f the tactic and its origins, yet he left no doubt 
that it was going to remain the Comintern line, as well as that o f the Russian party. ‘The 
tactic of the United Front remains correct,’ he said flatly. But he added the proviso that 
‘the question should be put concretely, for every country separately, in accordance with the 
prevailing conditions.’ He made it clear that he saw this tactic, which was returning Russia 
itself to relative economic normalcy, as a retreat:
Looking back on the road that has been traversed, we can see that to the Communist 
International as a whole in 1921-22, the tactics of the united front meant the realisation 
that we have not yet won a majority of the working class; secondly, that social democracy 
is still very strong; thirdly, that we are on the defensive and that the enemy was attacking 
... fourthly, that the decisive fight is not yet on the order o f the day. Hence we advanced 
the slogan: ‘To the masses!’ and later to the tactics of the united front...
For the European parties, the Fifth Congress constituted a move towards the left. Karl 
Radek, who had been advising the German party, had to bear the blame for the failure of 
the 1923 uprising there. Both he and, indirectly, Trotsky were castigated for interpreting 
united front tactics as ‘an organic coalition with social democracy’.60 Yet it should be 
noted that, as Radek and the German party leader Brandler maintained, this coalition had 
been approved by the Comintern in 1923.61 The insistence o f the Comintern and Russian 
leadership on laying the blame for failure on the local executors o f policy foreshadowed 
what would happen after the breakup o f the united front in China, It should also be noted 
that Trotsky was by no means a proponent of cooperation with social democrats. In his 
‘Manifesto o f the Fifth Comintern Congress on the Tenth Anniversary o f the Outbreak of 
W ar’, he criticized the German social democrats for their role in the failed 1923 uprising:
‘ it is precisely at such critical moments, moments of life and death for the bourgeoisie,
when the future o f the workers is at stake, that the social-democrats maliciously destroy the 
united front o f the proletariat, bring irresolution into the workers’ ranks, promote 
discouragement, isolate the communist party, and become the pace-makers of capitalist
58 Adibekov et al., op. cit., p. 94.
59 Inprecor, (English version), no. 41, 16 July 1924, p. 405: speech of 20 June, Third Session.
60Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, The Comintern, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 
47.
61 Jane Degras, The Communist International, vol. II, p. 96.
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reaction.. 62 This point o f view would in a few years become firmly set in Comintern 
thinking and widely propagated by Stalin by 1928-9. In Trotsky’s case in particular, one 
should remember that his policies were rarely the real cause o f the campaigns against him. 
Rather it was his closeness to Lenin and envied status as the founder o f the Red Army 
which motivated the ruling triumverate to isolate him.
French delegate Albert Treint’s comments on the united front seem to sum up the view 
which prevailed at the congress: ‘... The united front is a tactic for the revolutionary 
mobilisation of the masses and not an organised alliance with the social democratic 
leaders... Labour governments and Left Blocs result in bourgeois democracy finding an 
echo within our own parties... to fight against the bourgeoisie means more than ever a fight 
against social democracy, exteriorly (sic), and a fight against the right within the 
International.’ In his closing remarks he stated: ‘We are also: Against the 
debolshevisation of the Russian party; For the Bolshevisation of the fraternal parties, For 
the realization o f the world Bolshevik Party which the Communist International, animated 
by the spirit o f Lenin, must become.’63
Dmitry Manuilsky, a French-speaking Comintern operative from the Ukraine who would 
become identified as a spokesman for Stalin’s viewpoint, did make a pitch at the 
Congress for the united front tactic in the colonies. He raised the fact that the CCP had 
criticized those o f its members who had entered the Guomindang for ‘class collaboration’. 
He admitted that communists had to steer a fine course between taking advantage o f the 
united front tactics which, he said, ‘are revolutionizing the East,’ and losing their 
independent class identity. He wondered aloud whether Asian communists should be 
willing ‘not only to collaborate with petty-bourgeois parties but to take the initiative in 
organizing them in backward countries.’64 (To judge by a letter which he wrote from 
Canton in 1925, Nguyen Ai Quoc had no qualms about this tactic of collaboration or 
infiltration. In a post-script to this letter, written to the French delegation to the Comintern, 
he requested that they approach the Colonial Study Committee o f the French Party in Paris, 
to find out whether Nguyen The Truyen had joined the communist party. If he had, Quoc 
requested that he be given the order, ‘to enter the newly organized Constitutionalist Group 
in Paris, in order to infiltrate it (pour la noyauter).)65
62 Ibid., p. 108.
63 Inprecor, vol. 4, n. 42, 17 July 1924, session of 20 June, p. 416.
64 Pyatyi Vsemirnyi Kongress, 20th Session, 30 June 1924, p. 593.
65 RC, 495, 154, 594, p. 28-back.
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On the whole, however, Manuilsky was careful not to go too far in endorsing united front 
tactics. The bulk o f his intervention concerned the problems of self-determination for the 
Balkan nations and Central Europe. His effectiveness must also have been decreased by 
the sniping of M.N. Roy, who as in 1920, openly disagreed with the Soviet evaluation of 
the nationalist movements in colonies. Roy felt the Comintern should be paying more 
attention to the revolutionary workers and especially peasants in colonial countries.66 As 
he became a full voting member of the ECCI at this congress, his opinions must have 
carried some weight. Quoc’s intervention in this debate, from which I have quoted above, 
came in the session following Roy’s and Katayama’s, the 22nd. It was unambiguously in 
favour o f Comintern action in the colonies, but did not deal directly with the united front 
controversy. He shared with Roy the conviction that the revolution in Europe depended on 
the development o f liberation movements in the colonies, and seemed to be willing to 
finesse a discussion o f how or to whom this support should be offered. His target was the 
inaction of the French communists. He went so far as to warn that the colonial population 
was ‘turning towards democratic and liberal groups such as the League o f Human 
Rights..., which make an effort on their behalf, or at least give the appearance o f doing 
something.’67
Following the Fifth Comintern Congress, Nguyen Ai Quoc also participated in the Third 
Profintem Congress in July. (The Profintem, The Red International o f Trade Unions, was 
founded in 1921.) Again, his overarching theme was the desperate plight o f his nation and 
the need for the French comrades to support their long-suffering brothers in the colonies.
In his five-page report to the Congress, he made the case that there was a growing 
proletariat in Vietnam just waiting to be organized. ‘There are enterprises where 
respectable numbers of workers can be found,’ he said: 3,000 at a textile mill in Tonkin, 
4,000 in the mines o f Halong Bay; 8,000 railway workers and 30,000 employees o f the 
Portland Cement Company. These workers toiled in appalling conditions, according to 
Quoc. They worked 12 to 14 hour days, with longer days on the plantations. There was no 
question of pensions or compensation for accidents; the workers had no right to strike.68 
Worse still was the fact that there existed in Vietnam three categories of forced labour 
which Quoc described as ‘three categories of slavery’.69 First were the prisoners who were 
loaned to factories or plantations ~ they worked handcuffed and yoked at the neck. Next 
were those eligible for the corvee or labour contribution -  all Vietnamese from 18 to 60. 
The number o f days o f free labour to be furnished was fixed only in theory, Quoc said; ‘in
66 Charles McLane, op. cit., pp. 38-9.
67 Pyatyi Vsemirnyi Kongress, 22nd Session, p. 655,
68 RC, 534,1,40, p.34, report delivered at 15* session of Congress, 21 July 1924.
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practice it is indefinite’. ‘When there is a canal to be dug or a road to build or repair, there 
is a general mobilization which can last several months,’ he explained. Third were the 
labourers recruited to be sent to work in France’s Pacific colonies, where Quoc claimed 
they were sold to planters and European factory owners.
The workers’ situation was ‘deplorable’, but not hopeless, Quoc told the Congress. ‘With 
the aid o f revolutionary organizations and principally the Profintem, we can work to wear 
down and then break the yoke o f oppressive capitalism. ’ But the French comrades had to 
make a ‘real undertaking to give effective, practical assistance, and not just with words 
alone’. Quoc drew up a formal resolution, calling on the French unions to support the 
indigenous peoples’ right to unionize and to send at least two permanent organizers to 
Indochina.70 The French delegate, Reynaud, claimed to be well-disposed towards these 
proposals, but did not offer formal support for Quoc’s resolution, as his union had no 
money to send organizers to Vietnam.71
5. The Comintern and the United Front in China
The Comintern pendulum was swinging away from what had become known as ‘united 
fronts from above’, those organized by negotiation among party leaders, to ‘united fronts 
from below’, those created by attracting non-communist workers and peasants to support 
communist actions and programmes. It is ironic that the Russian party and state were at 
this very moment implementing Lenin’s Theses on National and Colonial Questions by 
helping to create a united front entirely from above between the Chinese nationalists in the 
Guomindang and the CCP. This policy was probably not submitted for debate to the 
Comintern; Charles McLane points out that it was a ‘multi-level policy’ involving a 
number o f Soviet party and government branches.72 As Comintern debates were still 
printed more or less in full, it must have been deemed politic not to stage an open 
discussion o f China policy. The Russian Foreign Ministry was not eager to publicize 
Borodin’s advisory role to Sun Yatsen, for fear that it would derail the normalization o f 
relations with the western democracies. (Recently published Russian documents show that 
Borodin was formally attached to the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Beijing mission. Leo 
Karakhan even considered withdrawing Borodin at the end o f 1923, as he feared that Sun
69 RC, 534,1,40, p. 35-6.
70 RC, 534,1,40, p. 38.
71 RC, 534,1,40, p. 66.
72 Charles McLane, op. cit., pp. 44-5.
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Yatsen’s indiscretions regarding Borodin’s advisory role would embarrass the Foreign 
Ministry.73)
Comintern structures with responsibilty for work in the East had undergone constant 
organizational changes from 1919 onwards. To avoid confusion about where and what the 
various Eastern and Far Eastern bureaux and secretariats were, I will give a brief 
explanation o f these changes up to 1924. An Eastern Section ( otdel) of the Comintern 
was established in December 1919 by a decision o f the Executive Committee (ECCI), but 
what it accomplished is not clear.74 In July 1920 a section o f Eastern Peoples was created, 
attached to the Siberian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party in Irkutsk, while an 
Eastern Bureau o f the ECCI was also set up in May 1920 in Vladivostok.75 Then in 
January 1921 a step was taken towards unifying Russian party and Comintern structures 
responsible for the Far East. The Section o f Eastern Peoples in Irkutsk was converted into 
the ‘Comintern representation in the Far East in the form o f a Secretariat’. By March o f 
1921 sixty-eight people were working there, including the future Mongolian leader 
Choibalsan,76 By the end o f 1921 this secretariat had four sections: a Mongolian-Tibetan, 
a Chinese, a Korean and a Japanese.77
But at the Fourth Congress in December 1922, a report revealed that the Eastern sector’s 
work followed no plan and was ‘completely unsystematic’.78 Again a reorganization was 
decreed. A single, all-embracing structure was created, again called the Eastern Section 
( otdel) with Karl Radek named as its head in May 1923. His deputy was Grigory 
Voitinsky. Three divisions were created within the Eastern Section: the Near Eastern 
Section, composed o f Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and 
Persia; the Middle Eastern Section, including British India, Indochina, and Indonesia; and 
the Far Eastern Section o f Japan, Korea, China and Mongolia.79 Indecision or perhaps 
competition for control seems to have caused rapid changes in how Far Eastern activities 
were handled. Immediately after the Fourth Congress, in December 1922, a new 
Vladivostok Bureau o f the Comintern’s Eastern Section had been designated, composed o f 
Voitinsky, Sen Katayama and Maring. But in January of the following year the ECCI’s
73 Go Henyu, M.L. Titarenko et al., VKP(B), Komintern IKitai, Doknmenty, [The Soviet Communist 
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75 Ibid., p. 26.
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78 Ibid., p. 72.
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Organizational Bureau proposed the creation o f a Far Eastern Secretariat directly 
answerable to the Executive Committee itself, not to the Eastern Section. The Far Eastern 
Secretariat was given broader powers than the Vladivostok Bureau, which was officially 
wound up in June 1923. The new secretariat took over the Bureau’s personnel: Voitinsky, 
Katayama and Maring. Although this secretariat was apparently based in Moscow, 
Voitinsky and Maring spent considerable periods in China.80 Conceivably, the change in 
the line o f command was deemed necessary by the Russian Politbureau, which by 1923 had 
decided to take a close interest in Russian and Comintern aid to China. It was, for example, 
the Politbureau and probably Stalin himself who in 1923 chose Mikhail Borodin to lead the 
mission to Sun Y atsen.81 The ECCI was even in Lenin’s day becoming closely controlled 
by its members from the Russian party.82
The Comintern became involved in advising the Chinese communist movement in the 
spring o f 1920, when Voitinsky first travelled to Shanghai and helped Chen Duxiu to 
produce the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) manifesto, which appeared that 
November.83 Maring and another Comintern envoy, Nikolsky, were on hand at the 
Chinese party’s First Congress in July 1921 -- M aring’s own report shows that he raised 
the issue o f a communist-Guomindang alliance during this visit, but that it was rejected by 
the congress.84 Thus the sections o f Lenin’s 1920 Theses which advocated alliances with 
nationalist movements in pre-capitalist countries remained a declaration without any 
tangible results. In August 1922, however, Maring persuaded five o f the CCP’s top leaders 
to accept what became known as the 'Bloc W ithin’ policy.85 This policy called on all CCP 
members to join the Guomindang (GMD), while retaining their own party structures and 
goals.
In 1923 the young Soviet state began to develop a programme of support for Sun Yatsen’s 
republican government in the south o f China. This policy grew out o f Russia’s foreign 
policy objectives -  the search for allies and safe borders -- and was perhaps pursued with 
more speed than the general membership o f the Comintern would have liked. As Charles 
McLane points out, the Comintern was not directly involved in the diplomatic negotiations 
which produced the agreement between Adolf Joffe and Sun Yatsen in January 1923.86 
The Joffe-Sun Agreement sealed M oscow’s offer of aid, and Sun’s conditional acceptance.
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81 Wilbur and How, op. cit., p. 7
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After that it was not just the Comintern which provided advisers to China, but the 
Bolshevik party’s Central Committee, the Red Army Military Academy, the Profintem 
and the International o f Communist Youth as well. After Nguyen Ai Quoc’s arrival in 
Canton the Krestintem would also have its representative there.
The Comintern appears to have functioned in China as one branch o f the Russian aid 
mission, with final decisions becoming the monopoly o f Stalin and the Russian party’s 
Central Committee. Comintern directives to the Chinese party up to m id-1923 show a 
measure o f caution regarding Sun’s intentions. For example, the May 1923 instructions 
of the ECCI to the Third Congress of the CCP decree that the communist party ‘must 
attempt to establish a union o f workers and peasants’; but continue, ‘it goes without saying 
that leadership must belong to the party o f the working class... To strengthen the CP, 
making it a mass party o f the proletariat, to assemble the forces of the working class in 
unions -  this is the overriding obligation o f the communists... \ 87 But the reorganization 
of the Comintern’s structures dealing with the Far East in early 1923 could be viewed as 
evidence that Comintern advisers would be working closely with the Russian Central 
Committee to implement the united front between the Chinese communists and the 
Guomindang. As mentioned above, it was in January 1923, the same month as the Joffe- 
Sun Agreement was signed, that a new Far Eastern Secretariat directly answerable to the 
ECCI was set up. When the CCP’s Third Congress officially adopted the Bloc-within 
policy in June 1923, the stage was set for the beginning of Mikhail Borodin’s mission to 
Canton. Borodin, (Mikhail Grusenberg), a seasoned Comintern operative who had spent 
eleven years in America teaching English to immigrants and organizing Russian socialists, 
left Beijing for Canton in September 1923.
5. Q uoc’s Assignment to Canton
After the Fifth Comintern Congress, Nguyen Ai Quoc finally prodded the Eastern Section 
into taking action on his planned voyage to China. His assignment appears to have been so 
loosely defined, however, that it is difficult to believe that the Comintern leaders who dealt 
with his request had paid it much attention. From his own recapitulation o f events in his 
letter of 9 September 1924, it is clear that he was leaving Moscow with very tenuous 
backing:
86 Charles McLane, op. cit., p.35.
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After the Fifth Congress, the Eastern Section informed me: 1) that it was going to 
recommend me to the Guomindang, for which I would be obliged to work, because 
except for the cost o f the voyage, the section could not give me any financial aid;
2) that I would be there as a private person and not as a Comintern agent; 3) that I 
should have no relationship with our party [this seems to mean the French party, of 
which Quoc was still a member] while in China.
Even though all these conditions seem difficult, I accepted them in order to leave.
To make up for conditions two and three, I asked my party to give me a mandate, 
and to send a letter to the Chinese party, asking them to help me in my work. The 
problem has thus been resolved.88
Still, his departure from Moscow was delayed, this time by a flare up o f the civil war in 
China. ‘The Guomindang hasn’t answered the letter from the Eastern Section. And my 
departure is once more adjourned to ‘an indeterminate date,’ he w ro te .89 None o f these 
difficulties would exist, he continued, if  it were not for the financial problem. He suggested 
that the Comintern simply give him the money to live in China which he was being given 
‘to wait in Moscow and do nothing’.
On the 19 o f September Quoc wrote to Albert Treint, a French Party member who had 
moved into the top ranks of the Comintern at the Fifth Congress. He was a full member o f 
the ECCI as well as on the Secretariat. In this letter Quoc made clear his reservations 
about having to earn a living while in Canton. ‘To work for a living is not a problem, even 
in a country o f which I know the written, but not the spoken language,’ he explained. ‘But 
in my case there are several inconveniences,’ he added. Firstly, he complained, he would 
be living illegally in a city which was ‘swarming with French spies’. Secondly, he said, he 
‘ought to be entirely free to do what I want to do, that is to study the situation, to see 
people and to organize something’. He made a final plea that Treint should put his case to 
the ECCI.90 Treint then approached the Comintern Secretariat, which seems to have had 
the power to make quick decisions, with a request that it advise the Eastern Section to 
reconsider Quoc’s request for financial aid. ‘This is not the time, when the French 
imperialists are starting to intervene in China, when they are using Indochina as their base 
of action, for the Eastern Section to skimp on the work in Indochina -  not if it has the least 
bit o f political sense,’ he wrote.91
87 Jane Degras, The Communist International, voi II, pp. 25-6; directives cited by McLane, pp. 37-8.
88 RC, 495,154,594, letter to an un-named ‘Comrade’. At top someone has written in pencil ‘to 
Voitinsky’. Hong Ha’s contention, repeated by Kobelev, that Quoc went to China as a ‘plenipotentiary 
of the Far Eastern Secretariat’ seems to be mistaken, or at least an overstatement. (Hong Ha, op. cit., p. 
82.)
89 Ibid.
90 RC, 495,18,282, p. 81.
91 RC, 495,18,282, p. 80, letter dated 22 Sept. 1924.
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Apparently Treint’s petition was successful, because Nguyen Ai Quoc at last got to Canton 
on approximately 11 November 1924. When he reported his arrival to a friend in the 
Comintern, he mentioned that he was staying in Comrade Borodin’s home with two or 
three Chinese comrades. He gave his address as Lou, The ROSTA Agency, Canton, 
China.92 It appears that between the 22 of September and his arrival in Canton, someone 
had arranged for him to work as a translator for ROSTA, the Russian Telegraphic Agency, 
a precursor o f the Tass news service. As Borodin had left for China in the autumn of 
1923, the arrangement is unlikely to have been his doing. Most likely it was thanks to 
Voitinsky’s intervention that Quoc found this niche in Canton. Voitinsky was back in 
Moscow at this point, and would return to China in November 1924.93 Correspondence in 
the Comintern archives shows that he had an agent or informant in Beijing, known as Sam 
Slepak, who worked in the ROSTA agency there in 1923. As Slepak had served as a 
Deputy Head o f the Comintern’s Eastern Section in 1922, one can assume that he was a 
regular Comintern operative and that ROSTA was already being used to provide cover for 
Comintern work.94 Whether or not Quoc was directly responsible to Voitinsky while he 
worked in China is unclear, but Voitinsky seems to be the most likely recipient o f the 
reports which Quoc would write in English from Canton. (Voitinsky and Slepak were 
both, like Borodin, fluent in English, which was a decided advantage for work in China.) 
But while Quoc’s work as a translator and correspondent must have provided enough 
money for his daily needs, it does not seem to have provided him with official journalistic 
cover. When he first wrote to the Krestintem after his arrival in Canton, he requested that 
they continue to list his name in their Presidium or, if  they decided to remove it, to 
announce that he was ill — he did not want it widely known that he had gone to Canton, 
since his status there was as an illegal95
To summarize, one can say with some certainty that Nguyen Ai Quoc was not sent to 
Canton to be a direct assistant or secretary o f Borodin as has been suggested in the past.96 
It is true, though, that his status and relationships within the Comintern in 1923-24 remain 
something o f a puzzle. There is little underpinning in the Comintern archives for the idea 
that Quoc was a respected equal o f the upper strata of leaders, such as Manuilsky, or the 
particular protege o f any one person.97 M.N. Roy, an imposing multi-lingual Brahmin
92 RC, 495/154/594, p. 16, letter of 12 Nov. 1924.
93 Comintern and China, vol.l, p. 328.
94 Ibid., pp. 283-295.
95 RC, 535/1/42, letter to Dombal of 12 Nov. 1924.
96 Jean Lacouture, Ho Chi Minh, p. 46.
97 See the argument of Ton That Thien, op. cit., pp. 52-54.
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Bengali who had burst on the Comintern scene in 1920, was the senior spokesman on 
colonial issues at the Fifth Congress. It is clear that Quoc was more in tune with the united 
front policy for the colonies than Roy, and for that reason may have been encouraged to 
speak at the Congress by Manuilsky. But unlike Roy and some of the other Asians 
involved in Comintern work in 1924, Quoc did not yet represent-an Asian communist 
party. Both Semaun o f Indonesia and Sen Katayama of Japan were included in the ECCI 
in 1924, presumably because they were thought to represent sizable communist 
movements.
Moreover, Quoc’s sympathy with Manuilsky’s views does not seem to have translated into 
privileged treatment. In a note to Petrov, head o f the Eastern Section, Quoc complained 
about the rent he was being asked to pay for what he considered inferior accomodation in 
the overcrowded Hotel Lux. ‘During the months o f December, January and February,’ he 
wrote, I was in room 176, where there were always four or five lodgers. In the daytime the 
noise was continual, which prevented me from working. At night I was eaten by bedbugs, 
which prevented me from getting any rest. ’ Since March, he had been housed in a small 
single room, he said. ‘Comparing the restricted space and very basic furniture in my room 
with the other larger rooms, more comfortable, with several lamps, telephone, bathroom, 
wardrobe, sofa, etc, and with a reasonable rent, the price which they want me to pay is 
scandalous.’98 The tone here is one o f insult — did he feel that he was getting worse 
treatment than the Europeans or someone of Roy’s standing?
The impression created by Nguyen Ai Quoc’s correspondence during his fourteen-month 
stay in Russia is, in fact, one of frustration with the lack of action by the Comintern. This 
could reflect the fact that the Comintern itself was without firm direction or that the 
struggle between partisans o f Trotsky and Zinoviev was absorbing the full attention of the 
decision-makers. Quoc’s membership in the French party may have complicated his 
position — Trotsky’s influence among French communists was considerable and as late as 
January 1923 he had been working as the designated Comintern consultant on France, with 
Jacques Doriot as his deputy.99 In this political minefield, Nguyen Ai Quoc seems to have 
learned to deal with whoever was in authority and to pursue his own concerns. His 
personal style was the antithesis o f Roy’s — Roy thrived on theoretical debate, and by 1929 
he was removed from the Comintern. Quoc felt able to promote his agenda with Albert 
Treint, a leftist supporter o f Zinoviev, even though he may not have been in complete 
sympathy with all o f Treint’s views. Once he got to Canton he. wrote to a French
98 RC, 495,154,594, undated note, written after March 1924.
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colleague in Moscow that Treint had ‘fought hard’ for his [Quoc’s] departure for China.100 
The first sign that Quoc’s political position within the Comintern was not entirely secure 
would come only in late 1927-1928, when he began to plan for his return to Asia from 
Europe. By the end o f 1927 Albert Treint would be expelled from the French CP and 
anyone with a first-hand knowledge o f the failures of-Stalin’s united front policy in China 
would find himself under suspicion.
99 Adibekov et al., op. cit., p. 83.
100 RC, 495,154,594, p. 28.
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CHAPTER III
The Canton Period and its Aftermath ( November 1924 -  June 1927)
Although Nguyen Ai Quoc could not yet speak Cantonese, his arrival in the tropical port 
o f Canton must have felt like a long-delayed homecoming. Canton (now Guangzhou) had 
served as an out-post o f Vietnamese freedom fighters since the Manchu dynasty’s collapse 
in 1911. But the early Vietnamese hopes that republican China would back an anti- 
French revolt with money and weapons had quickly faded. Intensified French repression 
within Vietnam during the First World War coupled with the eclipse o f Sun Yatsen’s 
. influence in China resulted in bitter disappointments for the leader of the anti-French 
movement, Phan Boi Chau. Acts o f sabotage designed to attract support from Sun 
Yatsen’s government, and then from the Germans during the war, caused Phan’s Quang 
Phuc Hoi (Restoration Association) to loose many o f its most faithful lieutenants.1 
Following the blowing up o f two French colonels in the Hotel Hanoi in April 1913, the plot 
for which Phan Van Truong’s two brothers were imprisoned, seven people were executed 
and 57 imprisoned.2 Phan Boi Chau himself spent the years from 1914 to 1917 in a 
Chinese prison, and then retired to Hangzhou where he earned his living writing for such 
journals as Junxi (Military Problems)?
Nguyen Ai Quoc appeared on the scene in November 1924, just as the Russian military 
mission in Canton was approaching its full strength o f around fifty instructors.4 The first 
shipment of arms from Vladivostok had arrived in Canton on 8 October.5 The united front 
between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Guomindang (GMD) had been 
formalized at the first GMD Congress in January 1924, when the establishment o f a 
military training academy on Whampoa (Huangpu) island in the Pearl River had been 
approved. At the same time three communists had been elected to the GMD’s Central 
Executive Committee, while six others, including Mao Zedong, became candidate 
members.6 Quoc’s stay in China, which would end in May 1927, coincided with a period 
of political success for the government in Guangdong. He was able to take advantage of
1 David Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism, 1885-1925 (Berkeley: Univ o f CA, 1971), pp.
220, 229.
2 Ibid., p. 220.
3 Phan Boi Chau, Memoires de Phan Boi Chau, trans. Georges Boudarel, (Paris: France-Asie, 1969), p.
183.
4 C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, p. 7.
5 Comintern and China, Vol. 1, p. 317..
6 O. Edmund Clubb, Twentieth Century China, (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1964), p. 123.
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the most fruitful months o f the united front, a time when emigre Vietnamese in China could 
freely absorb the training and new ideas being offered by the Russian advisers, both in 
military affairs and political theory and organizing. The ferment in China would 
encourage a new wave o f political activism in Vietnam, which in turn would provide fresh 
recruits to the population o f would-be rebels in southern China. How Quoc used these 
circumstances to create the nucleus of Vietnam’s communist party is the main theme of 
this chapter.
It is too simplistic, however, to look at Quoc’s Canton years as the time when he arrived 
like a missionary from Moscow to make converts to communism. The united front was 
also an important learning experience for him, as well as for the other Vietnamese who 
lived through it. Quoc found himself in the thick o f a peasant upheaval in Guangdong 
province, which he was expected to analyze and encourage on behalf o f the Krestintem. 
This was his first exposure to the Asian peasantry since his youth in Central Vietnam, and 
must have marked a major advance in his progression from propagandist to a real organizer 
of revolution. The CCP- Guomindang united front was, moreover, a politically complex 
phenomenon which would be re-examined and criticized for years to come. When it 
inevitably fell apart in 1927, the recriminations became part of the intensifying battle for 
the soul o f the world communist movement. The breakdown o f the united front would 
become a paradigm for communists o f various tendencies — both Stalinists and Trotskyists 
-  who would use it as proof that bourgeois allies should never be trusted. Nguyen Ai 
Quoc and his compatriots who experienced this chaotic time did not all draw the same 
lessons from it. In particular, a number o f Vietnamese students who were in China during 
the collapse and aftermath o f the united front became some o f the most radical in the 
Vietnamese political spectrum. The final part of this chapter will look at this aftermath and 
where the Vietnamese communist movement stood at the beginning o f 1928.
Three main documentary sources are available on this stage in Nguyen Ai Quoc’s career, 
each o f which portrays his activities from a different vantage point. There are his reports 
and letters to various Comintern departments, which cover his efforts to recruit 
Vietnamese for a proto-communist network. Then there are his letters to the Krestintem, 
which give the impression that he was heavily involved with the Guangdong peasant 
movement, especially in 1925. The third source is the French archives, in particular the 
reports of the Surete agent known as Lam Due Thu (Nguyen Cong Vien, Nguyen Chi Vien 
or Hoang Chan Dong).
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One o f Phan Boi Chau’s principal lieutenants, a graduate o f a Beijing military academy, 
Lam Due Thu (Agent Pinot) became an early recruit to Quoc’s secret group. He is now 
known to have been the son of Nguyen Huu Dan, fellow-student o f  Nguyen Ai Quoc’s 
father at the Quoc Tu Giam Academy in Hue.7 His reports to the Surete include 
occasional insights into how Quoc operated, but he often appears to have been retailing 
second-hand gossip, as several o f the Surete informers seem to have done. This can 
probably be explained by the fact that he was not accepted into the inner circle o f Quoc’s 
confidants -  but there is also a possibility that he ws not always forthcoming to the Surete. 
Some of his collaborators, including two who became Quoc’s closest allies, Le Hong Son 
and Ho Tung Mau, apparently believed that Lam Due Thu was passing useless 
information to the French in order to receive a subsidy for the Vietnamese group.8
On balance, however, it seems clear that the Surete reaped the greater benefit from Lam 
Due Thu’s services. He was, undeniably, an extremely useful agent until at least 1929. 
He was so sure o f his worth that he made frequent requests for more money. In December 
1926, for example, he complained that his salary was being paid with a long delay... ‘and 
moreover,’ he wrote, ‘I never receive all that is due to me and the expense of my 
correspondence is ruining m e.’9 Working as a photographer in Canton, he took pictures o f 
many early Thanh Nien recruits.10 These would be used in 1930-31 by the French police to 
identify communist suspects. Yet only at the end o f 1929 did the communists in southern 
China become convinced that Thu’s allegiance belonged to the French.11 In early 1925 
Thu was able to warn the French that Nguyen Ai Quoc was in China and using the 
pseudonym Ly Thuy.12 Quoc’s careful efforts to keep his presence a secret from the 
French were all to no avail.
1. The First Organizational Steps
Quoc announced his arrival in Canton to his communist contacts in several letters dated the 
12 November 1924. He claimed to have arrived the day before,13 even though he wrote as 
though he already had had considerable experience of events in China. For example, one 
of these letters purports to be a first-hand description of how Fanya Borodin, M ikhail’s
7 Song Thanh et al, Nguyen Ai Quoc o Quang Chau, [Nguyen Ai Quoc in Quang Chau], (Hanoi: Nha
Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 1998), p. 52.
8 AOM, SPCE 365, Mission Noel, annexe k l’envoi no. 208, 15 juillet 1925.
9 AOM, SPCE, box 368, Mission Noel, envoi n. 356, 5 Dec, 1926.
10 AOM, SPCE, box 368, envoi n. 534, 29 Oct, 1929
11 AOM, SPCE 383, Mission Noel, envoi no. 537, letter of Nov. 8 1929.
12 AOM, SPCE 365, Note Noel no. 155,24 May 1925.
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wife, was organizing Chinese women.14 He may have journeyed as far as Shanghai with 
Voitinsky, who returned to China from Moscow in November. In any case, he wasted 
little time in making contacts and setting up links for his work with the ROSTA Agency, 
which was to provide his main source o f income during his years in Canton. The 
immediate preoccupation of the republican capital that November was Sun Yatsen’s 
planned trip to Beijing, where the Guomindang president hoped to negotiate a political 
detente with the northern warlords.15 Quoc wrote in English in his usual laconic style to an 
un-named friend at the Comintern: ‘I haven’t seen anybody yet. Everyone here is busy 
about Dr. Sun going North.’16 To Tomas Dombal, the Polish Secretary General of the 
Krestintem, he sent his apologies for failing to inform the members of the council that he 
was leaving for China. ‘My departure from Moscow was decided somewhat brusquely and 
I had no time to warn you,’ he wrote in French. He went on to describe how the poor 
peasants were organizing, ‘under the aegis o f the Guomindang, but under the direction of 
the communists’. ‘It is an excellent opportunity for our propaganda,’ he said.17
Quoc wrote in the guise o f a female member o f the GMD named Loo Shing Yan in his 
account of the women’s movement. He sent it with a signed cover letter, also dated 12 
November, to a women’s newsletter whose title he doesn’t mention.18 ‘When I was at the 
Comintern I had the pleasure o f collaborating with your paper. Now I want to continue that 
collaboration. But since I am working here illegally I will send you articles in the form of 
“Letters from China”, and sign them with a woman’s name. I think that will give 
originality and variety to the pieces, and at the same time assure my anonymity,’ he wrote. 
As soon as Quoc had assumed his duties as a translator and propagandist for ROSTA he 
must have begun searching out the other Vietnamese emigres scattered around southern 
China. In late 1924 these Vietnamese do not seem to have formed a tightly knit group. 
They had been absorbed into a variety o f academies and local armies, in particular the army 
o f the Yunnan general Yang Ximin, who until m id-1925 shared power in Guangdong 
province. Some, such as the Sino-Vietnamese rebel chieftain Tam Kam Say, lived as 
outlaws, consorting with heroin traders and buffalo thieves in the border country. Even 
before Quoc’s arrival, Phan Boi Chau’s pre-eminence among the emigres had become less 
clear than during the pre-war years. Sometime in 1923 several o f them had begun to 
organize a new grouping, the Tam Tam Xa  (Heart-to-Heart Society or Society o f Like
n RC, 495, 154, 594, p. 16. 
h RC, 495,154,594, pp. 12-14.
15 Clubb, Op.Cit., p. 128
i6RC, 495,154,594, p. 16.
17 RC, 535,1,42 -  file containing N.A.Q’s correspondence with the Krestintem
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Minds), which they did not invite Phan Boi Chau to join. His reputation had been tarnished 
by a treatise he had written on Franco-Vietnamese cooperation in 1918 at the behest of 
emigre and suspected informer, Phan Ba Ngoc. The latter, son o f the Nghe Tinh nationalist 
leader Phan Dinh Phung, had been won over by the promised reforms o f Governor General 
Sarraut.19 Phan Ba Ngoc was assassinated as a traitor by Le Hong Son in 1922 on Cuong 
D e’s orders.20
The Tam tarn xa began by resuscitating some o f Phan Boi Chau’s fundraising networks 
within Vietnam, and in June 1924 carried out a bombing aimed at the visiting French 
Governor General Merlin, who was passing through Canton.21 While neither Hanoi 
sources nor Phan Boi Chau’s memoirs emphasize the point, Le Hong Son later confessed 
to the Surete that a leading role in this attack was played by Nguyen Hai Than, a northern 
nationalist who had first joined Phan Boi Chau in 1905 as a student in Japan. He was said 
to have approached an anarchist Chinese, a fellow officer in the Yunnan army stationed in 
Canton, who helped the Vietnamese construct two suitcase bombs. One of these was 
deposited at a reception in the French enclave o f Shameen by the recent emigre Pham 
Hong Thai, posing as a photographer. The bomb killed three French guests, but missed 
Merlin.22 Pham Hong Thai drowned in the Pearl River trying to escape and became a 
nationalist martyr. Ironically, this moment o f glory for the Vietnamese nationalists, seen by 
many as the opening salvo in a new round of the battle against the French, may also have 
been the moment when Lam Due Thu won the confidence of the Surete. He was believed 
by some of his confederates to have warned the French of the coming attack, and also to 
have turned over the second suitcase bomb for a reward.23
The attempt on M erlin’s life seems to have re-energized Phan Boi Chau. He arrived in 
Canton in the late summer, probably a few months before Quoc’s arrival, to consult with 
the Vietnamese exiles and make contact with the Russian advisers newly installed at 
Whampoa.24 At that point he may have helped some of his younger followers gain
18 RC, 495,154,594, p.16.; BNTS p. 238 says that the letter was sent to the newspaper Rabotnitsa 
[Working Woman].
Phan Boi Chau, op. cit, p. 178-9.
20 AOM, SPCE 367, Interrogation de Le Van Phan ( Le Hong Son), 24 Oct. 1932 and following days, 
pp. 5-6.
See Trung Chinh, ‘Tam Tam Xa la gi?’ (‘What Was the Tam Tam Xa?’), NCLS, no. 134,1970, p. 8; 
although this article claims that Le Hong Son’s fund-raising trip to Vietnam in 1923 was carried out on 
behalf of Tam Tam Xa, in his confession to the French in 1932, he claims to have been carrying out a 
mission for Cuong De., AOM, SPCE 367, Interrogation de Le Van Phan, p. 9.)
22 AOM, SPCE 367, Interr. de Le Van Phan, pp. 10-11; Memoires de Phan Boi Chau, p. 189-190.
23 AOM, SPCE 367, Declaration de Le Quang Dat, ‘Au Sujet de Lam Due Thu’.
24 Memoires de Phan Boi Chau, p. 194.
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admittance, via the good offices of the GMD leader Liao Zhongkai.25 He also discussed 
with his fellow exiles the transformation of the Quang Phac Hoi into the Viet Nam Quoc 
Dan Dang (Vietnam Guomindang or National People’s party, known by its initials as the 
VNQDD). They formed several committees, based on the organization o f the Chinese 
GMD, he wrote in his memoirs.26 But by November 1924 Phan had returned to Hangzhou, 
where he would remain until the following June.
Among the Vietnamese cadets who enrolled at the Whampoa Academy in the autumn of 
1924 were Le Hong Son, Le Hong Phong, and Le Quang Dat, all from Nghe An province.27 
But a number o f the Vietnamese who would enroll in Whampoa in mid-1925 were in 1924 
still cadets in the Yunnan army, probably under the command of Nguyen Hai Than. These 
included a Hoang Luong, Luu Bich, Ngo Chinh Coc and Lieu Khac Thanh, according to 
Lam Due Thu. 28 Along with Nguyen Hai Than, the older emigres Dinh Te Dan and Dang 
Su Mac served as officers in the Yunnan army. It is worth remembering that in the autumn 
of 1924, Whampoa had been open for only a few months and was still in the early phases 
of organization. In October 1924, the CCP’s Central Committee made it clear that they 
were not impressed with the way the school was being run. They reported to Borodin that 
anarchists were in charge and that even a newly formed model regiment had ‘fallen into 
their hands’. ‘They are spending your funds on the devil knows what,’ their letter said.29 
So it is difficult to say what quality o f military or political training any Vietnamese who 
entered the first training courses would have received.
Nguyen Ai Quoc arrived in Canton at a propitious moment, when the Vietnamese were just 
becoming aware o f the potential of the Russian aid mission, but had not yet decided how to 
follow up the bombing attempt against Governor Merlin. Phan Boi Chau in Hangzhou 
was too far away to play a role in day-to-day decision making about new initiatives, even if  
the younger emigres had been willing to include him in their deliberations. As a member 
o f the Russian mission, one who at first lived in Borodin’s residence, Quoc had the edge 
when it came to winning backing for the group of nationalists which would adopt his 
Leninist methods o f political organizing . But gaining financial support from the Soviet 
mission was not as easy as one might imagine. Moreover, the situation within the group of 
Vietnamese emigres was probably more fluid than is often assumed. Between December
25 AOM,, SPCE 367, Interr. de Le Van Phan, p. 12; Hong Son claims that Liao Zhongkai helped him
enter Whampoa.
26 Memoires de Phan Boi Chau, p. 194.
27 AOM, SPCE 367, Interr. de Le Van Phan, p. 12.
28 AOM, SPCE 365, loc. cit.
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and June 1925 Quoc was able to recruit a core group o f young emigres for a proto­
communist group, most o f whom would remain loyal followers until his disappearance 
from Canton in 1927. But this process, alternately viewed as a victory for Marxist- 
Leninist theory and organizational techniques, or attributed to Quoc’s manipulative skills 
and supposed betrayal o f Phan Boi Chau, was more open-ended than most accounts o f 
Vietnamese communist history have led us to believe.
In the anti-communist version o f Nguyen Ai Quoc’s assumption o f leadership in Canton, 
he was forced to inform against Phan Boi Chau in order to rid himself o f his only real 
competitor. This story has it that Quoc informed the French police o f his rival’s 
movements and then lured him to an address in Shanghai’s international settlement, where 
the venerated patriot was arrested.30 Part o f the rationale for Quoc’s action, in addition to 
his desire to be rid of a rival, is said to have been his need for the money the French had 
placed on Phan’s head. Quoc is also said to have calculated that the protests which Phan’s 
arrest would cause in Vietnam would stimulate resistance against the French.31
From Lam Due Thu’s reports, however, it appears unlikely that Quoc was involved in 
turning over Phan to the Surete. These reports make it clear that Thu had been informing 
the French o f Phan’s activities for some time, at least since 1924.32 So when the French 
decided the time had come to arrest Phan, they should not have had any difficulty in 
discovering his movements. He was indeed picked up in July 1925 (probably not June, as 
is often assumed, based on Phan’s own memoirs) and shipped back to Hanoi. (Lam Due 
Thu reported that Phan was planning to come to Canton at the end of July 1925; he had not 
yet been arrested according to this report at the end of June, 1925.)33 In November 1925 he 
was sentenced to hard labour for life. The campaign against his sentence became the start 
o f a series o f student strikes and nationwide demonstrations, which in the end set many 
students on the road to underground activism. In fact, Phan Boi Chau’s trial provided open 
publicity for the rebel movement in China, as one arrested activist testified in 1931.
29 The Comintern and China, Vol. I, p. 485, refers to Comintern doc. 514/1/82, pp. 19-21, letter from 
CCP CC to Borodin, ‘not later than 10 Oct. 1924’.
30 Hoang van Chi, From Colonialism to Communism - A  Case History o f North Vietnam, (New York: 
Frederick Praeger, 1964), p. 18.
31 Robert Turner, Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development, (Stanford, CA:Hoover 
Institution Press, 1975), pp. 8-9.
32AOM, SPCE 354, file ‘Lettre des Russes’, annexe a la note no. 197, 5 Jan. 1925; the envelope from 
this letter addressed to Phan Boi Chau and Lam Due Thu from the two Russian advisers was passed to 
the Surete by their agent Pinot.
33 AOM, SPCE 365, annexe a l’envoi 208, 15 juillet 1925. Hue Tam Ho Tai, e.g., gives the date of 
PBC’s arrest as 18 June 1925 in Radicalism and the Origins o f the Vietnamese Revolution, p. 140. The 
French Rapport de la Commission d ’Enquete sar les Evenements du Nord-Annam, p. 9, gives the arrest 
date as July 1925.
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Twenty-year-old Tran Van Thanh told his interrogators that, ‘the trial o f Phan Boi Chau 
revealed the existence of Vietnamese revolutionaries in China, especially in Canton. We 
students didn’t talk about anything but the 5,000 soldiers in the Whampoa army.’34 By 
December of 1925 the new Governor General, Alexander Varenne, would have to back 
down and convert Phan’s sentence to life-long house arrest. But it is difficult to believe 
that Nguyen Ai Quoc could have foreseen the outcome of Phan’s arrest and manipulated 
events as cleverly as his critics claim.35
It is, moreover, difficult to see why Quoc would have needed to get rid o f Phan, since in 
his own letters he claims to have made rapid progress in gaining the adherence o f ‘the 
best elements’ o f the Vietnamese Quoc Dan Dang to his ideas. A letter in the French 
archives which Phan Boi Chau sent to Quoc in early 1925 also shows that the older man 
did not feel that he and Quoc were competitors, but rather that Quoc would insure the 
continuation o f the anti-French struggle in the next generation. ‘.. .Aside from you, who 
else is there to entrust this responsibility o f replacing me to?’ he asked. ‘I left the country 
when I was almost forty,’ Phan wrote, ‘and I can’t escape the experience o f my studies — 
thus my ideas now are the same as they were formerly. You have studied widely and been 
to many more places than Uncle -  ten times, a hundred times more. Your ideas and your 
plan surpass mine -  will you share one or two tasks with me?’ he asked, perhaps with a 
touch of irony.36 Phan Boi Chau was also a friend o f Quoc’s father from the same 
district in Nghe An. Phan’s son-in-law, Vuong Thuc Oanh, who would become an early 
member of Quoc’s group, came from the same village as Quoc’s father. Quoc’s older 
brother and sister had both been sentenced to hard labour for the assistance which they had 
given to Phan’s fighters. So long as Phan Boi Chau was not actively thwarting his plans, 
Nguyen Ai Quoc would have had, in my view, a strong motivation to use him as a 
figurehead for his movement.
This is not to say that there were no rivalries among the Vietnamese in southern China. 
Nguyen Hai Than (also known as Vu Hai Thu and Nguyen Cam Giang), before long took 
a dislike to Ly Thuy, and in early 1927 would form a rival anti-French group. He and 
Nguyen Ai Quoc would remain competitors until 1946. But in the first heady months o f 
republican power in Canton, when the united front seemed to answer the needs of both
34 AOM,, SPCE, box 371 (on Phan Chu Trinh), Interrogation of Tran Van Thanh, 31 July 1931.
35 See Robert Turner, Vietnamese Communism, pp. 8-9; and Chinh Dao, Ho Chi Minh, Con Nguoi va
Huyen Thoai, [Ho Chi Minh, The Man and the Myth], vol.2, 1925-45, (USA:Van Hoa, 1993), pp. 33-5.
36 AOM, SPCE, 371, copy translated by Lam Due Thu to quoc ngu from Chinese, Annexe n.6 a Note
Noel n. 144, translation of a letter from PBC to Ly Thuy; retranslated to quoc ngu by Vinh Sinh for his
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nationalists and communists, the differences in their political inclinations had not yet 
become an obstacle to cooperation. Nguyen Ai Quoc knew how to wield political 
influence while allowing other emigres to take the more important posts in the 
organizations he formed. The defeat o f the Yunnanese army in mid-1925 also worked to 
his advantage, as we shall see, by making Whampoa and its army the main source o f - 
training and employment for the emigre Vietnamese. Overall, the evidence provided by 
Lam Due Thu and Quoc’s own reports to the Comintern lead to the conclusion that the 
Vietnamese nationalists and proto-communists had not yet formed well-delineated groups 
during Quoc’s first stay in China. Some emigres such as Le Hong Son and Truong Van 
Lenh, two of Quoc’s most trusted lieutenants, retained ties in both camps until at least 
1928. In my view, it is a mistake to assume that the Vietnamese emigres had sharply 
defined views about communist aid to their independence movement in 1924 and 25. So 
long as Quoc had something positive to offer, including new methods o f organizing and 
potential financial support, he had an automatic advantage over the older leaders, whose 
Japanese backers had always let them down. But when the Comintern was slow in 
responding to his requests for aid, Quoc worried that he would lose influence among the 
nationalists. I will discuss the evidence regarding these issues below.
On 18 December 1924, Quoc wrote to the presidium of the Comintern that he had arrived 
in Canton in the middle o f that month. (The discrepancy between this arrival date and his 
earlier claim to have arrived 11 November is unexplained. Perhaps he was simply being 
consistent with his practice of doling out bits of .the truth to different interlocutors.) In a 
post-script to this letter he informed the Comintern that he was posing as a Chinese named 
‘Ly Thuy’. Nguyen Ai Quoc glossed over the subtleties of his contacts with the 
Vietnameses emigres in this version o f his activities. ‘I have met several nationalist- 
revolutionary Vietnamese,’ he wrote, ‘among whom there is one who left Vietnam thirty 
years ago and who during this time has organized a number o f anti-French revolts... The 
sole goal o f this man is to avenge his country and his family, who were massacred by the 
French. He doesn’t know anything o f politics and even less o f mass organizing. In our 
conversations, I have demonstrated the necessity o f having something organized and the 
uselessness of agitation without any base. He is convinced... ’. 37 If one allows for a ten-
article, ‘Ve Moi Lien He Giua Phan Boi Chau va Nguyen Ai Quoc o Trung Quoc’ (1924-1925), [‘On 
Phan Boi Chau’s Relations with Nguyen Ai Quoc in China (1924-1925)], NCLS n.3, 1997.
37RC, 495, 154,594, p.17, letter ‘Au Presidium du Komintem, 18 Dec. 1924; note that the Hanoi 
rendering of this document drops the reference to a specific emigre, and apparently changes ‘he’ to 
‘they’ in the sentence about ignorance of politics and mass organizing, — see reference to the Hanoi 
version in Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism, p. 66 from Ban Nghien Cuu Lich Su Dang, 
Commission to Study Party History, Chu Tich Ho Chi Minh, Chairman Ho Chi Minh (Hanoi: Su That, 
1970), p. 32.
83
year exaggeration regarding his departure from Vietnam, this description might fit Phan 
Boi Chau. But from Phan’s letters of early 1925, it does not appear that the two met.38 The 
other possibilities for the identity o f this emigre are Nguyen Hai Than, or possibly Ho Hoc 
Lam, like Phan Boi Chau a native of Nghe An province, whose brother and father had both 
been killed by the French. But Lam, the uncle o f Ho Tung Mau, appears to have remained 
in Hangzhou during the united front period. A 1933 French political profile o f Nguyen Ai 
Quoc seems to show that Nguyen Hai Than is the most likely candidate. This report 
mentions that when Quoc arrived in Canton, ‘he skillfully consulted Nguyen Cam Giang, 
who at the time exercised authority over his compatriots.’39 The report says that with the 
aid o f Nguyen Cam Giang, Quoc created a new group, but that later discord grew up 
between them and Giang started his own association, with no more than thirty members. 
This falling-out coincides with the description o f Quoc’s relationship with Nguyen Hai 
Than given in Lam Due Thu’s reports. Nguyen Hai Than, also known as Nguyen Cam 
Giang, appears to have been the heir apparent to Phan Boi Chau until Nguyen Ai Quoc 
appeared on the scene.40
In his letter of 18th December, Quoc lists the tasks which he and his fellow-emigre had 
undertaken together. They had outlined an organizational plan; the emigre had drawn up a 
list o f ten Vietnamese who had worked with him in the past; and Quoc had chosen five, 
from five different provinces, to bring to Canton. He planned to give them instruction and 
then send them back to Indochina after three months of study, after which another group 
would arrive to take their place. This was the blue-print for what would become the Viet 
Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi, The Association o f Revolutionary 
Vietnamese Youth, usually called Thanh Nien (Youth) for short. But Quoc made no 
mention o f this name yet, and in two letters in January and February 1925 he referred to his 
group as the Vietnamese Guomindang. (See below) To bring the first bunch to Canton he 
would use the $150 [presumably U.S. dollars] left over from his travel money from 
Moscow. ‘But after that?... he asked pointedly. ‘I work several hours per day for 
ROSTA, but my salary won’t allow me to maintain my “students”, and when they are in 
Canton, it is possible that I will have to devote all or most of my time to their education; 
my financial situation will be hopeless. This is why I ask you to please give the order to 
your representatives in Canton to take care of Indochina as well.’41
38 See Vinh Sinh, op. cit., p. 46.
39 AOM, SPCE, box 364, Feuillets et Notices, a summary of NAQ’s career up to his 1931 arrest.
40 See Dao Trinh Nhat, Luong Ngoc Qnyen, (Saigon: NXB Tan Viet, 1957), p. 25, for Nguyen Cam 
Giang’s identification as Nguyen Hai Than.
41 RC, 495,154,594, pp. 17-18, letter ‘Au Presidium du Komintem’, signed Nguyen Ai Quae, 18 Dec. 
1924.
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By 5 January 1925, Quoc was able to report that, ‘The Komintang (sic) o f Indochina had 
been formed on the 3rd o f this month, with three members to begin.5 He wrote in English, 
so was quite likely writing to the English-speaking Voitinsky. ‘One member will be sent to 
Annam and Laos. Another man (not yet member) will be sent to Tonkin to bring five men 
to Canton to learn how to do organization w ork.. .In the same time, I beg you to give order 
to our Russian camrades [sic] here to take charge also o f the Indochinese affairs, because 
alone, I cannot do very much.’42 When he wrote on 10 January to the Comintern 
Presidium, this time in French, he was able to announce that the ‘Kvak-zan-dang ’ had just 
admitted its fourth member. But he complained that he had had to get an advance from 
ROSTA to pay the travel costs o f his envoys.43
More progress had been made when Quoc wrote again to the Comintern Presidium on 19th 
February 1925. This time he reported that his group, a secret one, had nine members, two 
of whom had been sent back to Vietnam; three were at the front in the army o f Sun Yatsen, 
he said, while one was on a ‘military mission for the Guomindang’. O f these nine 
members, five were candidate members o f the communist party (presumably Chinese) as 
w ell44 Quoc mentioned names as rarely as possible in his correspondence, but we know 
from Vietnamese accounts that among these five were Le Hong Phong, Ho Tung Mau, Le 
Hong Son, and Lam Due Thu; Le Quang Dat, one of the early students at Whampoa, was 
probably the fifth.45 All but Lam Due Thu, who came from Thai Binh, were natives o f 
Nghe An. Nguyen Hai Than appears to have remained outside the inner circle o f Thanh 
Nien recruits, perhaps because o f his duties as an officer in the Yunnan army. By February 
Quoc seemed to have succeeded in co-opting the existing infrastructure o f the Tam Tam 
xa, which in turn had made use of Phan Boi Chau’s old networks: he reported that his 
group had a solid base-station in Siam for getting men in and out of the country. ‘There 
are fifty farmers there who are closely united and who have rendered many services in the 
past,’ he wrote.
Now that Quoc was gaining the confidence of his compatriots, his plans were getting more 
ambitious. In this letter of 19 February he estimated that the tasks to be accomplished in 
1925 would cost $5,000. He needed the money to establish a base in Canton, as well as
42 RC, 495,154,594, p.26. Here Quoc is possibly referring to a reorganization of Phan Boi Chau’s 
group, or may be using QDD as a generic name for a revolutionary group which he thinks the Russians 
will understand.
43 RC, 495,154,594, p. 17.
44 All references in this paragraph are to RC, 495,154,594, pp. 29-31.
45 See Quang Hung and Quoc Anh, ‘Le Hong Son’, p. 16 for a partial list of the key members.
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communications bases in Guangxi; in the extreme south o f Guangdong; in Bangkok; at the 
end o f the railway line from Bangkok to Tich-kho (Udon Thani?), which he said was a 
twenty day walk from Lacfach; and lastly at Lacfach (Thakhek?), on the left bank o f the 
Mekong River (in Laos), 15 days on foot from Annam. He also planned to send someone 
back to Vietnam to collect and transmit news, as well as several people to work on the 
ships sailing between China and Indochina. He included a neatly sketched map of 
Indochina at the end of the letter, with the planned bases marked .
But in an undated memo titled, ‘The Indochina Question’, which seems to have been 
written a few months later in 1925, he remained less than assured about the future 
prospects o f his group. As it was written in English, it was probably again addressed to 
Voitinsky. In point 4 of the memo, which is another plea for money, he explains that, 
‘Without the help and counsel of our Russian camrades (sic), it will be difficult for me not 
to make mistakes. But I can get neither without order from you. And they can do nothing 
for me empty handed.’46 The crux of the request was that Quoc needed something to show 
his countrymen in the way of concrete Russian assistance, so that he would retain his 
credibility. In point 1 he wrote: ‘If  you allow me to send immediately one or two 
students, that will enable me to make good propaganda, to tell what the Russian Revolution 
can do and will do for the colonial people. That will enable me also -  from now until 
August -  to gain over the good elements o f the Indochinese Komintang [sic].
The Surete’s reports fill in some of the missing detail about how Ly Thuy approached his 
task in the early months of 1925. On 4 March Lam Due Thu informed his French contact 
that, ‘Ly Thuy and Nguyen Hai Than are working actively to organize the association 
referred to in the annexe to note 121. They are working without the knowledge o f Phan 
Boi Chau.’47 The association’s name is not given in this report or in the French summary 
of the tract which Ly Thuy had prepared to recruit members within Vietnam. It appears, 
though, that this was the first effort to develop the group which became known as Thanh 
Nien. The March report on Ly Thuy’s activities, apparently based on Lam Due Thu’s 
information, was signed by Governor Merlin himself. He noted that the recruiting tract 
took into account the Vietnamese mentality, by requiring an oath o f loyalty to the new 
‘party’, but also departed from the usual ‘grandiloquent phraseology’ o f the Vietnamese 
revolutionaries. ‘Nowhere is there a mention o f extreme methods,’ Merlin wrote. ‘One 
can see that for Ly-Thuy it is of first importance to organize his partisans into disciplined
46 RC, 4951154/594, p.49.
47 AOM, SPCE 365, Mission Noel, envoi 4 mars 1925, Note no. 127.
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groups, which will obey blindly the instructions issued to them.’48 Merlin was deeply 
impressed by the influence of ‘the Bolsheviks’ and their methods. His analysis o f the tract 
could have been written by Quoc himself -- ‘The nationalists have carried out a few 
attacks: they have always lacked cohesion and have not been able to win over the 
Vietnamese masses.’ He saw that the new style o f anti-French agitation could be harmful 
to French influence, ‘if  it were permitted to develop freely’. But measures were being 
taken to combat it, he assured his superior in Paris.
By early March Ly Thuy had convinced the emigres to contribute money each month for a 
propaganda fund. Ly Thuy was giving 200 dollars monthly, Nguyen Hai Than 300, Dinh 
Te Dan 100, and Lam Due Thu himself, 50. Quoc was by Thu’s account receiving from 
three to four hundred dollars monthly salary for his translation work.49 Thu reported in 
April that Nguyen Hai Than and Ly Thuy had established a mutually agreeable working 
relationship. ‘Each one preserves his liberty o f action. Nguyen Hai Than continues to 
advocate terrorist methods and Ly Thuy is carrying out communist propaganda. As they 
both are pursuing the same goal, they help each other when they have the opportunity,’ he 
explained.50
Recruitment within Vietnam seems to have been delayed, however, while the Chinese 
republican government consolidated its power in the first half o f 1925. The only new 
Vietnamese recruits who arrived from in country before the summer appear to be the five 
or six who attended the Peasant Movement Training Institute (PMTI) courses, and perhaps 
Phan Boi Chau’s son-in-law, Vuong Thuc Oanh. In order to understand the development o f 
the Vietnamese revolutionary groups, one needs to keep in mind the key events in this 
consolidation process. The fortunes of the Vietnamese emigres were dependent on both 
the local power structure in Canton and the condition of the CCP-Guomindang alliance in 
general. As we have seen, many of them served within Chinese military structures.
Nguyen Ai Quoc, like a number o f the other Vietnamese, could devote only a portion of 
his time to Vietnamese affairs. As Lam Due Thu reported at the end o f 1925, Quoc 
worked sixteen hour days, translating for ROSTA, reporting on the peasant movement for
48 AOM, SPCE 365, Hanoi le 15 mars 1925, Le Gouv. Gen. de l’Indo. A M. le Min. des Colonies, no. 
489.
49 AOM, SPCE 365, no. 127, 4 mars 1925.
50 AOM, SPCE 365, Annexe no. 1 a note Noel no. 146, extrait D, compte rendu de l’entretien Pinot- 
Noel du 6 avril 1925.
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the Krestintem, and setting up the structures which would become the nucleus o f a 
Vietnamese communist party.51
From February until May 1925 the Whampoa cadets and Canton army waged a 
campaign against the warlord Chen Jiongming in the East River Districts of Guangdong. 
The local power broker in Guangdong, General Chen had been threatening to return to 
Canton to take control, while Sun Yatsen stayed on in Beijing, his health deteriorating. 
When Sun died in March, the struggle to succeed him carried on. The Whampoa trained 
troops routed the General with the support o f peasant militias, who provided sabotage as 
well as intelligence and propaganda support.52 Three o f the Vietnamese in Quoc's secret 
nine-member group joined in the fighting, as Quoc had reported in his 19 February letter.
Le Hong Son served under the command of Zhou Enlai, political commissar of the First 
Army Corps.53 Then in May the Yunnan and Guangxi generals who had joined forces with 
the GMD, Yang Ximin and Lau Tchauwan [Liu Chenhuan], rebelled against the 
republican leadership. The newly-tested troops from Whampoa once again took the field, 
and defeated the rebel forces. This cleared the way for the formation o f an independent 
Guomindang government in Canton at the end of June 1925, headed by Hu Hanmin. The 
CCP-GMD united front was now approaching its zenith o f political success. The shift in 
local political power marked a new phase in Vietnamese organizing. For one thing, the 
defeat of the Yunnan army left Nguyen Hai Than without a power base. Lam Due Thu 
reported on 15 June that, ‘Hai Than is defeated. He has not got a single man left. He has 
come back to Canton, but he doesn’t yet dare to show h im self... he is at the end o f his 
resources and he seems very sad. . . The cadets from his troops were due to be 
‘incorporated into the Canton troops on Ly Thuy’s recommendation,’ he added.54 As 
mentioned above, a number o f them enrolled at Whampoa. Joining the new students was a 
pair from Nghe An, former students from the officers school o f the Guangxi corps: Truong 
Van Lenh and Le Nhu Vong (Le Thiet Hung).55
With its power consolidated in Guangdong, the united front gave increased attention to the 
peasant movment and labour organizing. The May 30th strike movement in Shanghai was 
quickly followed by the Hong Kong strike and boycott o f British trade in Guangdong. The
51 AOM, SPCE 365, Mission Noel, annexe £ l’envoi no. 226: entrevues Pinot-Noel des 29, 30, 31 oct.
et 1 nov. 1925.
52 Fernando Galbiati, P ‘engP ’ai and the Hai-lu-feng Soviet, (Stanford: Stanford U. Press, 1985), p.
192; Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy o f the Chinese Revolution, (Stanford: Stanford U. Press, 1951), pp.
68-9.
53 AOM, SPCE 365, Annexe a Note Noel no. 213, 1 Oct. 1925.
54 AOM, SPCE 365, M.N., annexe h Note Noel no. 201 29 juillet 1925, rapport de Pinot, 15 June 1925.
55 AOM, SPCE 365, Annexe a l’envoi 208, 15 July 1925.
Hong Kong movement began on 21 June with a mass strike against foreign companies — 
that same day Nguyen Ai Quoc brought out the first issue o f the Vietnamese paper, Thanh 
Nien, a weekly which would continue to appear until May 1930. (The first issue o f 60 
copies contained only two articles; by October, 80 copies were being printed and 
distributed in Siam, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Hangzhou, as well as Guangdong.)56 On 30 
June The League of Oppressed Peoples (in Vietnamese Bi Ap Buc Dan Toe Lien Hiep Hoi) 
was founded, a grouping of Vietnamese, Korean and Indian anti-colonial activists, along 
with their Chinese patrons. Liao Zhongkai, the new Canton governor and a leader of the 
GMD left, presided over the League, with a Korean and Lam Due Thu serving as vice- 
presidents. Ly Thuy controlled the secretariat and the finances of the Vietnamese section. 
The League was the first structure within which Nguyen Ai Quoc would create an open, 
revolutionary group of Vietnamese in Canton.
The League o f Oppressed Peoples served a double function for him. Its primary purpose 
was to demonstrate Asian support for the Chinese revolution, initially for the boycott of 
British trade in Hong Kong. The leaflet which Quoc wrote in Chinese characters for the 
League’s founding made this clear.57 But the League’s Vietnamese section also served as 
the basic organization for recruiting and educating anti-French Vietnamese in 1925. Its 
members, including Nguyen Hai Than, were the ones who put out the newspaper Thanh 
Nien. Although June 1925 is usually seen as the founding date of the Thanh Nien 
association, this grouping did not come to exist as a real political party until sometime in 
1926, to judge by the available evidence. It would not have a formal political programme 
and statutes until early 1927. Possibly Thanh Nien existed first as the youth group within 
the League, which according to Lam Due Thu had responsibility for the League’s 
propaganda.58 A recent Hanoi history o f Quoc’s years in Canton maintains that the formal 
name, the Association o f Revolutionary Vietnamese Youth, came into being at the end of 
1925. It quotes from the memoirs of Vuong Thuc Oanh, who claims that a Thanh Nien 
Cong San Doan (Communist Youth Group) had been created in Canton, but that the title 
‘Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Hoi’ (Association of Revolutionary Vietnamese Youth) 
was dreamed up by himself and Le Duy Diem, when the latter returned from Canton 
towards the end of 1925.59
56 AOM, SPCE 365, Annexe a Note Noel no. 213, 1 Oct. 1925. See Hue-Tam Ho Tai, Radicalism, pp. 
177-178 for a discussion of Thanh Nien’s political orientation.
57 AOM, SPCE 365, Mission Noel, envoi 189, 18 July 1925.
58 AOM, SPCE 365, Mission Noel, annexe a l’envoi 208, 15 July 1925.
59 Song Thanh et al., Nguyen ai Quoc o Quang Chau (1924-1927), (Nguyen Ai quoc in Quang Chau), 
(Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Chinh Tri Quoc Gia, 1998), p. 77.
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A French summary o f Lam Due Thu’s reports dated 22 July 1925 makes clear the new 
ascendancy o f Nguyen Ai Quoc in m id-1925: ‘NAQ has decidedly taken charge o f the 
Vietnamese revolutionary group in Canton. While carrying out his functions as a translator 
for the information service at the Soviet Consulate, he works tirelessly to prepare the 
revolution in Indochina. Treasurer o f the Vietnamese revolutionary group, founder, editor 
and printer of the paper Thanh Nien, organizer o f a League o f Oppressed Peoples in 
Canton, affiliated to all the labour guilds and revolutionary organizations in Canton, he 
attends most o f the meetings held in the Public Gardens and at Canton University; he visits 
the prestigious hosts at the Canton Cement Works, Liao Zhongkai, Sie Yng Pak and Hu 
Hanmin. Nguyen Ai Quoc has found a milieu in Canton which is entirely to his liking... ’60
At the end of September Lam Due Thu informed the Surete that Quoc, Nguyen Hai Than, 
Ho Tung Mau, Le Hong Son and himself had decided at one o f the Vietnamese section 
meetings to regroup the Vietnamese revolutionaries in Guangxi and to resume contact with 
agitators from Tonkin. Ho Tung Mau would undertake this mission in Guangxi, while 
Nguyen Hai Than would travel to Tonkin. ‘Nguyen Ai Quoc believes that we must 
reorganize the revolutionary groups in the interior on the same basis as that o f Canton... 
Questionable elements will be banished without pity, as in Canton,’ Thu wrote.61
Sometime during the summer of 1925, Le Hong Son relates in his 1933 Surete confession, 
a group o f 15 Vietnamese were escorted from Dongxing to Canton by Ho Tung Mau. 
Some of these may have been recruited by Nguyen Hai Than or Lam Due Thu. In the 
autumn, after Le Hong Son took leave from his duties as an officer in the Canton army, he 
escorted seven o f them back to the Vietnamese border, via Nanning and Longzhou. At the 
border he handed his charges over to a Chinese opium smuggler, who guided them back to 
Tonkin. Among the seven were Xuan (Nguyen Cong Thu, brother o f Lam Due Thu, who 
would become a Thanh Nien recruiter in Tonkin), Hoang Lun (Le Huu Lap) from Thanh 
Hoa, Le Duy Dung (probably Le Duy Diem) from Nghe An, and Nhan (Nguyen Ngoc Ba) 
from Nghe An as well.62 Vuong Thuc Oanh, Phan Boi Chau’s son-in-law, who had 
already established a network for sending Vietnamese to China, had been initiated into the 
Thanh Nien core group earlier in the year.63 These students would have formed part of
60 AOM, SPCE 365, annexe no. 2 a Note Noel no. 195 du 22 juillet 1925.
61 AOM, SPCE 365, annexe a Note Noel no. 213, 1 Oct; 26 et 27 sept. 1925.
62 AOM, SPCE, Interrogatoire de Le van Phan dit Hong Son, p. 13.
63 Quang Hung, Quoc Anh, ‘Le Hong Son, nguoi chien si xuat sac thuoc the he nhung nguoi cong san 
dau tien o Viet-nam,’ (‘Le Hong Son, An Exceptional Fighter of the First Generation of Vietnamese 
Communists’), NCLS 1-2, 1979, p. 15.
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the first official Thanh Nien training course, which Quoc would mention in a letter to the 
Comintern in June 1926 as being composed often  people.64
But more political turmoil apparently disrupted the plans for another group o f trainees to 
come to Canton. The growing militancy o f the GMD in Guangdong, along with the 
boycott o f British trade, encouraged the development of a new coalition o f interests in 
southern China between right-wing elements in the GMD and the imperialist powers. One 
o f the earliest signs of this break-down in nationalist unity was the murder o f  Liao 
Zhongkai in August. The cadets at Whampoa braced themselves for another outbreak of 
hostilities, as Le Hong Phong wrote from the Academy to the Vietnamese in the city.65 
However, a political compromise was worked out, which forced Hu Hanmin, implicated in 
the murder plot, to go into exile in Europe. The leftist Wang Jingwei took over the 
leadership o f the nationalist governm ent, while Chiang Kaishek became the Commander 
o f the Guomindang First Army as well as the Director of Whampoa Academy.66 Wang 
Jingwei’s position as successor to Sun Yatsen was to all appearances consolidated at the 
GMD’s Second National Party Congress held in January 1926. The Congress confirmed 
the strength of the united front and its alliance with Soviet Russia.67 But the loss o f Liao 
Zhongkai undermined GMD support for the peasant movement in Guangdong and was 
probably at least a temporary blow to Nguyen Ai Quoc’s projects as well. He had become 
deeply involved in his work for the Krestintem in mid-1925, but by the following spring 
the Comintern’s attention would be re-focussed in other directions. The second Thanh 
Nien training course would finally open in the autumn of 1926, when the united front had 
shifted its attention to the Northern Expedition. Before examining the subsequent 
development o f Thanh Nien, then, we need to look at the peasant movement and the 
political forces which affected it.
2. The Guangdong Peasant Movement
Between February 1925 and March 1926 Quoc was drawn into one o f the more 
tumultuous manifestations o f the united front, the Guangdong peasant movement, via his 
work for the Krestintem. Peasant organizing in Guangdong Province had begun soon after 
the creation of the CCP, largely inspired by the son of a wealthy family who had studied in 
Japan, Peng Pai. He made his first efforts to set up peasant schools and organizations in
64 RC, 495,154, 594, pp. 43-4, letter of 3 June 1926, to ‘Cher Camarade’, signed ‘Nguyen Ai Quae’..
65 AOM, SPCE 365, Mission Noel, note 205, Annexe no. 6, 20 aout 1925.
66 Isaacs, op cit, p. 84.
67 So Waichor, The Guomindang Left in the National Revolution, 1924-1931, (Hong Kong: Oxford Un.
Press, 1991), pp. 18-9.
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1922 and ’23, but had little success in protecting the institutions he created from the 
wealthy gentry.68 In the spring of 1925, however, the power equation changed in the 
countryside east o f Canton, when GMD troops, newly trained and armed, defeated the 
forces of warlord Chen Jiongming. The peasant associations founded by Peng Pai became 
government-recognized bodies with guaranteed rights and a central place in the united front 
movement. They also gained the right to organize their own militias to defend themselves 
against the landlord-backed mintuan or ‘popular militias’ which in reality functioned as 
the armies of the local elite.
The peasant militias in the Haifeng and Lufeng districts on the East River were created 
from the training classes held in the Peasant Movement Training Institute (PMTI) in 
Canton. Founded in August 1924, the PMTI was Peng Pai’s creation. For the first classes 
he did most o f the lecturing and shaped a program which included weekly practical work in 
the villages. Fernando Galbiati writes that in the Second, Third and Fourth Classes trained 
at the Institute, the ‘military element’ of the training steadily increased. The Third Class, 
which may have included some Vietnamese, ran from 1 January to 3 April, 1925. It was 
patterned on the organization o f an army company and received training in survey and 
propaganda work.69 The Fourth class started on 30 April, but was disrupted by the 
rebellion in Canton of the Yunnan and Guangxi generals. According to Galbiati, the 
students dispersed to rural areas until the Institute reopened in July. Five young 
Vietnamese who had been studying in this course were reported to have moved to Canton 
University that month.70 When only fifty students returned after this interruption, Galbiati 
believes that the course was filled out with new trainees who may have been Vietnamese.71 
This group graduated in September 1925. The Institute’s training may have been the root 
of the armed propaganda brigades which the Vietminh would form in 1945. The subjects 
covered were strictly practical -  they included instruction in speech-making and in setting 
up Peasant Associations, as well as ways to win peasant confidence such as speaking the 
local language and living, eating and dressing as the peasants did.72 The Fifth Course at the 
PMTI, for which Mao Zedong became an instructor, would include 43 students from 
Hunan Province.73 (Although Mao is sometimes credited with founding the Institute, he 
did not become the principal until the spring o f 1926.)
68 Hans Van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, pp. 120-122.
69 Fernando Galbiati, P ’eng P ’ai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet, (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ., 1985), 
pp. 240-3.
70 AOM, SPCE 365, Mission Noel, annexe a l’envoi no. 208, 15 juillet 1925.
71 Galbiati, op. cit., p. 243.
72 Ibid., pp. 241-2.
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The importance o f the Krestintem in guiding the peasant movement is unclear. The Russian 
advisers who lectured at the PMTI on survey techniques and who worked under Borodin 
as special advisers to the Peasant Department of the Guomindang may not have been linked 
to the Krestintem.74 One of these, S.N.Belenky, who was known in the Comintern as 
-‘Volin’, was also a ROSTA correspondent, perhaps the immediate day-to-day supervisor of 
Nguyen Ai Quoc,75 In the initial period o f organizing, Borodin himself seems to have been 
closely involved in giving advice on such issues as demands for reduction o f land rents and 
land redistribtion.76 Yet Nguyen Ai Quoc, apparently at this time the only Asian 
Krestintem representative (and a translator of French and English language materials), was 
able to follow the movement closely and participate in surveys o f the Guangdong 
peasantry. He sent the Krestintem a report in French on the major problems o f the Chinese 
peasantry, which they received on 2 March 1925. Along with high population density, 
primitive tools and natural disasters, he listed the greed of the landowners and the invasion 
o f foreign capital as major difficulties. It is not clear whether Quoc was simply translating 
a report prepared by others, or whether he had had a hand in compiling it. He mentioned 
only briefly at the end that the peasants were forming associations with the encouragement 
o f industrial workers and the southern government. The following groups were to be 
excluded from the peasant associations, he wrote: landowners with more than 100 mau77 of 
land; anyone who had committed acts o f extortion against the peasants; ministers or 
leaders of religious groups; anyone having relations with the imperialists; and gamblers 
and opium smokers.78
In August o f 1925 the Krestintem sent Quoc five-thousand rubles (worth around $US 
2,500 at the time) via Borodin’s account in the Bank of the Far East. They requested that 
he use the money to 1) produce revolutionary posters and brochures on the peasant 
question; 2) send representatives to other provinces to start peasant unions; 3) send a 
tmsted Chinese comrade to Moscow to work in the Krestintem; 4) and furnish regular 
information and documentation to Moscow on the Chinese peasant movement. Their final 
demand was for bi-monthly reports.79 Quoc replied in English on October 17 that he had 
received all the Krestintem’s letters dating from August and September (eleven in all, most 
o f which are not in the Krestintem file with Quoc’s correspondence) on the same day: 14
73 Ibid., p. 243.
74 Ibid., p. 251.
75 Comintern and China, vol. II 1926-27, p. 953, identifies Volin only as a Tass correspondent, while
V. V. Vishnyakova-Akimova identifies him as an adviser to the peasant movement -  see Dva Goda v
Bosstavshem Kitae, 1925-1927, (Two Years in Revolutionary China), (Moscow: Nauka, 1965 ), p. 249.
76 Hans Van de Ven, From Friend to Comrade, p. 163.
77 A mau or mu in Chinese is 3,600 sq. metres.
78 RC, 535, 1,42, pp. 17-19.
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October 1925. He promised to comply with most of their requests. But he declined to send 
a comrade to Moscow, ‘because all our comrades are needed here now, and no-one (sic) of 
them understands foreign language... ’. He also requested that they stop sending materials 
in German, because there was no one available to translate it.80
On 5 November 1925 Quoc sent the Krestintem the results of a survey o f peasant unions 
which had been completed for seven of the districts in Guangdong.81 In a summary o f the 
results, he wrote that the peasants, ‘agree with the CP programme when their fear o f the 
“socialization o f women” is vanished,’ and that ‘they are able to make great sacrifice (sic) 
to defend their class, or to support the revolutionary government.’82 Presumably his 
Cantonese was not yet good enough for him to have taken a direct part in the survey; he 
sent the reports to the Krestintem in English. Another letter written 3 December seems to 
show that Quoc was mainly transmitting information from Chinese peasant organizers, 
rather than collecting it himself. Quoc explained that his Chinese comrades had advised 
against his developing a formal relationship with the Guomindang Executive Committee in 
his capacity as the Krestintem representative, something the Krestintem had earlier 
recommended. ‘Our comrades said that it is not necessary, because I can get all 
information concerning the peasant question though our C.P. comrades. (Although the 
chairman of the Board o f Peasant Affairs is a Koumintang , all the work -  organization as 
well as propaganda — is done by our comrades),’ he wrote.83
In the early hours of 20 March 1926 Chiang Kaishek moved against the communist 
political commissars at Whampoa, arresting around fifty men84. The Soviet advisers in 
Canton were placed under house arrest. When faced with this coup de force, Borodin 
aquiesced to the demands o f the GMD Executive Committee, which met in May and 
demanded a more restricted communist role within the Guomindang. Communist members 
of GMD party committees were from then on limited to one-third of the membership, while 
communists were banned from serving as heads o f government departments.85 Although 
the united front would continue with Soviet backing until the summer o f 1927, the March 
20 incident marked the beginning of the decline o f the peasant movement in Guangdong, 
until the Hai-lu-feng Soviet of late 1927 was formed. As Nguyen Ai Quoc explained in his 
report to the Krestintem in June 1927, the GMD ceased helping the peasant associations as
79 RC, 535, 1,42, p.6, letter of 19 August 1925.
80 RC, 535,1,42, p.30.
81 RC, 535,1,42, pp. 47-63.
82 RC, 535,1,42, p. 32.
83 RC, 535,1,42, p.64.
84 RC, 535,1,42, p. 93.
94
*
soon as they had unified Guangdong province under their flag.86 The peasant militias were 
not strong enough to protect themselves against the militias of the gentry without the 
support of GMD troops.87 Nguyen Ai Quoc later claimed that the British and French had 
been arming these militias.88 In the spring o f 1926, when the planning for the Northern 
Expedition got underway, Mao Zedong took over the PMTI and the united front began to 
focus attention on the peasants of Hunan and Hubei.
In March 1926 the Krestintem seems to have rather abmptly lost interest in Nguyen Ai 
Quoc’s work. He wrote them a brief note in French on 8 March 1926, to ask why all o f the 
letters which he had sent them had failed to elicit a reply, and why they had failed to send 
any material for propaganda.89 He had passed on all their correspondence to Java, Manila, 
India and other places, he added. Part o f the explanation comes in their reply, an undated 
letter in which they revealed that they had received his letters. But they had begun to 
correspond with a new member of their Presidium, comrade Hu Hanmin, about the peasant 
situation in Shandong and Yunnan provinces.90 It turned out that Hu Hanmin had gone to 
Moscow, after being exiled from Canton, and had been elected to the governing body of 
the Krestintem. At the Sixth Plenum o f the ECCI in March 1926 he was received as an 
honoured guest.91 The conviction held by the Stalin-Bukharin coalition in Moscow, that 
the Guomindang was the prime revolutionary force in Asia, had led to this strange turn o f 
events.92 (Bukharin would replace the leftist Zinoviev as head o f the Comintern in 
October 1926.) The man who had been held responsible for the death o f Liao Zhongkai, 
the protector of the Guangdong peasant movement, was suddenly the Krestintem’s primary 
contact in China. Nguyen Ai Quoc was now presumably considered either too closely 
allied with the communists or simply too insignificant to deal with. After March 1926, 
there is no record of Quoc’s interaction with the Krestintem until his return to Moscow in 
June 1927.
85 RC, 535, 1,42, p. 95.
86 RC, 535, 1,127, p. 35, ‘Kratkoe Informatsionnoe Sobshcheniie o Krestianskom dvizhenii provintsii 
Guandun’ [‘Brief Report on the Peasant Movement in Guandun’].
87 Hans Van de Ven, op. cit., p. 175.
88 RC, 535, 1,127, p. 35, ‘Brief Report on the Peasant Movement in Guandun’..
89 RC, 535, 1,42, p. 69.
90 RC, 535, 1,42, p.9-10.
91 Harold Isaacs, op. cit, p. 86.
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3. The Growth o f  Thanh Nien
a. Expectations o f  Revolt
The progress o f Nguyen Ai Quoc’s attempts to organize links with Vietnam must have 
been slowed by the political tension within the Canton government, as well as his own 
financial difficulties. By April 1926, although Lam Due Thu reported that thirty young 
Vietnamese were studying political and military science at Canton University and the 
Whampoa Academy, there was still no sign o f a second intake o f trainees for Thanh Nien93. 
The Thanh Nien core group had dispersed for the time being: Le Hong Son was reported 
to be serving as a political agent on the staff o f General Zhang Fakui on Hainan Island. In 
May Ho Tung Mau went with a comrade identified as ‘Mr. Sau’ (Luu Hong Khai or Vo 
Tung) to Siam, where they hoped to organize a mutual aid society.94 Le Hong Phong, Han 
Rue and Dang Tu My were soon to depart for Moscow for further military training.95 At 
the same time, the entente between Quoc and Nguyen Hai Than was breaking down. In 
April 1926 Than was accused by Lam Due Thu of having misused money belonging to the 
Vietnamese section o f the League o f Oppressed Peoples.96 That March the League had 
been reorganized, perhaps in connection with Liao Zhongkai’s death and Chiang Kaishek’s 
move to limit communist power. An article announcing the reorganization in the Chinese 
press noted that the League had started a new drive to recruit members,97 The Surete 
passed on the above information with an appended note to its Heads o f Local 
Administration, which opined that the exodus o f Indochinese to Canton ‘may not be 
unrelated’ to the reorganization o f the League o f Oppressed Peoples. These new emigres 
may have been among the 30 Vietnamese then studying at Whampoa.
Lam Due Thu told the Surete that Nguyen Hai Than was jealous o f the influence which 
Nguyen Ai Quoc had over the group o f revolutionary Vietnamese in Canton. ‘Nguyen Ai 
Quoc is preparing for revolution methodically. He will move at the propitious moment. 
Nguyen Hai Than is a partisan of the violent method. He wants to make use o f it 
immediately,’ the informer said.98 In a follow-up to this conversation, Lam Due Thu 
expanded on his description o f Nguyen Ai Quoc: ‘Nguyen Ai Quoc is still attached to the
92 Ibid., p. 85.
93 AOM, SPCE, box 368, Pinot report of April 1926.
94 AOM, SPCE, box 368, Mission Noel, note of 11 May 1926.
95 In an autobiography which Le Hong Phong wrote for the Comintern, he said that he had arrived in
Moscow in October 1926. RC, 495/201/46. There is no record of what became of the other two
Vietnamese in Moscow.
96 AOM, SPCE, box 368, Mission Noel, envoi 290, 7 mai 1926.
97 Ibid., letter from Hanoi, le 22 mars 1926, 499 S.G.
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Agency of the USSR. He doesn’t say what he does there... he is extremely suspicious and 
only tells his friends what is absolutely necessary ... in all of his actions, he conforms to 
his ideas. To those like Hong Son who suggested that he buy some land on Hainan to start 
a school, he said that he would never pay to acquire land and that since it belongs to 
everyone it should be put at the community’s disposal for free.’99
Among both the emigres in Canton and patriots within Vietnam there seems to have been 
an expectation that Ly Thuy would soon declare an armed revolt. By the end of March 
1926 political protest in Vietnam had reached a level not seen since the tax revolts of 
1908. The death on March 23 o f reformist leader Phan Chu Trinh, once Nguyen Ai Quoc’s 
mentor, was the occasion for mass funeral observances all over Vietnam. Student leaders 
who helped organize the funeral marches and mourning ceremonies were expelled from 
schools in all three parts of the country -fo r many this was the break with the French 
colonial establishment which eventually pushed them into illegal organizing. The radical 
southern journalist and anti-French personality, Nguyen An Ninh, was arrested on 24 
March. Coming on the heels of the mass protests against Phan Boi Chau’s sentencing at 
the end o f 1925, Phan Chu Trinh’s funeral and Nguyen An Ninh’s arrest together created 
an explosive atmosphere.
In Canton, in the meantime, the Russians and Chiang Kaishek had decided to bury their 
differences by joining to organize a ‘Northern Expedition’ which would extend the 
nationalist government’s boundaries north to the Yangtze River. Certain Vietnamese 
rebels clearly believed that this was the time for them to strike against the Indochinese 
border. The French began to get informers’ reports about planned military activities on the 
Sino-Vietnamese border by July o f 1926, just as Chiang Kaishek’s Northern Expedition got 
underway. On the 13 July, a French doctor serving as French consul in Pakhoi 
transmitted to the Governor General in Hanoi the following:
A revolutionary Vietnamese named L. Soui — Lythuy alias Nguyen Ai Quoc, now a 
military attache with the Canton government, who has graduated from a military 
school in Moscow, is said to have received a secret promise from the Canton 
government o f a thousand Russian rifles, in order to attempt a surprise attack on the 
Tonkin border, in the region o f Moncay. This Vietnamese is said to have also sent 
emissaries into the Ten-thousand Mountains (the region of Na-Luong), where they are 
to sign up any pirate with a gun.100
98 AOM, SPCE, box 368, extrait d’un compte-rendu de la conversation Pinot-Noel, 6 April 1926.
99 Ibid., Mission Noel, envoi 290, annexe: conversation Pinot-Noel, 7 April 1926.
100AOM, SPCE, 368, Consulat de France, Pakhoi et Tongking, Le Docteur P. Gouillon, 13 July 1926.
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Tam Kam Say, who had led a military uprising in 1918, was reported by another French 
informer, ‘Konstantin’, to be eager to attack the northern Vietnamese town of Hongay. 
Konstantin at the same time passed on the information that Paul Monin, a French lawyer 
active in anticolonial politics in Saigon, had come to Canton to interest the Russians in 
supporting a revolt. (Other French sources place this visit between the end o f February and 
30 May 1926.101) The plan o f attack was as follows: three-thousand Chinese soldiers 
guided by 100 Annamites would sail from Pakhoi and disembark at a Chinese port on the 
coast o f Southern Annam. Konstantin, who seems to have had no access to Quoc’s inner 
circle, thought that the attack had been approved by Quoc.102 But another note, apparently 
from Lam Due Thu, reveals that Quoc had no faith in Monin’s judgment and refused to 
support his scheme. 103 The fact that Monin worked with Quoc’s Paris colleague Phan Van 
Truong and was highly respected in Saigon’s nationalist opposition circles was not enough 
to sway Quoc in his favour.
According to all the old rules o f Vietnamese anticolonialism the time was ripe for military 
action. These traditions o f revolt seem to have encouraged the development o f a myth of 
Ly Thuy as a new generalissimo. But what Quoc was actually organizing seems to have 
been nothing more than the nucleus, still tiny, of Vietnam’s future communist party. The 
Surete came to believe that he had turned down a large offer o f  aid from the Soviets in 
1926, which would have been used to launch armed attacks, because he judged that the 
Vietnamese rebels were not yet prepared.104 In fact, his plan to create a communist-led 
independence movement was only just getting off the ground.
b. The Cochinchina-Cambodia Branch o f  the Nanyang Committee
It is possible that some groups in Vietnam were planning violent actions against French 
power in 1926. (The belief that revolt was imminent also existed among leftist groups in 
Indonesia in the summer o f 1926 -  but there the uprising did materialize in November.)105 
The organization beginning in 1926 of a branch o f the Chinese CP within Vietnam may 
be one cause o f this confused picture. In February 1927 French intelligence received a 
report from a source labelled '‘digne de f o i ’ which claimed that a ‘Cochinchine-Cambodge’ 
branch of the Singapore-based Nanyang (South Seas) Provisional Committee of the CCP
101 Philippe Peycam, Intellectuals and Political Commitment in Vietnam: The Emergence o f a Public
Sphere in Colonial Saigon (1916-1928), Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of London (SOAS), 1999, pp. 101, 107. 
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was already active, and that it was beginning to organize in Tonkin. The South Seas 
Branch Committee or Provisional Committee had been formed by Chinese emigres in 1926 
as part o f the Chinese CP; it was believed to have members in the colonies o f Great Britain, 
Holland and France, as well as in Siam and Burma.106 The French information was based 
on a report supposedly presented to an Extended Plenum of the ECCI by ‘Samoyan’ 
(probably Semaun), identified here as ‘the agent for Indochina, Indonesia and the Malay 
Archipelago.107 I have not found corroboration o f this intelligence in the files of the Far 
Eastern Secretariat or the Seventh Extended ECCI Plenum held in November 1926, the 
most likely time for such a report to have been presented. (In 1930-31, there are several 
references to the ‘Cochinchine-Cambodge’ group in the Comintern’s archives.) However, 
a Surete report summarizing Indochinese political developments in 1926 and early 1927 
shows that there were numerous ethnic Chinese workers’ unions active in southern 
Vietnam, with ties to Canton.108 In the same period violent secret societies were also being 
encouraged by the GMD in Saigon.109 As part of the united front, these unions and 
societies probably contained a core of communists. By mid-1927 ethnic Chinese in South 
Vietnam were helping to send new Vietnamese recruits to Thanh Nien training courses in 
Canton, albeit under cover o f the GMD.110
Semaun claimed that the Chinese party was active in the five districts o f Indochina under 
French control (presumably the five territories in the Indochinese Union) and that the 
communist party o f Cochinchina ‘constitutes the most active organization, leading an 
energetic effort among the indigenous masses’. A diagram attached to this report showed 
sections within Cochinchina located in Saigon, Cholon, Tra Vinh, Sa Dec, Ca Mau and Thu 
Dau Mot. In Cambodia sections are listed in Kompong Cham, Kratie and Kampot, with a 
divisional committee o f 50 members in Phnom Penh. A conference o f representatives from 
Haiphong, Hanoi and Lao-kay was due to be held in February 1927 in Haiphong. These 
representatives seem to be ethnic Chinese, for example a ‘Mong Vinh Hoi’, referred to as 
one o f the most active revolutionaries in the North [of Vietnam]. Semaun also mentioned 
an indigenous revolutionary organization founded by natives o f Vinh- na Tinh (sic) in May 
1926, but said that it had not yet taken a definitive form. This appears to be a reference to
106 Rene Onraet, Singapore: A Police Background, (London: Dorothy Crisp, 1945), p. 112.
107 SLOTFOM III, 116, from le Conseiller d’Etat, Directeur des Affaires Politiques, Paris, Feb. 1927.
108 Christophe Giebel, Ton Due Thang and the Imagined Ancestries o f Vietnamese Communism, Ph.D. 
thesis, Cornell Univ., 1996, p. 158, n.20, quoting AOM, GG, 7F, c. 22 Surete Cochinchine, Rapport 
annuel 1926/27 (1 July 1927), vol.l.
109 Peycam, op.cit., p. 115 mentions an am sach dang (assassination party), citing a Surete annual 
report 1926-1927, Goucoch, II/A. 45/204 (1), NA 2..
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the early recruiting efforts o f Thanh Nien, or the Cach Mang Dang, (Revolutionary Party), 
discussed below. Conceivably those Vietnamese nationalists in touch with the 
Cochinchina-Cambodia organization were the ones most actively promoting armed revolt 
in 1926. M onin’s plan may have been drawn up in conjunction with elements of this 
group -  Chinese in Tra Vinh were known to have contributed generously to his 
journalistic efforts.111 There was also a group in Bac Ninh province, referred to by Tran 
Huy Lieu as the Vietnam Dan Quoc [Republican] faction, which was planning an uprising 
in late 1926. (Their plans were given away when some of their homemade bombs exploded 
prematurely.)112 At the end o f 1927 they would become one o f the constituent groups of 
the Vietnamese Quoc Dan Dang.113
c. The Second and Third Thanh Nien Training Courses
To what extent, if  any, Nguyen Ai Quoc and Thanh Nien were connected to Chinese 
GMD/CP activity within Vietnam, is impossible to say. Both the Comintern records and 
the French sources give the impression, though, that Quoc was determined to avoid 
engaging in premature military adventures. After a gap o f almost a year in his reports to 
the Eastern Secretariat, Quoc wrote to the Comintern on 3 June 1926 that his work was 
moving slowly because o f his lack o f funds.114 He was making do with his own salary, that 
o f one o f his comrades and some grants from the Russians. Another source o f money for 
Thanh Nien may have been the funds which the Krestintern advanced via Borodin for 
Quoc’s work in the peasant movement. This money may at least have supported those 
trainees who attended the PMTI.115 By this point Quoc may have also been receiving 
contributions from wealthy patriots in southern Vietnam. A Surete note of 12 August 
1927 noted that Diep Van Ky, a Saigon publisher and former pupil o f Nguyen Ai Quoc’s 
father, frequently sent money to a Chinese intermediary in Canton, whenever Nguyen Ai 
Quoc sent him a request for funds. 116 As early as 1925, Lam Due Thu had reported that 
Quoc was considering approaching his old Paris companion Khanh Ky, now a 
photographer in Saigon, for money. Quoc had also mentioned Bui Quang Chieu, the 
wealthy leader of the Constitutionalist Party, as a potential contributor.117 If  a southern
111 Ho Hue Tam Tai, op. cit., p. 288.
112 Tran Huy Lieu, Cach Mang Can Dai Viet Nam, vol. 5, (Hanoi: NXB BanNghien Cuu Van Su Dia,
1956), p. 22-3.
113 Hoang Van Dao, Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang [The Vietnamese GMDJ, (Saigon: Xuat -Ban Giang
Dong, 1965), p. 30.
114 RC, 495,154,594, pp. 43-4.
115 RC, 535,1,42, p.6, letter of 19 August 1925.
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funding channel was already in operation in 1926, Quoc clearly considered it unwise to 
reveal as much to the Russians.
Quoc claimed in this June 1926 report that since his arrival in Canton he had done the 
following for the Indochinese movement: 1) organized a secret group; 2) organized a 
peasant union among Vietnamese residing in Siam; 3) selected a group o f seven ‘pioneers’ 
from among the children o f peasants and workers (several o f these came from Siam), who 
were being educated in Canton; 4) organized a group o f revolutionary women with 12 
members; and 5) organized a propaganda school, for students brought clandestinely to 
Canton from Vietnam and Siam. At this point the history of the Thanh Nien group which 
we have from various Vietnamese memoirs intersects with what we learn from Quoc’s 
reports.118 Quoc sent this report as he was preparing for the second group o f students to 
arrive in Canton, for the training course which eventually began in September 1926. The 
first course, Quoc reported, had involved ten students; he was expecting around thirty to 
arrive for the second.
The participants in this second Thanh Nien training course left their homes for Canton in 
July and August o f 1926. At least three of those recruited came from a political society 
formed in Vinh by veterans o f the 1907-8 movement who had been imprisoned on Poulo 
Condor. At its founding in 1925 the group took the name Phuc Quoc, ‘Restoration 
Society’, in imitation o f Phan Boi Chau’s organization, the Quang Phuc Hoi. Renamed the 
Vietnam Cach-Mang Dang (the Vietnam Revolutionary Party) in 1926, it would become 
known as the Tan Viet (the New Vietnam Party) in 1928. This group, based in Quoc’s 
native region, formed mainly o f Chinese-educated literati and young school teachers, 
would provide some of the communist party’s most important leaders in its early years.
The first official leader o f the communist party formed in 1930 would be Tran Phu, a 
schoolteacher who was among the Phuc Quoc’s earliest members. Another early recruit, Ha 
Huy Tap, a young teacher from Ha Tinh, would be the de facto party leader between 1935 
and March 1938. Why the Phuc Quoc members were chosen for Thanh N ien’s inner circle 
is an intriguing question. A combination of their trusted family connections, mixed 
Chinese and French education, and alienation from the colonial establishment made them 
the sort o f recruits whom Quoc seems to have most valued. Tran Phu, for example, came 
from a family which had suffered under French rule. He was the son of a mandarin who, 
while serving in Quang Ngai province in 1908, had committed suicide, rather than force
118 See Nguyen Luong Bang, ‘Mes Rencontres avec Poncle Ho’, in Recits de la resistance 
vietnamienne (1925-1945), (Paris: Francois Maspero, 1966), pp. 11-13; Phan Trong Quang’s memoirs 
in NCLS, cited below; Hoang van Hoan, also cited below.
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the local peasants to take part in a French military sweep against the tax protests.519 The 
Phuc Quoc’s younger members, disaffected youth from Vietnam’s poorest region, were 
clearly themselves receptive to the theories o f revolution which Quoc was expounding. 
There is little doubt that the preponderance of early Thanh Nien recruits from north-central 
Vietnam, including most o f the Canton-based central committee, must have made the 
group appear to be something o f a regional club.
The band of recruits was led to Canton by Le Duy Diem, a former schoolmate o f Tran Phu 
who came from Ha Tinh. He had been selected in the second half o f 1925 by the Phuc 
Quoc party to make contact with the Vietnamese in Canton and discuss joint action. By the 
time he returned to Vinh he had been converted to the Thanh Nien philosophy.120 The 
same thing would happen to most o f the Phuc Quoc/Revolutionary Party members who 
made the voyage to Canton: from the second training course, Tran Phu and his pupil 
Nguyen Ngoc Ba would return to Vietnam after three months as Thanh Nien members.
(Le Hong Son places Nguyen Ngoc Ba in the first course, as we have seen; he may have 
participated in both.) In an account o f the journey told by Phan Trong Quang, other men 
from central Vietnam joined the convoy, including Nguyen Van Loi, Le Manh Trinh,
Tran Van Dac, Nguyen Van Khang, and himself. Two of the Phuc Quoc members, Ton 
Quang Phiet and Hoang Van Tung, never made it to Canton, as they were arrested when 
they fell behind the others at the northern border. It was not until September, after 
travelling by train, on foot and by ship with weeks o f waiting in between each leg o f the 
journey, that the group made it to the Thanh Nien headquarters in Canton. There they 
found more students from Tonkin and a group from Siam. Around twenty trainees in all 
were in Canton, including the future prime minister Pham Van Dong, who fell ill and 
had to join the following course.121
The basic training lectures on topics ranging from human evolution, world geography and 
Vietnamese history to Marxism-Leninism, Sun Yatsen’s Three Peoples’ Principles and 
Gandhian non-violence were delivered by Nguyen Ai Quoc. Outside lecturers were invited 
to talk to the trainees from time to time, among whom Phan Trong Quang remembers Zhou 
Enlai, Peng Pai and He Xiangning, widow of the assassinated Liao Zhongkai. Borodin and
119 Le Quoc Su and Pham Due Duong, Ke Chuyen Tran Phu, (The Story o f Tran Phu), (Hanoi: Nha 
Xuat Ban Kim Dong, 1969), pp. 7-9.
120 Gouvemement generate de Flndochine, Direction des affaires politiques et de Surete franfaise, 
Contribution a Vhistoire des mouvements politiques de Vlndochine francaise, Vol.l, (Hanoi: IDEO, 
1930-35), p. 15-16; Ha Huy Tap in RC, 495, 201,45 -  Renseignements supplementaires, p. 6, says that 
Le Duy Diem became a member of Thanh Nien’s Central Committee.
121 Memoir based on Phan Trong Quang, recorded by Thanh Dam, ‘Lop Huan Luyen Chinh Tri Thu 
Hai o Quang Chau’, [‘The Second Political Training Course in Canton’], NCLS n. 265, 11-12, 1992.
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a Russian woman also came to speak, Quang claimed. Much of the time was spent in 
political discussion or practicing public speaking. At the close o f the second training 
course sometime in November, Phan Trong Quang reports that five of the group were 
secretly chosen for membership in the Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cong san doan, the 
Vietnamese Communist Youth group. These five were Tran Phu, Nguyen Van Loi,
Nguyen Ngoc Ba, Phan Trong Binh and Phan Trong Quang himself, all o f whom were 
from Annam.
The third training course started in late 1926 and ended after the Chinese New Year or Tet 
holiday in 1927. Hoang Van Hoan, another recruit from Nghe An who would become 
prominent in the communist party, writes in his memoirs that there were again around 20 
students, some o f whom had just taken part in a student strike in Nam Dinh.122 Among the 
northern group were probably Do Ngoc Du, Duong Hac Dinh, and Nguyen Huu Can, who 
would all become leaders o f the Tonkin Thanh Nien group.123 (Hoan does not mention the 
students from the Lycee du Protectorat in Hanoi, what was known as the Buoi School, but 
Do Ngoc Du and a number o f later Thanh Nien trainees had been expelled from this school 
in 1926.)124 Among the lecturers Hoan lists Peng Pai and Liu Shaoqi, who spoke on the 
workers movement. Usually Ho Tung Mau, Le Hong Son or Lam Due Thu interpreted for 
the Chinese speakers, but Nguyen Ai Quoc was able to fill in competently if  the others 
were absent, Hoan says.125 He also recalls role-playing in improvised dramas. Quoc, 
known to the trainees as ‘Vuong’, usually played a worker or peasant.126 Hoan does not 
mention how many o f this group were inducted into the inner communist group, but if the 
figure was as low as in the previous training course, the number o f communists in the 
Thanh Nien Association must still have been quite small. Huynh Kim Khanh gives a figure 
o f 24 members o f the Communist Youth group in May 1929, but this figure appears to 
refer to those members then living in China.127
The total number o f Vietnamese who would eventually pass through the Thanh Nien 
school is difficult to assess. I have seen concrete references to only three formal intakes 
o f trainees; a fourth group of trainees was assembling in Canton in March 1927, but their 
training was disrupted by the April coup.128 Quoc himself reported to the Comintern on 
his return to Moscow in June 1927 that 75 young Vietnamese had been trained at his
122 Ibid. p. 24.
123 AOM, SPCE 367, ‘Declaration de Le Quang D af.
124 Nhung Ngaoi Cong San, p. 168.
125 Ibid. p. 25.
126 Hoang van Hoan, A Drop In the Ocean, (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1988), p. 26.
127 Huynh Kim Khanh, op. cit., p. 78.
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‘propaganda school’ in Canton.129 A Vietnamese memoir published in 1992, however, 
claims that there were ten classes with 250-300 students altogether.130 A 1990 article by the 
same author, citing a document from the Guangdong Institute of History, says that 
altogether more than 300 Vietnamese participated in various revolutionary activities in 
Guangdong from 1924 to 1927.131 This would include those who did not join the 
communist party. The higher number may also include students from formal training 
classes in the second part of 1927 and in 1928, after Quoc’s departure. It may, moreover, 
reflect the fact that there were different levels and lengths of training provided. We do not 
know, for example, whether there were separate sessions held for the women and 
‘pioneers’ whom Quoc recruited, or for the less educated workers such as Nguyen Luong 
Bang. Hanoi historians have, in fact, become more cautious recently about advancing 
final numbers for Thanh Nien trainees. They cannot account for Nguyen Ai Quoc’s 
number o f 75 trainees by April 1927, even by including the names o f recruits who are 
known to have attended courses later in 1927.132
The largest group o f expatriates was apparently that enrolled at Whampoa, where by early 
1927 there were 53 Vietnamese.133 (It was at that point that a Vietnamese language section 
was started at the academy -  before 1927 Vietnamese seem to have enrolled as 
Chinese.134) But we do not know how many of these also received the full Thanh Nien 
training course. As Lam Due Thu had pointed out, ‘Nguyen Ai Quoc only initiates 
recruits with extreme prudence and gives full instruction only to those who are known to 
be devoted to the revolutionary cause. ’135 It appears that during Quoc’s time in Canton the 
northern Vietnamese who passed through his training courses were less likely to become 
members of the communist group than those from Annam, perhaps because the former had 
been recruited by Nguyen Hai Than or Lam Due Thu.
The Thanh Nien course material, some of which was printed in 1927 as Duong Kach Menh, 
[The Path to Revolution], was most likely collected by Quoc during his stay in Russia, and 
may have been similar to the political lectures offered by the communist political 
commissars at Whampoa Academy before their removal in March 1926. This pamphlet 
became a Bible for the young communist recruits of 1926 and 1927, Ha Huy Tap would
128 RC, 495/154/600, p.l, unsigned letter in Vietnamese to Le Hong Phong, point 4.
129 RC, 495/154/598, p.2.
130 Thanh Dam, op. cit., p. 72.
131 Thanh Dam, ‘Cac Nha Cach Mang Viet Nam Tham Gia Khoi Nghia Quang Chau’ ( The Vietnamese
Revolutionaries Who Took Part in the Canton Uprising’, NCLS, no. 6 (253), 1990, p. 72.
132 Nguyen Ai Quoc o Quang Chau, p. 57 (*); pp. 201-205.
133 AOM, SPCE, box 368, Mission Noel, Canton, 16 fev. 1927.
134 Thanh Dam, ‘Cac Nha Cach Mang’, p. 72.
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write in 1932. ‘We learned it almost by heart,’ he said.136 It contained explanations of the 
different types of revolutions, the different internationals, of unions, peasant unions, and 
cooperatives. It was deeply imbued with the concept of a two-stage revolution, as outlined 
by Lenin’s Theses on National and Colonial Questions. These two stages the pamphlet 
defined as the national revolution and the world revolution. While the national revolution 
would make no distinction between classes, the world revolution would be led by the 
peasants and workers and bring to an end the world capitalist system.137 By 1932, 
however, this concept of a two-stage revolution had been disavowed by the Comintern and 
Ha Huy Tap would write deprecatingly o f the confusion and naivete of the Thanh Nien 
programme. In particular he would criticize the theory that ‘during the period of anti­
imperialist struggle, one must unite all the classes’. ‘Such a theory signifies nothing more 
and nothing less than class collaboration... ’ he would say.138
By February o f 1927, Nguyen Ai Quoc’s recruiting and training was at last gathering 
momentum. His success in converting the members o f the Tam Tam Xa was being 
duplicated in his relations with the Phuc Quoc/Cach Mang Dang. The next step was to put 
Thanh Nien on an official footing, that is to get recognition from the Comintern, to draw 
up a programme and find reliable funding. The arrival of a Comintern delegation in 
Canton in February 1927 gave Quoc the opening he needed. Jacques Doriot, a communist 
youth activist with whom Quoc had attended the Fifth Congress in Moscow, was in the 
delegation together with Tom Mann from Great Britain and the American Earl Browder. 
Doriot had also become the president of the Colonial Section of the French Communist 
Party, as well as a deputy in the National Assembly. In his capacity as propagandist and 
translator, Quoc was able to accompany the group around Canton and gain Doriot’s support 
for his work in Vietnam.139 Doriot’s role was certainly connected to the Comintern’s 
decision in March 1926 to create a new Secretariat for France, the French colonies, 
Belgium, Italy and Switzerland. At that time the major responsibility for developing an 
Indochinese communist movement was formally handed to the French CP.140 On 3 March 
1927 Doriot, Quoc (who signed himself Lee), and Volin representing the Russian advisory 
group, drew up a memorandum agreeing that ‘Lee’ would prepare a budget request for the
135 AOM, SPCE 365, annexe a Penvoi 226, entrevues des 29,30 et 31 oct. et du ler nov. 1925.
136 Ha Huy Tap in RC, 495, 201,45, p. 3 of manuscript titled, ‘Renseignements supplementaires sur 
l’origine des organisations communiste en Indochine’.
137 Cac To Chuc Tien Than Cua Dang, [  The Precursors o f the Party], pp. 23-24.
138 RC, 495,201,45, pp. 3-4 of Ha Huy Tap manuscript.
139 AOM, SPCE, box 368, Mission Noel, letter of 23 Feb. 1927.
140 Adibekov et al., op. cit., pp. 105-6. The regional secretariats formed in March 1926 were often 
referred to as lendersecretariats (landersekretariats).
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Comintern, while Doriot would write a manifesto to the Vietnamese Revolutionary Youth 
along with a resolution outlining their future tasks.141
Doriot reported in an explanatory letter to the Eastern Secretariat that the Thanh Nien 
organization had already established core groups all over Vietnam: one in Cochinchina, 
two in Annam, six in Tonkin and four in Siam. ‘Certainly, they still have numerous 
weaknesses,’ he wrote: ‘First, the lack o f a programme; second, a very marked tendency 
to conspiracy and sectarianism. Their activity resembles that o f a secret society, rather than 
that of a mass revolutionary organization. For example, the organization is constituted 
almost entirely o f comrades who have been to Canton. That is to say that their links with 
the masses are still weak. Nevertheless,’ he continued, ‘some links have been established 
and attempts at organizing larger groups have been made among students, merchants and 
peasants.’142 Doriot explained that his resolution on party work raised several points: a) 
the need to transform the work o f sects into mass work; b) to open the oganization to a 
larger number o f Vietnamese who actually lived in Vietnam; c) to become more involved 
in the political life o f Vietnam; d) to create workers’ unions, peasant unions and student 
associations and organizations for the other strata o f the population.143
Doriot’s manifesto -  a letter addressed to the ‘Indochinese Revolutionary Youth’ -  makes 
it clear that he viewed Thanh Nien as a nationalist organization, with overt goals similar 
to those o f the Chinese GMD. ‘The Indochinese people -  as your organization has 
proclaimed -  can only follow one path if they truly want to change their situation: that o f 
the struggle for independence,’ he wrote.144 He emphasized that the workers and peasants 
were the essential forces o f the struggle. But he added a strong endorsement for a united 
front: ‘Do not forget that under imperialist domination, all o f the people (workers, 
peasants, merchants and intellectuals), with the exception of a tiny minority o f profiteers, 
have an interest in fighting imperialism. Don’t neglect any effort to attract them and 
organize them every day for the struggle. Do not refuse their cooperation,’ he said.145 
Nowhere in his tract did he mention communism, although he did cite the example o f the 
Russian revolution as a model o f anti-imperialism, which had liberated the oppressed 
peoples of the Czarist empire.146 The Comintern’s desire to mold Thanh Nien as a 
nationalist organization is underlined by a report from Lam Due Thu on the 17 March
141 RC, 495, 154, 555, p.5.
142 RC, 495, 154,555, pp. 2-3.
143 Ibid., p. 3.
144 Ibid., p. 10
145 Ibid., p. 14.
146 Ibid., p. 12.
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1927. ‘Recently the Chinese and French revolutionaries have begun encouraging “les 
amis” to create a party similar to the Chinese nationalist party, with a programme, policy 
and world-wide propaganda service and information agency. The statutes o f this party will 
soon be completed,’ he wrote.147
Quoc submitted a one-year budget to the Comintern which totalled 40,000 Chinese dollars. 
O f this figure, half would go to cover the cost o f travel to and training in Canton for 100 
future propagandists. In addition he requested $1,500 to support ten full-time 
propagandists for one year. Publications, communications, setting up small shops as fronts 
for liaison posts and other organizational tasks would absorb another $8,500. The travel 
costs o f another 100 men who would come to study at Whampoa would amount to $5,000. 
As Quoc explained in an attached note, Whampoa had pledged to train these 100 
Vietnamese if  their travel costs were covered.148 The final $5,000 for ‘unforseen expenses’ 
was to be set aside for illness or other emergencies.
By March 1927, with Doriot’s support and two new groups o f trainees returning to 
Vietnam, Nguyen Ai Quoc’s organization appeared ready for sustained growth. In central 
Vietnam negotiations were underway for a formal union with the Phuc Quoc party, since 
m id-1926 renamed Cach Mang Dang. The two main sources on the negotiations for unity 
disagree, however, on how eagerly this goal was pursued. Ha Huy Tap, writing around 
1932 in Moscow, claimed that Le Duy Diem returned to Vietnam in March 1927 with a 
mandate from Canton to lay the groundwork for unification. Diem attended local meetings 
of both parties in north and central Vietnam, which were followed by a national unification 
conference in Hue that July. For the first time, Tap writes, both parties received a written 
programme and statutes, which included regulations for workers and peasant unions, 
student unions and other associations.149 This progression o f events would have been a 
logical consequence of Doriot’s visit to Canton. But all did not go as smoothly as Quoc 
might have hoped. According to Ha Huy Tap, the two parties had decided to accept the 
designation Viet Nam Thanh Nien Cach Mang Dong Chi Hoi, The Comrades Association 
o f Revolutionary Vietnamese Youth, still known simply as Thanh Nien or by its 
Vietnamese initials, V.N.T.N.C.M.D.C.H. The two organizations would carry out a 
merger from top to bottom, combining all cells under a provisional central committee. 
Provisional regional committees were formed in the north and center, and all that remained 
was to form a regional committee for Cochinchina. But the Thanh Nien members from the
147 AOM, SPCE, 368, letter from Canton, 17 March 1927.
148 RC, 495, 154,555, p. 17, ‘Note Explicative du Budget.
149 RC, 495, 201,45, p.7 of Ha Huy Tap manuscript.
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South, who had been unable to attend the Hue conference, balked at accepting the 
decisions of the July meeting.
By this stage, sometime after July 1927, Ha Huy Tap claims that the southern Thanh Nien 
membership had become the largest in the country. This was a rapid change from the 
situation in early 1927, when Doriot had reported only one Thanh Nien group established 
in Cochinchina, and must have reflected an intense effort to make the association into a 
mass party. Tap himself claims that he moved to Saigon to engage in political work in 
March 1927, after being removed from his teaching post in Vinh, where he had been 
organizing evening classes for workers.150 A group of ten expatriates from Cochinchina or 
Annam, mainly workers, had arrived in Canton in May or early June 1927, Lam Due Thu 
claimed.151 This group perhaps included labour organizer Ton Due Thang, the future 
President o f North Vietnam, who returned to Cochinchina from Canton in the second part 
of the year.152 As we have seen, a group o f nine southern emigres sponsored by the GMD 
arrived in Canton in July, Thanh Nien growth in the south may have been facilitated by 
the Cochinchina-Cambodia organization attached to the CCP. Ton Due Thang had been 
organizing Saigon workers since 1925, so it is quite possible that he had been in contact 
with this urban-based Chinese committee.153
There is other evidence which points to the fact that Thanh Nien was making an effort to 
develop roots in southern Vietnam in 1927. Ha Huy Giap, brother o f Ha Huy Tap, relates 
in his memoirs that he had moved to Saigon in 1926 to look for a way to leave for France. 
But in early 1927 Nguyen Van Loi and Phan Trong Binh, two of the Communist Youth 
Group members from the second training course, arrived in Saigon and convinced him to 
stay on there, as a Thanh Nien activist. The two Canton trainees remained in the south as 
teachers.154 Giap also reveals what is a potentially important link between the southern and 
central activists: he claims that Nguyen An Ninh was imprisoned in Saigon in 1926 with 
Tu Kien, one of the Poulo Condore prisoners who was part o f the original conspiracy to 
form the Phuc Quoc party in 1918. Both shared the ideas of Nguyen Ai Quoc, Giap says. 
Nguyen An Ninh is said by Giap to have passed on his ‘undertakings’ to Tu Kien, who 
was released from prison first. Tu Kien then returned to Vinh, where he was formally 
initiated into the Cach Mang Dang by Le Huan, his former prison mate from Poulo
150 RC, 495/201/45, ‘Avtobiografia Sinichkina’, [‘Sinichkin’s (Ha Huy Tap’s) Autobiography].
151 AOM, SPCE, box 368, Mission Noel, Annexe I, Lettre de Pinot le 3 juin 1927.
152 Hue-Tam Ho Tai, op. cit., p. 215.
153 Ban Lien Lac Tu Chinh Tri, Con Dao Ky Su va Tu Lieu [Con Son Island Memoirs and Documents], 
(Ho Chi Minh: Tre, 1996), p. 163.
154 Ha Huy Giap, Doi Toi, (T.P. Ho Chi Minh: Nha Xuat Ban T.P. Ho Chi Minh, 1994), p.47.
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Condore. After that he returned to the south, ostensibly to build up the membership o f the 
Revolutionary Party, but possibly also to work for Thanh Nien.155 A Surete note o f May 
1928 would refer to Tu Kien (Nguyen Dinh Kien) as the liaison between the Vietnamese in 
Canton and Saigon.156 When he was again arrested in 1929, the French found pictures of 
Marx and Lenin in his house.
Other party mergers may have been inititated since March, on Doriot’s advice to enlarge 
the Thanh Nien membership — it could be, for example, that some members o f the ‘Youth 
Party’ (also known as Jeune Annam) founded in Saigon in March 1926, had become 
affiliated with Thanh Nien. (The closeness to the Thanh Nien name is apparently 
coincidental.) In m id-1926 Nguyen Ai Quoc had made a glowing report to the Comintern 
on the Jeune Annam group, which was close to Phan Van Truong and Nguyen An Ninh, 
both o f whom had worked in Paris within the Intercolonial Union.157 Their possible links 
to Thanh Nien, perhaps via the French CP, also need to be investigated. On the whole, 
very little is known about the nature o f the contacts between Canton and the southern 
revolutionaries at this stage. But certainly by m id-1927 activists from Central Vietnam had 
begun to build formal organizational ties to augment whatever personal networks were 
already in existence.
The July 1927 attempt to merge with Thanh Nien left the Cach Mang Dang in some 
confusion: until July 1928 it would retain the name Thanh Nien, Ha Huy Tap claims, along 
with the association’s statutes and methods of organization.158 In his view, the two parties 
did not have any disagreements o f principle, but suffered from personal rivalries when it 
came to questions o f organization.
A more complicated view o f the relationship between the two parties is presented in the 
memoir o f the Revolutionary Party member Hoang Due Thi, published by the Surete in 
1933. He admits that in 1927 his Party adopted the organization in cells which Thanh Nien 
had instituted, and that they pretended that the two parties had united, under the leadership 
o f Thanh Nien’s central committee in Canton.159 He explains this Byzantine behaviour as 
an attempt to win back the allegiance of the students returning from China. But reading
155 Ha Huy Giap, op. cit., p.46 and Contribution, vol.l, p.21. The term of address ‘Tu’ was used for 
someone who had passed the tu tai examinations, roughly equivalent to the baccalaureate.
156 Fonds Goucoch, (NA2, HCM), Note Mensuelle de la Surete, Mai 1928. (My thanks to Philippe 
Peycam for providing this document.) Humanite, 13 Oct. 1929 refers to Kien’s 18 years’ deportation 
on Poulo Condore and his 1929 arrest in an article on repression in Indochina.
157 RC, 495, 154,596, p. 10, from an article written for Imprecor, 9 July 1926.
158 Ha Huy Tap, RC, 495, 201,45, p. 7.
159 Contribution, vol.l, p. 20.
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between the lines, one senses that he is playing down a potentially dangerous episode in 
his political past. By 1933, his old associate Tran Phu had died in police custody in 
Saigon, and Ha Huy Tap himself, an important Revolutionary Party member in 1927, was 
on the point o f returning from Moscow to become a major force in the leadership o f  the 
Indochinese Communist Party. While Hoang Due Thi may never have fully approved the 
closeness between the two parties, there is little doubt that it existed. Thi’s version o f the 
breakdown of negotiations places the blame on the Thanh Nien members who refused to 
merge their regional committees in the Center and North.160 Both he and Ha Huy Tap 
agree that Vuong Thuc Oanh played a negative role in these merger attempts.
The situation was probably complicated by Nguyen Ai Quoc’s fondness for the tactic of 
taking over movements from the inside. Ha Huy Tap describes what he calls ‘some typical 
examples’ of collaboration between the two parties: ‘the comrade H. o f Thanh Nien was 
also the second secretary o f the Revolutionary Party’s central committee; comrade Nguyen 
Si Sach, a liaison agent o f the Revolutionary Party’s central committee, was a member of 
Thanh Nien’s regional committee for Annam .. . \ 161 Tap does not say whether he played a 
dual role, although he makes it clear that he considered himself a communist. (He also 
shared a house with ‘certain members o f the Thanh Nien Regional Committee for 
Cochinchina.) Hoang Due Thi’s memoir confirms that even Thanh Nien trainees who had 
no previous association with the Revolutionary Party ‘offered their services’ to the 
Revolutionary Party on their return from Canton.162 One can assume that they did so on the 
instruction of the Thanh Nien leadership in China.
4. The Collapse o f  the United Front
The organizational progress which the Doriot visit represented for Thanh Nien had already 
been undermined by the time the merger negotiations with the Revolutionary Party fell 
apart. Just as Nguyen Ai Quoc’s party-building and lobbying for Comintern support began 
to pay off, the united front in Canton was brought to an abrupt close. Chiang Kaishek’s 
Shanghai coup on 12 April 1927 destroyed the left-wing workers movement there and 
pushed the CCP underground. Similar moves in other cities of republican China followed 
-  mass arrests and executions of trade unionists began in Canton around 14 April. By then 
Nguyen Ai Quoc had either fled north or taken refuge in the Russian consulate. He 
explained to the Comintern after arriving in Moscow that the one Russian remaining in
160 Ibid., p. 24.
161 RC, 495/201/45, p. 6 of Ha Huy Tap manuscript.
162 Contribution, vol. 1, p. 19.
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Canton, ‘could not give us any aid or advice, or even continue to pay me as a translator, as 
all work had become im possible... I had no choice but to allow myself to be arrested or to 
continue my work in Siam after returning to Moscow.’163 Agent Konstantin reported that 
Quoc and other Vietnamese communists had been informed on by members o f the rival 
patriotic group in Canton, led by Tam Kam Xay (Dam Giam Tay).164 This group, with -  
which Nguyen Hai Than was beginning to align himself, was positioning itself as the 
purely nationalist revolutionary organization in Canton. Two of Ly Thuy’s comrades had 
been arrested, along with 4 or 5 Vietnamese who had just arrived from Tonkin, Konstantin 
said. The intrepid Lam Due Thu had had to allow himself to be imprisoned along with Ho 
Tung Mau in order to preserve his cover. He wrote to his Surete contact on 13 May 1927 
that he had been in prison since 15 April. ‘.. .The presence of Ho Tung Mau is a 
considerable obstacle to the writing and transmission of my letters,’ he explained. ‘Do you 
realize, Sir, how I am feeling? If  at this moment I am still sparing no effort, it is because I 
have always had the most complete confidence in you.’ By mid-June they had been freed, 
however, and Lam Due Thu was once again engaged in reporting on the revolutionaries.165
Relations between Nguyen Ai Quoc and Nguyen Hai Than had been deteriorating as 
tensions grew within the united front. Nguyen Hai Than was drawing closer to the rival 
collection o f Vietnamese rebels, who were more exclusively focussed on military activity 
than Quoc. As Lam Due Thu described them, Tam Kam Xay and Pham Nam Son were 
‘professionals in circulating counterfeit money and in opium trafficking, who have used 
Hai Than to create this party ... \ 166 Lam Due Thu had reported at the end o f January that 
Nguyen Hai Than was discussing the organization o f a new party with Tam Kam Say and 
an assortment of others.167 By March, Thu reported, Ly Thuy was no longer consulting 
Hai Than.168 Lam Due Thu also reported that Ly Thuy’s highly secretive handling of 
financial matters was a cause o f the break-down in trust: ‘Almost all the expenses o f the 
group are paid by Ly Thuy in a very clever way: he gives the money either to Hong Son or 
Tung Mau who deposit it in their nam es... In this way it appears that the friends from 
Annam trust each other and lack confidence in their compatriots from other parts of the 
Union, and it is this very distrust which has pushed Hai Than and Pham Nam Son to
163 RC, 495,154,598, p. 2, undated report signed by NAQ.
164 AOM, SPCE 368, Mission Noel, Annexe I a l’envoi N. 374 du 21 avril 1927, Rapport de 
Konstantin
165 AOM, SPCE, 368, Mission Noel, Annexe a l’envoi n.384 du 27 juin 1927, Rapport de Pinot, 21 
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167 Ibid., Mission Noel, annexe a note du 10 fevrier 1927, letter of 29 jan. 1927.
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create their own group.’ (The money came from the Canton government, Thu wrote, 
which paid it on the request of a Russian councillor.) 169
Yet the two groups continued to cooperate within the framework o f Whampoa Academy.
In February 1927 Thu claimed that fifty-three Vietnamese had been enrolled at Whampoa 
since the previous December. Graduates, including Le Hong Son and Le Nhu Vong (Le 
Thiet Hung), had been selected to instruct the newly enrolled Vietnamese, for whom a 
special Vietnamese language section was being created.170 As it turned out, the Thanh 
Nien group would retain a foothold in Canton after the April coup by maintaining their 
links with the non-communist national liberation movement, including the left-wing of the 
Chinese GMD. In the case o f some members such as Truong Van Lenh, it was a question 
of out-and-out infiltration o f the rival group, as Lam Due Thu informed the Surete on 8 
April.171 Truong Van Lenh managed to stay on the payroll of the Canton government, first 
as police corporal, then as a police company commander, until the end o f October 1927. 
After that he served in the army of GMD General Zhang Fakui.172 As for Le Hong Son, 
his political fortunes were also linked in part to Zhang Fakui -  he had served on Zhang’s 
staff in 1926, when he was based on Hainan Island.
Nguyen Ai Quoc’s whereabouts were the source o f frequent rumours until at least 
December 1927. He may have primed Ho Tung Mau and Le Hong Son to pass on false 
reports to the emigre circle. Konstantin, for example, reported on 1 June that Ly Thuy had 
been imprisoned with the other Thanh Nien members. Later he was reported by Lam Due 
Thu to have fled to Hankou, 173 and still later in the year to have joined the troops o f Ye 
Ting in Swatow .174 From Quoc’s own account o f his movements to the Comintern, 
however, we learn that he must have gone more or less directly to Shanghai after leaving 
Canton. Perhaps he went via Hankou, where a meeting o f the Pan Pacific Trade Union was 
held in late May or early June. But he makes no mention o f this. He travelled by ship from 
Shanghai to Vladivostok with Jacques Doriot and arrived in Moscow sometime in June.175 
In Vladivostok he ran into Voitinsky, who tried to persuade him to return to Shanghai to 
work among the French and Vietnamese troops there. But Quoc seems to have already 
made up his mind to request funding to carry on his political training work from Siam. In
169 Ibid., Mission Noel, letter of 17 March 1927.
170 AOM, SPCE, 368, 16 Feb. 1927.
171 AOM, SPCE, 368, 8 April 1927.
172 SMP, National Archives, Washington D.C., Box 23 file 3055. (I suspect that Lam Due Thu was the
original source of this information.)
173 AOM, SPCE, Box 368, 10 June 1927.
174 Ibid., Annexe a l’envoi N. 401 du 5 oct. 1927, letter of 29 Sept. 1927.
175 RC, 495,154,598, p. 2, from a 3~page, unsigned report datelined Moscow June 1927.
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Moscow he had only brief contact with the Vietnamese at the University o f the Toilers of 
the East, who had formed a communist cell of five members. They were ‘Fon-shon’ 
(Nguyen The Rue, a northerner from the clan of Nguyen The Truyen); ‘Le-man’ (Ngo Due 
Tri, son of the scholar and former political prisoner Ngo Due Ke from Ha-Tinh); ‘Jia-o’ 
(Bui Cong Trung, the young journalist and activist from central Vietnam who first became 
known in Saigon as a member o f Jeune Annam); ‘Min-khan’ (Bui Lam, a sailor and print- 
shop worker from Haiphong, who came to Moscow via his French party contacts in Paris); 
and ‘Lequy’ (Tran Phu), who had been elected secretary of the group.176 In a brief note 
Quoc requested the communist cell at the university to take charge o f their political 
education. On 25 June he also made a report to the Krestintern in Moscow on the peasant 
movement in Guangdong.177 After a time in hospital to treat his tuberculosis, he would be 
sent to Paris in November with a new set of instructions from the Comintern.178
The remaining members o f the Borodin mission left their last Chinese refuge in July 1927, 
after an effort to patch together a new united front with the left-wing o f the Guomindang in 
Wuhan had failed. Once all illusions of compromise with its leader Wang Jingwei had 
disappeared, the CCP was left to work out a new strategy, in order to preserve something 
o f the gains it had made during the united front years. After three years of serving within 
the Guomindang-commanded army, the Chinese communists would within a matter of 
months have to create their own fighting forces. Stalin and the Comintern finally made an 
abrupt policy turn in July, after the first escapees from the April coup had returned to 
Moscow to report. (These included a ‘Freyer’, who made a lengthy report to the 
Krestintern on the Peasant Movement, as well as Nguyen Ai Quoc.)179 In a July 14 
resolution, the ECCI declared that, ‘The revolutionary role of the Wuhan government is 
played out; it is becoming a counter-revolutionary force. This is the new and peculiar 
feature which the leaders o f the Chinese Communist Party and all the Chinese comrades 
must clearly and fully take into account. ’ Still the communists were advised to remain in 
the Guomindang, but to apply a united front ‘from below’ strategy: to ‘intensify the work 
among the proletarian masses ... build up labour organizations... strengthen the trade 
unions... prepare the working masses for decisive action...develop the agrarian
176 RC, 495,154,598, p. 1, letter of 25 June 1927, signed by Humbert-Droz and NAQ, ‘the Vietnamese 
delegate’. Biographical information on the students can be found in Anatoly Sokolov, Komintern I 
Vietnam, [Comintern and Vietnam], (Moscow: Institut Vostokovedeniia, 1998).
177 RC, 535,1,127, ‘Kratkoie Informatsionnoie Sobshcheniie o Krestyanskom dvizhenii provintsii 
Guandun’, [‘Brief Report on the Peasant Movement in Guangdong’].
178 RC, 495, 154, 598, p. 5, letter of 4 April 1928 from Berlin, signed in Russian ‘Nguyen Ai Kvak’.
179 RC, 535, 1,127.
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revolution... arm the workers and peasants.. .organize a competent fighting illegal party 
apparatus.’180
After the anti-communist carnage unleashed by the GMD in April, the CCP leadership at 
last hit back. Their first attempt to wrest power from the GMD ‘reactionaries’ came on 1 
A ugust, when the troops commanded by generals Ye Ting and He Long staged a revolt in 
Nanchang, capital o f Jiangxi Province. Zhou Enlai was the political mastermind o f the 
Nanchang uprising. This event marks the foundation of the People’s Revolutionary Army, 
according to CCP historians, as it was the beginning o f the communists’ independent 
leadership o f their troops. The revolt was crushed within three days, when General Zhang 
Fakui, whom the communists had assumed was their ally, attacked the rebels with his own 
forces. The peasant masses did not come to the aid o f the beseiged communists, who were 
forced to retreat south to Swatow in the northeast of Guangdong Province, where their 
attempts to establish a new capital were once again defeated in early October. In the 
meantime, the CCP Central Committee met on August 7 in Hankou to condemn the ‘right 
capitulationism’ o f the party leader Chen Duxiu, who had become the scapegoat for the 
failures of the united front. They declared a new policy o f agrarian revolution and armed 
resistance to the GMD. The new provisional leadership ‘decided to make mobilization of 
the peasants to stage autumn harvest uprisings the major task o f the Party’.181 The new 
Comintern representative, Besso Lominadze, apparently took an active part in shaping 
these decisions. It was not until 19 September, however, that the Central Committee’s 
Politbureau resolved that it would no longer carry on the pretense of fighting under the 
banner o f the Left Guomindang. From then on the CCP was fighting for soviet power 
under its own red banner.182 At a November 1927 meeting of the CCP Provisional 
Politbureau, the communists confirmed their leftward course, again under the influence of 
Lominadze. Although their numbers had dropped precipitously since April, they resolved 
that the ‘revolutionary situation’ was still at a high point and that the tactics of armed 
insurrection should continue.183
The Vietnamese communists who had joined the GMD forces must have found 
themselves in difficult circumstances -  they may not have had time in 1927 to make a 
conscious choice to fight under the communist’s flag or under the command of the 
unpredictable Zhang Fakui. We know from Lam Due Thu’s reports, however, that one of
180 Cited by Harold Isaacs, op. cit., pp. 266-267.
181 Party History Research Centre of the CC of the CCP, A History o f the Chinese Communist Party: A
Chronology o f Events (1919-1990), (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1991), p. 53.
182 Ibid., p. 55.
183 Ibid., pp. 56-7.
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the heroes of the Vietnamese party, Le Hong Son, was still linked to Zhang Fakui as late 
as November 1927, as were other members of Thanh Nien. Lam Due Thu told the Surete 
on 13 November that there were still ‘a large number of communists’ in the army of 
‘Truong Phat Khue’, including Le Quang Dat and Truong Van Lenh. They were earning 
monthly salaries o f 200 and 150 piastres per month respectively.184 In Canton, the anti­
communist purge had been carried out by General Li Jishen, who, as Nguyen Ai Quoc 
reported to the Krestintern, had shown particular vehemence against the local peasant 
organizations.185 So when Zhang Fakui’s army staged a coup against General Li on 17 
November, there was apparently great relief among the Thanh Nien leadership. ‘.. .The 
partisans of Tung Mau are jubilant, because the return o f their comrades will permit them 
to find work and support easily.. Lam Due Thu wrote in anticipation o f the coup.186
During these months o f political transition, Vietnamese continued to come to Canton for 
training. They included several from Tonkin who would become the leaders of a radical 
break-away faction in the Thanh Nien group in 1929: Ngo Gia Tu, Nguyen Due Canh, 
Trinh Dinh Cuu and Nguyen Hoi.187 It is extremely difficult to do more than guess at what 
political influences they would have been subjected to after April 1927, as the political 
situation both within Thanh Nien and Guangdong Province was so complex. Different 
processes were under way which appear to have been contradictory. Within Thanh Nien, 
there was an effort at reconciliation with their nationalist rivals, while within the CCP, 
there was a lurch towards insurrection. On the one hand, the remaining members o f Thanh 
Nien in Canton began a concerted effort in the autumn of 1927 to reunite the estranged 
Nguyen Hai Than with their group. On both 18 and 24 October, Lam Due Thu had 
reported meetings between the two groups aimed at fusing their parties. ‘Yesterday, 
Sunday,’ he wrote, ‘Ngo Thanh and Dinh Te Dan met Tung Mau, Van Lenh and Quang 
Dat in the public gardens. They discussed the need to bring an end to their quarrels .,
Tung Mau believed that they had resolved their disagreements.188 It was in September of 
1927 that Nguyen Due Canh’s biography says he went to Canton to meet the Central 
Committee o f the Thanh Nien association, in order to coordinate the work o f his 
movement with theirs. A native o f Thai Binh Province bom in 1908, Canh had been ejected 
from his school in Nam Dinh in 1926 for organizing a student strike. He was a member of
184 AOM, SPCE, box 368, 13 nov. 1927.
185 RC, 535, 1,127, p. 36.
186 AOM, SPCE, 368, Annexe a l’envoi N. 401 du 5 oct. 1927.
187 Biographical information on Ngo Gia Tu, Nguyen Due Canh and Nguyen Hoi comes from, Nhnng
Nguoi Cong San, [The Communists], (no author), (T.P. Ho Chi Minh: NXB Thanh Nien, 1976). Trinh
Dinh Cuu’s presence in Canton is revealed in Quang Hung and Quoc Anh, ‘Le Hong Son’, NCLS, n.
184, 1979, p. 17.
188 AOM, SPCE, 368, 24 oct. 1927.
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the Nam Dong Publishing Society, which in December 1927 transformed itself into the 
Vietnamese Quoc Dan Dang or Nationalist Party.189 Like other students before him, he 
switched his allegiance to Thanh Nien after attending a training course based on Nguyen 
Ai Quoc’s programme. Trinh Dinh Cuu and Nguyen Hoi were possibly in Canton at the 
same time as Nguyen Due Canh. Ngo Gia Tu’s-official biography claims that he was in 
Canton in mid-1927. We do not know if he observed the April coup d’etat.
The Vietnamese trainees would also have been aware o f the events taking place in the 
Haifeng and Lufeng districts to the east of Canton. Some of the troops who had withdrawn 
from Nanchang to Swatow had since regrouped to these districts, the scene o f the first 
successes o f the Guangdong peasant movement. These troops began an attack on 25 
October to create a soviet. After the violence perpetrated against them by the troops o f Li 
Jishen, both the peasantry and the province’s communist leadership seem to have been 
bent on revenge. Provisional revolutionary governments were set up in Haifeng and 
Lufeng which were ‘fully communist and strongly military’, writes Fernando Galbiati.190 
He quotes a letter from the CCP’s Guangdong Committee which advised that, ‘the killing 
o f landlords should continue until not one is left... Where this does not occur the taking o f 
Hai-Lu-feng is as unsound as a house built on sand.’191 As Galbiati points out, the Hai-Lu- 
feng Soviet as a whole was firmly under control, stage-managed by ‘a small central body, 
whose orders were carried out by the members o f the Peasant Association’. The CCP 
organizers remained highly secretive and came to be referred to within the Soviet as ‘the 
zuzhV or ‘the organization’. 192
The existence o f the peasant soviet at Hai-Lu-feng was encouragement to the CCP 
leadership to stage a revolt in Canton itself. The immediate trigger, however, was the 
competition between Zhang Fakui and General Li Jishen, for on 26 November the Canton 
communists decided that the warlords’ conflict created a good opportunity to organize an 
insurrection. The date was set for 13 December. The German communist, Heinz 
Neumann, the new conduit for Stalin’s instructions in Canton , is believed to have made the 
final decision to stage the insurrection, perhaps under pressure from Stalin to deliver a 
success in China to coincide with the Fifteenth Congress o f the Soviet CP. The three-day 
insurrection, which was crushed by the newly united GMD generals, again resulted in 
harsh reprisals against the workers and communists who took part. It became an 
inspirational legend for the CCP, in spite of its poor planning and the lack o f support from
189 Nhung Nguoi Cong San, p. 93.
190 Fernando Galbiati, op. cit., p. 275,
191 Ibid., p. 275.
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the working class. But how did it affect the Vietnamese communists who were based in 
Canton or studying at the Whampoa Academy?
One official history of the Vietnamese C.P. claims that the members o f the Thanh Nien 
association joined in the fighting and that 24 Vietnamese were arrested.193 Those in the 
cadet corps at Whampoa are in fact the Vietnamese most likely to have taken part, for this 
was the only military force available to defend the communards. One Vietnamese, Phung 
Chi Kien, is said to have retreated to the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet after the insurrection failed, 
where he served as a unit commander o f communist troops.194 But a confession by a 
southern communist who knew Phung Chi Kien in China states that after participating in 
the Canton uprising, he returned to Whampoa until he was imprisoned at the start o f 1929. 
Only after his release in the autumn o f 1929 did Kien enter the Chinese CP and join the 
Red Army in eastern Guangdong (Dong Kiang) as a company commander.195 Another 
Whampoa cadet who may have been arrested following the uprising was Tran Van Cung 
(Quoc Hoa), who in 1929 led the break-away faction of Thanh Nien.196 A Hanoi source 
claims that Truong Van Lenh was one o f the leaders of the commune, but that he changed 
his name and uniform afterwards to blend into the nationalist troops.197 It is equally 
possible that he was with Zhang Fakui’s army outside of Canton. Unfortunately, Lam Due 
Thu’s reports are silent on how this drama unfolded. But in May 1928, he reported that 24 
Vietnamese were still teaching or studying at Whampoa. Among them were Le Duy Nghia 
(Le Duy Diem) and Manh van Lieu (one o f Phung Chi Kien’s pseudonyms). Those 
Thanh Nien members who had been arrested during the uprising were released on 13 May, 
most of them in bad health.198 One history o f the commune claims that the Vietnamese 
cadet Do Huy Liem was killed in the fighting;199 yet he remained at W hampoa until the 
end o f 1928 and returned to work for Thanh Nien and then the ICP in Tonkin until his 
arrest in 1930.200 Still, for the new recruits and trainees who were in Canton, the commune 
and the Hai-Lu-feng Soviet may have been radicalizing experiences. At this point the CCP 
was on an insurrectionary path: the formation o f soviets both in the towns and country was
192 Ibid., p. 295.
193 Nguyen Ai Quoc o Quang Chau, p. 194.
194 Georges Boudarel, Giap, (Paris: Editions Atlas, 1977), pp. 172-4.
195 AOM, SPCE, 367, Declarations faites par Truong Phuoc Dat les 22 mai 1933 et jours suivants, p.
41.
196 Nguyen Ai Quoc o Quang Chau, p. 194
197 Quang Nung and Quoc Anh, ‘Le Hong Son’, NCLS, n. 184 1979, p. 17. This is plausible, as Zhu
De himself is said to have returned to the GMD 16th Army after the loss of Swatow with the help of
another officer. See Pierre Broue, Histoire de L 'Internationale Communiste (Paris:Fayard, 1997), p.
476.
198 AOM, SPCE 368, Mission Noel, envoi n. 441 du25 mai 1928
199 Nguyen Ai Quoc o Quang Chau, p.205.
200 AOM, SPCE 368, Annexe a envoi no. 3222/S du 25 juin 1930.
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the order o f the day. But contrary to the standard Hanoi picture o f 1928, Thanh Nien 
would manage to continue some of its activities and military training in Canton until the 
end of the year, when a second wave of anti-communist repression would begin.
Two currents of Vietnamese communism may have already been diverging by the end of 
1927 within the emigre group in China. One would follow the united front strategy of the 
previous years, while the other would converge with the newly militant strategy o f the 
CCP. With no Comintern structure left in Canton at the end of 1927, there was no source 
o f instruction or orthodoxy for the Vietnamese other than the CCP. As Nguyen Ai Quoc 
had left China, he was not forced at this point to identify with either current. After his 
return to Moscow he would slip into the communist underground and apparently remain 
aloof from the rivalries which would split the Vietnamese communist movement in 1929. 
Although the French would continue to receive intelligence reports of planned Vietnamese 
insurrections throughout 1927, it does not seem likely that Quoc had approved any such 
schemes. He remained the gradualist and patient organizer, in spite o f the violent end to 
the united front experiment. When Grigory Voitinsky suggested to him in Vladivostok that 
he return to Shanghai to work among the Vietnamese troops there, he rejected the idea. 
‘Should we try to organize a few Vietnamese soldiers in Shanghai (who in any case are 
about to return to their country, from what they told me), and let the work begun in 
Indochina perish?’ he asked in a report to Moscow. He proposed to move his work to 
Siam: ‘... the work or rather the continuation o f the work in Indochina -  even though the 
result may be more distant and less visible -  is more important,’ he wrote, ‘because in 
Shanghai other comrades can replace me, but not in Siam. And because the news o f the 
Chinese reaction, which has been spread widely by the French imperialists, is sowing 
discouragement among the Vietnamese, and if  we discontinue our work now, all that we 
have done during the last three years will be lost, and it will be very difficult to begin 
again, in view of the morale o f the Vietnamese, who have already been disappointed 
several times.’201
201 RC, 495,154,598, p. 3 of June 1927 report.
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CHAPTER IV
From the Old to the New Course (1927-1929)
1. Nguyen Ai Q uoc’s Travels
When Nguyen Ai Quoc fled from Canton in April of 1927, he travelled via Shanghai and 
Vladivostok to Moscow. In Moscow, as we have seen, he sought support for his plan to 
continue the work he had begun in Canton from a new base in Siam. He spent part o f that 
summer in a Crimean hospital being treated for tuberculosis. That September (1927) the 
Comintern drew up directives for his future work, and sent him off to Paris in November, 
to coordinate his plans with the Colonial Commission of the French CP.1 Although the 
French party now had responsibility for nurturing communism in Indochina, in practice 
FCP members worked under strict supervision from Moscow.
In spite o f the Comintern’s disillusionment with the Guomindang, the instructions which 
Nguyen Ai Quoc took to Paris still reflected the tactic of the united front with nationalist 
forces. The two-page directive (dated 12 September 1927) noted that ‘AK ’ (Ai Kvak, as 
the Russians spelled his name) should help to fuse ‘the national-revolutionaries among the 
Indochinese emigres (first in Paris and in France) by creating a solid communist core 
among these elements... Then he was to establish liaisons with Indochina in order to 
transfer revolutionary activity to the country itself. In the meantime, in collaboration with 
the French CP, he was instructed to draw up an action programme for the national 
revolutionary movement in Indochina. After clearing this document with the Comintern 
Executive Committee (ECCI), he was to publicize it in Indochina and ‘determine the 
possibility o f developing intense revolutionary work for Indochina in a neighbouring 
country, in Siam or another country.. . ’.2 The Communist Party o f Indochina which 
‘should begin to function in the near future’ would rely ‘as far as possible on the national- 
revolutionary organisations, as the left wing of these organisations, while retaining 
complete liberty o f criticism.’ The basic political slogans of the revolutionary movement 
were defined as: * 1) independence; 2) withdrawal o f the forces o f occupation; and 3) 
convocation of a Constitutional Assembly and the creation of a democratic-revolutionary 
republic, assuring the free distribution of all land to the peasants, broad-based legislation to 
support workers’ rights, and the energetic defense o f the country’s independence against 
any attacks by the rapacious imperialists.’ The final point o f the 12 September directive
1 NAQ gives a resume of his movements from his departure from Canton to his 1928 stay in Berlin in 
RC,495, 154, 598, p. 5, letter dated 12 April 1928.
2 RC,495, 154, 556, p. 16, untitled French document dated 12 Sept. 1927
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notes that the Comintern would pursue its efforts to establish links to Indochina via 
China.3
For a variety of reasons, Quoc was unable to follow through on his Comintern instructions 
in France, he later reported to Moscow. A French police crack-down on communist 
activity in Paris coincided with a political crisis within the French CP, probably 
connected to the purge o f  Trotskyists then underway in the Soviet Union in anticipation o f 
the December Fifteenth Party Congress. At the same time, Jacques Doriot, Quoc’s patron 
in the party’s Colonial Commission, had been thrown in prison in France. Quoc wrote that 
the remaining members o f the Commission avoided substantive contacts with him. What 
he referred to in this report as a Tack of suppleness’ in the Commission’s work may 
actually have been political paralysis. ‘During the month- and-a-half when I was in Paris,’ 
he explained, ‘as Comrade Doriot was in prison, I could not find a single chance to have a 
serious conversation with the other comrades. Several times I asked for serious addresses, 
so that I could communicate with them when I am in the East, but the comrade in charge 
refused to give them to me.’4
Quoc made no mention of his contacts with other Vietnamese in Paris, but one wonders 
whether he found a way to meet Nguyen The Truyen again. Until at least 1926 Truyen was 
the key link between the Vietnamese leftists in Paris and the Colonial Commission o f the 
FCP. It was he who arranged for Vietnamese, including several o f his own relatives, to be 
sent to Moscow for study.5 In early 1927, following the 1926 collapse o f  the Intercolonial 
Union, Truyen had started a new party in Paris called the Annamite Independence Party 
(AIP).6 The formation o f this nationalist party in 1927 is normally seen as the beginning o f 
a split between nationalist and communist-oriented Vietnamese. But there is now some 
evidence that Truyen was following a Comintern-approved policy for colonial countries, 
which may actually have been strengthened during the time that Bukharin was in charge o f 
the ECCI. Jacque Doriot’s prescription for Thanh Nien to become a mass nationalist party 
is one example of this policy; Nguyen Ai Quoc’s September instructions are another sign 
that colonial communist groups were expected to exist within national revolutionary 
parties. Even as late as the winter o f 1929, French members of the FCP’s Colonial
3 RC,495, 154,556, p. 17.
4RC,495, 154, 598, p. 8, letter of 21 May 1928.
5 See e.g. SPCE 367, Declaration de Ngo Due Tri, April-June 1931,
6 Hue-Tam Ho Tai, op. cit., pp. 233-5, gives the summer of 1927 as the AIP’s founding date, but this 
appears to be too late.
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Commission would continue to implement this policy in Algeria, by working to form a 
nationalist Algerian party, VEtoile Nord-africaine.7
The AIP was closely connected with the French branch of the Comintern-led Anti- 
Imperialist League, which had held its first conference in February 1927. In a report from 
the French CP’s Colonial Commision to the Comintern in March 1927, the author 
mentioned that the Independence Party was establishing groups in the south o f France and 
planning to hold congresses in the summer. ‘We will take part in the group’s Paris 
meetings, to give them more practical support in their work,’ the report said.8 Truyen, 
along with two other activists from Vietnam, Jeune Annam journalist Trinh Hung Ngau 
and Duong Van Giao o f the Constitutionalist Party, undertook a French speaking tour in 
October, during which they subjected French policy and institutions to vigourous criticism. 
The Surete believed that these meetings were organized with the complicity o f the French 
CP.9 But like Quoc, Truyen may have found dealing with the FCP more difficult after 
Doriot’s arrest. Truyen returned to Vietnam in December. By the summer o f 1928 
Comintern prescriptions for action in colonial countries would grow more confused, but it 
would not be until the middle of 1929 that the Comintern would explicitly revise its stand 
on cooperation with non-communist nationalists in colonial countries.
From Paris Quoc moved on to Brussels in December 1927 to attend a conference, he 
claimed. But this was not, as is often written, the first Congress of the Anti-Imperialist 
League, which had taken place the preceding February.10 Possibly he took part in an 
interim meeting o f the League’s Executive Committee, which was held 9 December in 
Brussels. 11 From the middle o f December until May 1928 he stayed in Berlin, waiting for 
money and instructions from the Comintern for his return to Asia. He received 18 marks a 
week from the Red Aid organization to cover his living expenses, not enough to make 
ends meet, he said.12 During his enforced wait he wrote an account of the Canton peasant 
movement, which featured Peng Pai as the hero. It was 120 pages, free from politics and 
statistics, concerning the peasants’ way o f life, he explained. The Krestintern declined to 
undertake the editing necessary for publication, but some of Quoc’s material may have
7 RC, 495, 16, 10, p. 11; Tasca letter to Kuusinen, 7 Jan. 1929.
8 RC,495,154,296, p. 176.
9AOM, SLOTFOM III, 29, note from Ministry of Interior to Minister of Colonies, no. 7667, 27 oct. 
1927.
10 RC,495, 154, 598, p. 5 letter of 12 April 1928.
11 Thierry Levasseur, ‘La Ligue Fran?aise Contre l’lmperialisme et le mouvement anticolonialiste 
vietnamien’, Cahiers de VAsie du Sud-est, no. 26, 1989, p. 60.
12 RC,495, 154, 598, p. 5.
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found its way into other publications.13 What sort of contacts he had with the Chinese 
community in Berlin is unknown. But it would be surprising if he had not exchanged 
ideas with those associated with the Anti-Imperialist League, which had its seat in Berlin. 
Sun Yatsen’s wife Song Qingling moved to Berlin in late 1927 and seems to have spent 
most of 1928 there, working to establish a ‘Third Party’ for China.14 In his 21 May letter 
to Moscow, Quoc informed his contacts that he would be communicating with them via 
Comade Chutto, an Indian working in the Anti-imperialist League.15 So the League would 
appear to have been an important contact point for him in Berlin.
The Comintern was preoccupied with far weightier questions than Nguyen Ai Quoc and 
his travel plans that winter, Leon Trotsky and 148 other members o f his Opposition were 
exiled from Moscow at the end o f January, following the 15th Congress o f the Soviet CP. 
For most o f February the Comintern was busy with the 9th Plenum o f its Executive 
Committee. Jacques Doriot, who after his release from prison passed through Berlin on 
his way to the Comintern Plenum, had promised Quoc that he would take care o f his 
‘problem’. But by mid- April Quoc had still had no news from Moscow or Doriot.16 The 
Krestintern had also been unhelpful. Quoc had asked them for 500 US dollars and a 
‘practical organizing plan, so that I may work usefully.’17 Dombal not only refused to 
provide any funds, but said that he knew too little about the peasant situation in Indochina 
to provide a concrete plan of organization. He advised that Quoc use his experience of the 
peasant movement in China to begin the fundamental task o f forming peasant unions.18 On 
12 April Quoc wrote to Jules Humbert-Droz, a Swiss communist working in the Comintern 
Secretariat which had responsibility for the French colonies, saying, ‘you can imagine what 
a moral and material state I am in: knowing that there is a lot of work, but unable to do 
anything, unoccupied, without money, living from day to day in forced inactivity, e tc .. . ’.19 
Humbert-Droz was finally able to tell him (in a brief 2-paragraph note dated 28 April) that 
the decision to provide funds for his voyage and first three months o f work had been taken. 
‘The amount we send in the future will depend on news from you. I think that it would be 
more prudent for you to try to get along on your own, without waiting for any sort o f aid,’ 
he said.20
13 RC, 535,1,42, letters of 3 Feb. 1928 and 21 Feb. 1928
14 Klein and Clark, op. cit., p. 783. Song Qingling lived from 1927 to June 1929 in Europe, most of the 
time in Moscow and Berlin.
15 RC,495, 154, 598.
16 RC,495, 154, 598, p. 5.
17 RC,535, 1, 42, p. 68, letter from Berlin, 16 Dec. 1927.
18 RC,535, 1, 42, p. 11, letter of 5 Jan. 1928.
19 RC,495, 154, 598, p.6.
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With this luke-warm send-off, Nguyen Ai Quoc departed for Asia at the end of May, 
travelling via Switzerland to Italy, and from there by ship to Bangkok. By then he would 
have been aware o f the crushing of the Trotskyist Opposition which Stalin had engineered 
within the CPSU, as well as the varying strands of resistance to Stalin’s policy within the 
Comintern. One can assume that he would also have seen the documents o f the Ninth 
ECCI Plenum held in February 1928, which included a set of resolutions on China. These 
made clear that the Russians felt it was time for the Chinese comrades to show more 
caution, to take a step back after their reckless attempts at insurrection at the close o f 1927 
(which of course had been undertaken with the guidance of Comintern representatives 
Lominadze and Neumann.) The present stage of the Chinese revolution was to be 
characterized as neither socialist, nor ‘permanent’, as Lominadze had mistakenly claimed, 
but as still in the ‘bourgeois-democratic’ phase. The CCP’s basic tactical line was to 
‘prepare itself for a violent surge forward o f new revolutionary waves’. But the current 
task was still ‘winning over the worker and peasant millions, educating them politically, 
organizing them around the party and its slogans... ’ Although an ‘immediate tactical task’ 
was defined as ‘organizing and carrying through armed mass uprisings’, the vanguard of 
the workers and peasants should not break away from the masses and ‘play with revolts’.21 
As Vietnam’s revolutionary movement was less developed than China’s, Nguyen Ai Quoc 
may have interpreted these resolutions as an affirmation of his own policy o f careful 
political education and organizing.
It is important to keep in mind the fact that Quoc may have still been somewhere at sea 
when the Sixth Comintern Congress began in July 1928. He may not have heard any 
detailed news of its results for many months. From all the available evidence, it appears 
that he departed for Asia with nothing more recent than his September 1927 instructions to 
guide his work.
2. The Sixth Comintern Congress
By the summer o f 1928 the struggle against the Trotskyists had left both the Comintern and 
the FCP in disarray. Yet another round of political bloodletting was about to begin. In 
fact, by the 15th Party Congress at the close of 1927, Stalin’s surrogates had already begun 
to criticize Bukharin for ignoring the ‘right danger’ in the Comintern.22 But Stalin was not 
yet ready to dispense with his ally on the right. A dual system of policy implementation
20 RC,495, 154, 598, p. 7.
21 Degras, The Communist International: Documents, vol. II, pp. 437-9.
22 Stephen F. Cohen, Bukharin and the Bolshevik Revolution, p. 267.
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was developing in Russia, with Stalin increasingly working through his own appointees 
and organizations such as the Komsomol to implement forced grain collections and similar 
measures.23 The Sixth Comintern Congress, a drawn-out affair which lasted from 17 July 
until 1 September, reflected this duality. It was the beginning of a change o f course for the 
Comintern, a process which dragged on for an entire year, until the ECCI’s Tenth Plenum 
in July 1929. It is usually assumed that the Programme and Theses o f the Sixth Congress 
marked a new era for the Vietnamese communist movement. Yet it is very difficult to 
establish a direct chain o f cause and effect between Moscow and events in Vietnam until 
the autumn of 1929, or even precisely what the new polices for colonial countries were.
During the summer of 1928 the leaders of the Chinese CP gathered in Moscow, where 
their Sixth Party Congress was held from 18 June to 11 July, just before the Comintern’s 
Congress. This meeting was held under Bukharin’s patronage and approved the more 
moderate policies for China set out at the ECCI’s Ninth Plenum. But the dual nature o f 
Comintern politics at this juncture was reflected in the Congress resolutions, many of 
which were ambiguous or even contradictory. Bukharin’s advocacy of an anti-imperialist 
alliance with the petty bourgeoisie was overlooked. The slogan ‘preliminary victories in 
one or more provinces’ became what Zhang Guotao termed a ‘panacea’, a way o f excusing 
the putchism of late 1927, without having to claim that the Chinese revolution was 
experiencing a ‘high tide’.24 The Congress selected a new politburo, led by the worker 
Xiang Zhongfa. The other members were Qu Qiubai, Zhou Enlai, Zhang Guotao, Cai 
Hesen, Li Lisan and Xiang Ying. Three members o f the new politburo returned to China 
before the Comintern Congress. These were Xiang Zhongfa, Cai Hesen and Li Lisan, who 
according to Zhang Guotao had been placed in charge of party organization.25 The 
personal influence o f the CCP leaders who returned to Shanghai in July or August 1928, 
following their own party congress but before the Comintern gathering, may initially have 
had more effect on the Vietnamese communists than the Sixth Comintern Congress itself.
Although the Comintern’s Sixth Congress is commonly seen as the decisive event which 
instituted the ‘new course’ and ‘proletarianization’ as the watchwords o f world 
communism, it was in fact only the beginning o f a techtonic shift. Bukharin, still the 
General Secretary o f the Comintern, dominated the proceedings and produced the ‘General 
Programme o f the Third International’. But his position was already being undermined by 
Stalin’s manoeuvring within the CPSU -  by December 1928 he would quit his post in the 
Comintern, even though he was not officially removed until June 1929. Bukharin’s
23 Cohen, op. cit., pp. 278-80.
24 Chang Kuo-t’ao, The Rise o f the Chinese Communist Party, 1928-1938, pp. 78-81.
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position at the Congress meant, however, that his ‘rightist’ allies in European parties such 
as Jules Humbert-Droz retained their influence until the winter.26 In the summer of 1928 
there was thus still a degree of support within the Comintern for cooperation with the 
social democratic left and lack o f unanimity regarding the correct analysis o f the current 
stage of world capitalism. The Soviet delegation, made up mainly o f Stalin’s supporters, --- 
was dissatisfied with Bukharin’s ‘Draft Theses’, and ‘amended them to emphasize the 
international significance of the Soviet economic plan and the contradictions o f capitalist 
stabilization, and to sharpen the attack on the left social democrats.’27 Nevertheless, the 
apocalyptic tone o f the description o f the ‘Third Period’ in the development o f post-war 
capitalism was not as clear as it became at the ECCI’s Tenth Plenum in 1929. At the Sixth 
Congress, Bukharin characterized the Third Period as one o f ‘capitalist stabilization’, 
which would ultimately develop into another crisis o f capitalism.28 By the summer of 
1929, Otto Kuusinen would report to the Tenth ECCI Plenum that ‘there is now full 
unanimity on the characterization o f the Third Period as the period o f the break-up o f 
capitalist stabilization and further -  the period of the ripening o f a new revolutionary 
upsurge.’29
Kuusinen, a veteran Finnish communist, headed the Colonial Commission at the Congress 
and was put in charge o f the Eastern Secretariat at the Congress’s end. He was destined to 
become one o f the Comintern’s new authorities on the East, But it was Bukharin’s 
General Programme for the Third International which provided the most concise statement 
o f policy for colonial countries. This programme listed eight main tasks:
1. The overthrow of foreign imperialism, o f feudalism, and o f the landlord bureaucracy;
2. Establishment o f the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry on the 
basis o f Soviets;
3. Complete national independence and political unification;
4. Cancellation o f state debts;
5. Nationalization o f large undertakings (in industry, transport, banking, etc.) belonging 
to the imperialists;
6. Expropriation o f large landowners, o f church and monastery estates, nationalization of 
all land;
25 Chang Kuo-f ao, op. cit., p. 82.
26 See Richard Thornton, The Comintern and the Chinese Communists, (Seattle: Univ. of Washington 
Press, 1969), pp. 28-9, for a discussion of Stalin’s compromise with Bukharin.
27 Degras, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 455.
28 Inprecor, Vol. 8, no. 41, 30 July 1929, p. 726.
29 Otto Kuusinen, Mezhdunarodnoie Polozheniie I Zadachy Kominterna (The International Situation 
and the Tasks o f the Comintern), (Moscow-Leningrad: Government Press, 1929), p. 112.
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7. Introduction of the eight-hour day;
8. Establishment of a revolutionary workers’ and peasants’ army.30
Within the Congress’s Colonial Commission, Kuusinen’s attempts to elaborate a more 
detailed Comintern policy for the ‘colonial and semi-colonial countries’ faced 
considerable opposition. Delegates were confused by his attempted division o f colonial 
countries into four categories and the lack o f clarity regarding tactics for the more 
backward countries.31 (These classifications were abandoned in the final text o f the theses.) 
In his concluding speech on 21 August, Kuusinen admitted that the section o f the Theses 
concerning ‘non-capitalist development o f the backward colonial countries’ lacked 
theoretical proof. (It had lacked proof in Lenin’s 1920 Theses as well, he said.) He 
requested that this point, which refers to the ‘separate path’ to communism, receive special 
attention from the drafting commission, which had yet to begin work.32 In later remarks on 
the drafting commission’s work, he mentioned that the section o f the Theses on tactical 
questions now applied only to one group o f colonial countries: China, India, Egypt and 
Indonesia -  ‘certainly the most important colonial countries’, as he put it.33
The Theses on the Colonial and Semi-colonial Countries had not been printed in Inprecor 
by the end o f 1928, in contrast to the other Congress resolutions and theses. They were 
eventually printed as a 96-page booklet in Russian dated 1928, but precisely when that 
appeared is unclear.34 In their final form the theses upheld the analysis o f capitalism as a 
spent force, with no future developmental role, even in colonial countries. A brief 
dissenting view from the British delegation to the Colonial Commission was printed on 27 
December 1928.35 The Italian Angelo Tasca (Serra) who briefly headed the Romance 
[Languages] Secretariat after the Sixth Congress, was also unhappy. He wrote to Kuusinen 
in January 1929 to complain about the Theses. ‘They are neither purely political theses, 
nor a work programme, they are insufficient in either case. I don’t know to what extent the 
FCP took part in their elaboration...’.36 In July Tasca would be removed from the 
Comintern leadership. Jacques Doriot, the promoter of the united front in Vietnam, would 
have to make a full recantation o f his views on cooperation with social democrats in order
30 Degras, Vol. II, p. 507.
31 See remarks of Sultan-Zade, Inprecor, vol. 8, no. 74, 25 Oct. 1928, p. 1,359.
32 Inprecor, Vol. 8, no. 81, 21 Nov. 1928, p. 1,519.
33 Inprecor, Vol. 8, no. 81, p. 1,542.
34 Tezisy I  Resolyutsii VI Kongressa Kominterna, Vypusk Vtoroi, (Theses and Resolutions o f the Sixth 
Comintern Congress, part I I -  Theses on the Revolutionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial 
Countries), (Moscow-Leningrad: Government Press, 1928).
35 Inprecor, Vol. 8, no. 91, p. 1,743.
36 RC,495, 16, 10, p. 3, Tasca letter of 7 Jan. 1929.
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to retain his positions in the French CP.37 This difficulty in achieving consensus on the 
correct strategy for colonial countries was symptomatic o f the general malaise in the 
Comintern bureaucracy in the latter part o f 1928. It was in November that Spanish 
communist Andres Nin wrote a revealing note to Trotsky. ‘Here in the Comintern there is 
complete disarray. Nothing at all is done. Everybody is awaiting the outcome of the fight 
between Stalin and the right. Demoralization is complete,’ he complained.38
The three-man Vietnamese delegation which attended the Sixth Congress was selected by 
the FCP from among the activists in Paris. One o f the three was Nguyen The Vinh, from 
the family of Nguyen The Truyen. He had studied in Moscow from September 1926 until 
November 1927, but left after a year due to ill health.39 Another was a Tonkinese sailor 
identified only as 'Ban' who left the party not long after the Congress.40 The third was 
Nguyen Van Tao, a southern Vietnamese who had become a member o f the FCP and 
formed a Vietnamese communist group in Paris in April 1928.41 He delivered a speech to 
the Colonial Commission on 17 August using the pseudonym ‘An’.42 His analysis of 
French colonialism was close to Kuusinen’s view o f colonial development in India: 
Vietnamese small-scale industry was being destroyed by competition from companies in 
the hands o f the national bourgeiosie and imperialists; the artisans were joining the 
growing proletariat; agricultural productivity was stagnant. His report made no mention 
o f the training o f Vietnamese activists which had been taking place in Canton, nor o f the 
beginnings o f Thanh Nien. For this reason it appears unlikely that Nguyen Ai Quoc had 
prepared the speech which Tao delivered, as the Surete later believed 43 There was a 
group o f relatively experienced Vietnamese in Russia by mid-1928, including Tran Phu, 
Ngo Due Tri, and Le Hong Phong, who seem to have attended the Congress as observers. 
Why they were not made part of the official delegation is unclear. Two of the delegates 
from Paris, however, seem to have ended up as personae- non-grata. A subsequent letter 
from a disgruntled, Paris-based Vietnamese activist, written in 1930 to the Eastern 
Secretariat, mentions that after one o f the Vietnamese Congress delegates had criticized 
the work o f the FCP’s Colonial Commission, two o f them (presumably Nguyen The Vinh 
and Ban) were given their tickets back to France the following day.44 In September 1928 a
37L'Humanite, 4 April 1929, p. 1.
38 From letter in the Trotsky Archives, Harvard Univ. library, cited by Degras, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 566.
39 Dang Huu Thu, Than The va Su Nghiep Nha Cach Manh Nguyen The Truyen, [The Life and Times o f 
the Revolutionary Nguyen The Truyen], (Melun, France: 5, Blvd. Des Carmes, 1993), p. 160..
40 SPCE 367, Declaration de Ngo Due Tri.
41 Thierry Levasseur, ‘La Ligue Frangaise Contre lTmperialisme et le mouvement anticolonialiste 
vietnamien’, in Cahiers de I ’Asie du Sud-est, n. 26, 1989.
42 Inprecor, vol. 8, no. 74, 25 Oct. 1928.
43 See SPCE 367, Historique du P.C.A., p.2.
44 RC, 495, 154, 606, p. 8, unsigned letter.
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Comintern reorganization once again shifted responsibility for Indochina back to the 
Middle-eastern Section, a division o f the Eastern Secretariat which also covered India and 
Indonesia.45 Thus, although the FCP and its Colonial Commission continued to be called 
on to support the Vietnamese movement, in theory the primary source o f ideological 
guidance was now the Eastern Secretariat, which Kuusinen headed.
At the Tenth ECCI Plenum Kuusinen was able to make a more categorical statement on 
tactics in his comments on the opening day, 3 July 1929. Stalin, having emerged supreme 
in the factional warfare in the CPSU, was using the Comintern to demonstrate his new 
style o f leadership. In this report, later printed as The International Situation and the Tasks 
o f  the Comintern, Kuusinen called on communist parties to become, ‘chemically pure’, to 
prepare for ‘the decisive battles for power’.46 ‘Without cleansing themselves from 
opportunistic elements and overcoming their conciliatory relationship to them, the 
communist parties cannot successfully move forward to resolve their new problems, arising 
from the sharpening o f the class struggle in the new stage o f the workers’ movement,’ he 
declared.47 Members o f any party who refused to submit to Comintern decisions would be 
expelled. 48 Now there was to be no more equivocating about united front tactics -  the 
Indian communist M.N. Roy, who had come to believe in the need for a united front with 
Indian nationalists, was denounced.49 In a stirring conclusion, Kuusinen announced that, 
‘The current course o f the Communist International is a new course, but at the same time 
an old one. Three-quarters o f a century ago Marx had already stated our current slogan o f 
“class against class” in his call to the revolutionary class struggle. This is our new 
course.’50
At the Tenth Plenum far less attention was paid to the fine-tuning o f instructions to colonial 
countries in different stages of development. The world revolution, a purely communist 
movement, was seen as one massive force fighting for the world-wide proletariat.
Kuusinen was inspired to new heights o f eloquence: ‘Looking back on the mass battles 
which have taken place in the short space o f time since the Sixth World Congress, we can 
say: the world army o f active class warriors is growing rapidly. The miners of the Ruhr 
and Scotland, the textile workers o f Poland and France, the fighters on the Berlin 
barricades, the Bombay strikers and demonstrators, the plantation workers o f Columbia, the 
black rebels in the Congo, the striking agricultural workers o f Czechoslovakia and Poland,
45 Adibekov et al., op. cit., p. 155.
46 Kuusinen, The International Situation and the Tasks o f the Comintern, p. 124.
47 Ibid., p. 139.
48 Ibid., p. 142.
49 Ibid, op. cit., p. 61.
50 Ibid, op. cit., p. 159.
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the Chinese revolutionary workers and peasant partisans, the struggling Moroccans and 
hundreds of thousands o f others -  this is a gigantic, active army.’51 Kuusinen’s discussion 
of mass struggles foreshadowed what would happen in Vietnam within the next year. ‘In 
the current period the point o f departure o f the mass struggle is [the masses’] immediate, 
daily interests,’ he said. ‘We must take this into account in our tactics. But the struggle 
now is not limited by these immediate, partial demands — it has a clear, strong tendency to 
go beyond these... \ 52
3. Nguyen Ai Quoc in Siam
Nguyen Ai Quoc arrived in Siam just as the Comintern was initiating its shift to more 
radical class-based policies in the summer o f 1928. Since he wrote no known reports to the 
Comintern during the approximately 16 months he spent in Siam, from July 1928 until 
November o f 1929, we rely for information on this period on the memoirs o f a few 
communist veterans and on the Tran Dan Tien book, Quoc’s supposed autobiography. So 
the picture of the forgotten political exile derived from his own letters becomes that o f 
the ascetic underground sage, walking through the forests from village to village.
Although he was somewhere between 34 and 36 years old, in the Tran Dan Tien book he is 
known as ‘Old Man Chin’, and is always just a few jumps ahead of the police. At one point 
Tien writes that Quoc had to enter a Buddhist monastery in order to avoid the French 
detectives on his trail.53 This is perfectly plausible, but is not mentioned in any of the other 
Vietnamese memoirs of Quoc’s time in Siam.
The lack of documentary information on this period is especially frustrating, as one 
suspects that Nguyen Ai Quoc was involved in more than encouraging mutual aid 
societies, playing the village elder and helping to set up village schools. Echoes o f the 
changes in Comintern policy were beginning to be heard in China, Vietnam and the rest of 
Southeast Asia by the autumn o f 1928, yet we have very little sense from the available 
memoirs that these had an impact in northeastern Thailand. Only a few Thanh Nien cadres 
whom he had trained in Canton would have known his real identity, as well as one liaison 
agent, Cao Hoai Nghia, a former sailor who was probably also a member o f  Quoc’s Canton 
circle.54 By 1929 the rumour had spread in Europe that he had been arrested.55 The 
Canton-based Thanh Nien leadership assumed that he was still in Moscow.56 Whether his
51 Ibid., p. 94.
52 Ibid, p. 87.
53 Tran Dan Tien, op. cit. (1976), p. 71.
54 SPCE 367, Historique du PCA, p. 5.
55 See RC,495,154,558, p. lb, letter of 28 August 1929 from ‘Thibault’, sent from Belgium to Moscow.
56 SPCE 367, Historique du PCA..
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well-developed clandestine habits were simply coming into play, or whether he had a more 
precise reason to keep a low profile is unclear. One can speculate that he was waiting for 
the storms of the anti-Trotskyist purges to blow over. (Although he himself could hardly 
have been considered a Trotskyist, within the French CP he had contacts such as Doriot 
who were suspected Trotskyist sympathizers.) -He may also have feared being informed 
on by one o f the non-communist Vietnamese with whom he had earlier associated in 
southern China; or he may have begun to suspect that Lam Due Thu was a French spy.
Travelling on foot from the central town o f Phichit, Quoc arrived in Udon, one o f the 
centers o f the overseas Vietnamese community, in August 1928, according to the memoirs 
of Hoang Van Hoan.57 From what we can glean from Hoan’s and other Vietnamese 
memoirs o f this period, Nguyen Ai Quoc proceeded carefully, collecting information about 
local conditions, helping to organize and build a school for the training o f Vietnamese 
youth in a village outside of Udon.58 Hoan informs us that after his stay in the 
neighborhood of Udon, Quoc moved on to Sakhon, on the eastbound route to Laos, and 
then to Nakhon Phanom on the Mekong.59 A Thanh Nien cadre from Nghe An, Vo Mai, in 
1931 described to his French interrogators how he brought a group o f eight students from 
Vinh to Lakhon (an old term for the Nakhon Phanom region) in October 1928. He 
remained with them for their three months o f study, then escorted them back to Vinh in 
December. Vo M ai’s account does not mention Nguyen Ai Quoc’s presence in Siam, but 
the timing suggests that the trip may have been connected to his presence there. Vo Mai, a 
courrier working closely with the Thanh Nien Ky Bo (regional committee) in Central 
Vietnam, would have brought vital information about the state o f affairs in-country.60
Quoc’s approach to rural organizing recalls the methods developed by Peng Pai in 
Guangdong during the united front with the GMD. By the time Quoc turned up in Siam, 
these methods were already being put into practice by Thanh Nien members such as Hoang 
Van Hoan, who had arrived in northeastern Siam in June 1928. The heart o f the movement 
was to be found in the ‘progressive’ schools which the activists established in rural areas. 
In these schools young people could be exposed to modem political ideas and physical 
education, but also had to produce some of their own food and a surplus to pay the teachers 
if  possible. By the time Quoc reported to the Comintern on his activities in Siam, in
57 Hoang van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean, (Beijing: FLPH, 1988), p. 47.
58 See Christopher Goscha, Thailand and the Southeast Asian Networks o f the Vietnamese Revolution, 
1885-1954, (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2000), Chapter 2, for a list of Vietnamese sources.
59 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 50-1.
60 SPCE 368, Interrogatoire de Vo Mai, alias Quoc Hoa, 10 Nov. 1930. Vo Mai was believed by the 
Surete to be Dang Thai Mai, who later became Vo Nguyen Giap's father-in-law and a leading cultural 
figure in North Vietnam. See SPCE 367, Declarations de Ngo Due Tri, index of names.
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February 1930, he claimed that Thanh Nien had established three training schools and was 
working on a fourth.61 In the same report, he explained that as the Vietnamese resident in 
Siam were ‘free peasants, handicraftmen, small merchants, they can be organized only in 
“Brotherhood”, with patriotic and anti-imperialist ideology.’62 He suggested that the 
Vietnamese activists change the name o f their local newspaper from Dong Thanh (Unity) 
to Thanh A i (Fraternity ox Affection), which implies a step back towards a looser, more 
inclusive form of organization.63 There does not seem to have been a landless rural 
proletariat to attract his attention among the Vietnamese in Siam. By the end o f 1929 this 
emphasis on ‘patriotic ideology’ would be seen as dangerously reformist. But Quoc may 
not have been informed of the changing climate within the world communist movement 
until the summer o f 1929, when two Vietnamese delegates from Siam returned from the 
first Thanh Nien Congress in Hong Kong, held in May.
The available memoirs are lacking in details regarding Nguyen Ai Quoc’s activities from 
the end o f 1928 until November 1929, when he left Siam for Hong Kong. Vo Mai did not 
report any more trips across Laos to Siam after December 1928. Hoang Van Hoan informs 
us that Quoc occupied himself with the translation o f works o f communist theory from 
Chinese into simplified Vietnamese and that they often worked together on these 
translations. But he places this activity in the latter part of 1928. In Sakhon, Quoc is said to 
have composed a verse epic on the life o f Tran Hung Dao, a patriotic hero o f the 13th 
century whose cult was worshipped by the local Vietnamese. The memoirs o f Dang Van 
Cap report that Quoc studied traditional eastern medicine for a time, to help the local 
villagers improve their health.64 (Perhaps he was looking for a cure for his tuberculosis, for 
he later informed a Vietnamese colleague in Hong Kong that he had been ill for more than 
a year in Thailand, and had been ‘unable to undertake anything’.)65 Quoc travelled briefly 
in Laos in order to meet Vietnamese residents, but abandoned two attempts to cross into 
Vietnam, he later reported to the Comintern, because o f the heavy police presence on the 
border.66 According to Le Manh Trinh, around June 1929 he moved on to Bangkok, from 
where he visited a number o f ‘old revolutionaries’.67
61 RC,495, 154, 615, p. 5, letter of 18 Feb. 1930.
62 RC,495, 154, 615, p. 5, (original in English).
63 Hoan, op. cit., p. 48.
64 BNTS, vol. I, p.311, refers to Memoirs of Dang van Cap in the Hanoi Historical Institute.
65 SPCE 367, Declaration de Ngo Due Tri, 4 August, 1931.
66 RC,495, 154, 615, p. 4b; also Nguyen Tai, 'Nho lai ngay dua Bac Ho tu Thai Lan sang gay dung co 
so each mang o Lao', ['Remembering the Time I took Uncle Ho from Thailand to Laos to Build a 
Revolutionary Base'], Tap Chi Cong San, no. 2, Dec. 1986.
67 Bac Ho: Hoi Ky [Memoirs o f Uncle Ho], (Hanoi: Van Hoc, 1960), p. 108.
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Some Vietnamese historians believe that Quoc established contact with his father in 1928 
and 1929 via the widow of the Luong Ngoc Can, whose house in Phnom Penh served as a 
communications link for Vietnamese nationalists.68 From the spring o f 1928 until his death 
in November 1929, Nguyen Sinh Huy (who had taken the name Nguyen Sinh Sac) spent 
most of his time in the village o f Hoa An near to Cao Lanh, in Sa Dec province. Huy was 
believed by the French to use his travels as an itinerant practioner of eastern medicine to 
stay in touch with various centers of nationalist activity in the South. There appears to be 
no documentary evidence o f direct contacts between father and son, however, even though 
Huy wrote frequently to Can’s widow in the spring o f 1928, in the hope that she would 
have some special news for him.69 While he was working in Siam, Quoc was thought to 
have sent two natives of Nam Dan district in Nghe An, then living in Siam, to work in 
Cambodia.70 It is tempting to believe that Quoc contacted not only his father via Phnom 
Penh, but also the group of Thanh Nien activists who had established a progressive school 
in Sa Dec town. These included Chau Van Liem, Ha Huy Giap, and Pham Van Dong, 
according to Tran Van Diep, a Canton trainee and native of Can Tho who also taught 
there.71 Most of this group would become members o f the communist faction loyal to the 
Canton leadership and Nguyen Ai Quoc, the Annam Cong San Dang, in the autumn of 
1929.
4. The Progress o f  Thanh Nien
While Nguyen Ai Quoc worked quietly in Siam, while the Comintern readjusted its course 
in Moscow, the revolutionary movements in southern China and Vietnam developed their 
own momentum. During the latter part o f 1928 a group of around 24 Vietnamese was 
teaching and studying at Whampoa -- those activists arrested in December 1927 had been 
freed.72 By m id-1928 Thanh Nien Regional Committees (Ky-bo) had been formed in all 
three parts of Vietnam.73 The Canton-based Central Committee (Tong-bo) in February 
designated the members o f the Ky-bo for the Center: Vuong Thuc Oanh, Nguyen Thieu 
and Nguyen Si Sach. In June the Canton leadership named Le Van Phat to head the 
southern Ky-bo, which already included Nguyen Kim Cuong, Chau Van Liem and
68 This theory is put forward in a book about Quoc’s father: Nguyen Dac Hien, ed., Nguyen Sinh Sac, 
(Dong Thap: Khu Di Tich Nguyen Sinh Sac, 1994), p. 146.
Ibid., see letters on pp. 153-160. The author say sthat the Surete intercepted all of them.
70 Ibid., p. 146.
71 AOM, SPCE 371, Declaration of Tran Van Diep, 23 Sept. 1931; see also Ha Huy Giap, op.cit., pp. 
52-55.
72 SPCE 368, Mission Noel, ‘Rapport de I'Agent Pinot', envoi no. 441 du 25 mai 1928.
73 AOM: SPCE 368, Vo Mai declaration, p. 2 and SPCE 367, Do Ngoc Du declaration, p.3. for Feb. 
and July 1928 establishment of regional committees in the Center and in Tonkin.
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probably Ngo Thiem.74 Phat was a traditional doctor from Ben Tre who had just returned 
from Canton, where he had been imprisoned following the December uprising. The 
northern Ky-bo, started in July 1928, composed of Duong Hac Dinh, Trinh Dinh Cuu and 
perhaps Nguyen Danh Doi75, came under the leadership o f Tran Van Cung, when he 
returned from Canton at the start o f 1929.
In June 1928 a final attempt to unify the Cach Mang Dang with Thanh Nien had failed. 
After that the former party held a congress in Hue, where they took the name Tan Viet 
(New Vietnam) party. Several of the leaders selected at this Congress, including Phan 
Dang Luu, Hai Trieu (Nguyen Khoa V an ), and Nguyen Chi Dieu, would become the 
leaders o f the communist party in Central Vietnam during the Democratic Front in the late 
thirties.76 Vo Nguyen Giap, a student at the Quoc Hoc school in Hue, may also have been 
active at this Congress. The Tan Viet party, like Thanh Nien and the VNQDD, had begun 
organizing among women by this time. A student from Vinh, Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, was 
elected the leader o f their women’s group. She later claimed that in 1928 her group had 50 
members, including a cell o f 20 people at the match factory in Vinh, along with one o f 15 
members at the local saw mill.77 Labour organizing in Cochinchina was also showing 
marked growth in 1928 .78 Ha Huy Tap reported later that a successful strike was held at 
the Phu My sugarcane plantation in Ba Ria, in June and July. He himself went to work at 
the plantation in September 1928. He recounts an August strike of Bien Hoa railway 
workers and a strike at the Nha Be refinery as well. All o f these actions he attributes to 
unnamed communists.79
On 28 and 29 September 1928, Thanh Nien’s Tonkin Ky-bo is said to have met near Hanoi 
to discuss ways to ‘proletarianize’ their party. According to one Vietnamese source, this 
meeting, sometimes described as a congress, was held in the home of Ngo Gia Tu in the 
village o f Lien-xon, Bac Ninh province. It became known as the ‘Reorganization 
Conference’, this source claims. The group recognized that their membership was mainly 
composed of students and teachers, and so resolved in the future to make workers the base
74 See bio of Nguyen Kim Cuong in Nguyen Chon Trung et al., Con Dao ky su va tu lieu, p. 166; Chau 
Van Liem in Van Kien Dang, 1998, Vol. 1. On Le Van Phat see Hue-Tam Ho Tai, op. cit., pp. 215- 
217.
75 Nguyen Chon Trung et al., op. cit., on Nguyen Danh Doi, grandson of a patriotic resistance leader, 
and school mate of Nguyen Due Canh and Dang Xuan Khu (Truong Chinh) in Nam Dinh.
76 Ngo Nhat Son, Dong Chi Phan Dang Luu, ( NXB Nghe Tinh, 1987), pp. 13-4.
77 RC, 495, 201, 35, Autobiography of Fan-Lan, dated 16 Dec. 1934.
78 On 1928 strikes in Cochinchina, see Ralph Smith, ‘The Foundation of the Indochinese Communist 
Party’, in Modem Asian Studies 32,4 (1998), pp. 781-2.
79 RC, 495, 201, 45, Ha Huy Tap, op. cit., pp. 13-14. A Saigon worker at the Vth Profintern Congress 
in 1930 claimed that the strikes before 1930 were often spontaneous. See RC, 534, 1, 144, speech by 
‘Cong’, pp. 130-6.
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of their movement. They decided to increase propaganda among miners and factory 
workers; to send cadres to work in the mines, factories and on plantations and to use ‘every 
legal means to organize the masses more widely’.80 Two Thanh Nien cadres, Ngo Gia Tu 
and Nguyen Due Canh, were designated to oversee propaganda among the workers. They 
were also to oversee the attempted conversion o f the petty bourgeois students and sons of 
scholars, the great majority of Thanh Nien members, to the working class. Those Thanh 
Nien activists who could not adjust to the new demands were to be removed from the 
Association. This category included any bourgeois member who was ‘spoiled’, who 
didn’t follow revolutionary technique, who was afraid o f hardship or lacking in virtue. In 
March o f 1929 the Tonkin group would pursue their move to the left by organizing what 
they would claim was the first communist cell in Vietnam. Among those who attended this 
meeting at 5-D Ham Long St. in Hanoi were Ngo Gia Tu and Nguyen Due Canh, as well as 
Tran Van Cung (Quoc Anh) from Nghe An, who, as we have seen, had come to Tonkin 
from Canton at the start o f 1929 to take over the Ky-bo.81 This was a group which had all 
been in Canton after the departure o f Nguyen Ai Quoc, during the upheavals o f 1927. Tran 
Van Cung is thought to have taken part in the Canton Uprising.82 Their actions from 
September 1928 through to the end of 1929 show that they had lost confidence in the 
Thanh Nien leadership in Canton. The obvious question is whose ideological lead they 
were following in this period. Although their September 1928 meeting might be seen as a 
reaction to the Sixth Comintern Congress, it would seem to be too early for them to have a 
real understanding o f the Congress programme, especially as there was still no consensus 
as to how this programme should be applied in colonial countries.
News of the 1928 events in Moscow -  the Comintern’s Ninth ECCI Plenum and the Sixth 
Congresses o f both the CCP and the Comintern in the summer — may have been filtering 
back to Asia by the autumn. Informal reports from the Vietnamese in Moscow and Nguyen 
Van Tao in Paris could have alerted the Thanh Nien membership to the changes underway. 
But it is unlikely that any Comintern directives aimed specifically at Indochina reached the 
Vietnamese before the spring, and more likely the autumn, o f 1929. By that time 
Kuusinen’s Theses on the Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries must have been printed, 
at least in Russian, and Bukharin’s ‘General Programme’ could have become known via 
Inprecor and other communist publications. One must remember, though, that even the 
initial discussion o f Kuusinen’s Theses was not printed in Inprecor until 4 October 1928;
80 Nguyen Van Hoan, ‘Phong Trao Vo San Hoa Nam 1930’, (‘The Proletarianization Movement in
1930’j, NCLS, no. 134, Sept.-Oct. 1970, p. 11. Another source on this meeting is Nhung Su Kien Lich
Su Dang Bo Hanoi [Events in the History o f the Hanoi Party Committee], (Hanoi: Hanoi Press, 1982).
81 Nhung Nguoi congsan, [The Communists], (Ho Chi Minh City: Thanh Nien Press, 1976, p. 29).
Information on Tran van Cung's return comes from SPCE 367, Declaration de Do Ngoc Du.
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‘A n’s’ speech on Vietnam did not appear until 25 October. The French party did not begin 
to implement the ‘New Course’ until its own Sixth Congress, held in April 1929. In a 21 
April 1929 Humanite article, Maurice Thorez wrote that the party was entering ‘a decisive 
phase o f correction’ and a major struggle against ‘opportunism’.
5. The Evolution o f  the Chinese Left
From the Comintern’s archives on China one can see that throughout 1928 the Chinese 
Politburo tended to take a more militant line than the Comintern on the state of the Chinese 
revolution. For example, a May 1928 statement o f the Chinese Politburo criticized the 9th 
ECCI Plenum of February that year. It insisted that the ‘revolutionary upsurge’ was 
continuing, and that the Comintern resolution said ‘too little about the lack of perspective 
for political and economic stabilization o f the ruling class’ in China.83 The ECCI’s Far 
Eastern Bureau (FEB), formed in Shanghai in 1926 to guide the east Asian communist 
parties, was reduced to a skeleton crew during this period and did not resume its full 
guiding role until the spring o f 1929.84 The representative of the Comintern’s International 
Communications Section (Otdel Mezhdunarodnoi Svyazy or OMS), A. E. Albrecht 
(Abramovich), took on the double function o f distributor of funds and political 
representative during this interregnum. At the beginning o f June 1928, Albrecht wrote 
from Shanghai to Moscow, to complain that the CCP’s ‘putchist m ood’ was continuing to 
manifest itself in the countryside. In southern Hunan, Shanxi and northern Guangdong, 
he said, the army was continuing to fight. But it had broken away from the masses and was 
behaving like a ‘group of bandits’. Albrecht blamed his fellow Comintern representative 
Mitkevich (aka Olga) for planting the putchist tendency in the CCP.85 But Mitkevich 
himself criticized some of the excesses o f the Hai-Lu-feng Soviets: for example, the order 
to paint all the houses red, and the ‘tendency to destroy district towns (as centers where the 
power o f the landlords and gentry was concentrated)’.86
Although Albrecht reported that the May 1928 Japanese intervention in Jinan had given a 
‘strong push to the urban mass movement’, the CCP’s center of gravity was already 
shifting to the rural areas. Communist bands commanded by Zhu De and Chen Yi linked
82 Nguyen Ai Quoc o Quang Chau, p. 189.
83 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part 1, pp. 380-1, ‘Statement of the CCP CC Politburo on the 9th 
ECCI Plenum Resolution on.the Chinese Question’, Shanghai, April-May, 1928.
84 Joseph Ducroux revealed in an unpublished memoir (pp. 13-14) that he remained in Shanghai until 
the spring of 1928, working as a CYL organizer among the French troops; memoir dated 6 Sept. 1970, 
in author’s possession.
85 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part 1, p. 423-5, early June letter from A. E. Albrecht to Piatnitsky. 
Mitkevich was a Profintem representative in China in 1927 and 1928.
86 Ibid., Vol. Ill, part 1, p. 448-451, note by O.A. Mitkevich on ‘The Soviet Experience in China’, 
Moscow, 10 July 1928.
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up with Mao Zedong’s forces on the Hunan-Jiangxi border in April 1928, to create a rural 
base area. After the fall o f the Hai-Lu-feng Soviets in March, some o f their defenders 
retreated into the mountains of eastern Guangdong, while some may have returned to 
Canton and melted back into the GMD army. Other remnants joined the refugee flow 
which had swelled during 1927 to the Chinese communities of the Nanyang, the Southern 
Seas.87 This movement of working-class Chinese to Southeast Asia apparently reinforced 
the development of the Nanyang Provisional Committee, thus strengthening the latter’s 
potential influence on the Vietnamese communist movement. The French Foreign Ministry 
reported that by 1927 in Saigon, Cholon, and Phnom Penh, among the coolies and dock 
workers there was a ‘notable proportion of Chinese.’ In Tonkin the Chinese were heavily 
represented in ‘certain mining centers’ ,88
The refugees, who included fleeing communist activists, were absorbed by a well- 
organized diaspora where the GMD was already a strong force. The French report on 
immigration stated that ‘the Chinese in Indochina all claim to be affiliated to the nationalist 
party or Guomindang... They are in effect recruited by force, as they do not dare to rebel 
against the power o f their “Congregations” or “Corporations”, which all belong to a 
General Union, itself controlled by the GMD.’89 It is unclear to what extent communist 
structures remained hidden within the GMD in 1928. In Canton, as we have seen, some of 
the Vietnamese communists remained within GMD structures until the end o f that year in 
order to continue their clandestine training courses, but probably also to earn a living. In 
the colonial countries o f Southeast Asia they would have done so simply in order to 
survive. In Singapore, for example, the communist-influenced Left GMD (known as the 
Main School movement) controlled 21 out o f 29 GMD sub-branches in August 1927. A 
purge o f communists within the Singapore GMD began in April 1928.90 But the Nanyang 
Committee may have formed new front structures during the year in order to maintain its 
organization, as I will discuss below.
During 1928 and 1929 the left-wing intellectual climate in China was influenced by an 
effort to revive the Left GMD, independent of the Comintern. In May 1928 the 
Reorganization Comrades Association (RCA) was created . The term ‘reorganization’ was 
a reference to the spirit o f the 1924 reorganization of the GMD , carried out under 
Borodin’s influence. The immediate stimulus for the formation of this faction was the
87 For example, see bio. of Pen Hatan, CPM student leader in Malacca and Singapore in RC,495, 62,
30, p. 4.
88 MAE, Asie 1918-1929/Affaires Communes 50, Emigration Asiatique, enquete de Vannee 1927, pp.
303-315.
89 MAE, loc. cit, p. 310.
136
Japanese occupation o f Jinan in Shandong province that same month.91 But in the view of 
So Waichor, the GMD leftwing was also disturbed by Chiang Kaishek’s disregard for 
what they considered their basic principles: anti-imperialism and agricultural reform.92 The 
ideology which the RCA represented between 1928 and its collapse in 1931 ‘was intended 
to appeal to the “oppressed classes” in China, which comprised a variety o f social 
categories such as the middle and small merchants, the peasantry -  from small landlords to 
farm labourers, the working class, the petite bourgeoisie, intellectuals, and the youth .'93
The intellectual influence o f the RCA leader, Chen Kungpo, appears to have extended 
beyond the GMD. He was a US-educated intellectual and CCP drop-out who had held 
several key posts during the united front.94 The journal which he published from early 
1928 until it was suppressed by Chiang Kaishek in September, Ko-ming P ’ing-lun, 
{Revolutionary Critique ), was Marxist-oriented. Its contributors represented the extreme 
left o f the GMD and included communist ‘fellow-travellers’.95 One o f the ideas promoted 
by Chen Kungpo in this journal and other writings was that ‘the Chinese National 
Revolution was indissolubly linked with the world revolution against imperialism’. He 
believed that the GMD should take on the responsibility o f leading the national revolution 
of the colonial peoples of the East, thus promoting a world revolution.96 To this end he 
advocated the establishment of an ‘International o f the East’ or an ‘International of the 
Three People’s Principles’, which would be a counterweight to both the League of 
Nations and the Third International in Moscow. So Waichor maintains that Chen 
Kungpo’s theory o f anti-imperialism, ‘fashioned the minds o f the Left on the issue’.97
The July or August 1928 founding of a new anti-imperialist league in Shanghai, ‘The 
League o f the Oppressed Peoples of the East’, may have been the work o f the RCA 
faction (also known as the ‘Reorganizers’) in the GMD.98 This League would play a 
leading role in left-wing activity in the Nanyang during 1929 and the first months o f 1930. 
Its existence could have facilitated the RCA’s efforts to form overseas branches in Hong
90 C.F. Yong & R.B. McKenna, The Guomindang Movement in British Malaya, 1912-1914,
(Singapore: Singapore Univ., 1990), p. 89.
91 So Waichor, The Guomindang Left in the National Revolution, 1924-1931, (Hong Kong: Oxford
Univ., 1991), p. 156.
92 So Waichor, op. cit., pp. 91-5.
93 So Waichor, op. cit., p. 173.
94 Howard Boorman, ed., Biographical Dictionary o f Republican China, vol. 1, (New York: Columbia
Univ., 1967)
95 So Waichor, op. cit., p. 66.
96 Ibid., p. 84.
97 Ibid., p. 85.
98 Comintern and China, vol. Ill, part II, p. 888, n. 14, says the League was directed by the CCP.
However, the final issue of Thanh Nien (no. 208) of May 1930 says that the League was the creation
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Kong, Japan, Vietnam and Singapore," However, the League also seems to have been 
used as a legal front for communist activities. This seeming anachronism — a continuation 
o f the GMD-CCP united front ~  appears to have been connected to Willy Munzenberg’s 
direction o f the Anti-imperialist League in Berlin. At the Sixth Comintern Congress he had 
spoken up for the need to maintain communist influence in a wide-range o f non-communist 
organizations.100 As of April 1929 Mme. Sun Yatsen, by then associated with the ‘Third 
Party’ movement, was still listed as an Honorary President on the League’s notepaper.101 
In a March 1930 letter, the FEB would refer approvingly to the CCP’s ‘mastery o f the use 
o f legal and semi-legal possibilities’, which, it noted, included the Anti-imperialist League 
and the ‘Freedom League’.102
A report by the Nanyang Provisional Committee (apparently to the CCP Central 
Committee) written on 19 July 1928, reflects the importance o f anti-imperialist activity in 
this period. It also deals with the need for a ‘merciless purge’ o f the Committee’s leading 
organizations.103 The report covers an extended plenum which began 2 July 1928. This 
meeting included representatives from Borneo, the ‘Special Seamen’s Cell’, the cells of 
rubber workers, CYL and the Anti-imperialist League.104 The Guangdong Committee did 
not send any representatives; nor is there any mention of representatives from the 
Cochinchina-Cambodia branch. The plenum decreed that the party organization in the 
Malay Archipelago (one of the ways in which the Russians translated the term ‘Nanyang’) 
must be reorganized; all ‘saboteurs, regressive and hesitating elements’ were to be purged. 
Only the ‘bold, honest and self-sacrificing comrades’ were to be promoted; comrades from 
the workers and peasantry were to be advanced to leading posts.105 The organization o f 
events for the 3 o f August, designated a day o f anti-imperialist demonstrations, was given 
special emphasis at the plenum. Cadres were instructed to go ‘to the peasants’ and 
organize ‘the broad popular masses’ to ‘spontaneously rise up’ to participate in the anti- 
Japanese movement. But these actions would not be taken in the name o f the Nanyang 
Committee. The report stated that, ‘at present we still do not have the possibility to openly
of the Chinese nationalists, who founded it to separate Asian revolutionaries from the Third 
International. (AOM, SLOTFOM V, 16.)
99 So Waichor, op. cit., p. 165; also Yong and McKenna, p. 243, note that Liao Zhonggkai's widow was 
in Singapore in 1930 to persuade GMD branches to change their allegiance to the RCA.
100 Degras, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 465.
101 RC, 542, 1,30, p. 36a.
102 Comintern and China, vol. Ill, part 2, p. 826, letter to the Eastern Secretariat datelined Moscow, 20 
March, 1930.
103 RC,495, 62, 1, pp. 1-10, in Russian translation.
104 As I am working from a Russian translation, I cannot say for sure what the exact title of this Anti­
imperialist League would be in Chinese. The Russians, however, seem to have used the term 'anti- 
imperialist' for the League of the Oppressed Peoples of the East, as in Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, 
part II, pp. 885, 888.
105 RC,495, 62, 1, p. 2.
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lead the mass movement in the name of the communist party’. Thus the movement on the 
3 August would be secretly led, in the name of mass organizations such as the Anti- 
Japanese Society, the Society of Chinese Residents for the Salvation o f the Motherland, the 
Society for the Boycott o f Japanese Goods, and so on.106
The date o f this plenum, at which the reorganization o f the Nanyang Committee was 
decreed, is intriguingly close to that o f the ‘Reorganization Meeting’ o f the Tonkin Thanh 
Nien Committee in September. Did the Cochinchina-Cambodia branch o f the Nanyang 
Committee receive instructions on the need to ‘reorganize’ after the July plenum? Was 
there any kind o f link between the Chinese activists in Saigon or Tonkin and their 
Vietnamese counterparts in Thanh Nien? Potentially any o f the communist organizations 
such as the Seaman's Union, the CYL, the Pan Pacific Trade Union Secretariat, or 
communist elements in the Anti-imperialist League, could have provided the framework 
for contacts and transmission of political advice. At the very least, one can speculate that 
the impulsion to purge the Thanh Nien organization and place more emphasis on 
proletarian organizing was transmitted through the CCP, perhaps via the Nanyang 
Committee, not directly from Moscow or from Nguyen Ai Quoc in Siam. The Thanh Nien 
Central Committee in Guangdong does not seem to have been involved — as the events o f 
1929 would show.
When Li Lisan returned from Moscow in the late summer or early autumn o f 1928, he 
quickly moved to encourage the CCP’s leftward tendencies, but in a manner which 
temporarily brought the Chinese communists into a united front from below with elements 
o f the Left GMD. This is an aspect of Li Lisan’s policies which is not reflected in the 
official CCP record. But Comintern documents on the CCP provide some evidence o f this 
overlooked facet o f Li Lisan’s leadership, which in my view may have influenced the path 
of Vietnamese events in 1929 and early 1930. When Li returned to Shanghai he was only 
an alternate member o f the Politburo and the Standing Committee.107 But as head of the 
CCP’s Organization Department, he soon became a dominant leader in the urban areas. It 
seems likely that Li Lisan also made his influence felt in the Nanyang Provisional 
Committee. As both a leader o f the General Labour Union in Shanghai during its zenith in 
1925, and a member o f the Permanent Secretariat of the Pan Pacific Trade Union, he was 
probably a familiar figure to the labour activists who had emigrated to the ports of 
Southeast Asia between 1926 and 1928.108 He was associated with the leftist views o f the 
Guangdong Regional Executive Committee, o f which he had been a member after his flight
106 RC,495, 62, l,p . 6.
107 History of the CCP, p. 60.
108 Klein and Clark, op. cit., p. 514.
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from Shanghai in late 1925.109 Following the fall of the Canton Commune he was made 
head of the Guangdong Province Committee; it is not clear how long he held that post.110 
The Singapore police would later note that there was a ‘very great increase in propaganda’ 
sent from the CCP CC to Malaya in 1928 and 1929. They attributed the growth of 
communism in Malaya to this propaganda.111 The return of Li Lisan to Shanghai in the 
second half of 1928 would appear to be one o f the causes of this propaganda offensive.
One of L i’s first moves on returning to Shanghai was to expel Cai Hesen from the 
leadership, an act which the Comintern regarded as a rejection o f the results o f the Sixth 
CCP Congress. The Comintern had hoped to guarantee unity in the CCP’s leadership by 
bringing representatives o f various factions into the Politburo, a December 1928 letter from 
the Far Eastern section’s Vladimir Kuchumov to Stalin, Molotov, Bukharin, and Pyatnitsky 
explained. But Cai’s removal was seen as a step backwards towards the pre-Sixth 
Congress ultra-left line. Kuchumov’s letter referred to a CCP CC circular on 
organizational questions (no number is given) which criticized the moderate leadership of 
the Shanghai Committee, by contrasting it to the more radical Guangdong Committee.
The Comintern letter, in turn, criticized Xiang Zhongfa and Li Lisan for failing to organize 
the masses and for promoting the slogan, ‘Union with the Petty Bourgeoisie’. The remedy 
to these political mistakes was to send out a new team of ECCI representatives to work 
with the CCP CC. The final point o f Kuchumov’s letter recommended the re-establishment 
o f the Far Eastern Bureau to lead the parties o f China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines and 
Indochina.112
The new FEB was already working in Shanghai by the end of March 1929.113 It included a 
Pole named Ignaty Lyubinetski-Rylski, aka ‘Osten’, as well as a German who had been on 
both the left and right wings of the German CP in the 1920s. He was Gerhard Eisler, Ruth 
Fischer’s brother, who was known as ‘Roberts’. Others who were based in Shanghai in 
1929 were the Profmtern representative George Hardy and a G.M. Bespalov, the 
representative of the Communist Youth League (CYL), known as Willy or ‘Young’. Jakov 
Rudnik, head o f operations for the OMS, would not appear in Shanghai for his second stint
109 Van de Ven, op. cit., p. 220.
110 Klein and Clark, p. 514.
111 CAOM, GGI 65560, Police Journal, Straits Settlements, no. 5, 15 May 1931; my thanks to 
Christopher Goscha for sharing this document.
112 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part I, 1927 - 1931, pp. 510-512.
113 See letter from Gerhard Eisler to ECCI, 31 March 1929, Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part I, pp. 
543-546.
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until the spring o f 1930, using the pseudonym Hilaire Noulens, among several others.114 
Osten/Rylski and Roberts/Eisler were the principal political reporters until Pavel M if 
arrived in September 1930, while the other FEB staff had narrower responsibilites, e.g. for 
labour affairs, or in Rudnik’s case, for handling the money and logistics of the Bureau.
The Chinese communists were aware, as Zhang Guotao tells it, that Rylski and Eisler had 
‘rightist errors' in their pasts. (Zhang incorrectly identifies them as Thalheimer and 
Brandler.) For this reason, he belives, they were not treated as reliable authorities on the 
views o f the Stalinized Comintern.115
The summer o f 1929 brought new developments, which seemed to promise that the elusive 
‘revolutionary high tide’ which the Chinese had been waiting for was about to roll in. As 
we have seen, the Comintern’s Tenth Plenum in July made the ‘New Course’ and class 
warfare the official policies of the world communist movement. (A Comintern letter to the 
CCP that summer informed the CCP that rich farmers were no longer to be regarded as 
allies in the struggle against the landlords. 116) At the same time, armed resistance against 
the Guomindang in Nanjing from a loose coalition of warlords and generals was on the 
rise. Kuusinen had criticized the CCP in a February meeting o f the ECCI Political 
Secretariat, saying that ‘Many Chinese comrades are focussed on the short-term, as if they 
are sitting by the window and waiting for a sudden revolutionary miracle to take place.
How this miracle should take place is not entirely clear. ... They talk about the war of the 
bourgeoisie and the Guangxi group and say that thanks to this an upsurge o f the 
revolutionary movement is approaching.’117 However, with the Comintern increasingly 
emphasizing the need to guard against ‘right opportunism’ and 'conciliationism', the CCP 
seems to have decided that the rekindling of ‘militarist wars’ provided a good opening to 
promote their own armed uprisings. Stalin also was heightening the tension within the 
Comintern by issuing increasingly urgent warnings o f a coming imperialist war against 
Soviet Russia, perhaps to stir up support for his radical economic policies. He used the 
conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railway, which escalated in June 1929, to promote the 
idea that one o f the obligations o f the world communist movement was to defend the 
Soviet Union.
When the Reorganizers became involved in coordinating armed resistance to the Nanjing 
government in m id-1929, the CCP apparently gave them their support. Among the
114 For details of Rudnik's movements see Frederick Litten, 'The Noulens Affairs', China Quarterly, no.
138, June 1994, p. 502. Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part II also has biographical details of
Comintern and FEB representatives in its 'Index of Names'.
115 Chang Kuo-t’ao, Vol. II, pp. 126-7.
116 Thornton, op. cit., p. 87.
117 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part II, p. 523.
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militarists who backed the challenge to the GMD leadership were Zhang Fakui in Hubei, 
and Li Zongren and Yu Zuobo, both in Guangxi.118 Chen Kungpo moved to Hong Kong in 
June 1929 to take charge o f this military campaign, which developed into the ‘Party- 
defending and National Salvation Movement’.119 For a time it appeared to have a good 
chance o f bringing an end to Chiang’s rule. Two communist cadres, Deng Xiaoping and 
Zhang Yunyi (a native o f Hainan), were sent from Shanghai to Guangxi province to 
infiltrate the ‘National Salvation Movement’, Deng in mid-1929 and Zhang perhaps as 
early as 1928. Deng would tell Edgar Snow in 1936 that he went to Guangxi via 
Haiphong in Vietnam, as the route from Canton was too risky. He claimed to have had 
contacts with the Vietnamese rebels who started the ‘worker-peasant rebellion in 1930’.120 
It is improbable that, as Uli Franz claims, Deng consulted with Nguyen Ai Quoc in 
Shanghai on the best route to Guangxi. Yet Deng does appear to have used Vietnamese 
contacts to help him travel from Haiphong by train to the Guangxi border, from where he 
followed the Thanh Nien emigration route to Longzhou and then to Nanning.121
Following the Tenth ECCI Plenum, the FEB in Shanghai -- with former ‘rightists’ on its 
staff — made a point o f passing a resolution which would express their loyal support o f the 
‘New Course’. This document, dated October 1929, declared that the FEB was ready to 
combat ‘opportunistic dangers and deviations in the CCP’. The resolution criticized the 
CCP for having only a ‘thin layer o f industrial workers and contacts with various national- 
reformist groups’. The Guangxi Committee had carried on negotiations with the General 
Yu Zubei (Yu Zuobo) on work within his army, it said, and had sent telegrams to local 
organizations calling for a mass campaign in support o f a Zhang Fakui-Yu Zuobo bloc. 
Some comrades had also refused to create red trade unions in enterprises where 
government or yellow unions already existed.122
This FEB resolution would cause an angry reaction in the Chinese Politburo. During a 
series of meetings with the FEB in December 1929, the Chinese, represented by Zhou 
Enlai, Li Lisan and Xiang Zhongfa, would refuse to acknowledge the ‘rightist errors' they 
were being accused of. At a 10 December meeting, Rylski criticized the CCP for
118 Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Univ., 1974), Chapters 6 and 7, illuminates one side of this conflict, pitting the 'Guangxi Clique', 
which in 1928 and the first half of 1929 had a strong influence in Nanjing, against Chiang Kaishek. Her 
description of GMD politics in 1927, as a period which 'almost defies untangling' (p. 87), seems to 
apply equally well to 1928-1929. It was, however, a temporary alliance with Chiang Kaishek against 
the Guangxi Clique, which brought the Left GMD into a position of influence in Guangxi in the second 
half of 1929. (pp. 140-147)
119 So Waichor, op. cit., p. 131.
120 Klein and Clark, op. cit., p. 821.
121 Uli Franz, Deng Xiaoping, (Boston: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1988), pp. 78-9.
122 RC,495, 154, 380, pp. 19-20; also printed in Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part 1, pp 619-22.
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cooperating with the rich peasants and for collaborating with the ‘national reformists’ in 
Guangxi.123 Osten admitted that when the problem of the Eastern Railway developed, ‘we 
discussed partisan wars with you and made very concrete suggestions, which you accepted. 
We advised you to organize, broaden and provoke partisan battles... ’ .124 But in an effort to 
avoid responsibility for CCP errors, he added that this advice had been accompanied by 
instructions to educate the masses, which the CCP had failed to implement.125 Li Lisan 
rebutted this criticism in a second meeting (13 December), saying that the Chinese CC had 
been struggling against the right danger consistently, that it had fought such right 
tendencies as the move towards a legal movement, peaceful development and the over­
evaluation of the bourgeoisie. He also pointed out that the CC had criticized the 
‘Reorganizers’ in Guangxi. ‘Possibly there are comrades working in the military who do 
not clearly understand the situation in Guangxi. But their mistakes cannot be connected to 
the Central Committee and the [Guangxi] Special Committee,’ he explained.126
Finally, after a long speech from Eisler on 17 December, the two sides agreed to report 
their disagreement to Moscow, whose decision on policy would be final. ‘Until the 
resolution o f this question, we will carry on our daily work as before,’ concluded Xiang. 
‘Then, if  the CCP commits errors, the FEB can correct them and in the same way, if  the 
FEB makes mistakes, we must struggle against them. In addition to a telegram, we propose 
to send a Chinese comrade to Moscow,’ he said.127 This outcome left the FEB without any 
real authority in the eyes o f the CCP until Moscow handed down its decision. It appears 
that from the end of December 1929, Li Lisan and his supporters showed increasing 
independence in interpreting Comintern policy. They did not, however, want to lose the 
Comintern subsidy for their work, which in 1929 amounted to over 200,000 US dollars, as 
well as 16,408 dollars for the Communist Youth.128 Zhou Enlai left for Moscow for 
consultations in February 1930, where he arrived in April after travelling to Berlin.129 
Rylski would return to Moscow around the same time.
123 RC,495, 154, 380, p. 24; in Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part 1, pp. 664-670.
124 Ibid., p. 28.
125 Ibid., p. 28.
126 Ibid, pp. 34-5.
127 Ibid, p. 50, in Comintern in China, Vol. Ill, part 1, pp. 697-705.
128 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part I, p. 513, letter from Pyatnitsky to Albrecht, 14 Dec. 1928.
129 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part II, p. 791, letter from FEB to Eastern Secretariat, 30 Jan. 1930.
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6. The Thanh Nien Rift
The early stage of Li Lisan’s attempt to gain control of CCP structures coincides with the 
growth of a rift within the Thanh Nien association. As mentioned earlier, starting in 
September 1928, the northern branch o f Thanh Nien had begun a campaign to 
‘proletarianize’ itself. In March 1929 they had formed a communist cell in Hanoi. Just as 
the FEB was establishing itself in Shanghai, the Thanh Nien leadership called a national 
congress in Hong Kong. ( They had had to leave Canton at the start o f 1929, when Ho 
Tung Mau and a group of Vietnamese cadets at Whampoa were arrested.) By the time the 
congress opened in May, the leftward turn in Comintern policy had been clearly 
established. There was no apparent disagreement among the delegates on the need to 
establish a communist party in the Bolshevik mold, following what had become known as 
the spirit of the 6th Comintern Congress. But in meetings preceding the official Thanh 
Nien congress, the northern delegation provoked a split by insisting on the immediate 
formation o f a communist party. Three of the dissidents, Tran Van Cung, Nguyen Tuan 
and Ngo Gia Tu, left the congress early, when the China-based leaders, Lam Due Thu and 
Le Hong Son, refused to change their opinion that Vietnam was not yet ready to move 
beyond the preparatory phase of party formation.130 But according to a Surete source, Le 
Hong Son had consulted the Chinese CP in Hong Kong on the new programme, and so had 
some grounds to believe that he was following the right path.131 The delegates from the 
central, southern and Siam sections of Thanh Nien remained in Hong Kong until the end o f 
May to draw up a voluminous ‘minimum programme’, complete with a disciplinary code 
that listed five infractions meriting the death penalty. The programme explicitly accepted 
the documents o f the Comintern’s 6th Congress and announced the end of all relations with 
the Chinese GMD, which it called a party o f ‘notables, landowners and capitalists’.132 A 
Preparatory Commission was set up, to begin the work of establishing a communist party. 
Nguyen Ai Quoc was dropped from the leadership, as he was too far away; according to 
Lam Due Thu, there were now rumours that he was seriously ill in Germany.133
The question o f why the northern Thanh Nien leadership had become so hostile to the 
China-based committee probably has no simple answer. Youthful arrogance seems to have 
played a part, combined with a reasonable desire to bring the communist leadership closer 
to its members in-country. By the time o f the May congress, the northern group may have 
had several concrete objections to the Canton/Hong Kong leaders. The most obvious
130 Huynh Kim Khanh, op. cit., pp. 117-8, citing Contribution, vol. 4, supp. 2, p. 59.
131 SPCE 368, Mission Noel, Envoi. No. 507 du 11 juin 1929, Rapport de l’Agent Pinot.
132 RC,495, 154, 604, pp. 22; 67; Programme Minimum du VNKMTN.
133 SPCE 368, Mission Noel, Envoi no. 507 du 11 juin 1929.
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would have been the presence of Lam Due Thu, even in 1929 suspected by some o f the 
revolutionaries, notably Nguyen Hai Than, o f being a French informer.134 Thu was also 
known for his decadent life-style and himself reported to the Surete that he ‘had been 
violently criticized by certain comrades in the course o f the year.’ He had thus asked not 
to be given a leadership position, and assured the Surete that this would, ‘greatly facilitate 
my task’.135 (His task may have involved creating misunderstandings among the various 
revolutionary groups.) Another source o f friction could well have been the dominance of 
men from the central provinces of Nghe An and Ha Tinh in the Hong Kong leadership. 
Related to this regional tension may have been the different kinds o f training and 
organizing on which the two groups were concentrating. The China-based group was 
mainly composed o f men with military training, some of whom had been instructors at 
Whampoa. These included Truong Van Lenh, Le Quang Dat, Le Duy Diem and Le Hong 
Son. They had a rural orientation as well. Le Hong Son had served as a CYL propagandist 
among the peasanty o f Hainan Island; Ho Tung Mau had helped to organized mutual aid 
societies in rural Siam. The Tonkin members of Thanh Nien, on the other hand, were 
being drawn increasingly into organizing in urban areas. Their work in the port o f 
Haiphong and the mines o f Campha, Uong Bi and Mao Khe, where there were high 
proportions of Chinese labourers, may have brought them into contact with union 
organizers of the Nanyang Labour Federation or perhaps the CCP's Guangdong 
Committee. These tensions may well have been present in Cochinchina as well. The 
competition between Ton Due Thang, a Saigon labour leader, and Le Van Phat, which led 
to the latter’s murder by Thanh Nien assassins in December 1928, may have grown out of 
this conflict between urban and rural orientation. One can see that these sorts of 
differences would provide fertile ground for Surete provocateurs to sow seeds o f conflict.
The period from June 1929 until February 1930 was a critical one for the Vietnamese 
communists. The break-away faction in Tonkin formed their own communist party, the 
Dong Duong Cong San Dang (Indochinese Communist Party or ICP) in June, and quickly 
started sending emissaries to other parts of the country. As they controlled the Thanh Nien 
committees in north Vietnam, the northern membership appears to have joined the new 
party more or less automatically. They made inroads in the center and south as well. In 
both o f these regions the Thanh Nien leadership was hit by a wave o f arrests in the latter 
part o f 1929. In July the entire committee for central Vietnam was arrested, including 
Nguyen Si Sach, who had just returned from the Thanh Nien congress, and Vuong Thuc
134 SPCE 367, Declaration de Le Quang Dat, July 1931, ‘Au sujet de Lam Due Thu,’ pp. 4-5.
135 SPCE 368, Mission Noel, envoi no. 507, 11 juin 1929.
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Oanh. Tran Van Cung was also arrested. Vo Mai, fled to the uplands o f Nghe Tinh.136 
(Nguyen Ai Quoc and Tran Phu were both sentenced to death in absentia by a tribunal in 
Vinh in October 1929.) It was also in July that the French began to arrest activists whose 
names had come to light during the investigation of Le Van Phat’s murder, what came to 
be known as the Rue Barbier affair. These included Pham van Dong, Ton Due Thang, and 
Nguyen Kim Cuong.137 Other organizers were forced to retreat to rural areas such as Dong 
Thap.138 At the same time, the Tan Viet party (the former Cach Mang Dang) was 
decapitated by the arrest of its leaders, both in the Center and in Saigon. Their shared 
living arrangement with the Thanh Nien leaders had led to the discovery o f party 
documents written by Ha Huy Tap when the rue Barbier murder was discovered. (Ha Huy 
Tap and two other Tan Viet members, Tran Ngoc Danh and Tran Pham Ho, had fled to 
Shanghai following the discovery o f Tan Viet’s headquarters in December 1928.139) In 
Vinh, Nguyen Thi Minh Khai would report, only the workers and women’s groups 
remained strong.140 These arrests must have worked to the advantage o f the ICP faction, 
as they became by default the most experienced group of leaders in Vietnam. Not long 
after the ICP’s formation, Ngo Gia Tu was sent to Saigon, where he established a base 
among the coolies in Cholon and began to create a General Trade Union. The Thanh Nien 
labour organizers who remained outside the ICP would before long start to form their own 
General Labour U nion .141
Under the threat of losing its entire membership, the Thanh Nien Central Committee in 
Hong Kong was forced to give up its previous stand on the formation o f a communist 
party. By late August 1929, soon after Ho Tung Mau and around 20 former Whampoa 
cadets had been released from prison, they decided to form the Annam Cong San Dang 
(the Annam Communist Party or ACP). As they wrote in a long, defensive missive 
(probably dated mid-October, given the reference to an ICP letter o f 4 Oct.) to their 
membership: ‘the Preparatory Commission was suited to the earlier situation, but now this 
Commission no longer answers the needs of the moment.’142 Part o f the problem was that
136 SPCE 368, Interrogatoire de Vo Mai, p. 7.
137 Ralph Smith, op. cit., p. 784; also see La Tribune Indochinoise, 18 July 1930, ‘La Crime de la rue 
Barbier et les societes secretes devant la Cour Criminelle’.
138 Ha Huy Giap, op. cit., p. 60.
139 Contribution, Vol. I, part 2, pp. 48-9.
140 RC, 495, 201, 35, ‘Fan-Lan’s’ Autobiography, 16 Dec. 1934.
141 See SPCE 367, Declarations de Truong Phuoc Dat, 22 May and following days, on the formation of 
the ICP’s General Trade Union, and the competition from the ACP.
142 RC,495, 154, 616, p. 62; 'Letter to the Interior from the ACP'; the French copy in the Comintern 
archives is stamped 29 March 1930 and is 25 hand-written pages. This letter is one which was not 
captured by the French, and thus does not appear in their collection of documents in SLOTFOM III, 
129. These were intercepted by the French in Jan. 1930, and comprise letters exchanged by the ICP 
leadership in Haiphong and the ACP leaders in Hong Kong, as well as letters and instructions from the
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many members o f this Commission had been arrested upon their return to Vietnam 
following the May congress, the letter explained. Thanh Nien had been dissolved and there 
were now only a few remaining groups in Siam and Cochinchina. A cell of the ACP had 
been formed in Hong Kong, whose task would be to work for the formation o f a real party, 
‘as we have noted that the ICP is not a real party’, the letter said. -The new party, led by Ho 
Tung Mau, Le Hong Son, Le Quang Dat and Le Duy Diem, declared that it wanted to unite 
Thanh N ien’s communist elements within Indochina, but at the same time work towards a 
fusion with the ICP.143 This desire for fusion did not mean, however, that the ACP leaders 
fully accepted their rivals’ programme. They complained that the ICP had started 
organizing from the top down, before it had created cells in workplaces or among the 
masses. Another criticism was that the ICP was creating groups o f so-called ‘Reds’ who 
were called on to work among the masses and to pay monthly contributions to the Party, 
without actually becoming party members. Thus, the ‘Reds’ were forced to submit entirely 
to the orders and decisions o f the party -  this ran counter to the principles o f democratic 
centralism, the letter said. (The ACP leaders based their knowledge o f ICP methods on a 
letter of 4 October 1929 from the ICP to the CCP, as well as On the 26 September issue of 
the ICP paper, Co Do (Red Flag),)144 Yet another complaint was that, according to an 
anonymous ICP member, the latter party had Ted the masses to destroy pagodas and 
temples’.145
Perhaps the most galling ICP fault was the fact that it had worked ‘to overturn Thanh Nien 
and the Tan Viet parties, while offering collaboration to the Nationalist Party (Quoc Dan 
Dang) in order to contribute to its development’. The letter claimed, in fact, that the ICP 
had aided the VNQDD by modifying its programme and by introducing communists into 
the party.146 The introduction o f communists into the VNQDD is reminiscent o f Nguyen 
Ai Quoc’s tactics in 1926-7 with regard to the Cach Mang Dang/Tan Viet. It may have 
been an echo of the apparent alliance which existed in 1928-9 between the CCP and the 
Left GMD. The closeness between the ICP and the VNQDD also appears to be a sign o f 
regional rivalry between north and center. While the Thanh Nien leadership had been keen 
to infiltrate and then fuse with the Tan Viet Party, a group with roots in central Vietnam, 
the ICP preferred to form a front with the non-communist party rooted in the north. As the 
ICP leaders had written to the ACP on 4 October, their party believed ‘that it could
ICP in Haiphong to their representative Ngo Gia Tu in Saigon. Ralph Smith, op.cit., pp. 789-798,
gives a thorough description of this correspondence, which is extremely acrimonious on the ICP end. 
RC, 495, 616 pp. 6 lb-62.
144 Ibid., pp. 64-64b.
145 Ibid., p. 67.
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cooperate with the VNQDD for the time being... But this cooperation would only take 
place if the Nationalist Party did not oppose the propaganda and organizational work o f the 
ICP within their party (which means that the PCI will direct it secretly).’147 Then in a letter 
o f 7 January 1930, from the ICP CC to Ngo Gia Tu in Saigon, the author noted that vis-a- 
vis the VNQDD, the ICP would continue to look for ways to infiltrate it in order to 
organize a soviet, then ‘to incorporate our masses, in order to create real soviets.’148
Figures for the competing communist groups vary, but the ICP itself claimed by 5 
December 1929 to have recruited 60 members in Cochinchina, and either 40 or 20 in 
Annam (the reporter could not remember exactly).149 Ha Huy Giap claims in his memoirs 
that there were 800 Thanh Nien members in the south by the autumn of 1929.150 Yet the 
ACP had only absorbed around 50 o f these by mid-autumn, according to one Surete 
informer, Duong Hac Dinh. He was an early Thanh Nien trainee and until May 1929 a 
member o f the Tonkin break-away faction. But he had rallied to the China-based leadership 
after the congress, and was sent to Saigon in September to organize a provisional 
committee for the ACP. (This was after the July arrest of most o f the members o f the 
original preparatory committee.) Along with Hoang Tuyen (Tran Van Minh), a former 
Whampoa cadet from Cochinchina, Nguyen Ngoc Ba, Do Luong and Nguyen Van Ngoc, 
he drew up a list o f Thanh Nien members for the Saigon-Gia Dinh region, and another list 
for Mytho and Cantho, to be inducted into the new party. The two lists amounted to 
around 50 names, Dinh claimed.151
The first outside stimulus for the two communist factions to unite came from a Chinese 
inspector o f the FEB in Shanghai, who arrived in Hong Kong in November on his way to 
Singapore. As Ho Tung Mau wrote to the ICP on 14 November, a decision had been taken 
in Shanghai to form a secretariat of the Communist League o f the Oppressed Peoples of 
the East. The role of this league or federation would be ‘to guide directly Malaya, Java, 
Burma, Siam and Annam, with a view to organizing them as soon as possible into 
communist parties.’ The opening meeting o f this association was to be held within two 
months, with delegates from different countries attending. ‘But it would be preferable for
146 RC,495, 154, 616, pp. 65-67. The VNQDD did re-write its statutes in 1929, with advice from 
Hoang Van Tung, a member of the Cach Mang Dang/Tan Viet. Thus Thanh Nien, the CMD and the 
VNQDD had very similar structures. (Hue-Tam Ho Tai, op. cit p. 185.)
147 SLOTFOM III, 129, documents captured by French, letter 13, p. 5.
148 Ibid., letter of 7 Jan. 1930.
149 Ibid., letter 14.
150 Ha Huy Giap, op. cit., p. 58.
151 SPCE 367, Declaration de Duong Hac Dinh, p 30..
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us to complete our unification before sending delegates,’ Ho Tung Mau wrote.152 The 
League’s secretariat would be based in Singapore and thus appears to have been a new 
manifestation o f the Nanyang Provisional Committee. A hint o f the importance of the 
CCP role in Vietnamese communism at the end o f 1929 can be found in the Surete’s 
comments on one o f the letters exchanged between the two factions in November. The 
Surete noted that the ICP in Saigon was sending Chinese propaganda brochures to their 
comrades in Tonkin, a sign that the South was still the center o f Nanyang Committee 
activity in Vietnam.153 The Vietnamese in Hong Kong questioned the idea o f working 
under Singapore’s jurisdiction, according to Duong Hac Dinh’s account. The Chinese 
delegate advised them to inform the FEB of their feelings, but at the same time encouraged 
them to send two delegates from each faction to Singapore at a later date. Thus Le Quang 
Dat was sent off to Shanghai to talk with ‘certain Chinese members o f the FEB’.154
Significantly, at this stage the European members of the FEB seem to have been promoting 
the role of Chinese communists in Southeast Asia. The role of the Chinese inspector 
mentioned above may have grown out o f the request from the Anti-imperialist League in 
Berlin that the FEB organize a delegation to the Anti-Imperialist Youth Conference which 
was due to be held in Frankfurt just before the second World Congress o f the Anti­
imperialist League, scheduled for July 1929. The FEB wrote to Berlin in May 1929 that 
they had no addresses for youth organizations in Korea, Indonesia, Indochina or Malaya. 
‘The only possibility is to work through the Chinese organisations there ...,’ the letter said. 
They had decided that, ‘a comrade must be sent to these places carrying instructions and 
suggestions for the building o f some anti-imperialist youth organisation to include both 
native and Chinese youth.’ The FEB’s efforts were obviously too late to send any delegates 
to Berlin, but as they explained, their envoy would give them ‘the possibility to learn first­
hand the conditions in these places and to take steps for the formation o f some national 
organisation.’155
Rylski reported in January 1930 that the FEB was short o f ‘comrades to do the travelling’ 
required within the region. The usefulness o f the Chinese was limited by the fact that they 
were frequently refused entry at Southeast Asian ports, or were arrested on arrival.156 Yet 
there seemed to be no alternative but to rely on Chinese comrades. In Moscow the 
Comintern was coming to the same conclusion. The resurrected Mideastem Section,
152 SLOTFOM III, 129, documents captured by French, letter of 14 Nov. 1929, signed ‘Luong’, who is
identified in French notes as Ho Tung Mau.
153Ibid., French comments on'Luong'letter of 14 Nov. 1929.
154 SPCE 367, Duong Hac Dinh, pp. 34-5.
155 RC, 542 (Anti-Imperialist League), 1, 96, p. 2, letter signed ‘M’.
156 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part II, p. 803: FEB letter to Eastern Secretariat, 30 Jan. 1930.
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responsible for Burma, India, Indonesia and Indochina, held a meeting on 12 November, at 
which rebuilding the Indonesian CP was discussed. As the Indonesian cadres had been 
dispersed by the Dutch after the 1926 uprising, it was suggested that ‘the Chinese 
communist organization which exists in Singapore, the Malay States and Indonesia, which 
is linked to the CCP’s CC’ be made use of. ‘In spite of its numerical and ideological 
weakness, the organization has links among the local Chinese and the native workers and 
leads a variety o f trade unions, which are united in the Trade Union Council of the Malay 
Archipelago.. .For the time being this organization can serve as the base for the 
development o f work in Indonesia,’ the protocol reads.157 The Comintern does not appear 
to have understood the traditional Chinese concept o f the 'Southern Seas’ as a 
geographical area in which Chinese influence would be predominant. The Europeans in 
the FEB thought of Singapore as a central point for communicating with the area controlled 
by the Comintern’s Mideastem Section, from India to Indonesia, and when required, 
Indochina. Kuusinen viewed India and Indonesia as the main targets of Comintern work in 
this region, as we have seen; these two colonies would be the ultimate destinations of the 
two French Comintern inspectors sent to Southeast Asia in 1930 and 1931.
The first o f these to depart, an agent known as ‘Thibault’, was in Belgium in August 1929, 
to obtain false papers. While he waited for news and money from Moscow, he wrote that 
he was gathering documentation on Indochina, the Dutch Indies and the Philippines. He 
asked that any recent decisions regarding his task, including materials from the Anti­
imperialist League, be sent to him rapidly.158 By piecing together several sources, one can 
guess that this was Jean Cremet, the French communist who was long thought to have 
disappeared in China in early 1930. (In the 1960s he surfaced in Belgium.)159 Joseph . 
Ducroux, sent by the CYL to Asia in 1931, mentions in his memoirs that the OMS had 
asked him to search for Cremet in Shanghai and Hong Kong, as the Comintern had had no 
news o f him for over one year.160 Ducroux recalled that Cremet had travelled on a Belgian 
passport under a Walloon name. Ducroux had worked in Moscow from 1928 to 1930 as a 
CYL expert on India and was assigned in the winter of 1929-30 to take ‘political, moral 
and material aid’ to the Indian CP. Neither o f the Frenchmen would succeed in his 
mission: Thibault would get no farther than Tonkin before vanishing in February 1930, and
157 RC,495, 154, 378, p. 9, protocol no. 12, 12 Nov. 1929.
158 RC, 495,154, 558, pp. l-2b; letter of 28 August 1929, from ‘Thibault’ to Vasiliev.
159 Roger Faligot and Remi Kauffer, in As-tu vu Cremet?, (Paris: Fayard, 1991), p. 302, say that 
Cremet obtained a passport in the name of ‘Thibault’ while he was in Shanghai. This book depicts a 
working relationship in China between Ho Chi Minh and Cremet which is not supported by any of the 
documentation which I have seen in the French or Russian archives. Faligot and Kauffer do not make 
clear what their sources are or provide footnotes.
160 Joseph Ducroux, memoir dated 16 Sept. 1970.
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Ducroux, after travelling through Vietnam, would be arrested in Singapore in 1931 before 
reaching India. Thibault/Cremet’s disappearance seems to have created some confusion in 
the lead-up to the unification of the Vietnamese communist groups, as I will discuss in the 
next chapter.
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CHAPTER V
The Revolutionary Hightide (1930-31)
1. The Return o f  the Comintern Trainees
At the end o f 1929 the Vietnamese communist movement was composed of two feuding 
parties competing for members. The ICP faction had gone so far as to announce that even 
Nguyen Ai Quoc would be treated as an ordinary party member if  he returned.1 The 
former Thanh Nien leaders in Hong Kong were fighting to unify the communists on terms 
which would not mean total defeat for the Annam CP. They were on the point o f  sending 
Le Duy Diem to Moscow to find Nguyen Ai Quoc, when the liaison agent Cao Hoai Nghia 
admitted that he had met Quoc in Siam. He was only persuaded to reveal Quoc’s hiding 
place when he realized how severe the split in the ranks o f the Thanh Nien group had 
become.2 It was Truong Van Lenh, one of the remaining Thanh Nien stalwarts, who went 
to find Quoc in October and persuaded him to return to southern China.3
At the same time, in Moscow the Comintern was beginning to make long-delayed 
decisions regarding the communist movements in India, Indonesia and Indochina. Tran 
Phu and Ngo Due Tri, having completed their studies at the Stalin School, were preparing 
for their return to Vietnam via France. A brief set of ‘Directives for W ork in Indochina’ 
was drawn up in Moscow on 27 October 1929,4 when according to Ngo Due Tri the 
Comintern passed a formal resolution on the creation of an Indochinese Communist Party.5 
The following day Tran Phu attended a day-long discussion led by Kuusinen on the future 
programme for the Indian C P .6 This must have been a way of preparing him for the 
thorny theoretical and practical problems he would face in Vietnam. Caution was the 
dominant note in the directives for Indochina. The ‘general line’ was to form communist 
groups and then to proceed to their unification as a party. The two Vietnamese comrades 
leaving the Stalin School were to gather information on the peasant movement and the 
strikes which had been occurring in the the last year; they were to develop links with the
1 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 129, Societes Secretes, letter 13, p.5.
2 AOM, SPCE 367, ‘Historique du P.CA . ’
3 AOM, SPCE, Declarations de Duong Hac Dinh, p. 35.
4 RC, 495,154, 556, pp 10-11; the Russian version is dated 27 /V/1929, but given the strong evidence 
that these directives were drawn up in October, on the eve of Tran Phu and Ngo Due Tri’s departure for 
Paris, as well as the usual Hanoi date for these instructions, one can assume that the typist made a 
mistake in writing V in place of X.
5 AOM, SPCE 367, Declaration de Ngo Due Tri. In Vietnam, Ngo Due Tri’s role in 1930-1 has been 
reduced to that of a turncoat, as he is said to have given away many party members after his arrest in 
1931. How much blame he deserves for individual arrests is debatable, but he cleary was badly 
disillusioned by April 1931, and he eventually made a long confession to the Surete.
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proletarian and poor peasant elements among the nationalist groups and to ‘provoke a 
differentiation’ in such organizations in order to attract the proletarian members to join 
communist groups. The creation of labour unions, or where these had been dissolved, 
mutual aid groups, was another task. (They were encouraged to take advantage o f Chinese 
and Vietnamese traditions in developing these groups.) Point 15 of the directives was a 
warning against any confusion, ‘between our elements and the Independence Party of the 
ex-communist Nguyen The Truyen’. On the other hand, the two Moscow trainees were to 
enter into relations with the Chinese communist groups which existed in Indochina and to 
make use o f their experience. Point 17 called for the collection of political and economic 
data for the preparation of a set of ‘Theses’ on Indochina.
Tran Phu and Ngo Due Tri were in theory returning to Vietnam as equals. An addendum to 
their directives, on ‘Technical Problems’, stated that ‘the two Vietnamese comrades 
leaving the University must be considered as our leading elements’ for our work in 
Indochina.7 Yet Tran Phu, who had served as head o f the Vietnamese group at the Stalin 
school, was considered to be the first among equals, perhaps because he was not tainted by 
any contacts with Nguyen The Truyen (as was Ngo Due Tri, from his earlier stay in Paris). 
As the two were preparing for their journey they were presented to the French communist 
with the pseudonym ‘Thibault’, who was heading to Asia via Siberia as a delegate o f the 
Comintern. Thibault/Cremet made an arrangement privately with Tran Phu to meet him 
in Hong Kong between the first and 15 o f January 1930, or if  that failed, in Haiphong in the 
first two weeks of February.8
In addition to their resolution and the guidance which Thibault was due to provide, the 
Comintern was to furnish the returning Vietnamese with a more detailed set o f 
instructions. These took the form o f a 48-page brochure entitled ‘On the Immediate Tasks 
o f  the Indochinese Communists ’ which was drawn up in October and November. It was, 
in fact, a critique of the resolutions of the Thanh Nien Congress in May 1929. When Tran 
Phu and Ngo Due Tri arrived in what was then Leningrad on 11 November 1929, they were 
informed that they would receive money in Berlin and Paris; the resolution and the letter o f 
instructions on forming a communist party would also be sent to them in Europe. After 
sailing to Hamburg, they went by train to Berlin, where they received a ‘finely bound
6 RC, 495,154, 384, ‘Consultation on the Indian Question, 28 Oct. 1929.
7 RC, 495, 154, 556, p. 31, ‘Tekhnicheskiie Voprosy’ (undated).
sAOM, SPCE 367, Declarations de Ngo Due Tri, April, May and June, 1931.
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novel’. They were told not to take apart the cover until they were in Saigon, where they 
could extract the papers hidden by the Comintern.9
The Immediate Tasks o f  the Indochinese Communists is a typical Comintern document o f 
the time, an attempt to combine elements of Lenin’s Theses on National and Colonial 
Questions with the more radical prescriptions o f the Sixth Congress and the Tenth ECCI 
Plenum.10 The Indochinese revolution was still ‘a struggle with the remnants of feudalism 
and a struggle against French imperialism for national independence’.11 But now the party 
must be a ‘product of class struggle’, not something created in political education groups.12 
The Thanh Nien programme was criticized for outlining a specific progression of 
revolutionary periods, leading towards an armed struggle. The instructions stated that ‘it is 
impossible to establish the order or length o f the phases o f revolutionary development’. 
‘Concrete analysis of the movement in any given period’ must be the guide to action. 
Overestimation o f the situation could lead to ‘adventurism and putchism’, while 
underestimation would lead to ‘opportunism’.13 The blossoming o f the Indochinese 
movement was occurring at a time when an upsurge in the world revolutionary movement 
was beginning -  this demanded that the Indochinese communists orient themselves not just 
towards a gradual growth of their movement, but ‘towards the possibility and probability 
of large-scale struggles and a quickening tempo of e v e n t s . 14
‘The main defect of the Thanh Nien resolutions’, the Comintern said, was that ‘they do not 
contain the necessary exactitude regarding the essence o f classes and their roles’.15 The 
petty bourgeoisie could no longer be counted among the ‘moving forces’ o f the revolution, 
as the Thanh Nien programme had stated. They could be used in the anti-imperialist 
struggle and for the agrarian revolution, but only under the leadership o f the proletariat.
The true moving forces o f the revolution were the working class and the peasantry; the 
most revolutionary elements o f the peasantry were the rural poor -  landless peasants and 
small landholders.16 Relations with legal groups and other parties were now defined in 
terms o f pure exploitation. The party should ‘broaden, use and lead the anti-imperialist 
struggle o f the urban petty bourgeoisie, including students’.17 ‘The creation o f strong illegal
9 AOM, SPCE 367, Ngo Due Tri.
10 RC, 495. 154, 560, pp. 20-68, On the Immediate Tasks o f the Indochinese Communists, (brochure),
23 Nov. 1929.
11 Ibid., p. 20.
12 Ibid, p. 22.
13 Ibid, p. 24.
14 Ibid, p. 26.
15 Ibid, p. 42.
16 Ibid, pp. 7-9.
17 Ibid., p. 33.
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communist groups, who have mastered a large variety of weapons to wield legal and semi­
legal influence -  this must be the basis o f party work in Indochina’a current conditions,’ 
the brochure said.18 Work in rural areas was not to be neglected. One o f the most 
important tasks o f the party was to develop the peasant movement against the landlords. 
‘The communists must ignite, prepare-and lead the peasant struggle against land rents, 
against the expropriation of land, taxes, share-cropping and so on. We must aim for the 
extension of individual flare-ups to a broad peasant movement against the landlords and 
imperialists.’19 But still, the ‘center of gravity of party and mass work must be in the 
factories, mines, railways, plantations, etc. ’20 These instructions put heavy pressure on the 
Vietnamese to foment a violent struggle, yet made clear that errors in the analysis o f the 
local revolutionary situation would be blamed on them.
Tran Phu and Ngo Due Tri did not get to Saigon with their instructions until 8 February 
1930. They were delayed in Paris by their difficulty in obtaining false travel documents. 
Although it is generally believed that the Comintern had a workshop in Berlin turning out 
counterfeit passports, this does not seem to have been in operation in 1929 or 1930. For 
both the returning Vietnamese and the Frenchmen who went to Southeast Asia for the 
Comintern in 1929-31, obtaining false identy papers posed considerable problems. Tran 
Phu and Ngo Due Tri took the advice o f their former Moscow classmate, Bui Lam, and 
travelled clandestinely. They paid 1,500 francs each to be hidden by a Chinese sailor 
aboard the SS Porthos for the voyage to Saigon. Their late departure meant that Tran Phu 
would not arrive in Hong Kong until roughly mid-February. He would thus miss both of 
his rendez-vous with Thibault, not to mention the unification congress.21
The method and date o f transmission o f the Comintern’s instructions to Vietnam and Hong 
Kong are still sensitive details for Vietnamese communists, as they bear on Nguyen Ai 
Quoc’s legitimacy as the party’s unifier. The date on a Russian copy of the 48-page 
brochure is 23 November 1929. (Whether Tran Phu and Ngo Due Tri had received the 
instructions in their final form is unclear.) This document, it would seem, is what 
became known in the ICP as the ‘December instructions’ on reunifying the party.22 
Contemporary accounts refer to these instructions as the source of Comintern authority on
18 Ibid., p. 37
19 Ibid, p. 36.
20 Ibid., p. 38.
21 AOM, SPCE 367, Ngo Due Tri.
22 A synopsis made by Le Hong Phong was sent to Hong Kong , but intercepted by Lam Due Thu and 
passed to the Surete. They in turn sent a copy to Paris on 14 Dec. 1929. (AOM, SPCE 383, Mission 
Noel, envoi no. 542, 14 Dec. 1929.)
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unification.23 But the Vietnamese text which since 1970 has been cited as the basis on 
which Quoc unified the party is dated 27 October, 1929. (It has not been possible to find a 
version o f this document in the Comintern archives.) Titled, ‘ Ve Van De Lap Dang Cong 
San Dong D uong’, (‘On Establishing an Indochinese Communist Party’), it emphasizes the 
role of ‘the Comintern representative’ in the creation o f a communist party.24 However, on 
the basis of the 1930-31 criticisms of his role in the party’s unification, as well as Ngo Due 
Tri’s confession, it would appear that Quoc had seen neither the ‘December instructions’ 
nor the document printed in Van Kien Dang when he brought the communist groups 
together in early 1930.
2. The Unification Process
Nguyen Ai Quoc arrived in Hong Kong almost two months ahead of Tran Phu.25 
Although he reported to the FEB that he had arrived in China on 23 December,26 a Surete 
informer claimed that ‘Ly Thuy’ had been sighted on the train in Kowloon before the 15 of 
that month.27 In Hong Kong Quoc would find that the Vietnamese communist movement 
had already been receiving instructions from a Chinese representative o f the FEB. 
Moreover, Thibault, assigned to guide the Vietnamese communists, appears to have arrived 
in Hong Kong not long after Quoc. He would seem to have been the anonymous 
Comintern representative ‘charged with the inspection o f all communist groups in the Far 
East’, who was reported to have turned up in Hong Kong in late December 1929. 
According to a Surete report, this inspector repeated the message o f his Chinese 
counterpart, that the direction of the affairs of the Vietnamese communists would be in the 
hands of the Chinese CP for the time being.28 The FEB would report on 3 March 1930, 
that ‘Jacques’, ‘the Frenchman’, had headed to Hong Kong at the end o f December; after 
making contacts there and possibly undertaking some travelling, he was due to return to 
Shanghai at the end of February. ‘However, since a message from Hong Kong received at 
the end o f January, in which he wrote that he was planning to travel to Indochina, we have 
had nothing more from him,’ they reported.29 In an earlier communication the FEB had
23 See RC, 495, 32, 95: Lettre du C.C. d’lndochine (Tran Phu) to FEB of 17 April, 1931, p.7 of file.
24 Van Kien Dang, vol. I, p. 9-17; published in Nhan Dan 6 Jan. 1970. See excerpts in Robert Turner, 
op. cit., p. 16.
25 AOM, SPCE 367, Declaration of Duong Hac Dinh, p. 38-39.
26 RC, 495,154,615, p. 5, letter of 18 Feb. 1930.
27 AOM, SPCE 368, Mission Noel, Envoi no. 554, 3 Jan. 1930, which refers to a report by Agent 4K’ 
from 18 Nov. to 15 Dec. 1929.
28 Ralph Smith, op. cit., p. 795, citing AOM, SLOTFOM III, 48, no.4, pp. 5-6.
29 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part II, unsigned letter from FEB to the ECCI, 3 March 1930, pp. 
821-3.
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referred to him as, ‘the comrade for Indonesia’.30 Strangely, the French envoy does not 
seem to have met Quoc in Hong Kong.
In Hong Kong Quoc moved quickly to end what he considered a ‘puerile feud’, even 
though he had now become one voice of the Comintern among several who could claim to 
have authority to direct the Vietnamese movement. Duong Hac Dinh’s 1930 declaration to 
the Surete shows that Quoc disapproved of the dissolution of Thanh Nien.31 It should have 
been kept in existence after the creation of a communist party, ‘at least at the beginning’. 
This disapproval underlines Quoc’s view of Thanh Nien as a useful political front and may 
be why the Hong Kong party members continued to publish their newspaper Thanh Nien 
until May 1930,32 alongside the ACP paper Do {Red), which had first appeared on 1 
September 1929.33 Dinh’s report reinforces the idea that Quoc was out of touch with the 
rapid development of the political situation. ‘We reported to Quoc everything which had 
happened, both within the country and outside... he explained. Two days after his arrival, 
Quoc wrote to the leaders of the ICP faction to explain his mission from the Comintern, to 
form a communist party for Vietnam. By this account, Quoc drew his authority from the 
instructions he had received before his departure for Siam. He seems to have been 
convinced that he had to act fast, without waiting for updated directives. He requested that 
the ICP faction send two delegates to meet him in Hong Kong. (By the end o f December 
two delegates from the ACP were already in Hong Kong: Nguyen Thieu, alias Nghia, on 
the run from the French police, and Chau Van Liem, who had been designated by the 
Saigon party branch to attend the coming Singapore conference.)34 Quoc also wrote to the 
FEB to announce his presence in Hong Kong and submit his proposals to them. According 
to Duong Hac Dinh, he asked for a monthly salary of 240 to 300 Chinese dollars, to be paid 
via the Guangdong committee of the CCP.35 The authority which he displayed before his 
comrades may have involved a touch o f bravado, however. In late February 1930 he wrote 
to the French CP representatives in the Comintern to ask for a clearer mandate: ‘Now I 
don’t know exactly what my position is ... am I a member of the PCF or o f the PCV?,’ he
30 Ibid., Rylski letter of 30 Jan. 1930, p. 803.
31 AOM, SPCE 367, Declaration de Duong Hac Dinh, arrested June 1930, p. 38. Whether Dinh was a 
French informer prior to his arrest in early June 1930, as claimed by Huynh Kim Khanh, {Vietnamese 
Communism, p. 117, n. 49) is unproven by the documents I have had access to; it is equally possible 
that he was an ICP-faction spy within the China-based group. But it is certain that the Surete in large 
part based their analysis of events within the ACP leadership on his subsequent declaration. The report 
labelled Fusion des Associations Antifrangaises en Indochine et I 'Action Determinante de Nguyen Ai 
Quoc in SPCE 367 is a case in point.
32 AOM, SLOTFOM V, 16; the final numbers 207 and 208 appeared in May 1930.
33 See copy in RC, 495, 154, 610a.
34 AOM, SPCE 367, Duong Hac Dinh, pp. 33, 37. This contradicts the version of events in Nguyen 
Nghia’s first article on the unification, in NCLS 59, 1964, mentioned below.
35 AOM, SPCE 367, Duong Hac Dinh, pp. 40-2.
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asked. And further: ‘Has the mandate which the Comintern gave me been terminated? If 
not, am I a member o f the FEB here?’ He requested a decision from the ECCI.36
Sometime between 6 January and 8 February 1930 the process known as the ‘Unification 
Conference’ took place. In his 18 February 1930 report (in English) to the Comintern, 
Quoc gives a typically laconic description o f his actions: ‘...I  called out representatives of 
the two factions (Dongzuong (sic) [ICP] and Annam). We met on January 6. As envoy of 
the Komintem with full power to decide all questions regarding Revolutionary movement 
in Indochina, I told them where they were wrong, and what they must do. They agreed 
then to unite into one party. Together we fixed up programme and strategy, following the 
Komintem line.’37 He noted that a Provisional Central Committee of seven full members 
and seven candidate members would be formed. The representatives returned to Vietnam 
on 8 February, he claimed.38 Quoc sent the FEB an English translation o f his ‘Appeal to 
workers, peasants, soldiers, youth, students, oppressed brothers, sisters and Comrades’, 
which proclaimed the founding o f the VCP. The appeal was due to be distributed around 
20 March, when the Central Committee would be organized.39
On the issue o f Vietnam’s place in the communist hierarchy, Quoc appears to have made a 
diplomatic compromise. He explained: ‘The Singapore section has written to us that, the 
Annam CP will be under the direction o f Singapore. But considering geographical 
situation (Russia -  China -  Annam) as well as political situation (Party more strong, 
industries more developed in Tonkin than in Cochinchina) - 1 propose that, the An. CP 
shall be directed from Shanghai via Hong Kong. However, the An. CP must be in close 
touch with Singapore. For that reason, I ask the Chinese CP a letter of introduction, so that 
we may send an Annamese comrade to work with Singapore.’ 40 Quoc was thus signalling 
that he was willing to cooperate with the new federation being organized in Singapore, but 
that the Vietnamese party would be directly linked to the Comintern via the FEB. His 
preference for working through Shanghai should not be interpreted as a Chinese 
orientation, but rather as a refusal to be subordinated to the CCP. The new party was 
named the "Dang Cong San Viet Nam" (Vietnamese CP), which Quoc referred to in his 
English text as the Annam CP.
36 RC, 495, 154, 615, p. 34b, letter in French seems to be dated 27 Feb. 1930, but the day is unclear.
37 RC, 495, 154, 615, p. 5.
38 Ibid.,., p. 5-b.
39 Ibid., pp. 10-12b; p. 5b.
40 ibid., p. 8
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Hanoi’s official version o f the conference is that recorded by Nguyen Thieu, one o f the 
ACP faction delegates.41 In his account the conference occurred between 3 and 7 February. 
The two delegates from the ICP faction were Nguyen Due Canh and Trinh Dinh Cuu, both 
members o f the original ICP cell. A letter from the ICP faction to its members in Saigon 
dated 7 January indicates that the two delegates summoned by the International were due to 
depart for Hong Kong around the 17 or 18 o f January 42 Thus Nguyen Ai Quoc may have 
been referring to the lunar calendar when he wrote to the Comintern that the meeting began 
6 January -  that would have made it 4 February by the western calendar.43 Another 
possibility is that the meeting occurred in two or more stages, with a preliminary meeting 
held 6 January, followed by consultations with the FEB and ICP members in Tonkin, and 
then a final meeting between 3 and 7 February. To complicate this already confusing 
picture, a Chinese account o f the Unification Conference claims that Nguyen Ai Quoc was 
not present at the opening o f the conference, as the meeting was too Targe’ [apparently 
meaning too public], but that it was held under Quoc’s ‘direct leadership’.44 It is difficult 
to say what meeting this description would refer to, however, as all the other accounts of 
the conference describe it as an intimate affair.
The exact date o f the Unification Conference would be unimportant, were it not for the 
hints o f continued competition within the new party’s leadership which can be found in the 
French archives and even in Nguyen Thieu’s second article on the party’s founding.45 As it 
is, the confusion over dates reinforces the impression that there were still conflicting lines 
o f command in the Vietnamese CP after 8 February 1930. The Conference in the end 
provided the framework for unification of the feuding Vietnamese factions, but did not by 
any means complete the process. The short programme which Nguyen Ai Quoc put 
together for the new party is not very different from the 8-point programme for the colonies 
which Bukharin produced for the Sixth Comintern Congress. Quoc clearly had not given 
up on the united front tactic, for he did not condemn the bourgeoisie as a whole. His 
programme called for ‘the overthrow of French imperialism, feudalism and the counter­
revolutionary bourgeoisie’; the complete independence of Vietnam; a worker-peasant- 
soldier government; the confiscation of banks and other means o f production in the hands 
o f the imperialists; confiscation of all plantations and land holdings o f the imperialists and
41 Nguyen Nghia, ‘Cong cuo.c hop nhat cac to chuc cong san dau tien o Viet Nam va vai tro cua dong
chi Nguyen Ai Quoc’ [The Unification of the First Vietnamese Communist Groups and the Role of
Nguyen Ai Quoc], NCLS 59, 1964.
42 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 129, Associations Secretes, notes from Annexe N.I a la lettre N. 895/SG , 12
Feb., 1930.
43 See Ralph Smith, op.cit, p. 769.
44 Hoang Tranh, op. cit,, p. 80.
45 Nguyen Nghia, in NCLS, 62, 5- 1964, cited below.
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t
the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, to divide them among the poor peasants; an 8-hour 
work day; the abolition o f national loans, personal taxes and tax exemption for the poor; 
civil liberties; public education; and egality between men and women.46 The policy on land 
confiscation appears identical to that established by the Chinese GMD’s Central Land 
Committee at meetings between 19 April and 6 May 1927.47 Thus the programme as a 
whole would not be acceptable to the post-Tenth Plenum Comintern and bore little 
resemblance to the Moscow instructions drawn up the previous autumn. It would be 
replaced by a new programme and a long set o f theses at the party’s first plenum in 
October 1930. This would mark the real beginning of the party’s allegiance to the current 
Comintern line, as it had evolved between the summer o f 1928 and m id-1929.
In spite of Quoc’s apparent authority, the ICP faction appears to have played the 
predominant role in the new Vietnamese party in the first months after the unification.48 
Until his arrest at the end o f May 1930, Ngo Gia Tu would retain a strong hold on the 
Saigon party structures, as head o f a Provisional Exective Committee (Ban Lam Thoi chap 
uy) for the south. The two ICP faction members at the unification conference were given 
responsibility for work in North and Central Vietnam.49 A marked federalism in the party’s 
organization seems to have existed in the first half o f 1930: Nguyen Van Loi, who was 
elected to the southern Provisional Executive Committee by the remains o f the Tan Viet 
party, later told the Surete that ‘standing central committees’ (trung uong thuong vu), 
which met regularly in the north and center, were empowered to take decisions which had 
to be implemented in Cochinchina.50 The Provisional Central Committee formed in early 
March contained five ICP members, as opposed to one from the ACP and one from the old 
Tan Viet. The original group o f CC members was never able to meet, however. The 
members o f the Provisional Standing Committee based in the north were all ICP faction 
members: Trinh Dinh Cuu, Nguyen Hoi and Tran Van Lan.51 Some of the new party’s 
members may have harboured doubts about the need for unification. Nguyen Due Canh, 
for example, is said to have turned down a place in the Provisional Central Committee, in 
favour o f continuing his work in the Executive Committee of the Bac Ky General Labour
46 RC, 495, 154, 615, p. 35b; Letter to Bureau Francais a 1’I.C., signed ‘pour la Comintern et le PCV, 
Nguyen Ai Quoc. The list of ‘mots d’ordre’ is cited on the final page.
47 Galbiati, op. cit., p. 256.
48 See Ralph Smith, op. cit., pp. 799 and 803.
49 Nguyen Nghia, ‘Cong Cuoc Hop Nhat Cac To Chuc Cong San o Trong Nuoc’, [‘The Unification of 
Communist Organizations within the Country’], NCLS, 62, 5-1964, p. 54.
50 AOM, SPCE 371, Declaration ofNguyen Van Loi, 18 Jan. 1932. Loi, one of the first Thanh Nien 
trainees to work in the South, did not declare that he had been to Canton for training, and may have left 
out other important details about the party.
51 Nguyen Ba Linh, ‘Tim Hieu them ve Hoi Nghi Trung Uong Dang Thang 10 1930’ [‘A Further Look 
at the Central Committee Plenum of October 1930’], NCLS, no. 4, 1992, p. 1.
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Union, a structure which may well have been affiliated with the Nanyang Federation of 
Labour Unions.52 Overall, one receives the impression that the different committee 
structures were being used in a competition for power.
3. The New Year’s Uprisings
The first stirrings o f revolt in 1930 were already in their final planning stages by the time 
the VCP was formed. The Comintern showed no sign o f advance knowledge o f these 
events, but the CCP and the Vietnamese seem to have been working in line with the a 
common timetable. The strike at the Phu Rieng rubber plantation in western Cochinchina, 
from the 3 to 7 February, may in fact have been part o f a 1930 ‘Tet Offensive’. One o f the 
organizers, ICP member Tran Tu Binh, relates in his memoir The Red Earth that the strike 
actually began on 30 January, the first day o f the lunar New Year, when 5,000 workers 
gathered at the plantation manager’s compound to watch a dragon dance and present their 
demands for better working conditions.53 The strike appears to have been entirely an ICP 
initiative, overseen by Ngo Gia Tu in Saigon and activists from Tonkin, where the labour 
force had been recruited.
On 2 February, just north o f the Vietnamese border in Guangxi province, the Longzhou 
Soviet and the Chinese Eighth Red Army were formed. According to official CCP records, 
the Soviet covered eight districts around Pingxiang and Longzhou and survived for about 
six months. It reportedly was sparked off by an uprising o f GMD troops in Nanning and 
followed Deng Xiaoping’s establishment of a revolutionary base in Bose (Pai-se) in 
December. The Longzhou uprising was led by a communist, Yu Zuoyu, on the staff of 
warlord Li Mingrui’s Nanning-based forces.54
There is no direct evidence o f a Vietnamese role in creating this Soviet, but it would be 
surprising if  the Vietnamese communists settled in Guangxi had not been involved. This 
was an area which the French considered to be in their zone o f influence, and in fact 
bombing by their warplanes helped to destroy the soviet before long. A number o f 
Vietnamese communists were living in Longzhou, including two drivers on the staff of the 
provincial government, Le Quang Dat later told the French.55 Le Hong Son was thought to 
enjoy the support of the governor, Yu Zuobo, cousin of Yu Zuoyu and one o f the warlords
52 Nhung Nguoi Cong San, p. 97.
53 Tran Tu Binh, The Red Earth, trans. John Spragens, (Athens, Ohio: Univ. of Ohio Center for
Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), p. 67.
54 Klein and Clark, Vol. I, p. 74.
55 AOM, SPCE 367, Declaration de Le Quang Dat.
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with whom the CCP was cooperating in 1929.36 Nguyen Ai Quoc claimed in his 18 
February 1930 report that five Vietnamese ‘comrades’ working in Guangxi had recently 
been arrested .57 In the same report he said that the ‘anti-imperialist section’ of the newly- 
formed party would have to ‘do their best to enlarge the Guangxi Soviet influence’.58 In 
May the final issue of the newspaper Thanh Nien commented that ‘we must protest against 
the sending o f French imperialist troops to the Sino-Vietnamese border to destroy the 
Longzhou Soviet government’.59 Irrespective o f the political identity and numbers of 
Vietnamese involved in the organization o f the Soviet, the VCP rallied behind it.
The abortive Yen Bay mutiny o f 9-10 February, planned between September 1929 and 
January 1930, although organized by the VNQDD, may also have had some connection to 
the other lunar New Year actions. Envisaged as a ‘general uprising’ during which large 
towns and French military installations would be attacked,60 the uprising would have been 
a useful diversion of French troops from Longzhou. As we have seen, the ICP faction had 
stated its intention o f working through the VNQDD as late as 7 January 1930. Nguyen Ai 
Quoc also informed the FEB in his 18 February letter that the ‘left faction’ o f  the VNQDD 
‘is in close relation with us;’ at the same time he noted that its right wing was inclined to 
putchism.61 A key element o f the mutiny, which was not organized in time, was to have 
been an attack from Yunnan down the Red River Valley. (Later in 1930 the French consul 
in Yunnan informed the British that among the VNQDD members in the province, were a 
‘considerable number o f communists, o f whom many are now in the Chinese military 
academy.’62) A group in Macao called ‘The Executive Council of the Association o f 
Revolutionary Soldiers and Sailors’ was quick to produce a tract in support of the Yen Bay 
mutiny. In Hong Kong the French confiscated copies of this leaflet (dated 17 February
1930) addressed to the sailors o f the battleship Waldeck Rousseau, urging them to support
‘the revolutionary uprising of the Vietnamese’. The Vietnamese were ‘rising up heroically 
in Hanoi, Yen Bay and Hong Hoa (sic), e tc ...., the insurrection o f the Vietnamese people 
should be supported and aided by the workers o f France’.63 The French assumed that this 
tract was connected to the Thanh Nien organization, but it may equally well have been 
produced by the ICP faction or the VNQDD. The Yen Bay revolt was later criticized by 
the Vietnamese communists, but it was still viewed as a heroic uprising which lit a
56 Contribution, vol. IV, p. 19.
57 RC, 495, 154, 615, pp. 9-9b.
58 RC, 495, 154, 615, p. 5b.
59 AOM, SLOTFOM V, 16; translated French extracts from no. 208 are not dated, but issue 207 is
dated 5 May 1930.
60 Hoang van Dao, Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang, (Saigon: Giang Dong, 1965), pp. 78-80.
61 RC, 495, 154, 615, p. 7.
62 PRO, FO 371, 14743, p. 404: letter from British Consulate Gen., Yunnanfou, 19 May 1930 to FO.
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revolutionary fuse in 1930. French repression of the VNQDD uprising, which involved the 
destruction of whole villages which had shown support for the rebels, may have curtailed 
the development of communist activities in the Tonkin countryside later in 1930.
4. New Assignments
On 13 February Nguyen Ai Quoc left Hong Kong for Shanghai, where he wrote out by 
hand, in English, his account o f his doings since his arrival in Siam in 1928. The report 
reveals a preoccupation with relations with the CCP. He discusses not only connections 
with the Singapore section, but also mentions that he has asked the CCP for a letter with 
addresses o f some leading comrades (Chinese) in Siam, in order that Annam comrades in 
that country can work with Ch. (sic) comrades.’ He also says that he has asked the CCP to 
‘send some leading comrades’ to Saigon, where he notes that there are around 200 Chinese 
comrades, but who are lacking an able leader. He suggests that a bureau be created, with 
one or more representatives from each side, to coordinate the work o f the two parties when 
the interests o f the Chinese and Annamese masses are involved.64 At the time, he was 
planning to go on to Vladivostok to meet his correspondent, who remains unidentified. His 
report (dated 18 February) shows that he had not yet met Tran Phu. He wrote that he had 
had no news from the French and ‘the two Annam comrades’ at that point. I have found no 
proof that he actually went on to Vladivostok after writing this report.
Vladivostok had become the site o f a short-term training school established for Chinese 
party members to update their communist knowledge and technique. The CCP CC had 
suggested in May 1929 that such a training facility be set up, because they could not spare 
the cadres or the workers whom the Comintern wanted to train in Moscow. The Chinese 
saw it as a place to develop ‘those elements from the intelligentsia and peasantry, who had 
attained military experience in the red armed forces and who had fled after the defeat at 
Hai-lu-feng.’65 Several Chinese-speaking Vietnamese including Le Quang Dat, Ho Tung 
Mau and his wife Ly Phuong Thuan are believed to have travelled there in 1930 to attend a 
three-month propaganda course.66 By 1930 the Pan Pacific Trade Union also had a full­
time secretariat there.67 But Nguyen Ai Quoc may have been exempted from this retraining 
and prevented altogether from going to Vladivostok, as he was pulled into service by the
63 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 117, annexe 3 a la transmission no. 1965, 27 March 1930.
64 RC, 495, 154, 615, pp. 8-8b.
65 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part I, p. 555, letter from CCP CC to Eastern Secretariat, 6 May
1929.
66 AOM, SPCE 384, Pinot interview with the ‘Director’, 22-23 Feb. 1930.
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FEB in Shanghai. They reported on 3 March that Quoc had appeared, £a few days ago’. 
‘We are enclosing his letter, in which he relates everything which he has reported to us 
orally. We have decided to use him for liaison work and have given him several 
assignments regarding organization and the continuation of work in-country,’ they 
explained. The reason he was put to work in this ad-hoc way may be the fact that-Thibault 
had disappeared. Moreover, neither Rylski, who had already departed for Moscow, nor 
Eisler spoke Chinese. So Quoc could have served as a much-needed linguistic go-between 
and perhaps as a source of information about Chinese politics. The FEB did not mention in 
this letter that Quoc was being made head o f a Southern Bureau (it is unclear whether he 
ever had such a precise title), or that he was being sent to the Malayan party conference due 
to be held in Singapore in mid-April. They noted that one Chinese comrade would attend 
this conference, ‘with instructions from us’.68 It was only in May that they would reveal 
that they had sent Quoc to Singapore to the MCP conference.
Quoc returned to Hong Kong by mid-March, where he finally made contact with, first, 
Tran Phu and then Ngo Due Tri. After landing briefly in Saigon, Tran Phu had gone ahead 
to Hong Kong so that he could meet Thibault. Tri waited in Saigon three weeks without 
news, and then decided to sail to Hong Kong to find Tran Phu. Before leaving, however, 
he met Bui Lam, a fellow Moscow trainee who had just returned from Paris on 9 March. 
Bui Lam was carrying a set o f instructions entitled ‘ The Immediate Tasks o f  the 
Indochinese communists ', which had been translated into French in Paris. (Tri does not 
explain whether this was a version of the letter he had brought from Berlin, or whether it 
was an additional or more complete set o f instructions.) In early March Tri sailed to Hong 
Kong, where he eventually tracked down Tran Phu at the YMCA. Tran Phu had missed his 
appointments with Thibault, and had been unable to proceed to Haiphong because o f the 
French crackdown following the Yen Bay mutiny. He had not met Nguyen Ai Quoc until 
the latter returned from Shanghai in March. He told Tri about his meeting with Quoc and 
news o f the communist party’s unification in January. ‘We had nothing more to do but 
return to begin our work, given that Nguyen Ai Quoc was in charge o f relations with the 
Comintern,’ Tri told the French.69
Quoc later met Ngo Due Tri and explained that, ‘at the end of 1927 I received an order 
from the Comintern to make propaganda for the formation of an Indochinese communist
67 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 127, folder on ‘Bureau d Extreme Orient et SyndicatPan-pacifique 1929-
1933.
68 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part II, pp. 822-3, unsigned letter of 3 March 1930 to ECCI. The
Chinese comrade is identified in a contemporary footnote as Fu Da-tsin, Fu Ta Ching.
69 AOM, SPCE 367, Ngo Due Tri; note that here the party unification is again dated in January.
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party. I was ill in Siam for more than a year and was not able to undertake anything.’
Quoc then described the unification and said the FEB had given its approval. ‘After the 
fusion,’ he concluded, ‘all the Chinese communists living in Indochina would join the 
Indochinese communist party.’70 At this point, Quoc had enough authority to assign Ngo 
Due Tri to return to Saigon, while Tran Phu was sent to work in Hanoi. Tri’s declaration 
reveals nothing more of Quoc’s instructions or his own plans.
Back in Saigon by early April 1930,71 Ngo Due Tri was taken to meet Ngo Gia Tu. Tu 
assigned him to work on propaganda, but failed to give him any concrete tasks. He 
announced that, for the time being, ‘we are still too occupied by a number o f things which 
have not been finished.. . After that Tri was brought to Cholon to stay in the house which 
served as the office o f the communist cell of the Cholon power station. He was not invited 
to join in the cell meetings, and no position was offered to him other than as translator of 
the ‘Resolution’ he had brought from Berlin, as well as o f the letter carried by Bui Lam. 
Towards the end o f April, Tri was told that he would be producing propaganda for a strike 
in the towns and country. But only after the May Day strike at the electrical plant and a 
move to a new lodging, was he put in charge o f the paper Red Flag. Only after Ngo Gia 
Tu’s arrest at the end o f May was Ngo Due Tri invited to join the southern Provisional 
Executive Committee, and then the Central Committee itself.
The important role assigned to Ngo Gia Tu in this account is underscored by the 
description given by Nguyen Nghia (Nguyen Thieu) in the second part of his memoir on 
the unification process. Nghia’s memoir explains that the two communist groups in the 
south had selected two workers to serve on the Provisional Central Committee: Sau (Hoang 
Quoc Viet) and Lo (Pham Huu Lau).72 Yet he describes Ngo Gia Tu, who was chosen head 
o f the southern Provisional Executive Committee, as the chief decision-maker. It was Ngo 
Gia Tu who assigned work in the provinces to Nghia and Chau Van Liem, the two 
delegates from the Unification Conference sent by Nguyen Ai Quoc to oversee the party’s 
creation in the south, in the name o f the Comintern.73 Thus, as in China, the Comintern's 
power appears to have been much weaker on the ground than its staff in Moscow supposed.
70 Ibid.
71 Tri says he left Hong Kong in June 1930, but this appears impossible,, as he worked for a time with 
Ngo Gia Tu in Saigon, who was arrested at the end of May; in fact just a few lines later Tri gives the 
date as the beginning of April.
72 Pham Huu Lau was from a peasant family in Ho a An village, Cao Lanh, where Nguyen Ai Quoc’s 
father had been living at the time of his death. See Ngiiyen Sinh Huy, p. 160,168.
73 Nguyen Nghia, NCLS n. 62., p. 58.
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Nguyen Nghia’s article also raises the problem o f assimilating Chinese party members into 
the Vietnamese party. As Nghia points out, the Chinese group in Cochinchina was larger 
than either of the Vietnamese communist factions there, with many experienced activists 
who had fled Guangdong after the Canton Commune. They were unenthusiastic about 
delegating members to join the new Vietnamese party’s Central Committee, for a variety of 
reasons: they claimed that the Chinese lacked legal papers, were not familiar with the 
political situation, or did not speak the language. They preferred to select someone to serve 
on the southern Provisional Executive Committee.74 Eventually, another Hanoi source 
says, two Chinese comrades were selected to the central body: Luu Lap Dao (A Lau) and A 
Duyen (Duy).75
It is not surprising that the Chinese were slow to join the new party, given that it was not to 
be a sub-branch o f  the CCP’s Central Committee. As Ngo Due Tri reported to the French, 
the tension over the new party’s alignment continued in the spring. He learned from Ngo 
Gia Tu that a Chinese delegate from the FEB had passed through Saigon on his way to 
Singapore from Shanghai. The delegate showed his disapproval o f the Vietnamese party’s 
direct links to the FEB, and remarked that the Indochinese communists should be 
answerable to the ‘Secretariat of the Federation o f Communist Groups o f Indonesia’ 
(apparently meaning the Singapore-based Federation or League). The Surete believed that 
in April a meeting was held in Saigon with ‘a Chinese inspector from the FEB’ who was 
coming from Siam and who had not learned of the ‘independence given to the Vietnamese 
party by the FEB’. He held a meeting to unite the Chinese and Vietnamese communists on 
the 19th of that month.76 The CCP thus does not appear to have been enthusiatic about the 
loss o f authority over a Southeast Asian party.
5. The Revolutionary Upsurge in China and the Nanyang
As the Vietnamese communists were organizing their new structures, Li Lisan was 
pushing the CCP towards the crest o f the new revolutionary wave. On 26 February 1930 
he issued his Circular No. 70, which is considered ‘the first clear and unconcealed 
formulation of what was soon to be called the “Li Lisan Line’” .77 The circular claimed that 
as the ‘new revolutionary wave is developing forward’ and that as the ‘warlord war’ 
continued to expand, the objective basis was being created for the development of a ‘new 
revolutionary hightide’. Li maintained that ‘nationwide mass struggle’ was developing
74 Ibid., p. 57.
75 Nguyen Ba Linh, op. cit., p. 1.
76 AOM, SPCE 367, Historique du PCA, p. 11.
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evenly and that party organization in urban areas was recovering from the setbacks of 
1927. His strategy was one o f ‘concentration and attack’ to win an initial victory in one or 
more provinces. This would be achieved by organizing ‘an all industry general strike’, 
supporting and penetrating the peasants’ struggle for land, and organizing troop rebellions 
among the warlord armies. Li included a warning against ‘rightists and liquidationists’ 
who, he cautioned, would criticize the ‘party’s political line as putchism’.78
In early March the Guangdong Province Committee o f the CCP held a conference in 
Shanghai, to avoid the Nanking [Nanjing] spies and ‘Reorganizers’ in Hong Kong.79 
Around that time an ‘action committee’ was established in Shanghai by Li Lisan’s deputy 
Luo Mei (Li Weihan), in an effort to neutralize the still-recalcitrant Jiangsu provincial 
organization.80 On 15 March the Nanyang Provisional Committee also met, most likely in 
Shanghai, as a meeting o f the Federation o f the Oppressed Peoples o f the East occurred in 
Shanghai around the same time, and many o f the participants would have been at both 
meetings. At this gathering a resolution in support o f the ECCI’s Tenth Plenum was 
passed. This resolution, which emphasizes the CCP’s adherence to the Comintern line, was 
in part an answer to the FEB's October 1929 criticisms. It reads: ‘... the Executive 
Committee recognized that the line and resolution o f the Plenum [Tenth ECCI] fully 
answer the demands o f the leadership of the Revolution in China and in Nanyang, and 
especially the state o f the struggle with the right deviation, liquidators, appeasers and 
opportunists . . . ’.81 The Nanyang Committee's resolution rejected the criticism made by 
Chen Duxiu and others who ‘consider that the present struggle of the Chinese masses is 
the “opposite o f a revolutionary upsurge”.’82 The document states: ‘the transition from a 
general workers’ strike in Nanyang to a general political strike is a pressing question for 
the workers’ movement at the present time.’83 This meeting may have been an occasion for 
Li Lisan’s supporters to propagate his newly-articulated policy.
c
A Surete report shows that the day after this resolution was passed the Communist Youth 
League (CYL) held a meeting in Shanghai.84 This report demonstrates the increasing 
involvement o f the CCP in the affairs of other Asian parties. At this gathering the
77 Richard Thornton, op.cit., p. 111.
781 am relying on Richard Thornton for this summary of Central Circular no. 70, ‘ Chung yang tung
kao ti ch ’i shih hao Thornton, op. cit., pp.. 111-114.
79 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part II, p. 821, letter of 3 March 1930.
80 Thornton, op. cit., pp. 117-8.
81 RC, 495, 62, 1, p. 28., Resolution on the X Plenum of ECCI, ‘Passed by Nanyang Provisional
Committee’, 15 March 1930.
82 Ibid., p. 32.
83 Ibid. p. 33.
84 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 129, letter of 13 April 1930 from Gov. Gen. to Minister of Colonies.
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Formosan Lee Nan Mow announced that, on instructions from the CC o f the CCP, the 
Youth League had been assigned to support ‘by all possible means’ the revolutionary 
movement in the Indies, in Indochina and in Korea. The Korean and Indian participants 
noted that although their movements had recently made progress, it would nevertheless be 
difficult to continue the struggle without the support o f the ‘great fraternal Chinese party’. 
The meeting agreed to request that the Chinese CC send to the countries in question young 
Chinese propagandists and revolutionary cadres, who would be provided with arms, money 
and propaganda. The contact point for Indochina would be Canton. At the close of the 
meeting, the chairman announced that ‘the local office o f the GMD had promised to 
support the revolutionary movement in the Indies, Indonesia and Korea, independently of 
the policy of the Central Government.’ This seems to be a sign that the GMD left-wing was 
still engaged in some level of cooperation with the CCP in the spring o f 1930.
Although the discussions recorded by the Surete source make no direct reference to the 
Secretariat of the Communist Federation of the Oppressed Peoples of the Far East, their 
report cited above notes that this meeting o f the CYL confirmed the existence o f such a 
secretariat. This meeting may have been a gathering of the CYL's Anti-imperialist 
League, which had been created as a front for their ‘legal and semi-legal’ activities. The 
FEB noted in a May 1930 letter that at the start o f 1930 there had been three different 
Anti-imperialist Leagues in China -  ‘the best and the most popular’ of these was that o f the 
CYL, the letter observed. (One o f the three, the ‘Far Eastern’ League, organized by the 
CCP they said, had been wound up, as it was nothing more than ‘an apparat’.) The FEB 
apparently encouraged the CCP to work with what they called the ‘Chinese Anti­
imperialist League’ based in Tianjin.85 Behind these mild observations, there seems to lie a 
hidden drama, but it is only through the French sources that we get some hint o f what had 
occurred.
The final issue o f Thanh Nien in May 1930 reported that a new Anti-imperialist League of 
the East had been started, ‘to denounce the lies and tricks o f the nationalist Chinese 
party ... ’. Its first meeting in April 1930 had been attended by delegates from India, Korea, 
Java, Formosa, Indochina, China and other eastern countries. This report refers to the 1928 
creation o f the League o f  the Oppressed Peoples o f the East as ‘a subterfuge to separate 
Asian revolutionaries from the Comintern’.86 Possibly Nguyen Ai Quoc attended this April 
meeting. By this stage, Russian scholars believe that the FEB was having difficulty in
85 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part II, letter to Eastern Secretariat from FEB, 18 May 1930, p. 885.
86 AOM, SLOTFOM V, 16, Thanh Nien, no. 208.
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getting information about what was happening within the CCP; at the same time, they say, 
the fear o f being accused o f rightist errors was making the FEB staff ‘extremely cautious’ 
about reporting on or criticizing what they regarded as leftist tendencies in CCP policies.87 
That may be why the FEB staff played down their effort to get the CCP to close down or 
disassociate itself from one of the Anti-Imperialist Leagues, apparently the one founded in 
July-August 1928. As we have seen, the origins o f this organization seem to lie in some 
sort o f cooperation between the Left GMD/Third Party movement and the CCP.
The Surete’s reports from the spring o f 1930 are confusing and at times apparently 
contradictory. On the one hand, in March their detective in Hong Kong, Neron, reported 
that Nguyen Ai Quoc had suffered a considerable loss o f influence with the Comintern 
after Stalin's consolidation o f power.88 However, by September 1930 the Surete had 
produced a new analysis. By then they had come to believe that Nguyen Ai Quoc was the 
Comintern representative who had turned up in December 1929 with the power ‘to 
inspect... the communist organizations in the Far East’.89 This changed view o f Quoc’s 
role may reflect the FEB’s decision in March or April 1930 to take a more active role in 
combatting the influence o f Li Lisan. In fact, it appears that Nguyen Ai Quoc took over 
some o f the tasks which had been assigned to Thibault, the Comintern inspector (who as 
noted above was referred to by the FEB as ‘the comrade for Indonesia’) when the latter 
failed to return to Shanghai from his trip to Indochina. But Quoc’s authority, according to 
the Russian documents, seems to have been delegated by the FEB in Shanghai between 
March and April 1930 and was probably not as sweeping as that given to Thibault.
By April 1930 relations between the FEB and Li Lisan had come close to the breaking 
point. On 17 April Li wrote to Zhou Enlai and Qu Quibai (then in Moscow) to suggest 
that the Comintern reorganize the FEB. He believed that the FEB's mistakes were o f a 
'dangerous, rightist character’and that they were ‘politically in no condition to lead’.90 Li 
apparently believed that he would receive Stalin's or M if  s backing in this dispute. While 
Moscow delayed giving a clear sign o f approval or disapproval regarding the FEB, Li 
proceeded with plans for a general uprising. It was in this context that the FEB decided to 
use Nguyen Ai Quoc as an emissary to Siam and Malaya, to help the local communists 
establish national parties. The haste to set up these parties to replace the branches o f the 
Nanyang Provisional Committee could in part have arisen from the FEB’s desire to limit Li
87 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part I, p. 488, Introduction to Section 2.
88 AOM, SPCE 368, correspondance 1930, Note conf. no. 1725, S.G., Hanoi, 17 March 1930.
89 AOM, SPCE 368, 5220 S.G., 18 Sept. 1930, report on Nguyen Ai Quoc signed Neron.
90 Comintern and China, Li Lisan letter of 17 April 1930, p. 866.
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Lisan’s and the Chinese CC’s influence.91 It was only after the fact, in a letter of 18 May 
1930, that Eisler and Bespalov informed the Eastern Secretariat that they had sent Quoc to 
Singapore to the Malayan party conference, and also assigned him the task o f selecting 
Malayan delegates to the coming Fifth Profintern Congress in Moscow. They reported in 
the same letter that the French comrade who had gone to Indochina had still not been 
found, even though the Vietnamese communists were searching for his trace.92 This letter 
makes no mention of Quoc’s role in Siam.
The exact dates o f Quoc’s travel are difficult to establish. Hoang Van Hoan states that 
Quoc arrived in Bangkok around the end o f March 1930. After holding discussions with 
the Chinese comrades in Bangkok, he proceeded to Udon to explain the Comintern’s 
policy to the Vietnamese residents there, according to Hoan’s account. With the formation 
o f a Siamese CP, the Vietnamese communists would be expected to become members 
instead of joining the Vietnamese CP. The same principle would apply to Chinese 
residents of Siam. Hoan says that after the Udon meeting Quoc returned to Bangkok to 
oversee the formation o f the Siamese party on 20 April.93
A report sent to Moscow by the Siamese party in 1935, however, gives a somewhat 
different chronology.94 This document says it was in June 1930 that the Eastern 
Secretariat sent a delegate to Siam, who urged the Siam Committee (composed exclusively 
o f Chinese members) to join the Vietnamese in the northeast of the country to form one 
party. The British found a passport bearing Quoc’s picture, issued in the name o f Sung 
Man Sho, when they arrested him June 1931. It had been granted for six months on 28 
April 1930, by the Consul General o f the National Government of China in the Straits 
Settlements. It stated that he was a citizen of the Republic o f China proceeding to Siam on 
business.95 So it appears that at the end o f May Quoc did travel to Bangkok, after 
attending the Third Delegate Conference o f the Malayan Provisional Committee in 
Singapore. But it was not until September 1930, when Quoc had returned to Hong Kong, 
that the unification o f the Siam party was completed, with two Vietnamese joining the 
Siam Central Committee. Thus Nguyen Ai Quoc may have visited Siam as early as April 
1930, as Hoang Van Hoan claims, but if  he did so his visit did not coincide with the 
founding o f a unified Siam CP.
91 Charles McLane suggests this idea in Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, p. 133.
92 Comintern and China, Vol III, part 2, letter of 18 May 1930, pp. 884-885.
93 Hoang van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 52-55.
94 RC, 495, 16, 51, report on General Situation in Siam, pp. 66-68, original in Chinese.
95 AOM, SPCE 365, folder ‘Arrestation de Nguyen At Quoc'.
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The Third Delegate Conference of the Nanyang Provisional Committee was apparently due 
to be held to coincide with the 1 May observances in Singapore. However, as a letter 
addressed to the ‘English Komparty’ in London explains, at a 29 April meeting held to 
prepare for May Day, all eleven people in attendance were arrested, including the secretary 
o f the party, the Labour Union secretary and a member of the Central Committee. This 
letter says that on 21 May the ‘Conference was called’, and that the Malay Communist 
Party was organised on 24 May.96 The meeting was attended by eleven delegates, not 
including the CC members and the representative of the FEB. The ten-page conference 
report which Nguyen Ai Quoc seems to have authored97 demonstrates that the FEB was 
now moving to curb the influence of Li Lisan and the Chinese CC in the Nanyang. This 
report accuses the Nanyang Committee of the error of putschism and an irresponsible 
attitude toward the staging of insurrections.
After listing the ‘Ten Big Demands o f the Malay (sic) Revolution’, the report launched 
into a long list o f ‘Mistakes and Lessons from the Work done’. The first mistake was ‘to 
conduct the Chinese revolution in M alaya’: ‘the work was conducted in accordance with 
the political line of the Chinese Party, apart from the practical life of Malaya, and 
overlooked the fundamental tasks o f Malay revolution,’ it said. The party had neglected 
work among peasants and soldiers as well. ‘The development o f organization was not only 
directed towards Chinese people but towards one part of Chinese people (natives o f 
Kwangchow, Kwangtung) . . it went on. Under the heading, ‘Mistake o f putchism’, the 
report gave a list of errors. These included ‘commandism and compulsion o f strike’; 
‘disregard to insurrection and individual terror (the Malay party in part compelled the 
striking workers to play the insurrection as a joke. This is an unforgivable mistake)’;
‘firing o f factories and confiscation of property of factory owners’; and ‘to bring out the 
slogan: seizure o f power and establishment of soviet’. The author expanded on the final 
point thus: ‘As the Malay P. was still in beginning o f organisation, lack o f broad masses 
round the party, it is to neglect the forces o f enemies and overestimate our own forces and 
to abandon the general task of the Party, that is, to win over the masses, to organise masses 
and finally to prepare the armed insurrection, if we set up the slogan: seizure of power and 
establishment o f Soviet.’ 98 A final point described the ‘connection between the Malay p. 
and brotherhood [NAQ’s translation of ‘fraternal’] parties’. This drove home the fact that
96 RC, 495, 62, 6, p. 1, report of 1 June 1930 to the ‘English Komparty, London’.
97 RC, 495, 62, 3, pp. 1-10. Quoc did not sign the reports which he sent to the FEB on the Malayan CP, 
but in one of them he inserts a ‘note from V.’ (Victor), which was how he signed his Hong Kong 
letters to the FEB. The typing and English of the letters on Malaya get a bit erratic when he is in a 
rush, creating the impression of rapid, almost slapdash, execution which is often present in his letters 
on Vietnam, especially in the spring of 1931.
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the CCP did not have the exclusive right to direct the Malayan party: ‘the Malay parties 
(sic), besides under the direction o f the Comintern, hope the P. o f China, o f G. Britain, of 
Holland and of France give their experiences and instructions from time to time.’99 The 
Police Journal for the Straits Settlements later reported that propaganda and instructions 
from the ‘Central’ in Shanghai ceased in the middle o f-1930, following the third Delegate 
Conference. 100
6. The Revolutionary Wave in Vietnam
The FEB reported on 25 June that they had just learned that Nguyen Ai Quoc would be 
arriving in Shanghai in the coming days, (They were relieved to learn that he had not been 
caught in the Singapore arrests at the end o f April, which they had learned o f from the 
Singapore press.)101 He must have returned to Hong Kong by the middle o f June. He had 
thus missed the first wave o f VCP militancy in 1930: a series o f strikes and demonstrations 
in all three parts o f Vietnam which started in April and led to a large number arrests in 
early May. As we have seen in Cochinchina, these actions, at least in the urban areas, were 
organized largely by the ICP groups which had existed before the Unification Congress. 
Both Ngo Gia Tu and Duong Hac Dinh were picked up in Saigon at the end o f May. Just 
before the May Day events Hoang Quoc Viet was arrested in Haiphong, where he had 
gone to consult with Tran Phu. Many cadres in the northern labour movement joined him 
in prison after May Day.102
This blow to the urban movement refocussed the Vietnamese communists’ attention on the 
rural areas. Ironically, just after Quoc delivered his list o f criticisms o f the Malayan party, 
a group referred to as the ‘Provisional Central Executive Committee’ {Ban Chap Uy Lam 
Thoi Trung Uong) in Hanoi decided to work towards an uprising in Nghe An and Ha Tinh, 
two provinces often referred to collectively as ‘Nghe Tinh’. At a meeting in Hanoi (said by 
one author to have been held in June), Tran Phu, Nguyen The Rue, Tran van Lan, Trinh 
Dinh Cuu and Nguyen Phong Sac (the latter three from the original ICP faction) arrived at 
this decision.103 Nguyen Phong Sac, a former teacher at the Thanh Long school in Hanoi, 
was the cadre who had been assigned to lead the party in Central Vietnam. (His colleague
98 Ibid.., pp. 4-5.
99 Ibid, p. 10.
100 CAOM, GGI, 65560, Police Journal, Straits Settlements, 15 May 1931.
101 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part II, Eisler letter to ECCI, 23-5 June 1930, p. 916.
102 Hoang Quoc Viet, A Heroic People, (Hanoi: FLPH, 1965), pp. 158-9, cited by R. Smith, op.cit., p. 
805.
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from the old Tan Viet party, Le Mao, remained in Nghe An during this meeting.) The 
participants delegated Nguyen Due Canh, formerly based in Haiphong, to work with 
Nguyen Phong Sac in developing the Nghe Tinh movement. Thus the two major party 
figures guiding the Nghe Tinh Soviets were well-educated northerners who had been 
among the leaders o f the ICP faction. In the 1950s and 60s the Vietnamese would glorify 
the role of Le Viet Thuat, a Ben Thuy worker who became head o f the Regional 
Committee in Annam in April 1931.104 However, the Hanoi historian Tran Huy Lieu 
would credit Nguyen Due Canh with the direct leadership of the Nghe Tinh Soviets.105 
Tran Phu, imbued with the Comintern’s radical view of the ‘Third Period’, may have been 
persuaded by his comrades with more recent experience of political work in-country that 
the time was ripe for action. The meeting issued an appeal to the workers, peasants and 
soldiers of Nghe An to continue their resistance struggle and prepare for the imperialist’s 
repression -  the least hesitation would be the equivalent o f helping the imperialists to 
destroy them, it said.106
Nguyen Ai Quoc, who now appeared to have reached the peak o f his authority in the 
Comintern, seems to have returned to Hong Kong to deal with a situation beyond his 
influence. Although Huynh Kim Khanh speculates that Quoc may have played a 
‘considerable role in the conceptualization and direction of the soviet movement’, his basis 
for this view is the doubtful attribution to Quoc of the article on peasant insurrection which 
I discuss in the Introduction.107 Quoc’s letters and reports of 1930-1 do include a 
prescription for work within the military. But the content and style o f the 1928 article on 
military work among the peasants is very different from this 1930 document by Quoc.
The latter is a six page, hand-written essay which seems to post-date Quoc’s June return to 
Hong Kong and Shanghai, as it refers to a demonstration in Cholon province which 
probably occurred in or after the spring o f 1930.108 Headed simply, ‘Military’ this 
document (an English copy) is an attempt to strike a balance between the over-emphasis o f
103 Song Tung, Tran Phu, (Hanoi: NXB Thanh Nien, 1980), p. 142. It is not clear from this source 
whether this was a Bac ky or a national committee; the author says that Tran Phu had been co-opted as 
a member.
104 Guong Chien Dau cua NhungNguoi Cong San, [Exemplary Communist Fighters], (Hanoi: NXB Su 
That, 1959); and Nguyen Duy Trinh, ‘A Highlight of the Movement’, in In theEnemy’s Net, (Hanoi: 
FLPH, 1962), p. 25.
105 Tran Huy Lieu, Cach Mang Can Dai Viet Nam, tap VI, (Hanoi: Ban Nghien Cuu Van Su Dia, 1957, 
pp. 87-8)
Van Kien Dang, 1930-1945, vol. I, pp. 50-52., Appeal dated June 1930.
107 Huynh Kim Khanh, op. cit., pp. 168-9.
108 See Tran Huy Lieu, op. cit., p. 61 on spring demos, in the South; also La Tribune Indochinoise, 30 
May, 4 and 6 June 1930.
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military matters and the neglect o f preparation for a coming armed struggle.109 He states 
clearly: ‘The military task o f the party comprises: military training of the party members; 
agit-prop among the army; organisation of worker’s and peasant’s guards.’ He devotes 
most o f his attention to ‘agit-prop in the army’. The native soldiers are conscripted from 
. the villages and should not be treated as, ‘whole hunting dogs’ of the imperialist, he says. 
At a demonstration in Cholon, he points out, the peasants made the mistake of insulting the 
soldiers instead o f ‘making propaganda to them ’. In agit-prop work, he says, ‘the party 
must propagate the programme “Bourgeois democratic revolution” among the soldiers, and 
utilize national sentiment to make them agree with the revolutionary movement o f the 
workers and peasants and accept the leadership o f the party.’
By June the beleaguered Eisler in Shanghai was failing in his attempts to moderate Li 
Lisan’s policies, in spite of the fact that the M ay Day demonstrations in China had also 
resulted in large numbers o f arrests.110 Nguyen Ai Quoc may have found himself in a 
similar position in relation to his own party, where he apparently did not have a vote in the 
Provisional Central Committee. As a good Bolshevik, however, he had to accept his 
party’s decision to enlarge the Nghe An workers and peasants movement. A 9 June letter 
to the Vietnamese fighting in the Chinese Red Army, to ask that they return to the ‘Annam 
front’, may have been written by him. ‘The work o f the Vietnamese revolution is now our 
work,’ it says; ‘work in China is not our task.’111 However, at the same time Li Lisan was 
pressing the Comintern to send foreign comrades from, ‘ England, France, Japan, India, 
and Indochina’ to carry out propaganda work in China among the foreign sailors posted 
there. He insisted that they work under the direction of the CCP.112 Thus by June several 
Vietnamese had been seconded to work on military propaganda in Shanghai. The ICP 
organizer from Tonkin, Do Ngoc Du alias Phiem Chu, says that Quoc assigned him to go 
to Shanghai in late March, after he had fled from Hanoi. He began editing articles aimed at 
the French military after 14 June 1930, he later told the Surete. Another Vietnamese, Luu 
Quoc Long, was responsible for the printing and distribution o f tracts and articles. The 
French language newspaper L Armee began to appear twice monthly.113 A Vietnamese 
language paper, Giac Ngo (Awakening) was the responsibility of Le Quang Dat (aka Hoang 
Cao), his wife Ly Phuong Due, and Nguyen Luong Bang. Le Quang Dat was in charge of
109 RC, 495, 154, 462, pp. 485-487b; undated, unsigned document, accompanied in the Comintern file 
by a note which reads, ‘documents written by NAQ... Now our party has replaced them with others.’
110 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part II: on May arrests — letter of 18 May 1930, p. 881; on Li 
Lisan’s independent actions -  letter of 20 June 1930, p. 903.
111 RC, 495, 154, 623, p. 5, letter in Vietnamese, signed ‘q’.
112 Comintern and China, vol. Ill, part II, letter to Zhou Enlai and Qu Qiubao from Li Lisan, 17 April
1930.
113 AOM, SPCE 367, Declarations de Do Ngoc Du, 8 October 1931 and following days.
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liaison between the FEB and Hong Kong, as well as for making travel arrangements for 
Vietnamese travelling to and from Moscow.114
French reports describe the interval between 1 June and 30 August 1930 as a period of 
peaceful demonstrations in Vietnam.115 In fact two processes appear-to have been 
underway by June 1930: one was the formation of party structures which would lead to the 
selection of delegates for the plenum due to be held in the autumn; the other was, as noted 
above, the preparation for a second wave of direct action centered in northern Annam. It is 
difficult to say how closely coordinated the two processes actually were. Regarding party 
organization, Ngo Due Tri’s confession gives a picture (lacking for the two other regions of 
Vietnam) o f the restructuring which went on in the south following Ngo Gia Tu’s arrest. 
According to Tri’s account, Ngo Gia Tu’s leadership had not been entirely popular with 
local party members. ‘Since the creation o f the ICP and the Provisional Executive 
Committee all tasks had been decided by the members of this committee, without 
consulting the members o f the cell committees,’ he explained. He added, ‘No reports of 
work carried out were made to the cells, which caused some discontent. ’ Demonstrations 
in May and early June in Sa Dec, Vinh Long, Cholon province and Due Hoa in Gia Dinh 
had resulted in many arrests and the death of Chau Van Liem -  this may have also 
prompted the southern party to reassess its tactics.116 Around 18 June 1930 a meeting of 
the Nam ky Provisional Executive Committee was held, which delegates from other 
localities were invited to attend in order to present their opinions. Ngo Due Tri had joined 
Ung Van Khiem (Huan) and Nguyen Van Son (Dung) on the Committee just before the 
meeting.117 Afterwards he also joined the Provisional Central Committee. Over the 
summer, Tri says, ‘some comrades wanted to start insurrections and commit acts of 
terrorism.’ The Provisional Executive Committee had to summon the members o f the 
provincial committees to explain to them that they had to abandon these plans. The 
Committee instructed the members o f the province committees to explain to the masses 
that assassination is contrary to the fundamental principles o f communism.’ 118 Ngo Due 
Tri may have been trying to absolve himself of responsibility for the violence of 1930-31 in 
this confession, yet a 1931 report which he would send to Moscow confirms that he held a 
low estimation of the results o f the party’s activism, (see note 149)
114 AOM, SPCE 367, Declaration de Le Quang Dat, July 1930.
115Commission Morche, Rapport de la Commission d ’Enquete sur les Evenements du Nord-Annam, 
Part II, p.6; consulted in SO AS library in a version which provides no publishing data.
116 La Tribune Indochinoise, 30 May, 4 and 6 June 1930.
117 In his Siirete declaration (SPCE 371, 18 June 1932) Nguyen Van Loi claims that he was a member
of this committee for a time. It is not clear whether he was, in fact, Nguyen Van Son.
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In North and Central Vietnam, the party seems to have taken a different course. In 
principle Tran Phu gained more control over the party infrastructure when he joined the 
Provisional Central Committee in the summer, after the arrest of Nguyen Hoi. When 
Trinh Dinh Cuu dropped out o f the Standing Committee to join the Bac ky Regional 
Committee, his place also went to Tran Phu,119 But in practice, the northern party 
operated fairly independently, according to later Comintern reports. For example, in an 
undated letter written after 4 April 1931, the FEB instructed that ‘the question o f separatist 
tendencies in the North and Central organizations must be cleared u p ... ’,120 (These 
tendencies seem to have surfaced the previous autumn, as I will discuss below.) After the 
transformation o f the Nanyang Provisional Committee into a group of national communist 
parties, the CCP CC presumably no longer had a formal directing role in Southeast Asia. 
There is at present no way o f knowing whether or to what degree Li Lisan’s timetable for 
China’s ‘revolutionary upsurge’ influenced events in Vietnam. But there does appear to be 
a rough correlation between the periods o f planning and action in the two countries.
In China L i’s planning for the armed uprisings o f August and September 1930 took place 
at a series o f meetings held between early June and 6 August. On 11 June the CCP 
Politburo adopted a resolution which called on the Soviet Union and ‘the labouring masses 
o f the world’ to support the Chinese revolution. It made explicit the idea that the Chinese 
revolution had become the focal point o f the world revolution.121 The communists’ Third 
Army staged a briefly successful attack on Changsha on 28 July. On 6 August Li Lisan’s 
‘Central Action Committee’ called for immediate revolution and uprisings in Wuhan, 
Beijing, Tianjin, Harbin and other cities. (In response, the FEB sent the ECCI a telegram 
dated 4-7 August which requested that Li Lisan be ‘immediately recalled’ to M oscow.)122 
A second attack on Changsha was staged between 24 August and 12 September. During 
this period Moscow maintained a noncommital attitude towards Li’s endeavours, leaving 
the FEB to continue their efforts to curb L i’s adventurism. One o f the new FEB 
representatives, the Profintern representative S. Stolyar, known by the pseudonyms ‘Jack’ 
o r ‘Leon’, wrote to the Profintern chief Lozovsky on 5 August to support Eisler. He 
complained that Li Lisan was mobilizing all responsible comrades against the 
Comintern.123 Interestingly, the revolutionary high-tide which Li Lisan was proclaiming
118 AOM, SPCE, Declarations de Ngo Due Tri.
119 Nguyen Ba Linh, op. cit., p. 2. Linh says that Tran Phu joined the CC in August.
120 RC, 495, 154, 569, p. 52.
121 Benjamin Yang, ‘Complexity and Reasonability: Reassessment of the Li Lisan Adventure’,
Australian Journal o f Chinese Affairs, no. 21, Jan. 1989, pp. 121-2.
122 Comintern and China, Vol. Ill, part II, p. 962; telegram from FEB to ECCI, Shanghai 4-7 Aug
1930.
I23lbid., Stolyar letter to Lozovsky, 5 August 1930, p. 963.
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coincided with a full-scale civil war within the Chinese GMD which lasted from 5 April 
until early November.124 Chen Kungpo and the ‘Reorganizers’ played a key role in this 
conflict from their new base in Beijing. It seems likely that Li Lisan was counting on their 
eventual success.
In Vietnam, following the June meeting o f the Bac- ky Provisional Central Executive 
Committee in Hanoi, the provincial party committees for Nghe An and Ha Tinh were 
reorganized in July. In Nghe An party organizations were created down to the village (xa) 
level.125 The second wave of activism in Nghe Tinh, which led to the disintegration of 
local administration and the establishment o f soviets, began on the 29 o f August and 
reached its apogee on 11-12 September. (On 12 September the peasants o f Gia Dinh, 
Cholon and Tan An provinces also demonstrated.)126 District offices were burned down in a 
number o f areas and local mandarins handed over their seals to the village insurgents; 
village officials either joined the movement or were killed.127 French bombing o f 
demonstrators converging on Vinh on 12 September caused over 120 deaths. As Tran Huy 
Lieu explains, by the 12 September, local demonstrations were being coordinated to 
involve several districts. These events are recounted chronologically in the French reports, 
as well as by Tran Huy Lieu.128 It seems significant that the 12 September, later celebrated 
in Vietnam as the founding date o f the Nghe Tinh Soviets, was also observed by the CCP 
in the 1930s as the anniversary o f the 1927 August Harvest Uprising.129
There is little question that the local peasants, burdened with a variety o f taxes, were 
strongly motivated to demonstrate against the French and the local mandarins. But the 
idea that their actions were spontaneous or inspired by a few local hotheads is very hard to 
accept, in view o f the planning carried out by the VCP, as well as the incendiary 
instructions the communists had received from Moscow. James Scott contends that ‘while 
the party may have lent a certain coherence to the initial protests, it hardly needed to 
instruct peasants about the objects o f their anger.’130 Yet the very tactics which he refers to 
as arising from the ‘concrete grievances o f the rural cultivators’ — the demands for an end 
to taxes (or the delay o f tax payments) and ‘the seizure o f rice from the landlords’
124 On the summer military events, see Benjamin Yang, op. cit., pp. 120-6.
125 S.A. Mkhitaryan, Podyem Revoliutsionnovo Dvizheniia v Indokitae, The Revolutionary Upsurge in
Indochina, (Moscow: Nauka, 1975), pp. 63-4.
126 RC, 495, 154,615, p. 115, NAQ letter of 29 Sept. 1930 to FEB.
127 Tran Huy Lieu, op. cit., pg. 69.
128 Rapport de la Commission d ’Enquete sur les Evenements du Nord-Annam, part II, pp. 1-12; Tran
Huy Lieu, op. cit., pp. 62-72.
129 Nym Wales, Inside Red China, (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1939), p. 345.
130 James C. Scott, The Moral Economy o f the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia,
(New Haven: Yale Univ., 1977), p. 126.
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granaries’ -  were ones which had been taught to peasant organizers since the early 20s at 
Peng Pai’s Peasant Institute. The September actions in Nghe Tinh, which often involved 
the burning o f district offices and destruction of tax and land documents, employed 
methods which had been used in Hai-Lu-feng during the soviet movement.131 One might 
conclude that, rather than following the peasantry, the communists had developed -■ 
organizing methods which were well suited to the local conditions, at least in the short 
term. One can also conclude that Li Lisan’s actions in China must have had some degree 
o f influence on the events in Nghe Tinh. The Nghe Tinh uprising might well have 
occurred in some form without the Comintern’s involvement, or without the CCP 
leadership’s desire to hasten the advent o f the Chinese and world revolutions. However, it 
would not have taken place in the form that it did had communist organizers not been in 
command. It would probably not have occurred at the exact moment that it did, had they 
not set some form of schedule for action.
7. The October Plenum and Tran P hu’s Consolidation o f  Power
The newly-formed Vietnamese party was unable to unify its country-wide leadership until 
the first Central Committee plenum was held in Hong Kong in October 1930. In the 
interval between his June trip to Shanghai and the October plenum, Nguyen Ai Quoc 
seems to have settled into his work as a transmission post for the Malay, Siamese and 
Vietnamese parties. Between 23 July and 2 September, he claimed to have sent the FEB 
six letters. Of these, only the 2 September letter is in the Comintern’s archives. In this 
letter he explained that on 13 August he succumbed to a TB attack, a condition which he 
described as, Tung suffering and blood spitting, awfully weak and tired’.132 He also listed 
the agenda items which would be raised at the coming CC meeting: ‘a) autocritique of the 
past; b) plan to keep the work going until the congress; c) plan for the congress; and d) plan 
for the sending o f students.’ He apparently did not foresee that the October plenum would 
involve a major redirection o f the party. In the same letter he mentioned that he had just 
completed what he called ‘a prop-vulgarisation work’ entitled Notebook o f  a Shipwreck. It 
had taken 8 days to write and almost one month to print 20 copies, he said.133 This is a 
fable about three sailors, one. French, one African and one Vietnamese, who are 
shipwrecked and rescued by a Soviet vessel. They are taken to Moscow and given medical 
care, training in a communist institute, and shown respect which they had been denied as 
French labourers. The Vietnamese sailor is struck by the ‘unusually powerful attraction’ o f
131 Tran Huy Lieu, op. cit., pp. 63-7 enumerates the September events.
132 RC, 495, 154, 615, p. 101, letter of 2 Sept. 1930, unsigned
133 Ibid., p. 101.
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Leninist theory on colonialism ‘for people who have been deprived of their motherland’. 134 
It was probably more than author’s pride which led Quoc to spend a month preparing this 
pamphlet. He may well have been demonstrating his loyalty to Moscow, at a time when 
the CCP had adopted what the Russians considered an anti-Comintern line.
Quoc still maintained what appear to have been good relations with the CCP, however. He 
reported to the FEB on 22 September that he had requested advice from the Chinese 
Southern Committee on the tactics which the Vietnamese party should employ to deal with 
the ‘White terror’, the repressive measures which the French were using against the 
peasants in Nghe An. On 19 September three members o f the VCP CC had arrived in 
Hong Kong for the Central Committee plenum, he explained, and had made a report on 
events in Vietnam. As it would have taken too long to consult the FEB (a ‘fast’ letter 
between Shanghai and Hong Kong was taking 15 days to arrive at this point)135, the CC 
members and Quoc held a discussion with the Chinese to work out the VCP’s next move. 
Quoc’s bland description o f this discussion mentions that the Chinese agreed with the 
VCP’s decision to collect money for the victims and hold a national protest movement.
The group also decided to begin organizing a ‘peasant guard’, to reinforce party work 
among workers and propaganda among soldiers.136
Ngo Due Tri gives a more detailed account o f this encounter with two Chinese from the 
Southern Bureau, which he says included Quoc, Ho Tung Mau, Truong Van Lenh, his 
fellow CC member ‘Sau’ (Nguyen Trong Nha, also known as Nguyen Trong Nhat, a 
former student from Ha Tinh137), and himself. (The other members o f the Vietnamese CC 
had not yet arrived for the plenum.) The Chinese felt that the demonstrations which 
marked the beginning o f the ‘insurrectionary movement’ were a good thing. But Ho Tung 
Mau responded that insurrection was bringing ‘more defeats than victories’, although there 
was no harm in continuing the demonstrations. Quoc believed that it would be impossible 
to stage a full insurrection, but that in the villages the peasants could elect soviets and carry 
out land redistribution. Ngo Due Tri claims to have taken the firmest stand against the trend 
towards insurrection in Nghe Tinh. ‘The revolutionary movement is just taking shape... it 
is a mistake to advocate insurrection; it will have no value for the revolutionary movement, 
just bombing and defeats. The Chinese party is calling for insurrection, b u t ... what is 
possible in China is not always possible in Indochina. The creation o f soviets and the
534 Excerpts from A.A. Sokolov, Comintern and Vietnam., pp. 176-78.
135 RC, 495, 154, 615, p. 105, letter of 12 Sept. 1930.
136 RC, 495, 154, 615, p. 110, letter of 22 Sept. 1930.
137 See AOM, SPCE 371, Declaration de Nguyen van Loi, Jan. 1932, p. 4 on Nguyen Trong Nha .
Confusingly, Hoang Quoc Viet was also known as ‘Sau’.
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distribution o f land without the support of an insurrection is impossible to carry out,’ Tri 
claims to have said. O f the Vietnamese, only ‘Sau’ was in full agreement with the 
Chinese.138
The Chinese CC delegate from Saigon, A Lau, did not participate in this discussion. But 
he may have contributed to the report on the Cochinchina-Cambodia section o f the party 
which Quoc sent to the FEB on 22 September. By this stage, the Chinese party in the south 
appears to have formally merged with the Vietnamese. (However, in 1931 a report from 
Saigon would again refer to the Cochinchina-Cambodia section as an entity separate from 
the ICP.)139 In Cambodia, the party now listed 120 Chinese and 4 Vietnamese members, 
with 300 Chinese in a labour union. In Cochinchina the party had shown strong growth, 
with 70 Chinese members and 400 Vietnamese, an increase o f 350 Vietnamese since 
February 1930. There were 500 members o f labour unions (not broken down by ethnicity) 
and 13,500 members of peasant unions. 140
Two of the remaining CC members, Tran Phu and Le Mao, reached Hong Kong on 2 
October, just as the southern members were about to give up waiting and return home. (A 
third, the former ICP activist Tran Van Lan, missed the rendez-vous and spent most of 
October waiting in a hotel. One wonders if  he had been given a wrong address.) Nguyen 
Phong Sac, the other missing member, was too occupied with the Nghe Tinh movement to 
attend. Ngo Due Tri came down with appendicitis immediately before the meeting, and 
thus spent the next two weeks in hospital. Although at least one Vietnamese scholar has 
attempted to show that Nguyen Ai Quoc was also absent from the October plenum, the 
Comintern evidence shows that this was not the case. 141 On 28 October Quoc wrote one 
o f his least informative reports ever on the proceedings. In addition to listing the numbers 
of party members in various organizations (now 1,740 members, of whom 190 were 
Chinese), he enumerated the items and resolutions discussed, noting that these had not yet 
been translated. His expense report showed that the total cost o f travel, food and lodging 
during the plenum amounted to 440 Hong Kong dollars. At the close he asked, ‘Please, 
call for us immediately, because we must return immediately after having seen you.’142 
This would seem to show that he indeed accompanied Tran Phu to Shanghai, to report to 
the FEB, following the plenum.
138 AOM, SPCE 367, Declaration de Ngo Due Tri.
139 See unsigned report from Saigon in RC, 495, 154, 462b/part 3, p. 236.
140 RC, 495, 154, 615, p. 110.
141 Nguyen Ba Linh, op. cit., p. 3. Linh cites a letter of 25 Feb. 1931 from the Surete archives, which
he says is Quoc’s criticism of the October plenum. However, this letter is not included in Ho’s
Collected Works or in any other collection of party documents which I have seen.
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For anyone attempting to prove that Quoc was the constant guiding light o f the Vietnamese 
party, his absence from Hong Kong would have been convenient at this point. For it was 
at the October plenum that he lost his authority as the interpreter o f Comintern policy for 
Vietnam. His February 1930 programme for the VCP was replaced with new Political 
Theses and resolutions in tune with the current Comintern line. As we have seen, this 
required that the party develop as a class-based organization. The party’s two-fold mission 
o f anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution now concentrated on the emancipation o f the 
working class, both urban and rural. By 1931 this ideology would result in the purging of 
many middle class patriots from the party and their alienation from the revolutionary 
movement. At the same time, the plenum appears to have criticized the September uprising 
in Nghe An. A circular which is identified by Van Kien Dang as dating from October 
criticizes the ‘Annam Committee’., It states: At the present moment, given the situation in 
the country, the level o f preparation of the proletariat and the exploited masses in the towns 
and countryside, the level of party preparation and the strength of the enemy, isolated 
uprisings in a few places are putchism and are incorrect.’ 143 At the end o f the plenum, the 
participants decided to establish the Central Committee in Saigon. Tran Phu was named 
secretary o f the CC, with Ngo Due Tri and Nguyen Trong Nha as the other two members of 
the Standing Committee (Bureau Permanent). Nguyen Phong Sac and Tran Van Lan 
retained their CC membership. The Chinese member, A Lau, decided to remain in Hong 
Kong to work with the Chinese party, as he was a Whampoa graduate.144
Following the plenum, according to Ngo Due Tri, Quoc and Tran Phu went to Shanghai 
together to report to the FEB. When Tran Phu returned to Hong Kong around 20 
November, he brought a brief letter from Quoc, Ngo Due Tri explained. The letter 
admitted that the party’s unification had been carried out hastily, and that there had been 
many gaps in direction, due to the lack o f information from inside the country. Quoc also 
gave his agreement to the party’s change o f name to Indochinese Communist Party.145 A 
December 9 circular to party organizations made public Quoc’s admission of his errors. It 
noted that none o f the regions o f Vietnam had implemented the Comintern’s instructions, 
which had been sent out to them in February and March 1930; in fact, these directives had 
b e e n ‘coldly received’. Party members had not realized that the ‘comrade who called the 
Unification Conference had been sent home to work by the Comintern without any 
particular instructions... he acted on his own initiative and made a series of mistakes...
142 RC, 495, 154, 615, p. 109, 28 Oct. 1930, ‘Report’.
143 RC, 495, 154, 616, p. 102, Russian version undated, received 23 March 1931 in Moscow.
144 AOM, SPCE 367, Ngo Due Tri.
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This comrade has already recognized his mistakes and has agreed to correct them.’146 This 
circular also pointed out the need to view all landlords ‘as a class’. In opposition to the 
February programme of the Unification Conference, the circular stated that all landlords 
were enemies o f the peasantry and that their interests were ‘closely linked to the interests 
of imperialism’.147 ■ -
By late January o f 1931, although new waves of demonstrations were taking place in Ha 
Tinh and Quang Ngai provinces, Ngo Due Tri wrote to Moscow that ‘the bloody terror is 
affecting the sprint o f the masses and making our work more difficult’. Out o f 90 party 
members in Haiphong as of October 1930, he noted, 17 had been arrested, 10 had had to 
flee, and 45 had left the party out o f fear of repression. As o f December 1930 the number 
of members there had risen slightly to 93 with the addition of new recruits, but the number 
o f union members had dropped from 99 in October to 67 in December.148 In the coal 
mining regions o f Hongay, Campha and Hatu, where there are thousands o f miners, he 
wrote, ‘we have only 29 comrades’.149 The party had not been able to penetrate the 
plantations since the Phu Rieng uprising, and in the countryside where the repression was 
especially harsh, the peasant unions ‘had been annihilated’.150 As a post script he added 
that the CC had started to establish communications with Shanghai, but that at the 
moment, the system was functioning badly. (It is probable that the discovery o f the 
Chinese CP’s Southern Bureau by the British police in Hong Kong in December 1930 
disrupted communications, already slow, between Hong Kong and Shanghai. As the 
British would report in 1932, the bureau ‘lived on in a moribund state, as a transmission 
and translation agency o f the FEB, in the person of Nguen (sic) Ai Quae, the Annamite 
Communist.’) 151
This depressing situation seems to have affected the CC’s relations with Quoc. On 12 
February he forwarded a letter to the FEB from the Vietnamese CC (in his own English 
translation) , which began: ‘What is the opinion of the Cl concerning our draft resolutions? 
Has it any letter for us? If  not, then what is the use to have an office at HK. At least the Cl 
should have a letter for u s ... I f  you cannot help us connecting with the Cl and the E.
145 AOM, SPCE 367, Ngo Due Tri.
146 RC, 495, 154, 616, p. 123. Letter of the ICP CC to the Party Organizations, 9 Dec. 1930. The most
recent edition of Van Kien Dang (1998, vol II) includes this paragraph, which was omitted in the 1977
version.
147 Ibid., pp. 120-1.
148 RC, 495, 32, 95, p. 2, ‘Aux camarades du Secretariat d’Orient de 1’I.C, signed ‘Pierre’ (Leman),
undated.
149 Ibid, p. 1.
150 Ibid, pp. 1 and 3.
151 National Archives, Washington D.C., SMP Files, D2527/45 -  Noulens Case Analysis, pp. 34-5.
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Section, then what is the use o f you being there?’152 The instructions and support which 
the renamed ICP desired always took a long time to arrive in Vietnam; it was not 
necessarily Quoc’s fault, as the FEB was slow in responding to their requests. In a 
February note to the FEB, Quoc had emphasized the delicate position in which the CC 
leadership found itself and the importance o f building up their authority. The reason the 
‘new directors o f the Indochina firm’ are so anxious to receive your promised letters, he 
said, is that ‘they are newly arrived in the country and they do not yet have the necessary 
influence over their subordinates, who have been in the firm longer.’153 But the FEB was 
far better at issuing general instructions and criticizing the reports they received than 
solving concrete problems. (In the winter o f 1931 they may also have been fully absorbed 
by the task o f ridding the CCP of Li Lisan’s influence.) They had written to Quoc on 12 
January to promise that ‘a more thorough and detailed document’ with instructions would 
be ready shortly, but this did not materialize until the end of M arch.154 The FEB’s 12 
January letter also criticized his reporting, ignoring the fact that he probably had had to 
change his address and communications methods since the discovery o f the CCP’s 
Southern Bureau. ‘Your connections with the places seems to us still insufficient and 
unsatisfactory... Also the information about the White Terror is too “dry” (only that so- 
and-so many are arrested); it is important to know on what work they were arrested, why 
they were arrested, etc.’ 155 In the same letter, the FEB made demands for more 
demonstrations: 25 February was to be ‘Unemployment Day’, marked by ‘the widest 
possible mobilisation of the masses in the shops and factories..
Quoc seems to have told the FEB of his coming marriage plans sometime in the winter. 
The FEB informed him in their letter of 12 January that he should let them know the date 
o f his marriage two months before it took place. As this letter uses none o f the code o f a 
business firm, we can assume that they were literally referring to Quoc’s taking a wife. In 
February he mentioned that his wife was busy with preparations for the New Year and the 
planned reception o f visitors from Saigon and Tonkin, so it seems that he ignored the 
FEB’s instructions or that they arrived too late.156 From other Comintern documents from 
1934 and 1935, we learn that this wife was apparently Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, the former 
Tan Viet activist from Vinh who was assigned to work in Hong Kong after the party
152 RC, 495, 32, 95, letter no. 13 (no p. number).
153 AOM, SPCE 367, letter of Victor 16 Feb. 1931; for correspondence which was less than secure the 
Comintern often used the cover of business-style terminology.
154 RC, 495, 32, 95, pp. 24-26, ‘Brief von FEB an IPC’ in French, 29 March 1931. This letter is 
intended as a political document for a coming Congress, which was never held.
155 RC, 495, 154, 569 (no p. no.), to ‘Dear Friend’, 12 Jan. 1931.
156 AOM, SPCE 367, letter from Victor, 12 Feb. 1931.
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unification.157 She was later assigned to liaison work with the Chinese party. Whether she 
and Quoc remained man and wife after their arrests in April and June 1931 is not known.
8. The March Plenum and the End o f  the ‘High Tide ’
By 12 March 1931, when the Second plenum started in Saigon, the CC’s relations with 
Nguyen Ai Quoc had deteriorated to the point that he would soon ask to be relieved of his 
assignment in Hong Kong. One o f the items on the March plenum’s agenda was the 
‘question of Nguyen Ai Quoc’. According to Ngo Due Tri, the leaders in Annam and 
Tonkin complained that Quoc frequently demanded reports from them for the FEB in 
Shanghai, reports which were the responsibility of the CC’s ‘Standing Committee’ to 
prepare. The meeting decided to to write to Quoc to ask that he stop requesting these 
reports; when necessary, the CC would send reports to the FEB via Hong Kong, but Quoc 
would simply be asked to pass them on.158 Later in April, Tran Phu would write to the 
FEB to announce that they should no longer use Quoc as a go-between, as ‘he is too brief 
and sometimes he gives us his own opinions without consulting you.’159
Quoc responded to these criticisms in a letter o f 23 April to the CC, saying that he saw 
little point in simply serving as a post box. ‘I know that circumstances are difficult and the 
CC has a lot o f work. But “one” needs to understand our situation clearly, and that is why 
we have had to request reports form the local committees,’ he explained.160 At the end of 
March the FEB tried to persuade him to stay in Hong Kong, on the grounds that it would 
be no easier for him to maintain communications from Shanghai. They assured him that, 
‘You personally are indispensable and above all for the need we spoke o f last November. 
Here is how we have defined your tasks: 1) to maintain the closest links possible with the 
party organizations in your country; 2) to inform us o f everything that is going on where 
you are; 3) to prepare and educate the party for the future struggle.’161
The Comintern inspector Joseph Ducroux met Quoc in March and April, on his way into 
and out o f Vietnam, where he held several meetings with Tran Phu and Ngo Due Tri. He 
revealed very little about the tension between Quoc and the CC in a letter written just after 
meeting Quoc in April. But he remarked that Quoc felt isolated and suggested that the FEB
157 See Chapter V I, notes 54 and 55.
158 AOM, SPCE 367, Ngo Due Tri.
159 RC, 495, 32, 95, p.10., ‘Lettre du C.C. d’lndochine’, unsigned, 17 April 1931; as this was written 
when Tran Phu was the only CC secretary still at large, I assume it was written by him.
160 AOM, SPCE 365, 23 April 1931 letter to the CC.
161 RC, 495, 32, 95, p. 24, letter of 29 March 1931, addressed to ‘Cher Camarade’, signed ‘vos amis’.
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reinforce its guidance and the ‘concrete assistance’ which it gave to Quoc and his ‘friends 
in-country’.162 Ducroux also reported that the ICP’s ‘central leadership has finally been 
recognized by everyone and has authority, in spite of some minor federalist tendencies...’. 
These tendencies, though, were so strong in the North that the CC decided at their plenum 
to replace the northern leadership. Both Ngo Due Tri’s confession and the Comintern 
correspondence from Ducroux and Tran Phu relate that a member o f the Northern Regional 
Committee assigned to translate the Comintern’s letter,4 Immediate Tasks o f  the 
Indochinese C o m m u n is tshad included a preface which stated that the Third International 
did not understand the situation in Indochina. This dissident, identified as ‘K y’, maintained 
his influence on the northern leadership, even after being removed from his position, and 
had attempted to form a rival fraction.163 A letter from the FEB written following the 
March plenum reiterated that the ICP must fight against those ‘elements in the north 
provinces’ which think that the Comintern does not understand the concrete situation in 
Indochina. ‘These arguments have been used in the past year by Li Lisan, who did not 
carry out the directives o f the Cl, which resulted in very serious damage for the company 
here.’164
Where Nguyen Ai Quoc stood in relationship to this conflict over the Comintern line is a 
complex question. We can assume from his good relations with the FEB, his 1930 report 
from Malaya, as well as from his April 1931 correspondence, that he had no desire to 
become involved in disagreements with Moscow. But his position may have been 
weakened by M if  s assertion o f control over the FEB in the autumn o f 1930. From Tran 
Phu’s point of view, Quoc’s failure to impose a clear class line within the party was one of 
the chief causes o f its disunity. In his letter o f 17 April 1931, he held Quoc in large part 
responsible for the legacy o f the ‘old revolutionary organisations’ within the Vietnamese 
party. He claimed that, ‘.. .the months which have passed have shown that all the elements 
o f the ideology o f the old groups have coalesced into resistance to the new line of practical 
and ideological unification o f the party. The February 1930 unification conference had 
been imbued with the ideology o f the old revolutionary organisations, he said. This 
ideology included the acceptance o f small and medium landlords, as well as the nationalist 
bourgeoisie, as participants in the revolution. ‘The work of this “unification conference”
162 RC, 495, 32, 95, p. 22, unsigned letter, 15 April 1931.
163 AOM, SPCE 367, Ngo Due Tri; RC, 495, 32, 95, p. 23, Ducroux letter of 15 April 1931; RC, 495, 
32, 95, p. 9, Tran Phu letter of 17 April, 1931.
164 RC, 495, 154, 569, p. 52, undated, unsigned letter identified as written after 4 April, in non-native 
English, so probably by Rylski/Osten, who returned to Shanghai around October 1930, perhaps at the 
same time as Pavel M if s arrival.
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carried the clear imprint of the period of collaboration between the GMD and the CCP, in 
particular the rightist policy o f the CCP between 1925 and 1927,’ he explained.165
Tran Phu’s advocacy o f the class policies associated with Stalin’s ascendancy may have 
had an unintended consequence. His efforts to impose a ‘class line’ at the March 1931 
Plenum may have led to a new phase o f extremism in Central Vietnam in the spring o f
1931. The decisions taken by the two-week long March Plenum are often characterized as 
strongly critical of ‘leftist tendencies’ within the party in Central Vietnamese, for example 
by Ngo Vinh Long.166 It might be more accurate, however, to describe them as the 
replacement of one set o f extremist prescriptions by another. While the plenum did 
condemn individual terror and the premature use o f violence, it called for a strengthening 
o f the class character of the ICP. ‘One of the greatest dangers is that party members still do 
not have a clear understanding o f the position o f the proletariat in the revolution and the 
duties o f the party,’ the resolutions read.167 The first organizational tasks which had to be 
undertaken were: the solution o f the crisis in party leadership in Bac Ky and the 
strengthening o f the CC in the Center and South. It was necessary to gradually replace the 
representatives o f the intelligentsia and conservative elements in the leading organs with 
workers or poor peasants.168 The party was instructed to investigate the peasant unions and 
remove from them any elements who were not connected to the peasantry; to bring into the 
administration representatives o f the poorest peasants and rural labourers. The class 
struggle in the countryside was to be broadened and any nationalist influence was to be 
uprooted.169 W omen’s organizing was no longer to be aimed at ‘women in general’, but 
was to be carried out only among labouring women. The W omen’s Liberation Association 
was to be immediately disbanded.170
One result of these class-based resolutions seems to have been a purge o f the Trung-ky 
party organization in April. Again, there is confusion about the nature o f this purge. 
Nguyen Duy Trinh portrays it as a removal o f comrades ‘who had committed grave 
mistakes of leftist tendencies’.171 Tran Huy Lieu, however, describes a circular dated 29 
April 1931 from the Trung -ky committee as calling for opposition (bai xich) to the
165 RC, 495, 32, 95, pp. 7-9.
166 Ngo Vinh Long, ‘The Indochinese Communist Party and Peasant Rebellion in Central Vietnam, 
1930-1931, Journal o f the Committee o f Concerned Asian Scholars, December, 1978, p. 28.
167 Van Kien Dang, pp. 234-5, ‘An Nghi Quyet cua Trung Uong Toan The Hoi Nghi Lan Thu Hai, 3- 
1931 [‘Resolutions of the Second CC Plenum, 3-1931 ’].
168 Ibid., pp. 242-3.
169 Ibid., p. 246.
170Ibid., p. 247.
171 Nguyen Duy Trinh, op. cit., p. 25.
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intellectuals, rich peasants, landlords and notables. 172 This terminology recalls the well- 
known slogan of the most radical period o f the Nghe Tinh movement: 'tri, phu, dia, hao, 
dao tan goc, troc tan re ’ (intellectuals, rich peasants, landlords, notables ~  dig them up, 
pull them out by the very roots!) As Tran Huy Lieu writes, this sort o f divisive slogan 
enabled the French to win over a significant portion of the population, at a time when the 
French repression was at its height. When the 29 April Circular was issued, Le Viet Thuat 
had been entrusted with the leadership o f the Trung Ky Party, according to Nguyen Duy 
Trinh. Nguyen Due Canh and Le Mao had both been arrested on 9 April. ( Le Viet Thuat 
probably suffered the same fate on 1 May, while Nguyen Phong Sac was captured by the 
French on 3 May 1931.)173 This move against the bourgeoisie may have been intended as 
a non-violent purge. But it seems to have been transformed into a search for scapegoats, 
as the French brought more troops into Vinh and famine spread. French court records 
show that in Ha Tinh, beginning in November 1930 and throughout the first half o f 1931, 
suspected informers and villagers accused of holding back the soviet movement were 
assassinated by a variety o f means.174 One party dissident was tied up, then thrown alive 
into a river, along with his wife and child; a thief o f rice and potatoes was buried alive; a 
suspected informer was beaten to death. Whether these incidents were part o f the purge 
mentioned by Tran Huy Lieu is unclear. In a situation which was daily growing more 
dangerous to party members, though, a ‘class enemy’ who had been removed from a 
position of influence in the party would almost automatically have been suspected of 
betrayal.
According to Van Kien Dang, a directive was issued on 20 May 1931 from the CC to the 
Trung Ky regional committee, which called a halt to the purge. This document claims that 
‘The Trung-Ky. regional committee, in particular the Secretary, issued a directive to purge 
the party o f intellectuals, rich peasants, landlords and notables; this directive has no 
foundation and is ill-defined, arbitrary and rash.’175 The Trung Ky committee was 
instructed in the strictest manner to examine and correct its mistakes. Strangely, Tran Huy 
Lieu, writing in 1957, was not aware o f this directive. As we have seen, Nguyen Duy 
Trinh, who claims to have been a direct witness to these events and to have attended the 
April Trung Ky committee meeting, places the correction of leftist errors in April, when in 
fact a more violent phase of the soviet movement may have begun. There appears to be a 
distinct possibility that what by 1935-6 came to be considered ‘leftist errors’ were not in
172 Tran Huy Lieu, op cit, p. 87.
173 Tran Huy Lieu, op. cit, pp. 87-88.
174 Contribution, ‘Documents’, Vol. V, ‘La Terreur Rouge en Annam (1930-1931).
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fact corrected in 1931. The extremist phase may simply have petered out as the party’s 
structures disintegrated.
As we know from Tran Phu and Nguyen Ai Quoc’s last letters to the FEB (before their 
arrests), in April and early May 1931 all ICP structures above the provincial level were 
destroyed by French arrests. Ngo Due Tri was arrested on 1 April, along with the entire 
Nam Ky Committee. On 15 April the Saigon CC headquarters was discovered, which 
caused the loss o f its correspondence and 1500 dollars recently brought by Ducroux to 
cover three months’ expenses. Tran Phu escaped because he had been in the outhouse at 
the time of the raid.176 Quoc wrote on 28 April that ‘there are arrests every day’. Thai 
Binh and Nam Dinh provinces were hard hit as their liaison agent had been arrested and 
made a confession. In Saigon the new CC print shop was discovered and several more 
party members arrested ,177 Quoc reported Tran Phu’s arrest at the end of April. He had 
been taken on the 19 or 20 o f the month. After that only one young worker was left to the 
secretariat, Quoc wrote. In Hong Kong one of the ‘comrades in charge of 
communications’, Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, was captured on 29 April.
Given these widespread arrests, the authorship o f the supposed 20 May 1931 directive to 
the Trung Ky committee poses a problem. Was there at the time a CC which could have 
issued such a document? Did Nguyen Ai Quoc himself write it and send it to central 
Vietnam in the name o f the defunct CC? Would Nguyen Ai Quoc have been willing to 
take such an initiative, when the Comintern was to all appearances fully behind the policies 
articulated by Tran Phu? Was it actually received and put into effect in Trung ky? The 
only evidence from the French archives on this score is the unfinished circular which the 
Hong Kong police found in Nguyen Ai Quoc’s typewriter at the time of his arrest on 6 
June. The topic was the correct way to fight the French terror. The French described the 
letter as o f ‘no interest’, but believed that it demonstrated Quoc’s authority over his 
party.178
From a letter in German which the FEB sent to Moscow on 10 June, it appears that they 
had decided to issue an appeal ‘to all members o f the party’ in the name o f the ICP CC. 
This appeal supposedly ‘asserted that the party was restoring order and getting down to 
work’.179 The writer, who may be Rylski, does not give any more details regarding this
175 Van Kien Dang, vol. 1, pp. 285-288, ‘Chi thi cua Trung Uong gui Xu Uy Tmng-ky ve van-de Thanh
Dang Trung-ky’, 20 May 1931 ’, [CC Directive to Trung-ky Committee on the Purge of the Party in
Trung-ky’]; Mkhitaryan, op. cit., pp. 303-305.
176 RC, 495, 32, 95, p. 10, Tran Phu letter, 17 April 1931.
177 RC, 495, 154,462, no page nos, letter of 28 April 1931, signed ‘Victor’.
178 AOM, SPCE 365, folder ‘Arrestation de Nguyen Ai Quoc’, serie F, document 18.
179 RC, 495, 154, 462a, p. 205; letter to Eastern Sec., 10 June 1931, unsigned.
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document. However, in a 12 May letter apparently addressed to Quoc, in non-native 
English, the writer delegates the task o f writing an appeal to the party to him. ‘... We think 
it necessary that a letter be issued by you, an open letter to all comrades. In the letter you 
shall speak about the tasks o f the party in the mass work, in organising the economic fights 
of the workers-in the plantations, factories, agricultural workers, of organising the trade 
unions, Anti-imperialist League, Peasant’s Committees, Soldiers’ Committees, etc. You 
shall speak about the necessity to lead and organise the spontaneous actions of the 
Peasantry by our comrades, etc. You shall warn the party before the danger of putchist 
tendencies and first of all show the possibility for increase of the right danger as a reaction 
to the white terror... 180 Given the date o f these instructions, it is possible that Quoc did 
issue a letter in the name of the CC on 20 May. It is also conceivable that he realized that 
the message the FEB asked him to convey was out of touch with reality. He may have 
finally taken matters into his own hands and written the directive which appears in Van 
Kien Dang.
We learn something o f Quoc’s state of mind in April from his letters. On 28 April he 
complained to the FEB about the educational level of new party members. Both the 
students being selected for training in Moscow and the worker and peasant members are 
illiterate, he wrote. ‘This means that in spite o f their courage and abnegation, they work 
badly, their ideological and political level being too low.’ He added that, ‘The result o f this 
complete lack o f education is that in the daily work the worker and peasant comrades 
depend entirely on the intellectuals.’ At the same time he noted that the majority o f 
Vietnamese intellectuals sent to Moscow from France are ‘unusable’. They included 
spoiled children o f the bourgeoisie, he complained.181 He also worried about the tactics 
being employed to fight French repression. Between the 12 and 20 of April he noted that 
165 peasants had been killed during demonstrations. The imperialists had decided to stop 
the movement ‘by massacre’, he said. ‘What concrete plan of struggles shall we give our 
comrades? If we let them go on in that way there will be great danger o f putchisme (sic),’ 
he wrote.182 Ironically, in the same letter, he mentioned that Reuters had published the 
news on 25 April that the ICP had been admitted as an ‘independent section’ by the 
Comintern. If the news were true, he wrote, ‘it would be a great moral boost to the party 
and m asses....’.183
180 RC, 495, 154, 569, p. 50, letter addressed to ‘Dear Friend’, unsigned.
181 RC, 495, 154, 462, no p. nos, letter in French, signed ‘Victor’, 28 April 1931.
182 RC, 495, 154, 462, English letter written after 25 April 1931, signed ‘Victor’.
183 RC, 495, 154, 577, p. 36 -  From notes on the ICP’s history in this file, we learn that the ECCI
passed a resolution on 5 April 1931 to accept the ICP as an independent party at its Eleventh Plenum.
From the 6 Jan. 1930 until April 1931, the ICP had been a section of the FCP. (p. 35).
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Quoc’s prestige within Vietnam may still have been great enough to influence the ICP’s 
course at this stage, had he not been arrested in early June. But Tran Huy Lieu’s 1960 
description o f the spring o f 1931 does not leave one with the impression that Quoc was 
able to make a real impact on the course o f events: ‘The Soviet movement in Nghe An and 
Ha Tinh, far from petering out, gained in intensity and violence during its last months. 
Blood flowed more and more abundantly. In passing from the stage of economic and 
political demands to the struggle against the white terror, the demonstrations turned more 
and more frequently into armed engagements.’ 184 One suspects that Lieu’s judgment o f 
these events many years later would not have been possible in 1931. ‘The programme of 
action o f 1930 made the error o f calling for the overthrow o f the national bourgeoisie along 
with the French colonialists and the feudal classes... they should have been pulled into the 
ranks o f the democratic bourgeois revolution and not systematically kept apart,’ he wrote. 
‘In the countryside, the struggles undertaken against the rich peasants, the middle peasants 
and the village elders and scholars were grave errors which discredited the whole 
movement and gave an opening to enemy propaganda.’185
An anonymous rapporteur in Saigon, writing sometime in 1931 on the situation in 
Indochina, gives no hint that the ICP was making a correction o f course. (The writer 
identifies himself as a member o f a 4-person cell in a store where there are 200 workers. 
The report was stamped as received by the Comintern in June 1931.) At the time o f writing 
there were 2,400 party members in the country, of whom 600 were in Cochinchina (not 
including the 200 Chinese in the Cochinchina-Cambodia group). Commenting on 
‘opportunist tendencies’, he mentions that the national revolutionary elements who joined 
the party after the unification conference, and who had been excluded during the struggle, 
were ‘attempting to form a Cochinchina section of the Independence Party’[Nguyen The 
Truyen’s party]. There was also a newly-formed anarchist group, as well as an active 
Trotskyist group working among the intellectuals, and a new ‘Communist League’ formed 
by party members who had been expelled. The ICP was working against all of these 
tendencies, except for the anarchists, who were inactive. The 30 remaining members of the 
VNQDD in the South, he claims, were ready to join the ICP. But they had decided to 
organize a ‘great night’ o f actions which would shake the imperialists before joining the 
party. The leaders were captured before any o f these plans came about, he added.186 As we 
can see from this report, fragmentation o f the revolutionary movement lay ahead. The 
return of Nguyen Ai Quoc to a position o f influence lay many years in the future.
184 Tran Huy Lieu, Les Soviets da Nghe Tinh, (Hanoi: Editions en langues etrangeres, 1960), p. 44.
185 Ibid., pp. 51-2.
186 RC, 495, 154, 462b, part 3, pp. 13 and 16.
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CHAPTER VI
Death in Hong Kong, Burial in Moscow? (1931-1938)
1. The Prisoner
On 8 June 1931 the Governor General in Hanoi, Rene Robin, cabled the Ministry o f 
Colonies to announce the arrest of Nguyen Ai Quoc two days earlier.1 Quoc had been 
found thanks to the discovery o f Joseph Ducroux’s address book in Singapore, where the 
French agent had been caught exchanging documents with local communists. Robin’s 
cable announced that Quoc’s arrest was due to ‘ the liaison established by the Surete 
Generale with the British police in Hong Kong and Singapore, and the police o f the French 
concession in Shanghai.’ These links had enabled the French to capture Ho Tung Mau, 
Nguyen Huy Bon, a Moscow returnee, the worker Phan Due who had attended the Fifth 
Profintern Congress in Moscow, and most o f the Vietnamese communists working in 
Shanghai, (Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, arrested 29 April in Hong Kong, had been deported to 
a Canton prison, on the assumption that she was Chinese. There she joined Truong Van 
Lenh and three other Vietnamese who had been arrested earlier in 1931.) Ho Tung M au’s 
wife Ly Ung Thuan was arrested along with Quoc. The greatest blow to the Comintern’s 
operations would come on 10 June, when their OMS agent Hilaire Noulens and his wife 
were traced via a Shanghai postbox address found in Ducroux’s notebook. Although for 
many years they were thought to be the Swiss citizens Paul and Gertrude Ruegg, they have 
now been identified as the Russian couple Jakov Rudnik and Tatiana Moiseenko- 
Velikhaya.2
Robin’s dispatch was full of self-congratulation. The arrest of ‘all communist leaders in 
Vietnam’, including nine Moscow returnees and the majority of Vietnamese activists in 
China, was ‘the fruit o f investigations skillfully carried out by the competent services’, he 
wrote; they ‘give us absolute mastery o f the political situation.’ He did not, however, 
anticipate Nguyen Ai Quoc’s extradition to Indochina. The French consul in Hong Kong 
had already warned him that the Vietnamese arrested in Hong Kong might well be set free. 
Robin proposed that the best solution might be to persuade the British to intern Quoc in 
some ‘distant possession’, as a reciprocal gesture for the detention o f any Indian or
'AOM, SPCE 368, telegramme officiel, Gougal a colonies, Hanoi 8 June 1931.
2 Frederick S. Litten, ‘The Noulens Affair’, The China Quarterly, no. 138, June 1994.
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Burmese communists who might be captured on French territory.3 By late June the Surete 
detective Neron was considering how to allocate the reward money for these arrests 
($15,000 for Quoc and $10,000 each for Ho Tung Mau and the activists arrested in 
Shanghai)4. But the course o f British justice would run counter to French designs.
Nguyen Ai Quoc’s fate hinged on the nature of the deportation order which would be 
handed down in Hong Kong. Neron believed that the documents found at Quoc’s address 
would serve as evidence to have him deported for communist propaganda, with Shanghai 
as the probable destination. Not only had the British found an unfinished circular in 
Quoc’s typewriter denouncing French imperialism, they had also found letters 
demonstrating that he played an active role in abetting the communist movement in 
Malaya. Yet some of the British legal advisers who commented on the case in the 
Colonial Office’s dossier advocated a strict interpretation of the detainee’s civil rights. He 
had committed no offense against Hong Kong law, and thus the only grounds for deporting 
him was the fact that he was a communist. One Walter Ellis wrote, for example: ‘we 
cannot, it seems to me, insist on his going to Indochina any more than if  we had occasion to 
deport an ex-official o f the Tsarist government [illegible] insist on his going to a Soviet 
republic.’ Ellis explained that if  the French had had evidence that Quoc had committed 
‘any extraditable crime’, they would have made a formal appeal for extradition.5
Quoc did not admit to any name other than Sung Man Cho, the name on the Chinese 
passport he had received in Singapore. In contradiction to his claim to be Chinese, though, 
he portrayed himself as a nationalist fighting for king and country, with a death sentence 
hanging over his head in Vietnam.6 As Dennis Duncanson has pointed out, this 
contradictory testimony may have been a defensive tactic advocated by the Comintern.7 By 
July 1931 he was receiving what appears to have been highly-skilled legal counsel, 
apparently arranged by the International Red Aid organization, from a team of lawyers led 
by Frank Loseby. His lawyers argued that deportation to Shanghai would be the 
equivalent of a disguised extradition to Indochina. 8 (Ho Tung Mau and his companions 
were in fact deported to Shanghai at the end o f June, without a formal identification having
3 Ibid., p. 2.
4AOM, SPCE 368, Telegram from Neron to ‘Gougal’, Hanoi, Hong Kong, 25 June 1931.
5PRO, CO 129, 533/3, 27 July 1931, pp. 3-4, and 4 August 1931, p.8.
6 MAE 91, Affaires Communes, Annexe n. 4 a la Depeche n. 52 a la Direction des Affaires Politiques 
et Commerciales, 12 Sept. 1931.
7 Dennis Duncanson, ‘Ho Chi Minh in Hong Kong, 1931-32’, China Quarterly, Jan.-March, 1974, p. 
91.
8 AOM, SPCE 368, Tel. from GOUGAL to Colonies, Paris, 28 juillet 1931, signed Pasquier.
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been made. They were arrested in the French concession and shipped back to Vietnam.9) 
The defense strategy was to demand Quoc’s rights as a political detainee under the 
Deportation Ordinance, which required that he be allowed to chose his destination and 
depart in secret. If this right was not guaranteed, the defendant would ‘attack the 
proceedings in every possible manner and by every known step,’ his lawyer Mr. Jenkin told 
the court.10
Thanks to the application o f this strategy Quoc’s case would drag on until January 1933. 
The mobilization of world-wide left-wing support for the mysterious Noulens probably 
gave Quoc’s plight more attention than it would have received had he been arrested on his 
own. To judge by the press accounts, he also made a good impression in court, speaking 
in English without a translator, projecting sincerity in his declaration o f his nationalist 
beliefs. The Colonial Office would clearly have liked to have handed him over to the 
French; one official referred to him as being ‘one of the worst agitators who was put into 
the bag in the round up following the Leffanc [Ducroux] seizure,. .’.ll After the Hong 
Kong judiciary rejected a defense appeal for a writ of Habeas Corpus, the French grew 
confident that they would finally get their man. On 24 August 1931, the Surete in Hanoi 
had cabled Saigon to announce that Nguyen Ai Quoc would leave Hong Kong on 1 
September on the General Metzinger bound for Saigon. Two French policemen had been 
delegated to escort Quoc back to Vietnam. 12 But with just days to go before the 
deportation, Quoc’s solicitors appealed to the Judicial Committee o f the Privy Council in 
London. They claimed that the deportation order was not valid under Hong Kong law.
Thus on 23 October 1931 the Secretary o f State announced that there would be no 
deportation until the results of the appeal to the Privy Council were known.13 Given the 
length of time needed to prepare the briefs, the appeal was not scheduled to be heard until 
November o f 1932.
In the meantime the Surete began to pressure Lam Due Thu to gather information on the 
Vietnamese who had been arrested in Canton, and perhaps to make contact with Quoc. 
After Ly Ung Thuan’s release in late August 1931, on the grounds that she was a Chinese 
national, she went to stay with Thu for a time. In November ‘Agent Pinot’ claimed to have 
received a request from Quoc, for aid in getting the Vietnamese imprisoned in Canton
9 AOM, SPCE 368, Hong Kong 23 June 1931, Francsulat a Gougal, Hanoi. Ho Tung Mau would 
remain on Con Son island until 1945. This would seem to indicate that he was accused of a serious 
criminal offense.
10 South China Morning Post, August 1 1931.
11 PRO, CO 129/535/3 (1931-2), p. 7, note by G.L.M. Ransom, 4 Aug. 1931.
12 AOM, SPCE 368, Dirsurge a Dirsurge, Saigon, sent from Hanoi 24 August 1931.
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released, as well as for help in carrying on the party’s work until the new activists due from 
Russia arrived Quoc was particularly eager that Truong Van Lenh be released to take over 
the party’s affairs in China, according to Lam Due Thu; Quoc may also have been 
concerned about the welfare o f Minh Khai. 14 It is indeed strange that he would have 
contacted a known informer at this point -  perhaps he believed that there was no more 
damage that Thu could do, with the party’s work so badly disrupted. These contacts may 
have resulted in criticism o f Quoc’s conduct after his release. They do not appear to have 
lasted very long in any case. From a report which Lam Due Thu sent on 16 May 1932 we 
discover that Thu was getting information regarding Quoc indirectly, from Loseby’s 
office.
Toward the end o f 1931 Nguyen Ai Quoc was transferred to hospital, where he stayed 
under guard. In December Prince Cuong De sent him a letter, in response to the news that 
Quoc was gravely ill. The Prince sent 300 yen towards Quoc’s medical expenses, and 
advised him to take good care o f himself, for ‘the sake o f the country’.15 (At this stage the 
Vietnamese communists such as Le Hong Son maintained their links to Cuong De, 
perhaps for purely pragmatic and financial reasons.16) Dennis Duncanson’s assertion that 
Quoc was not ill during his imprisonment appears, thus, to be incorrect.17 As we have 
seen, Quoc claimed to have suffered a severe TB attack in September 1930; the French 
consul in Hong Kong, Soulange Teissier, in 1932 confirmed in a letter to his foreign 
minister that Quoc was suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis o f a slow-developing, 
controllable form. In the summer o f 1932 press accounts o f ‘the little Vietnamese, with 
his body debilitated by consumption and the soul o f a ch ief began to appear.18 Later the 
communist press would announce that Quoc had died o f TB in August 1932.19 The French 
were never taken in by these reports, however. Their Hong Kong consulate kept the 
authorities in Hanoi informed o f each stage in Quoc’s efforts to leave the British colony.20
His departure would finally take place in late January 1933, after one false start. On 27 
June 1932 the appeal to the Privy Council was withdrawn, when Quoc’s lawyers agreed
13 CO 129/535/3, p. 27, letter from Howell (?) of 31 Dec. 1931.
14AOM, SPCE 368, ‘pour M. le Directeur de la Surete Gen.’, Saigon, 19 nov. 1931.
15 MAE, Asie, Affaires Communes 91, p. 170, from Mission Noel, Envoi n. 645, 11 jan. 1932.
16 AOM, SPCE 368, Note Conf. n. 3435/S.G. from Hanoi, 2 Oct. 1931 describes Le Hong Son’s 
attempt to get funds from Cuong De in the summer of 1930.
17 Dennis J. Duncanson, ‘Ho Chi Minh in Hong Kong, 1931-32’, China Quarterly, 1-3, 1974, p. 96.
18 AOM, SPCE 368, press clipping from VOpinion, 20 April 1932, story by Jean Dorsenne, ‘Nguyen 
Ai Quoc: 1’Illumine’.
19 An announcement of NAQ’s death appeared in the Daily Worker (London) on 11 Aug. 1932.
20 AOM, SPCE 369, see cable of 20 Jan. 1933 from Gougal, Hanoi to Saigon; and 22 Jan. 1933 from 
the Hong Kong consulate to Gougal.
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with the counsel for the Hong Kong government on new terms for his deportation. Quoc 
was eventually put on a ship to Singapore, where he arrived on 6 January 1933. The 
Straits Settlements authorities refused to allow him to remain, however, so he was sent 
back to Hong Kong where he was re-arrested as he disembarked on 19 January. The Hong 
Kong governor William Peel decided against imposing the one-year prison term meted out 
to illegal immigrants; he also refused to inform Teissier of the details o f Quoc’s subsequent 
departure.21 Loseby this time convinced the authorities to play a more active role in 
implementing their undertaking to help Quoc depart for a destination of his choice. As 
Peel himself explained in his dispatch, he arranged for Quoc to be taken by a ‘non­
government launch’ to the S.S. Anhui lying at a berth outside the Hong Kong harbour late 
on 22 January.22
2. In Hiding/ New Political Currents
Quoc travelled disguised as a wealthy Chinese with Loseby’s secretary, Mr. Lung, to 
Swatow [Shantou].23 At this point in 1933 the Vietnamese communists had not yet re­
established official contacts with the Chinese party and, according to the rules o f 
revolutionary discipline, a party member fresh out of prison was forbidden from returning 
to any o f the addresses he had frequented before his arrest. So perhaps Quoc did, as is 
usually assumed, maintain his disguise o f the wealthy businessman for the next months, 
as he lay low in Swatow. The Vietnamese who were still at large or who, like Nguyen Thi 
Minh Khai, had been released from prison, spent the latter part of 1932 and most of 1933 
trying to restore their communications networks. Ironically, trusted members o f Quoc’s 
Hong Kong circle, Le Hong Son and Minh Khai, as well as the returnee from Moscow,
Tran Ngoc Danh, brother of Tran Phu, found themselves under suspicion when they tried to 
contact the Chinese party in 1932.
The one Vietnamese party member who remained in contact with the CCP in Shanghai was 
Truong Phuoc Dat, a naval mechanic from Phan Rang who in 1929 had been an early 
recruit to the ICP faction in Saigon. After escaping from prison in Saigon and travelling to 
Hong Kong in 1931, he was chosen by the party to go to Russia for study. He and his two 
travelling companions had been turned back at the border in Manchuria, however, so Dat 
returned to Shanghai. Here the CCP’s Jiangsu province military committee assigned him
21AOM, SPCE 369, Francsulat a Gougal, Hanoi, 22 Jan. 1933.
22PRO, CO 129/539/2, pp. 3-4, letter of 31 January, 1933 from Governor Peel to Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister.
23Duncanson learned these details from Loseby’s assistant, Mr. Lung Ting-chang, Duncanson, op.cit.,
p. 100, note 81.
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to restore the links with the French and Vietnamese military men which had been broken 
by the arrests of the Vietnamese propagandists in the summer o f 1931. Thus by mid-1932, 
Truong Phuoc Dat found himself being asked to vouch for the Vietnamese who turned up 
in Shanghai looking for help and money from the Chinese party. Tran Ngoc Danh 
requested funds to support the union o f Vietnamese domestics which he had reorganized 
from old Thanh Nien elements in Hong Kong. He and Minh Khai were attempting to 
rebuild the ICP’s communications network there with the help o f various sailors. Some 
French reports refer to her at the time as his concubine. Le Hong Son was planning to 
return to Siam, from where he hoped to reorganize the ICP Central Committee. The 
Vietnamese gathered in Shanghai decided to send Dat to Siam to work, along with Le 
Hong Son. As this decision displeased him, Truong Phuoc Dat sabotaged their projects by 
accusing them of ‘petit bourgeois’ behaviour (e.g. staying in a modern hotel with 
elevators) in his report to the Chinese CC. Moreover, he denied having known any of 
them before their arrival in Shanghai. In the end the Vietnamese group, which now 
numbered five, had to pawn some o f their clothing in order to pay their hotel bills and 
travel to Nanjing, where they could count on the hospitality o f Ho Hoc Lam.24 Whether 
this episode reflects continuing tension between the former ICP and ACP factions of the 
Vietnamese party, or simply one case o f double-dealing, we do not know. Tran Ngoc Danh 
and Le Hong Son were eventually arrested in Shanghai on 25 September 1932. Truong 
Phuoc Dat himself was captured in April 1933.25 By March 1933 Minh Khai had returned 
to Hong Kong, from where she corresponded with the Vietnamese in Nanjing.26
A French informer in Thailand claimed that Nguyen Ai Quoc was hiding in the Nakhon 
Phanom region from early January 1933, but this was later classified as a case of mistaken 
identity.27 In September 1933 a French informer claimed to have sighted Quoc living in 
Nanning with a small group o f Vietnamese. Agent ‘M aria’ said that among the four 
Vietnamese men living at 78 Cau Song Kai St. one matched the photo o f Nguyen Ai Quoc. 
The informant also mentioned that three women, along with three girls and a boy, were 
living in the same house. Quoc was said to be using the name Ly Sin Sang (Mr. Ly).28
24 AOM, SPCE 367, Declarations faites par Truong Phuoc Dat a la SCirete Gen., 22 May 1933 and 
following days; pp. 43-53.
25 Truong Phuoc Dat may be the Sino-Vietnamese who was planted in Singapore as a British agent in 
1934, and who rose in the MCP to become the Secretary General known as Lai Teck. See Yoki 
Akashi, ‘Lai Teck, Secretary General of the Malayan CP’, Journal o f the South Seas Society, vol. 49, 
1994.
26 AOM, SPCE 385, Envoi n. 92 du S.R. Changhai, translation of 3 letters sent 31 March 1933 by 
Nguyen Thi Minh Khai.
27 AOM, SPCE 369, folder on Nguyen Ai Quoc in Laos.
28 AOM, SPCE 383, Note Conf. n. 394/s, from Cao Bang, 5 Sept. 1933, signed Barthouet.
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However, Le Hong Phong, who was living in Nanning and Longzhou during much of 
1933, made no mention o f contacts with Quoc when he reported to the Comintern in 
January 1935. Phong had planned to go up-country to meet the Siam-based Vietnamese 
when he arrived in Bangkok in February 1932, on his way home from Moscow and Paris. 
But finding himself under close police surveillance, he gave up this plan after ten days and 
by April had moved on to Canton and Nanning. Here he began to reconstitute the 
communist group in the Vietnamese border province of Cao Bang and also formed some 
new cells in Langson province. He propagandized among the cadets at the Nanning 
military academy, which since 1925 had been a source of communist recruits. In August 
1933 he met his fellow returned students Ha Huy Tap and Nguyen Van Dut in Canton, and 
by June 1934 they had constituted an Overseas Bureau to manage the party’s affairs until 
an in-country Central Committee could be created. 29
If Nguyen Ai Quoc had taken refuge in Nanning, we can assume that he had moved on by 
September. For it was at the end o f September 1933 that his old acquaintance from the 
French CP, Paul Vaillant-Couturier, showed up in Shanghai for an Asian Congress 
Against War. Quoc later claimed that it was Vailllant-Couturier who helped him get back 
to Moscow by putting him in touch with Soviet representatives in Shanghai.30 (The USSR 
had restored diplomatic relations with China at the end of 1932. The new ambassador 
presented his credentials in Shanghai on 2 May 1933.) The conference was held 
clandestinely in a private home on 30 September. The French reported that the participants 
included Lord Marley, Vaillant-Couturier, a Dr. Marteaux, the American journalist Harold 
Isaacs, a Soviet representative and fifty Chinese, including Mme. Sun Yatsen.31 Several o f 
these personalities were leading members o f the Berlin-based Anti-Imperialist League. 
Nguyen Ai Quoc may have stayed away from the proceedings, but it seems to be from 
this period that Harold Isaacs retained a memory o f Quoc as, ‘my Shanghai friend o f long 
ago’.32 We can only speculate on how close Quoc’s ties to Song Jingling, Mme.Sun, were. 
But there is no reason to discount his story that he made contact with Vaillant-Couturier by 
arriving at her house in his disguise as a wealthy Chinese, to leave a letter for her.
By this point in 1933, as Nguyen Ai Quoc began to plan for his return to Moscow, the left- 
wing of Vietnamese politics was once again making itself felt. Radical students returned 
from France had demonstrated the continuing anti-establishment sentiments o f the Saigon
29 RC, 495, 154, 686, pp. 1-12, ‘On the work of the last three years and the internal situation of the
ICP’, dated 15 Jan. 1935, written in Russian, signed ‘Hai An’.
30 Days With Ho Chi Minh, (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1965), p. 81.
31 SLOTFOM III, 127, folder ‘Congres Asiatique contre la guerre’.
32 Harold Isaacs, No Peace For Asia, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1947, 1967), p. 163.
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populace by winning two places in municipal council elections held in late April and early 
May. Although the election o f Nguyen Van Tao, an ICP member, and Tran Van Thach, a 
Trotskyist, was annulled in August, their initial success pointed towards the future 
development of the La Lutte front between the Trotskyist and ICP communists.33 The 
Stalin School student Tran Van Giau had returned to South Vietnam in early 1933, where 
he was rebuilding the ICP in line with the dictates of the radical 1932 Action Programme 
which he had helped to draft in Moscow.34 ICP members in Siam, as well as Vietnamese 
who had become members o f the Siam CP, were also actively supporting the rebirth of the 
ICP via a Committee to Aid Indochina.35 Anti-imperialism, in the interpretation o f the 
‘Third Period’ had become an expression o f world-wide proletarian solidarity, while 
nationalism was an out-moded concept. Daniel Hemery notes that in 21 months o f 
publication, up to June 1936, La Lutte mentioned Vietnamese national aspirations in only 
20 articles, and then often in the context o f criticism of bourgeois patriotism.36 Yet a 
meeting ‘Against Fascism and W ar’ held in Saigon’s Khanh Hoi Theatre on 11 August 
1933 was attended by over six hundred participants, according to a French report, and 
attracted a cross-section o f activists ranging from Duong Van Giao and Trinh Hung Ngau, 
associated with the Constitutionalists, to Nguyen Van Tao and Tran Van Thach. Vaillant- 
Couturier attended this meeting before travelling on to Shanghai, and received warm 
applause when he described actions in Paris in support o f the Vietnamese political 
prisoners under sentence o f death.37 Ta Thu Thau, who had been an active member o f the 
Anti-imperialist League in Europe, may have been involved in organizing this meeting.
The French believed, however, that the legal political activities o f Nguyen Van Tao and 
Tran Van Thach were connected to Tran Van Giau’s return to Vietnam.38
Although the full elaboration o f the Comintern’s revamped united front policy would not 
come until its Seventh Congress in 1935, by 1933 one can already observe a drawing-back 
from the class-against-class radicalism expounded in 1929. Nazi power in Germany had 
become a real factor to reckon with, while the designs o f the imperialist powers in Asia 
appeared as an ever-growing threat both to the Soviet Union and the Chinese communists.
33 Daniel Hemery, Revolutionnaires vietnamiens etpouvoir colonial en indochine, (Paris: Maspero, 
1975), pp. 58-9.
34 See R.C. 495, 154, 676, p. 34; letter to Cam. Vasilieva of 20 Dec. 1934 from ‘Honam’. In this 
letter Giau defends himself against allegations that he was misinterpreting the ‘Action Programme’, 
which he says that he ‘helped to edit’.
35AOM, SLOTFOM III, 54, Noteperiodique de la Direction de la Stir. Gen., first trimester 1935, 
Chap.l. p. 1.
36 Hemery, op. cit,, pp. 105-107.
37 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 127, from folder Congres Asiatiqne contre la Guerre.
38 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 54, Note Periodique n. 34 de la Direction de la Sur. Gen., first trimester 1935, 
Chap. I, p. 23.
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Otto Braun claims that as early as January 1933 an ECCI directive recognized the need for 
a ‘united struggle against Japan’ with any Chinese army or group which would end attacks 
against the Soviet regions.39 A Comintern pamphlet which appeared in July 1933 
addressed to the Indian and Indochinese communists reverted to the Leninist strategy of 
emphasizing the national independence struggle over the goals of the socialist revolution. 
The pamphlet, first published in English by the Pan Pacific Worker, was the record of a 
question and answer session with ‘Orgwald’, who from Comintern documents can be 
identified as the old Bolshevik Osip Piatnitsky who headed the Comintern’s all-important 
Organization Department between the Fifth and Seventh Congresses (1924-1935). It is not 
surprising that by mid-1933 the rise of Hitler was causing some Bolsheviks to re-examine 
their views on nationalism and united fronts. ‘Orgwald’ advised in his pamphlet that it 
would be unwise at present to call for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, as that would 
alienate the peasantry and the urban petty-bourgeoisie. A united front with nationalist 
parties would be acceptable if it followed the principle of ‘fight together, but march 
apart’.40 This material was not published in French until 1934 and we have no evidence 
that it was published in Vietnamese at all. It contradicted the policy line brought back from 
Moscow by key ICP leaders such as Tran Van Giau and Ha Huy Tap. This divergence 
between the class-against-class line o f the ‘Third Period’ and the new tactics which began 
to be discussed in 1933 would become a serious stumbling block to ICP unity.
Evidence o f this divergence can be seen in the long letter addressed to the Indochinese 
communists from the CCP’s Central Committee in August 1934. It was given the 
Comintern’s sanction as a political directive. (As late as March 1935, Vera Vasilieva 
would refer to it in correspondence to the ICP’s Overseas Bureau as a document which laid 
out ‘those basic tasks on which you must concentrate all your attention at present’.41) In all 
likelihood this letter was prepared in Moscow with Comintern support by the Chinese CC 
members there, led by Wang Ming. While it called for the creation o f a legal press and the 
exploitation of other legal organizing possibilities, it sent a strong warning against 
cooperation with social democrats and the nationalist bourgeoisie. It cited the failure o f the 
Austrian uprising o f 1934 as an example o f the ‘traitorous influence’ o f social democracy. 
Although the letter acknowledged that many members of the Indochinese bourgeoisie were 
eager to fight French imperialism, the workers and peasants must never forget that the 
‘nationalist bourgeoisie, self-interested and cowardly, betrayed the movement o f 1930- 
3 1 ...’. ‘In the situation of general discontent which is growing in the country, national-
39 Otto Braun, Kitaiskiie Zapiski [Notes on China], (Moscow: Iz. Politicheskoi Literatury, 1974), pp.
35-36.
40 References from McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, pp. 161-162.
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reformism will try more than once to take over the leadership of the mass movement, in 
order to behead it,’ the letter read. ‘This is precisely why we must constantly work to 
unmask all o f the national-reformist groups and parties, no matter what “leftist” slogans 
they hide behind... \ 42
This Chinese letter might be interpreted as an effort by some Comintern leaders to combat 
the French party’s decision to cooperate with the Socialist Party, which had been made at 
an FCP CC meeting 14 and 15 March 1934.43 Nguyen Ai Quoc’s old contact Jacques 
Doriot was among the most out-spoken advocates o f this rapprochement with the French 
socialists. But in Saigon, where there was no socialist party, the united front o f the left 
remained a joint effort o f the Moscow-oriented and Trotskyist communists. The formal La 
Lutte front was launched at a September 1934 meeting led by Nguyen An Ninh. It was an 
alliance aimed against the colonial government and the Constitutionalist Party with a 
strongly proletarian orientation.44
3. Return to Moscow
Nguyen Ai Quoc did not get back to Moscow until July 1934, by his own account.45 There 
is no information about how he spent the autumn of 1933 and the first months o f 1934. He 
returned to a Moscow which must have been quite changed from the place he had known in 
1923-24 and again briefly in 1927. It was no longer the free-wheeling city o f the NEP 
which he had experienced on his first visit; nor was it the politically charged communist 
capital where the final battles for control of the Soviet party were about to be played out in 
1927. Stalin’s cult o f personality and control o f all Soviet institutions was creating a 
deadened political climate dominated by paranoia and a siege mentality towards the outside 
world.
By 1930 purges (chistld or literally ‘cleansings’) in Comintern institutions such as the Sun 
Yatsen School, closed that year, and the International Lenin School had become a feature 
o f Comintern life. A purge of the French section of the Lenin School, where Nguyen Ai 
Quoc would enroll in October 1934, was held in October 1933, presided over by Andre 
Marty o f the Romance Secretariat. An essay by one o f the students with the pseudonym
41 RC, 495, 154, 585, p. 5, Letter to Indochinese Comrades, signed ‘Vasilieva’, 17 March 1935.
42 Inprecor, nos. 73-4, 11 August 1934, pp. 1189-1192 (French edition); second part of letter printed in 
nos. 75-6.
43 Cahiers du Bolshevisme, n. 7, 1 April 1934.
44 Hemery, op. cit., p. 63.
45 RC, 495, 201, 1 p. 132, ‘Autobiography’ dated 17 April 1938, signed ‘Lin’.
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‘Bretane’ gives some idea of what was required during these ‘cleansings’. Even among 
those who had not committed any political errors, or were not threatened with expulsion 
from the party, a high degree o f self-abasement was required. In his essay titled, ‘Purging 
as a Factor of Bolshevization’, Bretane writes: ‘What is important is to lay bare the 
weaknesses which remain in order to eliminate them. We have been able to see, via -
various biographies, that at the bottom of these weaknesses lie social origin and the foreign 
influence which is imprinted on the militant when he is working abroad’.46 Yelena Bonner, 
whose step-father Gevork Alikhanov was a top official in the Comintern’s Cadres 
Department, watched from behind a curtain in her home at the Lux Hotel, as he and others 
were investigated by a troika in 1933, They were expected to bare their souls and reveal 
even their most personal secrets, down to past romantic liaisons and any resulting 
children.47
When Nguyen Ai Quoc turned up in the summer o f 1934 there is reason to believe that he 
expected to be the object o f an investigation o f some sort. Vera Vasilieva’s daughter, then 
a girl o f ten, has a memory o f him sleeping on the couch in the wooden house where her 
family then lived in central Moscow, as though he were trying to keep a low profile.48 
Quoc had, after all, been involved in a series of arrests which had been a major blow for 
both the Far Eastern Bureau and the Chinese CP in 1931. Vasilieva, a naive and perhaps 
unimaginative Bolshevik, is known to have defended friends accused o f political misdeeds, 
including her own husband, M ark Zorky 49 But there is no record o f any political 
difficulties for Quoc in the Comintern files, until the time of the Seventh Congress the 
following year. He recounts in his autobiographical questionnaire that he spent several 
months recuperating from his illness in the Crimea in 1934, then enrolled in the Lenin 
School in October.50 At that time he was the only Indochinese registered at the school, 
although the Comintern planned to admit twelve Indochinese students for a short-term 
course for the 1935-36 term.51 It does not appear that these places were filled. The school 
was described at this time by its director, Kirsanova, as ‘the only forge o f cadres for the 
Communist International’52 and was viewed as a training institute for foreign communist 
leaders. Still, there was an element o f disgrace for such leaders as Li Lisan and Quoc who
46 RC, 531, 1, 260, Bulletin de I’Epuration, p. 13.
47 Yelena Bonner, Mothers and Daughters, (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1992), pp. 147-50,
48 Author’s interview with Neiia Zorkaia, Moscow 1992.
49 According to Vasilieva’s Comintern biography, she defended her husband against accusations that
he had been close to the disgraced Comintern operative Madyiar. (RC, 495, 65a, 956).
50 RC, 495, 201, 1, p. 132, ‘Autobiography’, dated 17 April 1938, signed ‘Lin’.
51 RC, 531, 1, 50, Decree of ECCI Political Commission on the selection of students for the 1935-36
academic year, issued 15 Oct. 1934.
52RC, 531, 1, 51, p. 36, letter from Kirsanova to Kaganovich, Secretariat of Soviet Party CC, 22 Aug.
1934.
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were sent there. The fact is that (in Li’s case in particular) they had earlier served in the 
top ranks of their parties and might have expected to be given work in the ECCI, had their 
status remained intact.
On 1 December 1934, as preparations for the Seventh Congress were underway, the 
Leningrad Party chief, Sergei Kirov, was shot by an intruder in his headquarters at the 
Smolny Institute. This murder provided Stalin with a pretext to begin a man-hunt for 
enemies o f the state.53 As the era o f the Popular Front was dawning, then, a new round of 
suppression o f Stalin’s political enemies, real and imagined, was about to begin. When on 
8 December the three Congress delegates sent by the ICP arrived in Moscow, a mini­
crisis erupted at the Stalin School. Because the OMS failed to meet them at the train 
station, the three had had to make their own way to the hostel where the Vietnamese were 
housed — this was viewed as a major lapse in conspiratorial technique. Three people filed 
reports on the incident: Vera Vasilieva, Kotelnikov of the Eastern Secretariat, and ‘Kan 
Sin’ (Kang Sheng), whose position is not given on his report.54
The three Vietnamese delegates were Le Hong Phong, the senior member o f the Overseas 
Bureau; a member o f the Tay minority who went by the name Cao-bang or Van-Tan in 
Moscow, whose real name was Hoang Van Non; and Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, referred to 
in a letter from Ha Huy Tap to the Comintern as ‘Quoc’s wife’. Quoc would also be 
designated as a Congress delegate by the ICP plenum held in March 1935.55 On the 
autobiographical form which Minh Khai filled in after her arrival, she wrote that she was 
married and gave her husband’s name as ‘Lin’.56 This would seem to show that theirs was 
more than a fleeting liaison, in spite of the French suspicion that she had been the mistress 
o f Tran Ngoc Danh. (Nguyen Ai Quoc, however, never mentioned a wife on any o f his 
official Comintern forms.) In Moscow she took the name ‘Fan Lank
Between December 1934 and the end of March 1935 several reports on the situation o f the 
ICP arrived in Moscow from Vietnam. In addition Le Hong Phong wrote a long account 
in Russian of his activities since his return to Southeast Asia in February 1932.57 Quoc 
wrote his own critique o f the ICP’s failings during the ‘revolutionary upsurge’ o f
53 See Robert Conquest, Stalin and the Kirov Murder, (London: Hutchinson, 1989).
54 RC, 495, 154, 543, ‘Declarations made 15 and 17 Dec. 1934 to the Rector of KUTV, Eastern
Secretariat, and the Political Commission of the ECCI’ (in Russian).
55 RC, 495, 154, 688, p. 14, letter from Overseas Bureau to Moscow, 31 March 1935,
56 RC, 495, 201, 35, ‘Ankieta’ dated 14 Dec. 1934.
57 RC, 495,154, 686, pp. 1-12, see ref. on p. 196.
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1930-31.58 (He undoubtedly wrote other accounts of his activities from 1930 -1934, but 
these are not available in the archives.) With the Comintern’s policy now shifting back to 
where it had been in 1924-27, Quoc apparently felt safe in criticizing the ICP’s generally 
low level of theoretical understanding, and in particular the fact that, ‘the majority of 
comrades -  even those in charge -  do not understand the meaning o f “the bourgeois 
democratic revolution”.’ ‘They repeat words without understanding their meaning.. .and 
very often find themselves caught out in their propaganda and agitation work’, he wrote.
He also criticized the mechanistic way in which workers had been trained to organize a 
strike, without being encouraged to make decisions based on their own judgment of the 
situation. Another danger which he raised was that the workers who had been brought into 
the leading party organs, ‘always allow themselves to be influenced by the intellectual 
elements, because they have read everything in the theses or in books’. ‘This is what had 
happened in 1930-31,’ he said, ‘when our comrades were old and experienced militants. 
Now, all or almost all of these comrades are in prison or have been killed. The comrades 
today are younger and less experienced, and are as a result likely to make more serious 
errors,’ he wrote.
The remedy which he proposed was the production of a series o f short brochures in simple 
language on themes starting with The Communist Manifesto and Comintern history, 
moving to ‘the national question’ and ‘the agrarian question’, and ending with ‘how to 
form a united front’ and ‘the Comintern’s theses and resolutions on the colonial question’. 
He had learned to quote Stalin at the appropriate moment -  ‘Stalin is a thousand times 
right,’ Quoc wrote, ‘when he says that, “Theory gives the comrades... the power of 
direction, clarity o f perspective, faith in their work and confidence in the victory o f our 
cause.’” 59 One can assume that Quoc realized that the prevailing theory had changed since 
1928-29, but was intelligent enough not to point this out in writing. His attitude as a 
teacher and student at the Stalin School, as we shall see, would seem to show that he did 
not take M oscow’s approach to theoretical training terribly seriously.
Le Hong Phong’s report of his activities from the end o f 1931 until his return to Moscow at 
the end o f 1934 is a factual, almost a-political account o f his successes and failures. The 
reports which Ha Huy Tap (Sinitchkin in Moscow) sent back to Moscow between 
December 1934 and April 1935 have quite a different tone.60 They show that he began to 
take a more active, even dictatorial role in shaping the ICP after Le Hong Phong’s
58 RC, 495, 154, 686, p. 13, Lin’s letter of 16 January 1935 to Eastern Secretariat.
59 Loc. cit., p. 14.
60 E.g. R.C. 495, 154, 586, letter of 20 April 1935, to Bureau d’Orient, signed ‘Cin.’
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departure for Moscow. A slight man known by the nickname ‘Sniffles’ (Khit) in Saigon 
and as ‘Mr. Short’ in China, Ha Huy Tap seems to have gone back to Asia with the foil 
trust o f the Comintern in m id-193 3. One Surete report refers to him as a irenifleur‘, a 
‘sniffer’ or ‘bloodhound’, perhaps a play on his nickname.61 He was for a time the only 
one in the Overseas Bureau whom the Comintern trusted-with the cipher code for the radio 
messages which it was beginning to use for communications in 1934-1935.62 The security 
obsession induced in the Comintern by the Kirov murder would have made the Moscow 
apparat appreciative o f someone with Ha Huy Tap’s penchant for detailed reporting. 
Moreover, for the Eastern Secretariat security had become a major preoccupation after the 
destruction o f the CCP’s Shanghai Bureau in December 1934. At that time the Comintern 
lost its only radio link with the CCP, which was in the middle o f its Long March. (After 
that the ICP was instructed to cut off all contact with the CCP and the Soviet Consulate in 
Shanghai.)63 In any case, Ha Huy Tap would eventually have the distinction o f 
denouncing Tran Van Giau, Nguyen Ai Quoc, and a number o f other ICP members, 
including one o f Quoc’s liaison agents Nguyen Van Tram (Cao Van Binh).64 During the 
lead-up to the Seventh Congress (which originally had been scheduled for 1934, then for 
March 1935 and finally opened in July) Nguyen Ai Quoc was perhaps the one who 
suffered the most dramatic loss of trust.
The ICP’s 27-31 March 1935 Congress in Macao passed a 30-page political resolution, 
selected a new Central Committee and permitted Ha Huy Tap to take control o f the ICP in 
Le Hong Phong’s absence. What it did not do, however, was reflect the currents o f change 
in Moscow, which would only be articulated at the Seventh Comintern Congress in the 
summer. At the end o f 1934 Tap had reported that the party had around 600 members, 
including those in Laos and Cambodia.65 Thirteen had managed to attend the Congress, he 
claimed. It selected a Central Committee headed by the absent Le Hong Phong, including 
eight workers, one poor peasant from the Tay minority, three intellectuals and one member 
from Annam still to be selected (profession unknown).66 Nguyen Ai Quoc was listed 
number 13 as a candidate member. The Moscow trainees in the CC included the worker 
‘Din-Tan’ (Tran Van Diem), head o f the party committee in Tonkin; and ‘Svan’ (Nguyen 
Van Dut), then head o f the Inter-regional Committee in Cochinchina. Ha Huy Tap
61 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 54, Note Periodique n. 34 de la Direction Sur. Gen., first trimester 1935,
Chap. 1, p. 62.
62 RC, 495, 154, 585, undated letter signed ‘Vasilieva’, written before receipt of March plenum
materials.
63 Ibid.
64 AOM, SLOTFOM III, 54, Note periodique de la S.G., 2e trimestre, 1935, pp. 64-6, on Nguyen Van
Tram. On Tran Van Giau see RC, 495, 154, 676, letter of 28 Dec. 1934 to Bureau d’Orient from ‘Jos.’
65 RC, 495, 154, 676, p. 15, letter of 20 Dec. 1934.
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reserved for himself a position in the Overseas Bureau, which at this point had the power to 
give political guidance to the CC.67
At the end o f his report on the Congress, Tap brought up the issue of Nguyen Ai Quoc. He 
said that the Congress had designated Comrade Line as the ICP’s representative to the 
Comintern. But at the same time he wrote that,
In Siam and in Indochina the communist organizations are carrying out an open 
struggle against the remnants o f the national-revolutionary ideology, mixed with 
reformism and idealism, o f the Thanh Nien association and o f Comrade Nguyen Ai 
Quoc. These remnants are very strong and constitute a very serious obstacle to the 
development o f communism. This pitiless struggle against the old opportunist 
theories of Quoc and Thanh Nien is indispensable. The two party committees in 
Siam and in Indochina will write a brochure against these tendencies. We propose 
that Comrade Line himself write a brochure to criticize himself and his past failings.68
By the end of April 1935 Ha Huy Tap felt obliged to make his criticisms clearer. As the 
final point o f a four-page letter hand-written in French, which dealt with various cases of 
suspected treachery in the ICP, he informed the Eastern Secretariat that several delegates to 
the Macao Congress had discussed Quoc’s responsibility for the arrests of over 100 former 
Thanh Nien members trained in Canton. Tap listed their reasons as follows:
a) Quoc knew that Lam Due Thu was a provocateur, yet continued to use him; b)
Quoc was wrong to demand 2 photos of each student, his real name, address, the 
names of parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents...; c) in the country, in Siam 
and in the prisons, they continue to talk about Quoc’s responsibility, responsibility 
which he could never deny; d) the photos demanded by Quoc and Lam are now in the 
hands o f the police; e) gradually as the party’s line becomes clearer to party members 
and to the masses, they are criticizing more severely the policy followed by Com.
Quoc. The general secretary o f the Siam CP, formerly a convinced follower o f Quoc, 
is one of those who says that before 1930, Quoc was not a communist!!! 69
In response to the ICP proposal that Quoc become their representative to the Comintern, 
Vasilieva gave a definite ‘no’. ‘Quoc will have to study seriously for the next two years 
and will not be able to undertake anything else,’ she explained; ‘after his studies we have 
special plans to make use o f him.’70 We do not know whether she had received the April 
denunciation when she wrote these remarks. The April letter appears to have affected 
Quoc’s role at the Seventh Congress, however. On one list o f Congress delegates, giving
66 RC, 495, 154, 688, p. 19, letter of 31 March 1935 from Overseas Bureau to Comintern.
67 See RC, 495, 154, 675, p. 32, Resolutions of Overseas Bureau Conference, (Russian version), 15-20 
July 1934, on the role of the Overseas Bureau.
68 RC, 495, 154, 688, letter in French from Overseas Bureau 31 March, 1935. The final remark on Lin 
does not appear in the Russian translation.
69 RC, 495, 154, 586, p. 4 of letter, 20 April 1935, signed, ‘Cin.’
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the nature o f their mandate, someone wrote, ‘necessary to refuse’ next to Quoc’s name.71 
Most lists o f Congress delegates show three representatives from Indochina, one o f whom 
was a woman — all three o f these were listed as having full votes. The two Siamese 
delegates received consultative votes (soveshchatelniie golosy), which in communist 
practice meant that their votes did not count.72 But it seems that Quoc did not even receive 
that. One can argue that he was kept away from the public Congress proceedings to 
preserve secrecy, but then one has to ask why any Vietnamese, all of whom were expected 
to return to active political work in Indochina, should have been given public roles.
If an investigation or commission was organized to investigate the latest charges against 
Quoc, it is likely to have taken place just before the Seventh Congress. Given the concern 
with security lapses in the wake o f the Kirov murder, it would be strange if  no action at all 
had been taken. One account given many years later by a former staff member of the 
Soviet Central Committee’s International Department, Anatoly Voronin, has it that Quoc 
was investigated by a troika composed o f Dmitry Manuilsky, Kang Sheng and Vera 
Vasilieva. According to this version, Manuilsky was neutral, while Kang Sheng called for 
Quoc’s execution. Vasilieva is said to have defended him, on the grounds that his mistakes 
in security procedure were made out of inexperience.73 In 1935 it would have been more 
likely that Kang Sheng called for Quoc’s expulsion from the party than for his execution, if 
he believed that Quoc shared the guilt for the 1931 arrests. But without some kind o f 
documentary evidence, which may well be hidden in the archives o f the former KGB, we 
have no idea as to how seriously Ha Huy Tap’s accusations were taken. The Vietnamese 
communists themselves, though, were well aware that their party had been penetrated by 
the Surete. At the end o f 1934, Ha Huy Tap had sent a list to Moscow which analyzed the 
record o f the 37 Vietnamese students who had left Moscow for France or Asia. Of these, 
12 were classified as having turned traitor or provocateur. Only ten were listed as 
‘professional revolutionaries ’ .74
Some light is shed on the Comintern’s handling o f cases such as Quoc’s by Joseph 
Ducroux’s report o f his treatment in Moscow, when he returned in January 1934. Ducroux 
wrote in 1970 that the OMS chief Abramov had been keen to lay the blame for his 
Singapore arrest on Ducroux’s own technical errors. He was not treated as a returned
70 RC, 495, 154, 585, undated letter signed ‘Vasilieva’.
71 RC, 494, 1, 454, p. 264; From Seventh Congress file containing correspondence of the Commission 
on Mandates and lists of Congress delegates.
72 RC, 494, 1,454, p. 205, list of country reps, dated 26 July 1935.
73 Conversation with Anatoly Voronin, spring 1992.
74 RC, 495, 154, 676, p. 37, letter of 28 Dec. 1934, signed ‘Jos.’.
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hero, and was only authorized to eat in the common dining hall at the Lux Hotel, not with 
the political leaders. He was summoned to a meeting in the ECCI, at which Manuilsky, 
Lozosky, Piatnitsky and Bela Kun were present. Manuilsky made a ‘violent attack’ against 
him, and called for his expulsion from the party. Lozovsky showed more understanding o f 
the difficult conditions-he had worked in. After two days he was informed that he could 
stay in Moscow to work as a translator for the bulletin, Communist International. Instead, 
Ducroux asked to be sent back to France. Permission was granted, but he was forbidden to 
take on any work connected with the FCP’s Central Committee.75 Nguyen Ai Quoc would 
in a similar fashion be removed from work that involved political decision making. Quoc 
faced the added complication o f involvement in the affairs of the Chinese CP, in particular 
in the difficult days of 1930. It is possible that Kang Sheng had a grudge against him, as 
someone who knew what his role had been in the period o f Li Lisan’s ascendancy, or as 
someone who may have known about the failures o f his special security organization in
1933. After the Kirov murder, Kang is said to have begun to agitate for a new purge of the 
Chinese party in Moscow.76 But again, without more documentary evidence there is very 
little that one can say with certainty about the relationship between Quoc and Kang Sheng.
4. The Seventh Comintern Congress
The Seventh Comintern Congress at last opened on 25 July 1935. It achieved a belated 
consensus in support of an alliance with the social democratic left in the fight against 
fascism in Europe. This consensus had been painstakingly prepared since the middle of
1934, when the French CP had agreed to carry out ‘joint action’ against fascism with the 
French Socialist Party. There appears to have been little in the way o f spontaneous debate 
and all Congress resolutions were passed in unanimity. The political passions of the Sixth 
Congress, where the nature o f the ‘Third Period’ and the effects of colonialism had been 
thrashed out, were now carefully channelled by the Comintern leadership. In a 
transformation apparently conceived by Georgy Dimitrov in July 1934, the Comintern 
would grant greater freedom o f manoeuvre to individual communist parties, but would at 
the same time renew its apparat and ‘build a close link between the Comintern leadership 
and the Politbureau of the Soviet party’.77 The Comintern was now leaving behind the 
extremism of 1929 and the Tenth Plenum, when the radical tactics laid down in Moscow 
were imposed without regard to local conditions on the worldwide communist movement. 
Dimitrov emphasized the necessity o f taking into account the uniqueness o f conditions in
75 Joseph Ducroux, unpublished memoir dated 16 Sept., 1970, copy in author’s possession.
76 See Victor Usov, ‘Kang Sheng -  Chinese Beria’, in Far Eastern Affairs, no. 4, 1991, pp. 146-7.
77 Adibekov et al., Organizational Structures o f the Comintern, p. 179.
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different parts of the world and the unequal development within the communist movement; 
a standardized approach should not take the place of concrete analysis in various 
countries.78 But at the same time the Comintern would continue to aid its member parties 
in training ‘truly Bolshevik leaders’. 79 Dimitrov may have convinced Stalin to accept 
what was already happening in France and China, where the parties were making decisions 
in response to their own political situations, by agreeing to a tighter level o f control by the 
Soviet leader at the top-most level of the Comintern.
A small, cohesive Secretariat o f the ECCI was chosen in August 1935, whose members 
would each have their own secretariat, directing the affairs of a group o f communist 
parties. Dimitrov, General Secretary o f the Comintern, took charge o f the Chinese party, 
while Wang Ming became responsible for the South American and Carribean parties. 
Responsibility for Indochina was in the hands o f Manuilsky’s secretariat, which handled 
the countries o f the former Romance Secretariat and their colonies. Thus, throughout most 
o f the Popular Front period, at least until the autumn of 1937, the Vietnamese communists 
were in close contact with the French CP. Otto Kuusinen, a specialist in Indian questions, 
took on the parties of Japan, Korea, India and Siam. The Philippines fell under Andre 
M arty’s secretariat, since he ran the affairs o f the Anglophone countries and some o f their 
colonies; the Netherlands and Indonesia became the province o f Ercoli (Togliatti).80 The 
interests o f the Southeast Asian parties were in this way subordinated to the needs of the 
parties in the metropolitan countries.81
In 1935, as many authors have emphasized, the Comintern superimposed the concept o f a 
united front on the radical policies of 1928 and 1929. The stage o f renouncing socialist 
goals, even if  temporarily, had not yet arrived. As McDermott and Agnew write, ‘The 
close identification of Stalin with the sectarian tactics and theories o f the Third Period 
precluded any far-reaching critical examination o f the experience of the previous six years. 
As such the Popular Front era was marked by an unresolved tension between tradition and 
innovation, between inherited ideological and organizational structures and the initiatives 
o f communist parties to re-engage with democratic national political cultures.’82 Nguyen 
Ai Quoc’s desire expressed in January 1935, to look at the failings of 1930-31 in terms o f 
a misunderstanding o f the ‘bourgeois democratic revolution’, may have been ahead o f the
78 Ibid., p. 180.
79 Ibid., p. 181.
80 Ibid., p. 188-9.
81 See Charles McLane, op. cit, pp. 212-13, for a discussion of the Seventh Congress and 
subordination of the interests of the S.E. Asian parties to those of the metropolitan parties.
82 McDermott and Agnew, op. cit., p. 131.
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times. Dimitrov explicitly stated in his Congress report that the united front would not 
signal a move back to the concept of the two-stage revolution. It would be a mistake, he 
said, to see an anti-fascist coalition government as ‘a special democratic intermediate stage 
lying between the dictatorship o f the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship o f the proletariat’.83 
At this stage there was still scant information in Moscow about the progress of the Long 
March. Wang Ming and the other Chinese leaders assumed that a new soviet district was 
being established in Sichuan, around Chengdu.84 Wilhelm Pieck could, thus, still cite the 
creation o f soviets in China as the ‘outstanding event’ in the Asian communist movement 
since the Sixth Comintern Congress.85 But in the absence o f a special commission on 
Colonial and Semi-colonial Countries, the Seventh Congress did not elaborate a clear 
message for the colonies o f the western nations.
Le Hong Phong was the only Southeast Asian to become a member o f the ECCI at the 
1935 congress. This placed him in the elite company o f the Chinese leaders Mao Zedong, 
Zhou Enlai, Zhang Guotao and Wang Ming. (Kang Sheng and Bo Gu were made 
candidate members.)86 When he addressed the Congress on the fourth day, under the 
pseudonym of Hai An, Phong emphasized the importance of the Chinese experience for 
Vietnam. The October Revolution in Russia had played a large role in the development o f 
the revolution in Vietnam, he said. ‘But it is the victorious soviet movement in China 
which is playing the decisive role,’ he claimed. ‘During our party’s entire history, the 
Chinese PC has given us aid and support and shared its experience... Close fraternal ties 
bind our two parties,’ he said.87 The true relevance o f the Chinese soviets for Indochina in 
this period is not clear from Hai A n’s speech, however. After the period o f the ICP’s 
‘maximum development’ in 1930-31, he explained, there remained nothing more than 
isolated communist groups in Vietnam. But at the present moment, he said, ‘the movement 
is developing on a much broader base than in the past. The most diverse strata o f the 
population, the most backwards elements o f the working class, the national minorities 
(Moi, Tho, Laos, e tc ...), the broad masses o f the petite bourgeoisie, the intellectuals have 
all been pulled into the struggle,’88 But he regretted the fact that his comrades had not yet 
considered the task o f creating a united front based on ‘a broad anti-imperialist front’.89
83 McDermott and Agnew, op. cit. p. 132, reference taken from G. Dimitrov, The WorIcing Class
Against Fascism, (London, 1935).
84 McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists 1931-1946, (New York: Columbia Univ.,
1958), p. 56.
85 Cited in McLane, Soviet Policies in Southeast Asia., p. 211.
86 Adibekov et al., op. cit., p. 182-3; list of ECCI members footnoted to 494/1/399, ‘ The Report of the
Commission on Mandates and the election of the ECCI’, pp. 54-5.
87 RC, 494, 1, 177, pp 39-40.
88 RC, 494, 1, 177, p. 44.
89 RC, 494, 1, 177, p. 48.
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Nguyen Thi Minh Khai’s intervention at the Congress on 16 August also demonstrates the 
intermediate state of progress towards the united anti-fascist front. She spoke on the anti­
war themes raised by Ercoli’s report to the Congress. She mentioned women’s issues only 
briefly, to lament the small number o f women at the Congress. Her main theme was the 
increasing danger o f French militarism in the Pacific and the transformation o f Indochina 
into a French military base. The task o f the ICP was thus to ‘mobilize all its forces to 
create a broad popular front to struggle for peace’. Although the Soviet Union had in June 
1934 agreed to a mutual assistance treaty with France, the ICP vowed to ‘unmask French 
imperialist policies, using the concrete example o f Indochina’.90 Only after the election of 
a Popular Front government in France in the spring of 1936 would the ICP begin to modify 
its opposition to French defence efforts.
5. The United Front in Indochina
In examining the results o f the Seventh Comintern Congress, one is struck by the fact that 
the change to a new united front policy did not immediately bring about a reversal of 
fortune for Nguyen Ai Quoc. We do not know what Vasilieva had had in mind when she 
wrote of ‘plans to use him after two years o f study’ -  but we do know that Quoc remained 
in Moscow after the return to Asia o f Le Hong Phong in 1936 and then o f Minh Khai and 
Hoang Van Non in 1937. A note from Vasilieva to ‘Dmitry Zaharovich’ (Manuilsky), 
which must have been written in late 1935 or early 1936, confirms that in Moscow Le 
Hong Phong was taking the lead in developing the line of the ICP at this time. Vasilieva 
writes that, ‘Hai An wants to hold a consultation on Indochinese questions in the coming 
days, as he has to 1) write a letter to the party ... and 2) will probably have to spend several 
days in hospital... ’.91 Eight Comintern staff members were invited to the consultation: 
Manuilsky, Kuusinen, Kon-Sin (Kang-Sheng), Wang Ming, Stepanov, Gere, Mirov and 
Vasilieva. At the bottom o f this list Vasilieva has noted that the two Indochinese students 
from the Stalin School and ‘Comrade Lin (Ai-kvak)’ from the Lenin School can also be 
called on to attend.92
During 1936 the ICP produced several letters on the subject of a united front in Indochina. 
The earliest o f these may have been drafted in Moscow following the consultation referred 
to above. A letter in French from the Indochinese Section of the Anti-imperialist League to
90 RC, 494, 1,379, p. 47.
91 RC, 495, 10a, 138, p. 1, undated note.
92 RC, 495, 10a, 138, p. 3.
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‘Parties and Revolutionary Elements at Home and Abroad’, dated 27 February 1936, can 
be found in the files of Manuilsky’s secretariat. The letter calls on all parties, all 
revolutionary elements at home and abroad, to join the Indochina section o f the Anti­
imperialist League ‘in order to unify the national liberation movement in Indochina’.93 
Another document titled ‘Open Letter from the Central Committee o f the ICP’ appeared in 
April — a copy received in Moscow was translated into Russian on 6 June 1936. It was 
addressed to ‘the Vietnamese Quoc Dan Dang, and to all nationalist revolutionary groups 
and organizations, to anti-imperialist groups, to reformist and opposition groups and to 
isolated revolutionary elements in Indochina’.94 The letter proposed a flexible framework 
for a united front, which would give lower level communist organizations the power to 
make decisions regarding joint actions on the local level. It suggested that other parties 
either join the Indochinese section o f the Anti-imperialist League or that each group elect a 
number o f delegates to a coordinating committee. The Overseas Bureau o f the ICP would 
be responsible for holding talks with the overseas branches of other parties.95
It is not clear who was the actual author o f the above letter. Its inclusion o f ‘reformist 
groups’ in its appeal is, however, one o f the first signs o f a shift to a new sort o f  united 
front strategy for the ICP. One can say with some certainty that the letter was not a joint 
production of Le Hong Phong and Ha Huy Tap. For when Ha Huy Tap wrote a report to 
Moscow covering ICP business from May 1935 to June 1936, Le Hong Phong had still not 
made contact with the Overseas Bureau, then situated in Macao.96 One can guess that the 
February and April letters advocating an anti-imperialist front with other nationalist parties 
were connected to the original founding o f the Viet Minh Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi (Viet 
Minh Independence League) in Nanjing. As reported by Hoang Van Hoan, this event took 
place with Ha Huy Tap’s approbation, sometime in early 1936.97 However, in his own 
report to the Comintern o f 1 July 1936, Tap writes that ‘a so-called Revolutionary 
Vietnamese Independence League had been founded in Nanking’, and that a ‘fake congress 
was even held’. ‘We have excluded from the party all the communists who created this 
league with Min [aka Phi Van, Nguyen Huu Cam]; it has already been dissolved, as we 
have unmasked it,’ he reported.98 (Hoang Van Hoan, however, writes that the League 
lapsed into inactivity due to the hostility of certain nationalist Vietnamese and the difficulty
93 RC, 495, 10a, 139, no page numbers, 27 Feb. 1936.
94 RC, 495, 10a, 139, pp. 1-6.
95 RC, 495, 10a, 139, pp. 3-4.
96 RC, 495, 10a, 139, pp. 86-91, report written 1 July 1936 , signed Overseas Bureau, acting CC.
97 Hoang Van Hoan, op.cit, p.84; p. 86.
98 RC, 495, 10a, 139, p. 6 of report of 1 July 1936.
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of raising money.99) Conceivably, Le Hong Phong went directly to Nanjing from Moscow 
with his united front message: he had longstanding ties with Ho Hoc Lam and Nguyen Hai 
Than, two of the members o f the first Viet Minh group. As subsequent events would show, 
even after Le Hong Phong and Ha Huy Tap made contact in 1936, Tap would continue to 
resist elements o f the post-Seventh Congress strategy.
At a meeting held in late July in Shanghai, often referred to as a Central Committee 
plenum, the two Vietnamese leaders finally made contact. It was at this meeting that the 
outdated resolutions o f the Macao Congress were suspended. The plenum in reality may 
have been a gathering o f the Overseas Bureau, which since September 1935 had also been 
acting as the Central Committee; it may not have been attended by any party members 
from in-country.100 It issued a new open letter on the formation o f a united front, now 
referred to as ‘a United Anti-imperialist Popular Front’.101 The gathering followed the June 
formation o f a Popular Front government in France, which opened the way for Ha Huy 
Tap to move to Saigon in August to establish a new Central Committee.102 He in theory 
took with him the July ‘Open Letter’ and a set o f resolutions which reflected the ICP’s 
acceptance of the Seventh Congress line. But as it transpired, he would later be accused o f 
refusing to implement the Comintern’s new policies and failing to publicize the decisions 
o f the July meeting in Shanghai. In a retrospective report which he apparently wrote in the 
late summer o f 1937, he mentioned that ‘Litvinov (Le Hong Phong) is staying abroad as a 
reserve agent; due to his absence he is not playing any role in the work o f the CC ... \ 103 
Someone in the Far Eastern Secretariat wrote a commentary on this report in January 1938, 
and noted that ‘Litvinov (Hai-An) received the assignment when he left Moscow to return 
to the country and organize the transfer of the CC of the ICP to the interior. After the 
transfer organized by Ha Huy Tap took place, Hai-An was instructed by Lozeray [a French 
communist visiting Asia with a parliamentary commission of inquiry] ... to try to regain 
the leadership o f the party in-country. Evidently he did not succeed.’104 It may be, then, 
that Ha Huy Tap was acting on his own initiative in 1936.1 will discuss the further 
development o f this disagreement in the next chapter.
99 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 91.
100 R.C. 495, 10a, 140, pp. 23, letter to Vasilieva of 10 Sept. 1937, Vietnamese text signed ‘F.L’; 
refers to the meeting as an ‘overseas conference’.
101 Van Kien Dang, ‘Tho Cong Khai cua Trung Uong Dang Cong San Dong-Duong gui cho cac Dong 
Chi Toan Dang,’ [Open letter From the ICP CC to Comrades in all Parties], pp. 56 -  69; dated June 
1936 here; the letter cited in note 99 refers to it as the ‘letter of 26 July 1936.
102 RC, 495, 10a, 140, p. 33, from ‘Sinitchkin’ letter written in approx. Sept.1937.
103 RC, 495, 10a, 140, p. 33..
104 RC, 495, 10a, 140, p. 30, ‘Explanation of the document received from Indochina’, dated 17 Jan.
1938.
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The effects o f the Leon Blum government in Vietnam have been well documented, 
particularly for Cochinchina, where La Lutte flourished as a joint publication and political 
alliance of the ICP and local Trotskyists until the summer of 1937.105 The Indochina 
Congress movement, which began with a proposal by Nguyen An Ninh printed in La Latte 
on 29 July 1936, brought a new wave o f political activism across the political spectrum. 
Action committees were organized, first in southern towns and villages, to collect the 
peoples’ demands and prepare for the holding o f a Congress, conceived by the communists 
and Trotskyists as a body which would have broad popular representation. An amnesty for 
political prisoners resulted in the release from July 1936 to August 1937 of over two 
thousand activists, 643 o f them from the prison island Poulo Condore.106 Many o f these, 
including an important group o f the ICP’s leaders, were soon integrated into the movement 
to demand better working conditions and democratic freedoms for the people of Indochina. 
But the colonial adminstration’s lack o f enthusiam for the Popular Front meant that the 
first wave o f Vietnamese optimism regarding the new French government did not endure 
for long. By September 1936 the socialist Minister o f Colonies, Marius Moutet, had 
informed Hanoi that the holding o f a large-scale Congress in Saigon was out o f the 
question.107 Following the visit o f Popular Front representative Justin Godart to Saigon 
and Hanoi in early 1937 and the mass demonstrations to welcome him, the colonial 
authorities began a new campaign of repression. A 1937 report from the Overseas Bureau 
to Moscow, however, placed some of the blame for the Congress movement’s failure on 
the Trotskyists: this letter criticized La Lutte for driving the ‘national bourgeoisie’ away 
from the united front with excessive criticism.108 The ‘united front from below’ between 
the ICP and the Trotskyists did not survive the general disappointment with Leon Blum’s 
government. In May 1937 the ICP was pressured to withdraw from the alliance by the 
French CP, which was now involved in Stalin’s all-out war against Trotskyism. But it was, 
in large part, the Comintern’s growing commitment to anti-fascist alliances which brought 
about the dissolution o f the La Lutte front in June 1937. By August the ICP would begin a 
period of reorganization which I will discuss in the next chapter.
The activities o f Le Hong Phong in China have been less well-documented than the history 
o f La Lutte in Saigon. Surete reports show, however, that from the autumn o f 1936 
through the first part of 1937 he was moving around southern China and renewing contacts 
with, among others, Nguyen Hai Than, the nationalist leader who had fallen out with the
105 Daniel Hemery’s Revolutionnaires vietnamiens provides in -depth coverage of the Lutte front.
106 Sud Chonchirdsen, Ph.D. thesis, The Indochinese Communist Party in French Cochin China
(1936-1940), (Univ. of London, 1995), p. 56; on figures for Poulo Condore, Hemery, op.cit., p. 310.
7 Hemery, op. cit., p. 323.
108 R.C. 495, 10a, 140., p. 3, ‘Summary of a report on the Situation of the ICP, October 1937.
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Thanh Nien group in 1927. According to Agent ‘Konstantin’ Le Hong Phong visited Than 
around 23 September 1936. The two were said to be planning to hold a large meeting in 
Shun-tac (Shunde).109 Phong was sighted again by Surete informers in March and April 
1937 -  he was said to be constantly on the move between Shun Tac, Fat Shan and 
Canton.110 Le Hong Phong’s activities may have influenced the creation of a Popular 
Front among the Vietnamese emigres in Yunnan, an event which was the subject of a 
French military intelligence report o f March-April 1937. This report noted that the three 
most important cells o f the ‘Nationalist Party’, those in Hekou, Amitcheou (Kaiyuan) and 
Kunming had joined this front, which the report called a ‘sub-section o f the Tonkin section 
o f the Indochinese Popular Front’.111
Here we have one of the early signs that the united front in Tonkin (as well as central 
Vietnam) would take a different form from that in Saigon. Obviously there was no 
escaping events in China for party activists in the North. But it was also true that in Hanoi 
the Trotskyists did not possess a strong organization and do not appear to have penetrated 
the workers movement. Moreover, there was no local equivalent of the bourgeois 
Constitutionalist Party. Thus when the amnestied communist prisoners began to show up 
in Tonkin at the end o f 1936, the ICP had little competition in organizing the labour 
movement. At the same time they had an open field when it came to making political 
alliances with middle-class forces, and seem to have actually played the key role in 
creating the Vietnamese branch of the Socialist Party, the S.F.I.O., in the North. In March
1936 the bi-monthly socialist review L 'Avenir began to appear. Among its staff were Vo 
Nguyen Giap, Phan Anh, Dang Thai Mai, Vu Dinh Huynh and Bui Ngoc Ai, most o f whom 
would play important roles in the Viet Minh.112 In November 1936 a mixed group of ICP 
communists and Trotskyists established Le Travail, a paper which gave aid to released 
political prisoners and organized the preparations for Justin Godart’s visit. By January
1937 the Travail group was cooperating with the SFIO and the Radical Party (both French 
organizations) on a plan to create a Tonkin section o f the SFIO.113 This group was joined 
in April 1937 by Pham Van D ong , who had been living in Hue under restricted residence, 
as a recently released prisoner. A Surete report noted that he had a reputation as an 
excellent journalist, and was being made a permanent editor of Le Travail114 However, the 
paper had to close down soon after Dong’s arrival, due to a series o f fines and law suits
109 AOM, SPCE 383, Envoi no. 195 of 7 Oct. 1936.
110 AOM, SPCE 383, Envoi no. 74, 22 April 1937.
111 SHAT, 15H Troupes de lTndochine, Bulletin Mensuel de renseignements No. 32., 28 May 1937, 
p.2. My thanks to Chris Goscha for making this document available.
AOM, SPCE 377, Note conf. no. 2470/S, Hanoi 7 March 1936.
113 AOM, SPCE 377, note conf. no. 90/S, 5 Jan. 1937.
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against its publisher. By the summer o f 1937, disagreements between Trotskyists and ICP 
communists had broken up the first attempt at a united front in Hanoi. But the ICP would 
continue to pursue an alliance with nationalist intellectuals and other members o f the 
bourgeoisie in Tonkin.
6. Nguyen Ai Q uoc’s Last Years in Moscow
After the Seventh Congress Nguyen Ai Quoc stayed on at the Lenin School until the end o f 
1935. By 1936, however, he was working as an instructor within the Indochinese section at 
the Stalin School, where the two remaining Vietnamese delegates to the Seventh Congress 
were enrolled. A report of a meeting o f teachers and students o f this section in April 1936 
shows that ‘Lin’ and Vera Vasilieva were working together, apparently to develop a 
course of study on Indochina. She served as the senior lecturer in the Indochinese Section. 
‘Working with him is pleasant, as he is not a novice in the study o f his country,’ she 
commented; ‘he knows the country but not systematically.’ They were working on 
political problems such as the agrarian question. ‘He has a large amount of revolutionary 
experience, but as he has, like other Indochinese comrades, made many errors, we are 
now paying a lot o f attention to these questions... he has made significant progress,’ she 
said.115 Some Vietnamese sources claim that Quoc was planning to write a thesis on the 
agrarian question, but I have seen no references to this, beyond Vasilieva’s report. One o f 
Quoc’s students, ‘Van-Tan’ (Hoang Van Non) complained that Comrade Lin was putting 
him through a ‘Stakhanovite’ course o f study -  in one month he had had to complete a 
course on the history o f the Soviet communist party, and as there was no literature 
available, he had had to memorize everything. ‘Comrade Lin speaks quickly, like a 
spinning wheel,’ he said; ‘that is the reason for the state of my knowledge.’116 (One can 
speculate that Quoc had no real interest in teaching the young Tay the Stalinized 1935 
version of party history. When Quoc wanted to teach something, we know that he would 
go to great lengths to make the subject matter clear and simple.)
At the close o f 1936 Vasilieva drew up a training plan for Indochinese students which 
provided for a new contingent o f ten Vietnamese students to come to Moscow. It also 
called for the creation o f a new training school in China, to offer two-month political 
courses to lower-level party activists from Vietnam. She projected a budget of 3,000 US 
dollars to train ten students for each two-month session. Point nine o f her proposal
114 AOM, SPCE 377, 10 April 1937, note signed ‘Amoux’.
115 RC, 532, 1, 386, Record of meeting of teachers and students of Section 7, 1 April 1936.
116 Ibid.,
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mentioned that, we have to ‘decide the question o f sending Comrade Lin, who has 
finished his studies in Moscow, to organize and run this school.’ However, at the end of 
her memo, someone had scribbled, ‘All these proposals have been cancelled, following the 
clarification of the problem.’117 What the ‘problem’ was is not explained, but we know that 
Comrade Lin stayed on in Moscow for further studies.
In 1937 the Stalin School was reorganized, with the non-Soviet students being placed in the 
‘Scientific Institute for the Study o f National and Colonial Problems’. The more neutral 
name did not mean that the school had changed its function, however. In a letter to the 
‘Soviet Control Commission’ in April 1938, a school administrator explained that the 
Institute’s function was to prepare cadres for foreign parties -  the name was a cover and 
did not reflect the true nature o f the institute’s work, he wrote.118 Quoc was still registered 
as both an instructor and as a graduate student, now in the ‘first course’ o f the Institute’s 
History Department. He did not show a great deal o f enthusiasm for his studies: his marks 
for ‘Dialectical Materialism’, ‘Ancient History’ and ‘Middle History’ were all just 
‘satisfactory’. Only in ‘Modern History’ did he receive ‘excellent’. His status as an 
instructor was seemingly relatively low -  he was teaching Indochinese Studies in the 
Vietnamese language. By contrast, ‘M inin’, Nguyen Khanh Toan, who had studied at the 
University of Hanoi, was listed as ‘acting lecturer’ in ‘Political Economy’, ‘General 
History’, and ‘Country Studies’.119 (Nguyen Khanh Toan’s extended residence in Moscow 
has never been explained. He would return to China in 1939.)
By m id-193 8, when Nguyen Ai Quoc was preparing to leave Moscow, the Institute was 
being closed down. Pavel Mif, the Institute’s Director and since 1928 Stalin’s hatchet man 
for Chinese affairs, was arrested as ‘an enemy of the people’ sometime in 1937. He was 
executed in 1938. Throughout 1937 and 1938, a long list o f Russian party leaders and 
Comitem activists were arrested and shot. The Comintern operatives who had helped to 
implement the hard-line o f 1928-29 were particularly hard hit. These included the Pole 
‘Rylski’, ‘Gailis’ -  the compiler o f the book Armed Insurrection, Volk, Vasiliev, Safarov 
and Piatnitsky (Orgwald) himself. The peasant experts who had overseen Nguyen Ai 
Quoc’s work in the mid 20s -  Dombal and ‘Volin’ -  were also swallowed up by the 
purges.120 At the same time, the three Russian communists -  Trotsky, Zinoviev and 
Bukharin -- who had led the Comintern up to 1929 had all been swept from the scene.
117 RC, 495, 30, 1175, typed document dated 8 Dec. 1936.
11SRC, 532, 1,265, p. 24.
119 RC, 532, 1,246, p. 49.
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It is difficult to imagine how an old communist like Nguyen Ai Quoc could have kept 
functioning through this period of madness. But in January 1938 he was still translating 
the rare letter that arrived in Moscow from Indochina. His survival through the worst years 
o f the purges is often taken as a sign that Quoc was protected by one o f the higher ranking 
survivors, Manuilsky, or that he was a dutiful Stalinist. On the latter score, we know that 
Stalin had made so many changes o f course that it was almost impossible not to have been 
in conflict with one o f his policies at some stage. Quoc, as he showed in 1924, was willing 
to cooperate with whichever group held the current Comintern leadership in order to 
promote his goal o f independence for Vietnam. Yet even quiet compliance would 
probably not have been enough to save him had he been a Pole, Balt, German, or Turk. 
These latter parties received the full force o f Stalin’s vengeful attentions in 1937-8. 
Comintern representatives from legal parties, such as the French, British and American 
CPs, were largely spared in this period.121 In Nguyen Ai Quoc’s case, the fact that he came 
from a distant country with a low priority for Soviet foreign policy must have been at least 
part o f the reason that he was not arrested. At the same time, he had made it a long-term 
practice to keep a low-profile in Moscow and had never presented himself as a theoretician, 
as had M.N. Roy, for example. In a biographical questionnaire which he filled in when 
entering the Lenin School in 1934, he was typically secretive. He wrote that he had no 
adult family members, no wife, no profession or specialty, was not acquainted with any 
branch o f industry and did not know what kind of work he could do. At the end o f his 
short essay on his life, he wrote tersely, ‘I think that is all about my biography for the time 
being’.122
As far as his relationship with Dmitry Manuilsky is concerned, we learn from a letter sent 
to Manuilsky’s Secretariat on 6 June 1938 that the two had not met for quite sometime. ‘I 
would be very grateful, dear Comrade, if  you would grant me an interview,’ Quoc wrote; 
‘You have not seen me for a long time.’ Quoc pointed out that it was the seventh 
anniversary since his arrest in Hong Kong as well as the beginning o f his eighth year o f 
‘inactivity’. ‘Send me somewhere. Or keep me here. Use me in whatever way you judge 
useful. What I am requesting is that you not let me live too long without activity, outside 
the party,’ he wrote.123 The records of the Institute for the Study o f Colonial and National 
Questions show that his wish was granted and that on 29 September 1938 he was officially
120 Adibekov et al, op. cit., p. 193.
121 Milorad Drachkovitch, The Comintern: Historical Highlights, Essays and Recollections, (Paolo 
Alto: Hoover Institution, 1966), p. 141
122 RC, 495, 201, l,p . 163.
123 RC, 495, 10a, 140, 92.
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discharged.124 Not long afterwards he seems to have departed for China. Once again, we 
are in the dark as to what Quoc’s job description was when he departed from Moscow for 
China. But we do know that he went back as an official emissary o f the Comintern to the 
ICP. Vasilieva intervened with Dimitrov to have Quoc granted an audience before his 
return. In a brief note she explained: ‘It is essential that someone from the leadership 
should speak with Comrade Lin before his departure, about those questions which were 
the subject o f disagreements within the Party (Indochinese) leadership and which now still 
face the party. Lin is a member o f the Central Committee, enjoys great authority in the 
Party, and as he is coming from here (Moscow), they will listen to what he says very 
attentively. It is important that he speak correctly,’ she said 125. (It would seem that at this 
stage Quoc was still considered at least a candidate member o f the ICP CC.)
As it turned out, Vasilieva’s confidence in Moscow’s authority was somewhat misplaced. 
In the following chapter I will review the disagreements within the ICP leadership which 
divided the party from 1936 to 1940. It would not be until May 1941, after Quoc had 
spent two-and-a-half years in China, that he would officially deliver his message to the 
party’s Central Committee.
RC, 532, 3, p. 5.
125 RC, 495, 74,261.
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The Return of Nguyen Ai Quoc and the Path to the Eighth Plenum (1937— 1941)
By the time Nguyen Ai Quoc had received the go-ahead to return to Asia in the autumn of 
1938, the Soviet Union and the nationalist Chinese government had re-established an 
alliance. The drawn-out negotiations between the two sides in Moscow and Nanjing led to 
the signing o f a non-aggression pact in August 1937. As in the early 1920s, this diplomatic 
achievement was not received with entirely good grace by the Chinese communists. But it 
did result in a new in-flow of military aid to help the GMD slow the Japanese advance from 
the coastal cities into central China. Charles McLane estimates that between the end o f 1937 
and November 1940, Russian aid to Chiang Kaishek reached an amount somewhere 
between $300 million and and $450 million.1 The Russian-GMD understanding led to the 
revival o f the united front between the nationalist and communist Chinese, as well. This 
meant a return to legality for the CCP for a few years, and a chance to establish a presence in 
the GMD’s capitals, first Nanjing and, briefly, Wuhan; then Chongqing. In September 1937 
the Chinese Red Army was reorganized under the command o f the GMD’s Military Affairs 
Commission, with the Eighth Route Army formed to operate in the northwest and a New 
Fourth Army created to fight south o f the Yangtze. The CCP was authorized to run two 
Guerilla Training Courses in southern China in cooperation with the GMD. As early as June 
1938, overseas Vietnamese communists were able to meet the CCP general Ye Jianying, 
who was liaising between the Eighth Route Army and the Military Affairs Commission, in 
Wuhan.2
Nguyen Ai Quoc was thus returning to China at an auspicious moment o f Sino-Soviet 
cooperation. His assignment on returning to Asia was to bring the ICP into a ‘broad national 
democratic front’, which would include progressive French residents o f Indochina and the 
nationalist bourgeoisie as well.3 The Comintern’s eight-point directive, which he had had to 
commit to memory, called on the Vietnamese communists to place the aims o f the anti­
fascist front before the aims of the proletarian revolution. This was the nature of the fronts 
which had been established in France in 1936, and then in China in 1937. The ICP was 
asked not to make demands which were too extreme, for full independence, for example, or 
a parliament. ‘This would be to fall into the trap of the Japanese fascists,’ the directives
1 Charles McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists 1931-1946, (New York: Columbia
Univ., 1958), p.129.
2 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit, pp. 98-99.
3 R.C., 495, 10a, 140, p. 106, NAQ’s own rendering of his directives as he remembered them in July
1939.
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cautioned. The party should organize a front to press its demands for freedom of speech, 
press and the right to assemble, as well as a full amnesty for political prisoners. Regarding 
the national bourgeoisie, the party was advised to act ‘with suppleness’; to draw it into the 
front and push it to act, or if  necessary, to isolate it politically. The party should not claim 
the right to direct the democratic front. It should earn that right by showing itself to be one 
of the ‘most active, sincere and devoted’ parties. Towards the Trotskyists no concessions or 
entente were permissible. They were to be politically exterminated.
1. The Political Prelude to Nguyen Ai Q uoc’s Return (193 7-1938)
By 1938 within Vietnam a complex configuration of political forces had evolved, a fact 
which made Quoc’s organizing task even more difficult than it had been in 1924-27. The 
ICP had only re-established a unifed leadership in 1935. Now the Vietnamese party was 
being asked to sign on to a world-wide anti-fascist crusade which would require that it 
moderate its opposition to the French colonialists. But without the unifying force o f a 
Japanese invasion, the Vietnamese communists found it very difficult to agree on the nature 
o f the united front which they should enter. The immediacy o f the Japanese threat would be 
much more strongly felt in Tonkin and Annam than in Cochinchina. Some Vietnamese 
viewed the Japanese as potential liberators. As we have seen, when Le Hong Phong 
returned to China from Moscow in 1936, his message regarding the united front met with 
opposition from an unexpected quarter — from Ha Huy Tap. Tap had returned to Asia when 
theproletkult was still a powerful force; he was apparently surprised by the Comintern’s 
about-face. However, the ICP’s resistance to the Comintern’s orders only became known 
in Moscow in January 1938, when they received a report dated 10 September 1937 and 
signed by ‘F.L.’. This report recaps some of the developments which followed the Central 
Committee meeting held in July 1936 in Shanghai. Given the author’s description o f her 
return journey to Asia via Paris, we can be fairly sure that the writer was Nguyen Thi Minh 
Khai or ‘Fan-Lan’.4 The letter was written after the ICP’s Enlarged Party Conference and 
Second Plenum, held outside o f Saigon from 25 August until 4 September 1937, when the . 
Vietnamese CC fell into line with the Comintern’s policy.5
Minh Khai and Hoang Van Non had travelled back to Hong Kong via France and Italy in 
the late spring o f 1937. They had memorized a nine-point list o f policy directives, which 
they were to transmit to the Overseas Bureau on arrival. I have not found a copy of this list,
4 R.C., 495, 201, 35, Ankieta [Questionnaire] for Fan-Lan, 14 Dec. 1934 -- written across the top are
the words, 'Left for her country 2 Feb. 1937'.
5 RC, 495, 10a, 140, pp. 23-7, French translation of letter of 10 Sept. 1937.
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but we can assume that it was close to the eight points which Nguyen Ai Quoc was called on 
to implement in 1938. The two travellers found Le Hong Phong in Hong Kong in July and 
passed on the Comintern’s recommendations. As ‘F-L’s’ letter relates, he explained to them 
that the Central Committee had been critical o f the Comintern’s new emphasis on legal and 
semi-legal methods o f organizing and viewed it as, Tiquidationist, opportunist and rightist’. 
The Overseas Bureau had written a brochure explaining the new policies, but this had been 
kept out of circulation by Ha Huy Tap. According to Le Hong Phong, Ha Huy Tap had 
written to tell him that ‘the comrades overseas were far from the practical reality o f the 
country, and that the CC must be responsible for the work in-country.’
Le Hong Phong sent Minh Khai to Saigon in August 1937 to deliver the Comintern’s latest 
directives in person. (Hoang Van Non was sent to Hanoi to do the same.) In response to 
these instructions, Ha Huy Tap once again stated that the tactics being promoted by Moscow 
and the Overseas Bureau were ‘reactionary’. (As ‘F.L.’ explains, she discovered that the 
CC in Saigon had sent the party organizations a letter on March 26 1937 to annul the 
decisions of the 1936 Shanghai meeting.6) ‘I wanted to write to explain all this to the 
comrades overseas,’ she writes, ‘but comrade Sinitchkin told me that if  I did, I would be 
expelled from the party. ’ At a conference held before the CC plenum, however, the 
northern party members, Hoang Quoc Viet and Nguyen Van Cu, supported the Comintern 
recommendations. They claimed that they had not seen the 26 July 1936 letter on new 
methods of organizing, and that Ha Huy Tap had given a false explanation o f Comintern 
policy at the preceding CC plenum in March 1937. Phung Chi Kien represented the 
Overseas Bureau at the August plenum. The presence o f the French communist Maurice 
Honel in Saigon at this time seems to have been critical in overcoming Ha Huy Tap’s 
resistance to the new line. F.L .’s letter says that Honel criticized Tap’s ‘sectarianism’, and 
that he encouraged her to write to the Comintern to make clear what was happening within 
the ICP.
The reason for the bitterness o f this disagreement is hard to fathom from the political jargon 
used by the Comintern trainees — on the surface it would seem to have been fairly 
insignificant. Personal animosity may have accounted for some o f the tension. (F.L’s 
September 10 letter does not mention disagreements over policy towards the Trotskyists.) 
We know that the Comintern and Overseas Bureau advocated placing greater emphasis on 
legal organizing and joining a front with non-proletarian parties. (They do not seem to have
6What appear to be extracts from this letter can be found in the French military archives in Vincennes,
SHAT, microfilm 15H, ‘Annexe II au Bulletin de Renseignements no. 33, 31 July 1937, Troupes de
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questioned the need for the party leaders to remain underground.) One other item of 
contention was the nature of youth organizing. Ha Huy Tap wanted to transform the 
Communist Youth into an illegal Anti-imperialist Youth League to develop cadres for youth 
work. Eight o f the party members who attended the Plenum supported this point o f view, 
while the remaining five supported the transformation of the Communist Youth group into a 
popular, legal organization. In this latter scenario, the best o f its members would be 
brought into the communist party and, at the same time, would form the backbone o f the 
legal youth organizations. The whole debate on methods of organizing could reflect the 
continued presence within the communist movement o f the tensions which had surfaced in 
1928-29, when the cult o f proletarianization began.
The final decision on youth organizing was left to the Comintern. Otherwise, F.L. judged 
that the August-September plenum had been successful in unifying the party and combatting 
‘sectarianism’. Ha Huy Tap reacted quickly to the Plenum decisions, to judge by a letter 
which came to the Surete's notice. On 7 September 1937 he informed the writers o f the 
Avant-Garde newspaper that from now on all brochures in French and quoc ngu would have 
to be submitted to party censors; all newspaper articles would have to be written one or two 
days in advance. {Avant-garde was the paper formed by the ICP after their separation from 
the La Lutte group in May 1937. Around this time its name changed once again to the more 
inclusive Le Peuple. By the following March the Stalin School trainee Tran Van K ie t, aka 
Remy, would return from France to take over Le Peuple and start its Vietnamese-language 
version, Dan Chung.7) As Tap explained, L  ’Avant-Garde had published several articles 
‘whose extreme left-wing tendency has served as a pretext for repression’. He warned that 
the press in Tonkin was also distorting the party’s policy. ‘All these actions will inhibit our 
legal action or turn against us those groups with whom we could form alliances,’ he wrote.8
A French summary o f the resolutions adopted by a Congress of the Southern Regional 
Committee gives some more information regarding the policy changes which were decided 
in September 1937. Held from 22 to 25 September 1937, this congress declared that the 
party’s propagandists had been talking over the heads o f the masses with their ‘scholarly 
dissertations’. Their ‘incendiary goals’ had either ‘intimidated the “unconscious masses” or 
created antipathy among the religious elements, or wounded the amour-propre of the rich 
peasants.’ The party line, however, was to ‘use all efforts to enroll these elements in popular
l’lndochine, Service des Renseignements Central. My thanks to Chris Goscha for providing a copy of 
this document.
7 AOM, SPCE 384, Note n. 2057-S, Cochinchine, Iere Section; Ultra-secret, 14 April 1938.
8 AOM, SPCE 384, Police de Cochinchine, premiere section, note of 20 Sept. 1937.
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t,
organizations (friendship circles, mutual aid associations, e tc ...) .,9 Rich peasants were in 
future to be won over or neutralized. ‘ .. .But if  there are those who, sacrificing their 
interests, ask to join our organizations, we should open the doors wide to them so as not to 
upset them and force them into the arms o f the reformists, the reactionaries and the 
Trotskyists,’ the resolutions said.10 "
Soon after the CC's August plenum, Le Hong Phong moved to Saigon, in part to establish 
contacts with the Central Committee o f the Chinese Party, apparently via their Saigon 
committee.11 At the end o f March 1938, when the ICP held a Third Plenum at Ba-Diem in 
Gia Dinh, with seven people attending, Ha Huy Tap was removed from the post o f General 
Secretary. (He would be arrested in May and expelled to Ha Tinh under restricted 
residence.) Nguyen Van Cu, a young protege o f Ngo Gia Tu from Bac Ninh province, an 
amnestied political prisoner who had served time on Poulo Condore, became the new 
General Secretary. A new Secretariat of the Standing Committee was established, including 
Ha Huy Tap, Nguyen Van Cu and, as the Surete noted, ‘a returnee from China’. This last 
member was most likely Le Hong Phong, as Phung Chi Kien had returned to Hong Kong 
after the September 1937 plenum. The Standing Committee itself included five people: Ha 
Huy Tap, Nguyen Van Cu, Gia or Anh Bay from the South (apparently Vo Van Tan), 
Nguyen Van Trong or Nguyen Chi Dieu, a released prisoner who was rebuilding the Annam 
regional committee, and again the ‘Returnee from China’. At this time Nguyen Thi Minh 
Khai was identified as a member o f the Cochinchina Regional Committee, as well as o f the 
Saigon Committee. She was also, put in charge of the education o f party members.12
We can assume, then, that by the time of this March 1938 meeting the Comintern line and its 
supporters were beginning to have a stronger influence within party structures in 
Cochinchina. The CC report on the March Plenum mentions, in fact, that some party 
members in the South had been excluded for Tack of activity’, while others had left o f their 
own accord. The total number o f party members in Cochinchina had remained steady at 
655 since the Second Plenum.13 However, the selection o f Nguyen Van Cu as General 
Secretary shows that the Moscow-trained communists had to compromise with the ICP 
structures already existing inside Vietnam, as Tran Phu and Ha Huy Tap had done before. 
With the released political prisoners being brought back into the party, former activists of
9 Vincennes, SHAT 15H, Troupes de Tlndochine, Annexe I au Bulletin de Renseignements no. 36, p.
1.
10 Ibid., p. 4.
11 AOM, SPCE, 383, Note Confidentiel, n. 5701, S.G., Hanoi, 26 Nov. 1938; from document found in a 
police raid on Phung Chi Kien’s Kowloon residence on 25 Oct. 1938.
AOM, SPCE 384, Note confidentielle n. 144-ss; Hue, 14 April 1938.
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the Tan Viet party appear, in particular, to have begun to play a major role in the leadership. 
Preparations for a May Day meeting to be held in Saigon also show that, although the ICP 
was now trying to become an acceptable partner to bourgeois parties, they were still 
countenancing some cooperation with the Trotskyists. The organizing committee for this 
meeting was composed o f one socialist (French), one Trotskyist, and two ‘Stalinists’. But 
Ha Huy Tap insisted that leaflets announcing the meeting list only ‘workers’ as the 
organizers. According to the Surete, he was afraid that if  the VNQDD saw that Trotskyists 
were involved, they would break their links with the ICP.14
From the ICP reports to Moscow written in late 1937 and early 1938, we can see that the 
party’s links with the Comintern and the French CP had weakened since the first days o f the 
Popular Front. Maurice Honel had returned to France in 1937, promising to raise the profile 
o f Indochina within the FCP. But nothing had been heard o f him six months after his return. 
As the CC report sent to Moscow in April 1938 makes clear, lack o f support from the PCF 
was eroding the ICP’s influence in Cochinchina. Following the June 1936 formation of the 
Leon Blum government, the report said, the PCF had stopped paying attention to the 
problems of Indochina. On the other hand, the Trotskyists in France attacked the colonial 
policies of the Popular Front, a fact which helped the Saigon Trotskyists gain influence 
among the masses, especially among intellectuals.15 The Trotskyists had also publicized the 
FCP role in the ending o f the La Lutte front in May-June 1937 and printed brochures on the 
show trials taking place in Moscow.16 Still, the ICP CC remained committed to the concept 
o f the anti-fascist front and continued to try to establish regular contacts with the Comintern. 
(They did not seem to have any idea of the havoc which the Moscow purges were working 
within the Third International -  they may have been unaware that Comintern leaders such 
as Piatnitsky and M if had been arrested in 1937.) In their April 1938 report they requested 
that the Comintern send regular directives on political and organizational questions, and that 
a ‘leading comrade’ be sent to Vietnam every five or six months to bring these directives, 
along with financial aid. In addition to an immediate advance of 5,000 dollars to print 
books, they requested advisers and funds to open a legal training center in China, along the 
lines o f what had existed in 1926-7.17 The dispatch o f Nguyen Ai Quoc to Asia in the 
autumn of 1938 may have been a response to this request.
13 RC, 495, 10a, 140, p. 68, report dated Saigon, 6 April 1938.
14 AOM, SPCE 384, note-, n. 2246-S, Iere Section, Information provenant de la police de Saigon, 23 
April 1938.
15 RC, 495, 10a, 140, p. 72, report dated Saigon, 6 April 1938.
16 Daniel Hemery, op. cit, p. 415; Huynh Kim Khanh, op.cit., p. 227.
17 RC,495, 10a, 140, pp. 70-70b, ‘Proposals and requests’.
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By this time the ICP's communications with the Comintern via China had become 
extremely difficult as a result o f  the outbreak o f the Sino-Japanese conflict. The Chinese 
ships on which the ICP had liaison agents were no longer able to sail to Vietnam due to a 
Japanese blockade.18 When Phung Chi Kien wrote to the Comintern in November 1937, he 
requested permission to open official contacts with the Southern Bureau o f the CCP, as the 
Chinese party had become, ‘more or less legal’. As he explained it, ‘Even though for more 
than a year, we have had relations with the Southern Bureau, this link, although close, 
remains irresponsible because it has not received your approval... He also asked to 
transfer his responsibility for communication with the Siam CP to the Southern Bureau.19 At 
the time of writing this letter, Kien seems still to have been in Hong Kong. By June 1938, he 
was in Wuhan to consult with the Chinese general Ye Jianying, according to Hoang Van 
Hoan. Kien was probably already acquainted with the general from his days as a Whampoa 
cadet, when Ye Jianying commanded the Training Regiment. After October 1938, as the 
Japanese were moving into Wuhan, and after his Kowloon residence had been raided by the 
police, Phung Chi Kien was said to have gone to Shantou for guerilla training.20 For the 
Vietnamese communists in southern China at this juncture, the role o f  the Comintern in their 
day-to-day decision making must have been growing negligible. Yet, as noted above, the 
ICP in-country was eager to re-establish regular links with Moscow, partly for financial 
reasons, and in March 1938 was trying to raise the money to send a party member abroad 
for consultations. One Surete report claimed that Phung Chi Kien had volunteered to be the 
emissary, but that the CC had decided to send a legal communist instead.21 It does not 
appear that anyone made the journey, either to France or Russia.
2. Nguyen Ai Q uoc’s Travels/  Vietnamese Politics: 1939
Nguyen Ai Quoc embarked for China in the autumn of 1938 and must have arrived in Xi’an 
by November or December. He travelled via Urumchi and Lanzhou and would have been 
part of a larger movement o f advisers and materiel which was being transported to China to 
support the war effort. It seems probable that he made most o f the journey by train and 
plane, as he managed to spend a month in Yan’an, and still arrive in Guilin by February
1939. He later wrote that, with the outbreak o f war in China, he had ‘fallen into a vast 
maelstrom which is changing the fates of hundreds of millions o f m en... ’ 22 In the same
18 RC, 495, 10a, 140, p. 33, undated report signed ‘Sinitchkin’.
19 RC, 495, 10a, 140, ‘Letter from Kan’, 13 November 1937.
20 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 108.
21AOM, SPCE 384, Police de lTndochine/Annam, Service de la Surete, note conf. n. 144-ss, 14 April 
1938.
22 RC, 495, 10a, 140, p. 102, Lin report in French sent July 1939 from Guilin.
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letter he reported that he had lost his luggage in Y an’an, including the notes he had made on 
his Comintern instructions, Chinese sources say that Nguyen Ai Quoc, now known as Ho 
Quang, stayed in the CCP’s guesthouse for foreigners in the Date Orchard region in the 
northwest o f Yan’an, where Kang Sheng was his host.23 Quoc would have arrived there 
soon after the CCP’s Sixth Plenum in October, which is believed to have ended with a rough 
balance in the leadership between Mao and the leaders such as Wang Ming and Zhou Enlai, 
who were more enthusiastic supporters o f the united front.24 The battle for Wuhan had 
finally ended with a Nationalist retreat at the end o f October, a fact which seems to have 
increased M ao’s influence. We can assume from a long report and request for aid which 
Quoc would address to the Chinese party in mid-1940 that he maintained his low-profile 
behaviour in M ao’s base — in that report he would not demonstrate any intimacy with the 
Chinese leadership, or assume that they knew the history of his role in the ICP.25
Throughout China armies and refugees were on the move. Chiang Kaishek's army was 
retreating south and west at the end of 1938. Hoang van Hoan’s memoirs describe his 
travels with the GMD bureaucracy beginning with the 1937 evacuation from Nanjing to 
Wuhan; then in late 1938 to Changsha and Guiyang, where the north-south highway to 
X i’an intersects the east-west route; and finally west to Kunming in early 1939. At roughly 
the same time, Nguyen Ai Quoc moved south-east across China, from Yan’an to Guilin in 
Guangxi province, which was now a front-line city, regularly bombed by the Japanese.
Quoc had been made a major in the Eighth Route army, which seems to have facilitated his 
travel through the chaos. After his stay in Yan’an Quoc first made his way south to 
Chongqing, where he was sighted in Zhou Enlai’s company in early 1939.26 King Chen 
recounts that he moved in the entourage o f General Ye Jianying, who after the retreat from 
Wuhan had been appointed to run the Southwest Guerilla Training Class in Hengyang, in 
Hunan province 27 A Chinese account o f Quoc’s activities in the Eighth Route Army 
emphasizes that he was moving under CCP patronage and protection, yet depicts him as 
fulfilling routine tasks in what is sometimes referred to as a club or a liaison office, in Guilin 
and then in Henyang, 350 miles to the north. The Guilin liaison office may have served in 
part as an intelligence gathering point for the CCP, as it was outside the area of operations of 
the Eighth Route Army. Quoc was said to have been in charge of ‘sanitation’, perhaps 
meaning that he was a public health officer; he ran a club museum; he produced a small
23 Hoang Tranh, op. cit, p. 94.
24 Thomas Kampen, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the Evolution o f the Chinese Communist Leadership,
(Copenhagen: NIAS, 2000), pp. 93-98.
25 RC, 495, 10a, 140, pp. 123-139, report written in Chinese dated 12 July 1940, translated into
Russian on 27 Feb. 1942.
26 King C. Chen, Vietnam and China, 1938-1954, (Princeton: Princeton Univ., 1969), p. 34.
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newspaper for the unit; he listened to foreign language radio broadcasts, all the time 
remaining in the disguise o f a Chinese officer with a Cantonese accent. This account says 
that Quoc moved to Henyang from 20 June 1939 until 20 September that year, as an 
instructor for the second training session at the Guerilla Center.28
This depiction o f Quoc’s activities in China does not accord with the picture of an acclaimed 
communist leader returning home to take up the reins o f power in his party. The confusion 
created by war in China had certainly complicated his task. But the rivalries and conflicting 
political views within his own party may also have contributed to the difficulty he had in 
establishing contact with the ICP. By his own account, Quoc arrived in Guilin around 
February 1939. He was clearly discouraged when he wrote a long report to Moscow in July 
that year. Seven months since his arrival in China, he wrote, he still had not managed to 
accomplish his mission.
‘What have I done in these seven months?’ he wrote. ‘With the help of friends I have begun 
my search, which has not produced any results. Then I tried to build some links; that has 
had certain results... While waiting and so as not to waste time, I am working in the Eighth 
Army as a translator (listening to radio broadcasts), as secretary o f the cell, as president o f 
the club, and now as a member o f the club committee. At the same time ... I have written a 
brochure on the Special Region and articles on political and military events, on Japanese 
atrocities, on the heroism o f the Chinese combattants, on the anti-Trotskyist struggle, e tc .. . ’ 
He explained that since 12 February 1939 several o f his articles had been published in the 
Hanoi weekly o f the ‘legal Indochinese P.C.’, Notre Voix. ‘These articles are date-lined 
“Kweilin” with the signature “Line”, in the hope that the responsible comrades might guess 
who the author is and where he is. But this hope has not yet been realized,’ he wrote. He 
had established good links with the paper’s editor, who assumed that he was a Chinese 
journalist. It was only at the end o f July, he said, that he had been able to send on his 
address and the Comintern’s directives to the ICP CC via a friend and the editor of Notre 
Voix.29 The report to Moscow which follows this explanatory letter, on the political 
situation in Vietnam since 1936, is an eight-page, typed document full o f information on the 
press, elections, strikes and other political movements. He claims he has gleaned these facts 
and figures from his reading of Notre Voix and Doi Nay (These Times), another legal party 
paper from Hanoi which was edited by Tran Huy Lieu. But one wonders if he had a more 
direct source of information.
27 King C. Chen, op. cit, pp. 34-5.
28 Hoang Tranh, op. cit., pp. 95-99.
29 495, 10a, 140, p .102.
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Quoc’s explanation of his contacts with Vietnam leaves a few questions hanging. Was it 
really possible that between February and July the ‘responsible comrades’ in the ICP had not 
figured out who ‘P.C. Line’ was? As it happened, a leading journalist at Notre Voix was 
V o’Nguyen Giap, who in 1939 married the younger sister of Nguyen Thi Minh Khai.30 In 
1937, Surete reports show that he had taken a forceful stand on the need to form a united 
democratic front and at one point had even advocated forming a mixed section o f the 
French CP in Vietnam to engage in legal organizing activity.31 There is in my opinion some 
ground to suppose that Quoc was in independent contact with Minh Khai, or some of the 
legal activists who shared her point o f view, throughout 1939. As we shall see, by late 1939 
she appears to have made a trip to China to contact him. Another possible source of 
information for Quoc at this time would be links via the CCP to Le Hong Phong in Saigon. 
The latter, however, was arrested on 22 June 1939 and sentenced to six months’ 
imprisonment, followed by three years o f restricted residence, for using a false identity 
card.32 Hoang Tranh's book on Quoc’s time in China, cited above, claims that he was in 
contact with a Chinese liaison agent who travelled between Guilin, Haiphong and Hong 
Kong. This agent, Ly Boi Quan, on one o f his trips to Haiphong is supposed to have 
procured a Baby Hermes typewriter with a French keyboard for Quoc. But he does not 
claim to have contacted the ICP on Quoc’s behalf until the autumn o f 1939.33
The ICP’s internal conflict over tactics flared up again in the summer o f 1939. After the 
United Democratic Front candidates Nguyen An Ninh , Nguyen Van Tao and Vu Cong Ton 
were defeated by the Trotskyists in the elections to the Saigon Colonial Council in April 
1939 , a polemic began in the communist press. The debate pitted three o f the so-called 
Stalinist communists, Nguyen Van Tao, Le Hong Phong and Nguyen Van Cu, against each 
other. Once again the main issue was how the ICP should relate to the bourgeois reformist 
parties. Nguyen Van Tao, the legal communist who had represented the Vietnamese at the 
Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928, wrote in Dong Phuong tap chi (The Far East Review) 
that the communists should take a harder line against the Constitutionalist party, which had 
won three seats in the assembly. A writer now identified as Le Hong Phong, using the 
pseudonym ‘T.B.’ or ‘Tri Binh’, wrote in several issues o f Dan Chung to defend the ICP
30 Tran Huy Lieu, Hoi Ky, (Hanoi: NXB Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1991), p. 216. The other leading writer 
(cay but chinh) was Phan Boi, also known as Hoang Huu Nam, a former prisoner from Quang Nam.
31AOM, SPCE 377, Note conf. n. 7964-S, signed P. Amoux, Hanoi, 22 June 1937.
32 AOM, SPCE 383, PROCGAL Saigon a DIRJUST Hanoi, telegramme off. N. 335-Pg, 30 June 1939.
33 Hoang Tranh, op. cit., pp. 97-8. The purchase of this typewriter is one of those events which has 
taken on symbolic importance in accounts of this period. Vu Anh, in his memoir Tu Con-Minh ve Pac 
Bo, in Bac Ho -  Hoi Ky, p. 148, says that the typewriter was purchased by Phan Boi, the journalist on 
Notre Voix mentioned in note 31.
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policy.34 This author took the line that there was no need to attack any indigenous party or 
class, so long as it was not reactionary. He placed most o f the blame for the ICP’s electoral 
failure on the harrassment of the colonial government. (In fact, Dan Chung’s  main 
personnel had been arrested during the campaign.)35
However, the ICP General Secretary, Nguyen Van Cu, wrote a pamphlet titled, Tu Chi Trich 
(Self-Criticism), in which he took to task both o f these viewpoints. In an introduction to his 
pamphlet, he mentions that he had originally sent it as an article for publication to Dan 
Chung in Saigon. But for one reason or another, he writes, the article did not get printed.
He then had it published in pamphlet form by the Dan Chung publishing house in Hanoi, 
which was more am enable.36 He criticizes Anh T.B. for expressing an ‘individual opinion’, 
not ‘the united opinion o f  the whole Party’.37 Part o f the blame for the failure in the 
elections, he says, lies in the fact that the ICP placed too much emphasis on the peril of 
Japanese fascism and did not speak enough about the oppression of the masses by ‘the 
reactionary colonial forces’. 38 The mistake made by T.B., he writes, is that he does not 
distinguish between a reformist party and a reactionary one.39 (The author does not mention 
that in Hanoi’s April municipal elections a single list o f candidates was presented by the left 
under the SFIO umbrella, and ran unopposed.) Around this time, June 1939, the Surete got 
wind of a ten-chapter ‘Draft fo r  Discussion ’ which was being circulated by the ICP’s 
Regional Committee for Annam to its provincial committees. According to this document, 
the party’s policy was to support the formation o f a democratic front -  but this front would 
have to be formed within ‘powerful mass struggle movements’. The Democratic Front 
would be a form o f class struggle as well as anti-imperialist resistance.40 This conception 
would seem to be the one held by Nguyen Van Cu.
When one reads the articles which Nguyen Ai Quoc was sending to Notre Voix, one can see 
that his situation in the middle o f the Sino-Japanese war was a world apart from that of 
Saigon and its elections. He was engaged in producing war-time propaganda to build 
support for China and faith in its ability to resist the Japanese. At the end o f February he
34 Marr, Tradition on Trial, (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1981), p. 394 identifies Tri Binh as Le
Hong Phong.
35 Notre Voix, 9 April 1939.
36 The details of these publications appear in the introduction to Tu Chi Trich, republished in Hanoi in
1983 by the Su That Publishing House. The latter pamphlet is the only one which I have had access to.
Tran Huy Lieu explains that after the closure of Tin Tuc in late 1938, two members of the Tin Tuc
group opened a book shop which published books and pamphlets with the Dan Chung imprint. (Tran
Huy Lieu, op.cit., p. 215.)
37 Tu Chi Trich, p. 18.
38 Ibid., p. 24.
39 Ibid., p. 28.
40 AOM, GGI 65459, activites politiques en Annam, June 1939.
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wrote about the third session of the Chinese National Political Council. This was the first 
session after the defection of its ex-president, Wang Jingwei, former leader of the Left 
GMD. Quoc cited statements by Mao and Chiang Kaishek to show that there was close 
collaboration between the major parties in the anti-Japanese national front. The council had 
met ‘at the moment when the defeatist tendencies personified by Wang Jingwei -  which had 
raised their heads after the loss of Canton and Hankou — had been definitively crushed by the 
unity and determination of our people,’ he explained.41 At this point many communists 
believed that the GMD’s will to resist Japan was hanging in the balance. Those ICP 
members who identified most closely with the Chinese struggle (Le Hong Phong, originally 
a CCP member, would have been one o f them) would have been less inclined than in the 
pre-war period to worry about the exact political complexion o f the Vietnamese parties 
which were willing to join them in an anti-fascist front. But within Vietnam, especially in 
the South, other issues such as the increasing recruitment of Vietnamese for military duty in 
Europe and the tax levies of the colonial regime had more immediacy than Japanese 
aggression in China.
Quoc was apparently keen to demonstrate his loyalty to Stalin and distance himself from the 
left-wing GMD leaders who had fled to Hanoi at the end o f 1938. His letters to Notre Voix 
include some fairly crude anti-Trotskyist propaganda quoting from the Moscow show trials. 
He mentioned trials o f accused Trotskyists in the Yan’an Special Region in 1937 as well. 
What he actually thought about these trials remains a mystery. But he made the point that in 
1937 the Chinese Trotskyists had condemned the communist call for a united front with the 
Guomindang as treachery.42 Altogether he wrote four anti-Trotskyist articles from Guilin.
In his 1939 pamphlet Nguyen Van Cu also emphasizes the Trotskyist danger, as something 
which should be viewed very seriously. In Vietnam, we should remember, the anti- 
Trotskyist struggle was still a political contest for influence in which both sides had roughly 
equal weaponry -  the spoken and written word.
3. The Changing International Situation
In August and September 1939 international politics would intrude more forcefully than 
ever into the internal debates of the ICP. On 23 August the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was 
signed, which overnight brought the Moscow-aligned communists into alliance with Nazi 
Germany. War broke out in Europe when the Germans attacked Poland on 1 September.
On 28 September the French Governor-General o f Indochina outlawed the ICP and all their
41 Notre Voix, ‘Lettre de Chine’, 9 April 1939.
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publications. In the next weeks the French began a round-up o f communists, both 
Trotskyists and Stalinists, which continued throughout the autumn and into 1940. But while 
the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and Germany is usually viewed as a near 
disaster for the ICP,43 there is evidence that many ICP cadres had gone into hiding by the 
end o f September and found ways to take advantage of the new political situation. The fact 
is that the Nazi-Soviet Pact allowed the communists to once again take an uncompromising 
stand against French imperialism. During the Democratic Front period, they had been 
forced to support France’s national defence programme and recruiting efforts in Indochina. 
Now they could once again work to stir anti-military sentiments within the Vietnamese 
troops in the French army at a time when recruitment was becoming increasingly 
unpopular.44
The issue of party leadership becomes increasingly complicated in this period, as leaders 
inside Vietnam were arrested one after another and communications between north and 
south became more difficult. In China, the Japanese advanced west from Canton in 
November 1939 to Nanning and Longzhou, virtually to the Vietnamese border. The 
communist Chinese source relates that Nguyen Ai Quoc attempted to make contact with an 
ICP envoy in Longzhou at some point in the autumn of 1939, but that the emissary had to 
return to Vietnam prematurely when he was robbed and ran out o f money 45 After a wait of 
three days, Quoc is said to have returned to Guilin. This story may well be true, but it 
probably does not give us a full picture o f Quoc’s efforts to contact the ICP CC. In April 
1940 the Surete would find a curious letter which they believed to be in Nguyen Thi Minh 
Khai’s handwriting, when they searched a party member’s house in Gia Dinh. Its 
peremptory tone and criticism o f the CC are quite surprising. It is written to participants in 
a meeting which she had the right to attend, but where she would not have had the right to 
vote. She mentions that she has been working for the past two years with the ‘directing 
organs’, so one can guess that the letter was written around the time o f the ICP's Sixth 
Plenum, held in Hoc Mon in November 1939. It reads:
Comrades!
We need to appoint someone urgently to bring back L! Why all this disorder? You 
haven’t decided on the rendez-vous. Which means that L. has waited a long time, without
42 Notre Voix, ‘L’activite des Trotskystes en Chine’, 11 August 1939.
43 See Huynh Kim Khanh, op. cit, p. 250. Khanh cites arrest figures from Tran van Giau, Giai Cap
Cong Nhan, 3.
44 See Sud Chonchirdsin, The Indochinese Communist Party in French Cochin China (1936-1940),
Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of London, 1995; pp. 261-65.
45 Hoang Tranh, op. cit. p. 102.
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anyone going to get him. I was counting on bringing him back, but I didn’t know the 
meeting place, and anyway, I hadn’t received any instructions about th is...
In China events o f exceptional seriousness are now taking place, which could have 
repercussions for our Central Committee. We have to resolve this question, as well as the 
financial question, which is very important. We have several hundred piasters at our 
disposal and are awaiting the decision o f the CC or the Regional Committee. You must 
send a trustworthy comrade to come and get the money. The CC will be asked to assign 
tasks more clearly. As it is, sometimes we make a lot of effort without obtaining any 
results, because of the bad division o f labour.
I know that the idea o f a woman, even if  she is just or has a good political character, does 
not inspire great confidence. However, I feel that since I have begun working with the 
comrades here, I have not made any suggestions or begun any activities which are against 
the principles or the policy o f the Party. ..46
This letter’s tone of authority leads one to suppose that Minh Khai saw herself as a 
representative of the Comintern or the Overseas Bureau of the ICP. With Le Hong Phong 
under arrest this responsibility could have fallen on her shoulders. But as her letter makes 
clear, her fellow party members did not like to be given orders by a woman; they may have 
viewed her as insubordinate for making unauthorized contacts with ‘L .’ or with her allies in 
Tonkin, such as her brother-in-law Giap. By the time this letter was written, the Surete was 
referring to her as ‘the concubine o f Le Hong Phong’. The two had been sharing a house in 
Cholon and had at least been posing as husband and wife. In 1937, however, the French 
had described her as already married, but separated from her husband.47 From what we 
know o f Nguyen Ai Quoc’s difficulty in making contact with the CC, it seems highly 
possible that the ‘L .’ referred to in her letter is indeed ‘Lin’. The letter could have been 
written just after the failed attempt to make contact in Longzhou, which must have occurred 
before the Japanese occupied the town in late November 1939.
4. The Sixth Plenum and the 1940 Uprisings
Nguyen Van Cu came to Saigon from Hanoi in the autumn of 1939 for the Sixth Plenum of 
the ICP. (He had been expelled to Tonkin in the summer o f 1938, not long after he took 
over his post.48) This would be the final CC meeting before the uprisings o f 1940, which 
were to create an upheaval in the party’s leadership structures. Nguyen van Cu himself 
would be arrested in January 1940, along with Le Duan, another ex-prisoner from Poulo
46 AOM, SPCE 385, translation of a letter seized during a search made on 21 April 1940 in the home of 
Nguyen Van Cho, Hoc Mon, Gia Dinh. A photostat of the Vietnamese original is in this file, along 
with the French translation.
47 AOM, SPCE 385, Note n. 5819-S, Activite communiste Rev. en Cochinchine, Saigon, 6 Sept. 1937, 
signed: Campana.
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Condore who had moved to Saigon to work in 1939.49 Phan Dang Luu, Le Duan, and Vo 
Van Tan are the three other cadres usually mentioned as having taken part in this meeting 
held from the 6 -8  November in Hoc Mon. Hoang Quoc Viet does not seem to have taken 
part, as he had gone into hiding north o f Hanoi; the Annam CC representative Nguyen Chi 
Dieu may have already succumbed to tuberculosis by this time. Ta Uyen, a northerner from 
Ninh Binh, who had been working in the South since his escape from Poulo Condore in 
1935, is another cadre likely to have participated. A member of the original ICP faction 
from 1929, his biography identifies him as secretary of the Southern Regional Committee at 
the time of his arrest in October 1940.50 Minh Khai does not seem to have been a full CC 
member at this stage, although by 1940 the French identified her as a CC secretary.
The Sixth Plenum reacted to the changed international circumstances o f late 1939 by 
calling for the creation of an Anti-imperialist United Front. National liberation now 
became the major goal o f the ICP. In a circular published in December, the CC called on 
the ‘struggling forces o f the proletariat, o f the labouring peoples, o f the small and weak 
nations’ to unite with the Soviet Union. They would have to rise up and struggle, ‘to stamp 
out the flame of war by eliminating its root: the capitalist, imperialist system’.51 This 
manifesto called for a halt to the sending of Vietnamese soldiers to France or other foreign 
countries; it also called on communists to support the Soviet Union, as well as the 
revolutions in France, China and the world.52 According to a version o f the Sixth Plenum 
Resolution published in 1983, the meeting revived Nguyen Ai Quoc’s moderate policy of 
1930 with regard to land confiscation.53 But in contrast to the statements of the Eighth 
Plenum in 1941, the documents of 1939 still are aimed primarily at workers, peasants, and 
dan-chung, ‘the masses’. The ICP was, on the one hand, returning to familiar terrain for 
those activists such as Nguyen Ai Quoc who could recall the European anti-war movement 
of the First World War. At that time, left-wing socialists and Bolsheviks had refused to 
adopt the war aims o f their respective ruling classes. On the other hand, the CC was now 
taking a stance which would bring it closer to the party's own left-wing, as it prepared the 
ground to return to a violent struggle to overthrow French power.
48 Nhung Nguoi Cong San, p. 63. Tran Huy Lieu says that Nguyen Van Cu was a member of the Tin 
Tuc group in Hanoi. (Tran Huy Lieu, op. cit., p. 201).
49 Ngo Nhat Son, Dong Chi Phan Dang Luu, [Comrade Phan Dang Luu], (Nghe Tinh: NXB Nghe 
Tinh, 1987).p. 46.
50 Nguyen Chon Trung et al., Con Dao ky su va tu lieu, p. 164.
51 ‘Chu truong cua nguoi cong san doi voi viec bat linh’ [‘The Communist Position on Forced 
Recruitment’], 30 Dec. 1939, Van Kien Dang, II (1930-1945), p.389.
52 Ibid., p. 394-395.
53 Nhung nghi quyet co ban dan den thang loi each mang thang tam, [Basic Resolutions Leading to the 
Victory o f the August Revolution], (Hanoi: NXB SuThat, 1983), p.8.
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After the January 1940 arrest o f Nguyen Van Cu it is unclear how the void in the leadership 
was filled. Cu’s removal from the scene seems to have created a succession crisis in the ICP 
which was not fully resolved until the Eighth Plenum in 1941. It may be that in 1940 two 
wings or tendencies within the party once again developed, in a way that echoed the split in 
the Thanh Nien association in 1928-29. In March or April Vo Van Tan was arrested, which 
eliminated another key leader.34 In May 1940 two legal activists from Tonkin, Vo Nguyen 
Giap and Pham Van Dong, began to play a new role as a link between the CC and the 
communists in southern China. Meanwhile, in Cochinchina a reinvigorated anti-French 
movement sprang up, which made recruitment inside the army a major part o f its mission. 
How closely what was happening in Yunnan and Guangxi was coordinated with activities in 
Cochinchina and other parts o f Vietnam is impossible to say. The communists who made 
the effort to travel to Kunming to meet Nguyen Ai Quoc and the Overseas Bureau in 1940 
were some o f those who had been most closely associated with the policies of the United 
Democratic Front. They would include, in addition to Giap and Dong, the former Tan Viet 
activist Phan Dang Luu. A woman known as Ly Thi Lan in Yunnan was also sighted with 
Nguyen Ai Quoc in May and June 1940. It is noteworthy that a French report written that 
June mentions that the ICP has ‘the intention to make more use of its female elements for 
propaganda and liaison work’.55
In June o f 1940 the in-country and overseas sections of the ICP finally began to come 
together. Nguyen Ai Quoc had arrived in the Yunnan capital of Kunming early in the year. 
After his failed attempt to rendez-vous with the ICP in the autumn o f 1939, he is believed to 
have returned to Guilin, then made his way to Guiyang and Chongqing. There he once again 
met Zhou Enlai, according to Hoang Tranh,56 With the sudden change o f policy in Moscow 
in August 1939, the Vietnamese would have been eager to consult on how to adapt their 
own tactics. (Presumably Quoc met Zhou before the latter’s visit to Moscow in early 
1940.57) The Vietnamese say that Quoc also met Ho Hoc Lam, still attached to the GMD 
General Staff, in Chongqing.58
The Vietnamese communists who were now making Kunming their center o f operations 
were a combination o f old Thanh Nien trainees from Canton and former members o f the 
VNQDD who had taken refuge in Yunnan in 1930. Among the Thanh Nien group Hoang
54 Ngo Nhat Son, op.cit., p. 46. Other sources, such as Nhung Nguoi Cong San, place his arrest in 
‘mid-year’.
55 AOM, GGI65461, Annam, June 1940.
56 Hoang Tranh, op. cit., pp. 105-6.
57 McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, p. 144.
BNTS, p. 88.
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Van Hoan and Phung Chi Kien were the most prominent. Kien, like Nguyen Ai Quoc, had 
still been considered a member of the ICP CC as o f 1938.59 In Kunming he had become the 
head o f the party’s reconstituted Overseas Bureau. The antecedents o f two other members 
o f this group, Vu Anh (Trinh Dinh Hai) and Cao Hong Linh or Lanh are less clear. Both 
were apparently communists in good standing and fluent in Chinese, who may have earlier 
been part o f the Nanjing circle around Ho Hoc Lam. In 1935 Vu Anh and a former VNQDD 
cadre, Tran Quoc Kinh, had been sent by the ICP to build a communist group in Yunnan. 
They recruited two students at the Kunming officers training school, Bui Due Minh and Le 
Tung Son, who had grown disenchanted with the VNQDD leadership.60 These two became 
stalwarts of the overseas communist group, Bui Due Minh serving as the guide for Giap and 
Dong when they made their trip to Kunming in May 1940. There may still have been a 
considerable number of VNQDD-affiliated workers in Yunnan in 1940, along the railway 
line between Hanoi and Kunming. In spite o f their theoretically legal status conferred by the 
united front in China, the communists generally used some sort o f front organization to 
protect themselves from persecution by the local GMD. Several Vietnamese sources 
recount an inspection tour along the Yunnan railway which Nguyen Ai Quoc undertook with 
Phung Chi Kien in April 1940.61 Quoc encouraged the Vietnamese communists to increase 
their propaganda along the railway, to call on the Vietnamese to ‘fight the French and to 
support China’s resistance to Japan’, using the cover of the ‘Association o f Vietnamese in 
Support o f China’s Resistance’ for their activities.
Vo Nguyen Giap relates that he and Pham Van Dong departed from Hanoi for Kunming in 
the beginning of May 1940. In Yen Bay they met Bui Due Minh, who took them by river 
boat on the next stage o f the journey. After crossing the river into China at Lao Cai, they 
changed into Chinese clothes to continue their trip to Kunming.62 On 13 May, however, the 
Surete received a report that ‘an emigre recently arrived from Sian [Xi’an], Tran Ba Quoc’, 
and Ly Thi Lan had left Yunnanfou by train on 12 May. They were planning to travel to the 
Vietnamese border and cross on foot, this report said. The man was dressed as a scholar and 
the woman as a Hakka Chinese.63 The French identified the man as Nguyen Ai Quoc. It 
seems possible that Quoc was hoping to meet the two envoys from Hanoi at the border. 
According to Giap’s account, however, he and Dong waited in Kunming until early June 
before Quoc, whom the Vietnamese referred to by his old Hong Kong alias o f Vuong,
59 RC, 495, 10a, 140, p. 68b; CC report of 6 April 1938 to Comintern.
60 Le Tung Son, Nhat Ky Mot Chang Duong [A Stage in the Journey], (Hanoi: N.X.B. Van Hoc, 1978), 
pp. 42-3.
Hoang van Hoan, op. cit., p. 108.
62 Vo Nguyen Giap, Nhung Chang Duong Lich Su [Historic Journies], (Hanoi: N.X.B. Chinh tri quoc 
gia, 1994), pp. 14-8.
235
t
turned up. At this point the Vietnamese accounts are uninformative about the discussions 
which ensued. However, a long report and request for aid which Quoc addressed to the CCP 
in July 1940 may well have been the product o f a joint decision made that month. The 
Surete reported in December 1940 that Phan Dang Luu had admitted after his arrest that he, 
too, had been in Yunnan in June.64 Another Surete report of 9 June 1940 referred to 
‘Indochinese communists in China returning to Indochina’. It mentioned four people as 
travelling together: Tran Ba Quoc, Ly Thi Lan (whom it said was not Nguyen Thi Khai), 
Duong Ba Linh, and Nguyen Cong Nam.65 Giap’s alias in China is usually given as Duong 
Hoai Nam and Dong’s as Lam Ba Kiet. So we cannot say with any certainty who these four 
were. The identity o f the woman remains a mystery, but the French may have been too 
quick to assume that it was not Minh Khai. They did not have any confirmed sightings of 
her between the autumn 1937 plenum and her arrest in Cholon at the end of July 1940, 
although they believed she gave birth to a daughter in Saigon in early 1939. By May o f 
1940 she was being identified as a CC secretary by informers o f the Surete, so it would have 
been quite logical for her to join the group which travelled to Yunnan.66
Quoc's report on Indochina and request for aid, dated 12 July 1940, is presented in the 
exhaustive style favoured by the Comintern. It includes an analysis o f the strategic situation 
in Indochina and international attitudes regarding its future. As it is written in the first- 
person by someone who mentions that at the end o f 1929 he returned to Hong Kong to call a 
meeting of communist factions, we can assume that the author is Nguyen Ai Quoc. He 
refers to the French capitulation to Germany on 16 June 1940 as a moment when all 
Vietnamese rejoiced, believing that the propitious moment for the overthrow of French rule 
had come. ‘For this we are only lacking organizers and leaders. And why doesn’t the CP 
take up this organization and its leadership? Because 80-90% o f the old cadres have been 
arrested, and the new cadres do not have enough experience or strength. The problem is that 
in order to arouse the people to rise up we need an influential man, who will boldly and 
decisively go on the attack.’67 Quoc’s analysis o f Japan’s intentions shows that he did not 
foresee the Japanese-Vichy French partnership for control of Indochina which was to be
63AOM, SPCE 369, Yunnan fou 13 May 1940, Dirsurge Hanoi, n. 104.
64 AOM, SPCE 385, Fiche de Reference, Surete Cochinchine, n. 7624-S, 5 December 1940.
65 AOM, SPCE 385, pour m. le Commissaire de Police speciale, Langson, en communication a Mess. 
Le Chef des Services de Police de Tonkin, Hanoi, Les Commissaires de Police speciale Laokay, 
Caobang, Moncay, Hanoi 9 June 1940.
66 AOM, SPCE 385, Activites communistes/arrestations d’agitateurs, signe Castrueil, chef local des 
services de Polices; in May 1940 the French arrested a Nguyen Due Hung, who confessed that he 
worked as a liaison agent between several organizations in Cholon and Nguyen Thi Minh Khai, 
‘member of the CC of the ICP and head of the Saigon-Cholon Committee.’
67 RC, 495, 10a, 140, p. 134: quoted from a Feb. 1942 Russian translation of the 1940 Chinese- 
language document.
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cemented in September 1940. ‘At present,’ he wrote, ‘Japan is making efforts to grab this 
country [Indochina].' The Japanese were already within three hours o f Hanoi, while their 
special forces were ready at any time to land in Haiphong, he said. Although the 
government in Indochina had declared its support for the London Committee o f the Free 
French, he noted that they were in reality making concession after concession to the 
Japanese.68 Yet he concluded that, although Japan was strong, she could not use her full 
force to pacify Indochina, as her enormous military might was tied down by the war in 
China. The French troops in Indochina, on the whole, were made up o f indigenous soldiers, 
he pointed out, and ‘if  we can appeal to them, they -  or at least some of them -  will fight the 
French (or even the Japanese).’ He also noted that the anti-French forces had strong allies: 
in addition to the USSR, these included China and India. A situation had been created when 
it would be enough ‘for one person to cry out loudly, for all the rest to rise up’. ‘In a word’, 
he wrote, ‘objective conditions favour our success, but our subjective force — our party -  is 
very w eak ... at present our old, experienced cadres are groaning in prison. Thus the masses 
are leaderless and cannot make use o f this ‘once-in-a-thousand years propitious situation’.69
In order to change the situation, in order to help the party fulfill its historic mission, he 
explained that its forces would need to attack from the outside. For this they required: 1) 
freedom to cross their border; 2) some weapons; 3) some financial aid; and 4) a few 
advisers. When we have these things, ‘we can definitely create an anti-fascist, anti-Japanese 
base,’ he claimed. ‘Further,’ he said, ‘i f  we can use the contradictions among the 
imperialists and create and broaden a united front o f oppressed peoples, then the bright 
future will not be far off,’ he concluded.70 This request would appear to be the first 
formulation o f plans for the armed Viet Minh. It may also be the first sign that Nguyen Ai 
Quoc was preparing to transform himself into the nationalist leader, Ho Chi Minh, ‘the 
influential man who would boldly go on the attack’. The weakness o f the ICP would seem to 
have dictated a time-frame of at least six-months to a year for the planned uprising to reach 
its take-off point.
The GMD Sixth Section (for information) picked up news of a Vietnamese communist 
approach to the CCP in the summer o f 1940. They reported that a communist from 
Cochinchina, Tran Van Hinh, had arrived in Yan’an and that in August the Chinese and 
Vietnamese concluded an aid agreement. (It is not clear whether he was delivering Nguyen 
Ai Quoc’s request, or whether this was a separate approach to the CCP.) King Chen lists the
68 Ibid., pp. 135-6.
69 Ibid, pp. 137-138.
70 Ibid, p. 138.
237
following items as part o f this agreement: 1) to establish a United Front of the Sino- 
Vietnamese people against Japan; 2) to enlarge the communist’s armed organization and 
begin guerilla activities; 3) to unite the ICP with all political parties in an effort to set up a 
‘United Front for National Independence’, 4) to make the goal o f the ICP struggle ‘Anti- 
French Imperialism and Anti-Feudalism’; 5) to send ICP cadres to Yan’an for training at the 
Resistance-Japan University; and 6) for the CCP to serve as representative o f the 
Comintern’s Asian Information Bureau to guide the ICP, and to offer $50,000 Chinese per 
month to the ICP.71 This agreement would have reflected the inability o f the French CP to 
continue advising the Vietnamese, and the return to an arrangement of ICP subordination to 
the Chinese party. Such an arrangement may have been inevitable at this point in the ICP’s 
development, as direct communications with the Comintern seem to have ceased. (Quoc’s 
aid request to the CCP was not translated into Russian until 1942; how it eventually arrived 
in the Comintern’s files is not clear.) Giap’s memoirs mention that in Tonkin the party had 
been discussing the need to revive an Asian League o f Oppressed Peoples72, an idea which 
Quoc also raised in the conclusion to his aid request. It appears that the same kind o f front 
organization which had been used to unite the Asian communists in 1925-26 and 1928-30 
was being considered as the vehicle for a Chinese-led anti-Japanese front.
In July 1940 the French had begun to collect evidence in Cochinchina that some sort of 
uprising was in the offing. They believed that at the end o f June 1940, the ICP CC had 
passed an order instructing party members to prepare for an armed insurrection.73 This 
report could refer to the meeting which was held in Kunming in June 1940, as there may 
actually have been more CC members there than remained at large in Cochinchina. These 
would have included Phung Chi Kien, Nguyen Ai Quoc, Phan Dang Luu, and perhaps 
Nguyen Thi Minh Khai. The Surete also reported that the ICP had sent a Chinese member o f 
the ICP to China, to request CCP support for an insurrection.74 We do not know whether 
this refers to Phan Dang Luu’s trip to Yunnan, the travels of the ‘Tran Van Hinh’ noted by 
the GMD, or whether there was another link to the CCP from Cochinchina, for example via 
the CCP organization in Saigon. The French gained their first hard evidence of the planning 
for an armed movement when they arrested Nguyen Thi Minh Khai at the CC headquarters 
in Cholon on 30 July 1940, along with the escaped political prisoner Nguyen Huu Tien.
They seized documents which they described as, ‘concerning the insurrection which the ICP
71 King C. Chen, op. cit., p. 41; whether there really were plans to form an 'Asian Information Bureau' 
at this date is uncertain.
72 Vo Nguyen Giap, op. cit., p. 24.
73 Sud Chonchirdsin, op.cit, p. 282, citing AOM, Direction des Affaires Politiques, rapports sur les 
mouvements subversifs de Cochinchine et d’ Annam, Nov. 1940 -  May 1941.
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plans to start when the “favourable moment” comes’. Most o f these documents had not yet 
been mimeographed and distributed among party members. Some passages in the 
confiscated materials were aimed against the French military, so the newly arrested 
prisoners were handed over to the military courts.75 Sud Chonchirdsin describes the seized 
documents as covering the ‘forming o f an insurrection organization, sabotage plans and ' 
guerrilla tactics.’76 The party member arrested along with Minh Khai, Nguyen Huu Tien 
(Giao Hoai), was like Ta Uyen a former member o f the 1929 ICP faction from Ha Nam 
province. The two had escaped together from Poulo Condore in the spring o f 1935.
There would seem to be a connection between the gathering in Kunming in June 1940, not 
recognized in party history as an official ICP meeting, and the beginning o f an 
insurrectionary movement within Vietnam. Yet from subsequent developments in 
Cochinchina, one has room to question whether the plans which Nguyen Ai Quoc discussed 
with his colleagues, and the aid request he sent to the CCP, really provided the masterplan 
of the Nam Ky Insurrection, which began on 23 November 1940. Nguyen Ai Quoc, as the 
cautious planner, most likely did not endorse the rapid timetable for the insurrection which 
took shape in Cochinchina between September and November 1940. As in 1930, it would 
appear that the voluntarist wing of the party, which retained its predilection for symbolic 
violence and revolt within the military, set the pace o f the events which occurred in the 
autumn months, A Vietnamese source claims that at a meeting o f the Cochinchina 
Regional Committee held in Mytho in July 1940, one group of delegates favoured delaying 
the insurrection due to the weakness o f the party’s forces. This group included delegates 
from Saigon-Cholon, the eastern provinces and Phan Dang Luu, now described as 
representative o f the CC for Cochinchina. The majority, however, voted to go ahead with 
the insurrection. It was at this point that Phan Dang Luu suggested consulting with the rest 
o f the Central Committee.77 After Phan Dang Luu had been arrested in November 1940, he 
would confess that the insurrection had been led by the extreme left in the party, ‘who were 
ignorant o f the advice given by the Standing Committee of the Cochinchina Committee 
concerning the preparedness of the party.,78
Some Vietnamese sources, Tran Huy Lieu in particular, claim that the Anti-imperialist Front 
in the South was extremely successful in attracting indigenous soldiers. In his article on the
74 Chonchirdsin, op. cit., p. 283, citing AOM, Note sur l’activite des intrigues politiques pendant le
mois de juillet 1940, Surete 7F 27.
75 AOM, SPCE 385, Note postale, conf., Gouvemeur Cochinchine a Gouverneur general de l’lndochine
(Direction des Affaires Pol.), Hanoi, 21 August 1940.
76 Chonchirdsin, op. cit., p. 284, citing CAOM, Surete 7f-27, July 1940.
77 Ngo Nhat Son, op. cit., pp. 52-3. Cited by Chonchirdsin, op. cit., p. 284-5.
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Southern Insurrection he says that groups of soldiers in Gia Dinh and Cholon, up to 300 at 
one time, fled into the jungle with their weapons in order to prepare resistance to the 
French.79 In November 1940, as the French were preparing to send troops to the Thai- 
Cambodian border to defend against Thai incursions, Lieu claims that up to 15,000 (sic) 
Vietnamese soldiers in Saigon, including two artillery units, were prepared to'protest against 
their involvement in the conflict. As many as two-thirds o f the Vietnamese soldiers were 
ready to ‘follow the revolution’ at that point, Lieu writes, as well as 15,000 ordinary 
southerners. Other sources claim rapid rates o f growth for the southern party in this period 
after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.80 Yet it appears that the French were able to suppress 
the insurrection fairly easily when it broke out in November.
The Japanese and French came to an agreement on military cooperation on 22 September 
1940, which permitted the Japanese to station six thousand troops in Tonkin , to use four 
Tonkin airfields and to move their troops through Tonkin to Yunnan.81 But the night the 
agreement was signed, a Japanese attack on the French border post at Dong Dang led to 
three days of fighting between French and Japanese troops. Vietnamese in the Japanese- 
backed Viet Nam Phuc Quoc Dong Minh Floi (Vietnam National Restoration League) took 
part in fighting at Lang Son, while in the district o f Bac Son an ICP-led insurrection broke 
out on 23 September. Resistance in the area o f Vu Lang carried on sporadically until 28 
October, when the French returned to disperse the revolutionary fighters.82 Once it had 
become clear to the communists that the Japanese were not going to dislodge the French in 
support of Vietnamese nationalist forces, the short-term aims o f the Anti-imperialist United 
Front would have to be re-evaluated.
When Phan Dang Luu went north to Tonkin for consultations in October 1940, it is not at all 
clear what sort o f meeting he would have been attending, or whether its authority would be 
recognized by the party in the South. William Duiker writes, based on interviews in Hanoi, 
that Luu met with the members o f the Tonkin Regional Committee, who at their meeting in 
early November 1940 reconstituted the Central Committee, making Truong Chinh the acting 
General Secretary.83 The other members included Hoang Quoc Viet (who, in 1937 at least, 
had served on the CC), Hoang Van Thu, and Tran Dang Ninh, who had taken charge o f the
78 Chonchirdsin, op. cit., pp. 300-301, citing CAOM, Surete 7F 27, Nov. and Dec. 1940.
79 Tran Huy Lieu, Cac Cuoc Khoi Nghia Bac Son, Nam Ky, Do Luong, (Hanoi: NXB Van Su Dia,
1957), pp. 19-20.
80 Ngo Nhat Son, op. cit, p. 47, says the ICP grew by 66% in the period leading up to the insurrection.
81 David G. Marr, Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power, (Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1995), p. 19.
82 Tran Huy Lieu, Cac Cuoc Khoi Nghia, pp. 12-5.
83 William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power, p. 66. For more discussion of this issue see
Stein Tonnesson, The Vietnamese Revolution o f1945, (Oslo: PRIO, 1991), p. 115-6. .
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Bac Son insurrectionary movement. This seems the most plausible explanation of how the 
ICP succession crisis was resolved, although it is not clear when the November meeting 
became identified as the CC's Seventh Plenum, or whether the CC members in Kunming had 
any input in its decisions. Curiously, in the Museum o f the Revolution in Ho Chi Minh City, 
there is an ‘urgent communique’ in pamphlet form sent from the Standing Committee o f the 
ICP CC asking for support from the Central-Northern party committee {Dang bo Trung-Bac 
Icy) for the Southern Insurrection. The uprising had begun on 23 November, the pamphlet 
says; it was the duty o f the Central-Northern Committee ‘to bring more renown to the 
soldiers o f the uprising by diverting the imperialist forces’.84 If this is authentic, it shows 
that the southerners still considered the Standing Committee to be in Cochinchina. As noted 
above, Ta Uyen is mentioned in one French report as being the head of this committee.85 
However, the Surete reported in December 1940 that Phan Dang Luu had admitted that he 
had gone to Tonkin in October 1940, ‘doubtless in order to attend the ICP CC meeting 
which is believed to have been held on the 5,6, and 7 November.’86
In any case, the meeting which Phan Dang Luu attended voted to delay the insurrection in 
the south, but to develop the armed forces in Bac Son.87 Either the CC advice failed to 
reach the southern party in time, or as some sources have it, the plans were too far advanced 
to abort. Phan Dang Luu was arrested on arrival in Saigon, shortly before the capture o f Ta 
Uyen. The French had managed to keep abreast o f the insurrection plans, thanks to arrests 
o f key participants. Thus most elements of the uprising, such as the raid on the Central 
Prison in Saigon, were prevented. The mass uprising o f indigenous troops was nipped in the 
bud when they were locked into their encampments. One suspects that the French were 
simply waiting for the organizers to show their hand, before moving in to arrest them. A 
1941 telegram to the Vichy colonial authorities listed the damage from the insurrection as 
follows: thirty deaths, including three Frenchmen, as well as thirty wounded, with again 
three Frenchmen among them. Some of the victims had been savagely attacked. O f the 130 
rifles and revolvers which had been stolen, 40 had still not been recovered. Numerous 
buildings had been burned down, bridges and telegraph and telephone lines had been 
sabotaged. Admiral Decoux considered the violence to be so abhorrent that none o f the 
accused ICP leaders was to be shown clemency.88
84 The author saw a copy of this pamphlet on a visit to Ho Chi Minh City in February 1995.
85 Chonchirdsin, op. cit., p. 305 citing AOM, Surete 7F 27, Nov. -  Dec. 1940.
86 AOM, SPCE 385, fiche de ref., Surete Cochinchine, n. 7624-S, 5 and 12 December 1940.
87 Nhung Nguoi Cong San, p. 135.
88 AOM, SPCE 385, projet telegramme d’Etat a Colonies Vichy, signed: Decoux, 17 May 1941.
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The arrests and executions which followed this still-born uprising destroyed the ICP 
infrastructure in the South. As many as 100 leaders were executed, according to Tran Huy 
Lieu.89 Ha Huy Tap, Nguyen Van Cu, Phan Dang Luu, Vo Van Tan, Nguyen Thi Minh 
Khai, and Nguyen Huu Tien were all executed by firing squad in August 1941. Le Hong 
Phong, Le Duan and most o f the legal communists such as Duong Bach Mai and Nguyen 
Van Tao were imprisoned. (Le Hong Phong would die on Poulo Condore in 1942.) This left 
the newly-constituted CC in Tonkin to reorganize the communist infrastructure, which in 
theory should have been preparing for a long-term independence struggle. The party’s 
center o f gravity would now shift over the border to China, where Nguyen Ai Quoc and the 
overseas party members were beginning to make the links which would enable them to take 
part in the GMD-sponsored Vietnamese liberation movement. The legitimacy o f the new 
party leadership now derived from Nguyen Ai Quoc and his comrades from the days of the 
Canton training courses. Even Truong Chinh would seem to have required Nguyen Ai 
Quoc’s blessing in 1941 to be confirmed in his post as party leader. To party members o f the 
1928-35 generation, Quoc's entourage would have perhaps had weak credentials: they had 
been involved in united fronts with the bourgeois Guomindang on two occasions and few of 
them had been ‘proletarianized’. Vo Nguyen Giap, who would become one of Quoc’s 
right-hand men, had only become an official party member in 1937.90 His background as a 
Tan Viet student activist in 1928-30 and a united front journalist in Hanoi may have been 
suspect in the eyes of some ICP members. Only Phung Chi Kien had really seen action 
with the Red Army in China. But these were the men who played the key roles in 1941, 
when the Viet Minh began to take shape.
5. The Move to the Border and the Eighth Plenum
In October 1940 Nguyen Ai Quoc and his entourage moved to Guilin from Kunming. It was 
at this point that the communists abroad decided to use the mantle of the Viet Nam 
Independence League (Viet Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi), Viet Minh for short, for their 
nationalist front. This was the same organization which had been founded in Nanjing by Ho 
Hoc Lam, Hoang Van Hoan, Le Thiet Hung, Phi Van, Nguyen Hai Than and others in 
1936. As it was still an officially registered organization in China, it was a structure ideally
89 Tran Huy Lieu, op.cit, p. 124.
90 Cecil B. Currey, Victory At Any Cost, (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, Inc., 1997), p. 37, quoting two 
western sources; this date appears probable, as a Surete document of Jan. 1938 lists Giap as a member 
of a peasant organizing committee of the Tonkin ICP Executive Committee. (SPCE 377, Note conf. 
1533-S, 28 Jan. 1938.) Vu Thu Hien in Dem Giua Ban Ngay (Darkness at Noon), (Fed. Rep. Of 
Germany: Thien Chi X.B., 1997), p. 120, presents the view that Pham van Dong was not considered a 
party member until 1940, when he underwent a training course on the Chinese border led by NAQ. (I 
am grateful to Judy Stowe for bringing this to my attention.)
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suited to Quoc’s purposes. Ho Hoc Lam, although now ill in hospital in Guilin, remained a 
respected figurehead, with good contacts in the GMD General Staff. Via Ho Hoc Lam the 
Vietnamese communists were able to make contact with General Li Jishen, head of the 
GMD Southwest Field Headquarters in Guilin.91 Ironically, Li Jishen was the general 
whom Quoc had accused of being behind the'destruction o f the Guangdong peasant 
movement in 1926-27; he had also crushed the Canton Commune in December 1927. 
However, he had over the years been an opponent o f Chiang Kaishek and may now have 
found that cooperation with the Viet Minh nationalists was essential to the extension of anti- 
Japanese activities. Quoc helped to enhance the Viet M inh’s legitimacy by promoting the 
formation of an ‘Association o f Sino-Vietnamese Cultural Comrades’, composed of what 
were then known as ‘progressive writers’. Ho Hoc Lam and Pham Van Dong became 
members of its board o f directors.92 Quoc’s experiences within the earlier united front in 
Canton, when he formed the first League of Oppressed Peoples, were now being brought 
into play.
In late 1940, as a flow o f refugees from the unsuccessful uprisings in northern Tonkin 
arrived in China, the Vietnamese nationalists moved south to Jingxi, a town just 65 miles 
from the Vietnamese border. Zhang Fakui, now Commander-in-Chief o f the Fourth War 
Area, sent Truong Boi Cong to Jingxi to enlist the refugees in a ‘border work team’.93 There 
were already a few communists such as Le Quang Ba and Hoang Sam in this refugee group 
and Nguyen Ai Quoc quickly sent three o f his best cadres south to join them. These were 
Vo Nguyen Giap, Vu Anh and Cao Hong Lanh. They advised Quoc that he should proceed 
to Jingxi to join them. When Quoc travelled south, accompanied by Pham Van Dong,
Phung Chi Kien and Hoang Van Hoan, he carried three pieces of identification, all dated 
1940. According to Zhang Fakui’s account, these identified him as 1) a member of the 
Young Chinese Newsmen’s Association; and 2) Special Correspondent o f the International 
News Service; the third I.D. was a Staff Travel Permit of the Headquarters o f the Fourth 
War Area. All o f these documents were issued under the name o f ‘Ho Chi M inh’.94 The 
name, which means ‘Ho the Most Enlightened’, marked the creation o f a new persona, that 
o f the wise patriarch and monk-like disciple of the nationalist cause.
After Quoc arrived in Jingxi in December 1940, he sent Vu Anh to the border o f Cao Bang 
province to choose a secure area to serve as a revolutionary base, according to Vu Anh’s
91 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., pp. 112-3.
92 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 114.
93 King Chen, op, cit., p. 46, from information based on an interview with Zhang Fakui.
94 King Chen, op. cit., p. 147; from Report o f Zhang Fakui dated 23 Jan. 1944.
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own memoir.95 It was at this time that Quoc opened a training class in two border villages, 
for around 40 of the Vietnamese refugees who had been selected from Truong Boi Cong’s 
‘Border Work Team’ by Giap and his comrades. Vu Anh claims to have selected the cave at 
Pac Bo as a secure hide-out across the border for the communist nationalists. In view of 
French reports from 1941, however, it seems likely that the cave was mainly used as a hide­
out for guerillas moving back and forth between Vietnam and China.96 Nguyen Ai Quoc is 
said to have returned to Vietnam in February 1941, but he may actually have spent most of 
his time in the villages on the Chinese side o f the border.
Nguyen Ai Quoc and his communist core group continued to function successfully within a 
united front structure in 1941, while at the same time rebuilding links to the ICP in Tonkin 
and Annam. In early 1941 Bui Due Minh and Hoang Van Thu came across the border to 
discuss plans for an Eighth Plenum o f the ICP Central Committee.97 This plenum would be 
one o f two important meetings held in the spring o f 1941 in the Jingxi area, meetings which 
would strengthen the cross-border communists’ ties on both levels. In April a meeting of the 
Vietnamese National Liberation League ( Viet nam Dan Toe Giai Phong Dong Chi Hoi), yet 
another united front group, organized by Truong Boi Cong and Ho Hoc Lam, took place. 
According to King Chen , the nucleus o f this grouping was the Viet Minh.98 Chen says that 
Dong, Giap and Hoang Van Hoan were the key organizers of the Liberation League, as they 
had first broached the idea with Li Jishen in late 1940, and had set up a preparatory office in 
Jingxi. The League was clearly identifed with the GMD united front and took Sun Yatsen’s 
‘Three Peoples’ Principles’ as its basic philosophy. It would continue to be a useful vehicle 
for the Viet Minh communists until the end o f 1941, when strains in the united front 
between the CCP and GMD had nearly reached the breaking point.
The organization o f the ICP Eighth Plenum may also have required delicate diplomatic work 
on the part o f the Viet Minh collective. This would be remembered as the first official 
meeting of Nguyen Ai Quoc and the Central Committee since Quoc’s arrival in southern 
China. By the spring o f 1941, with the party in all three parts of Vietnam under strong 
pressure from the French, it appears that the Tonkin ICP leaders were in no position to 
refuse the leadership o f the overseas communists. The fragility o f the links among 
communists who remained at liberty in Vietnam is demonstrated by the way that participants 
in the Eighth Plenum were recruited in Annam. One o f them, Bui San, later arrested by the
95 Vu Anh, 'Tu Con-Minh ve Pac-Bo ’ (‘From Kunming to Pac Bo’) in Bac Ho -  Hoi Ky (Memories o f
Uncle Ho), (Hanoi: Van Hoc, 1960), p. 152.
96 AOM, SPCE 369, report of informer ‘Ursule’, 10 June 1941.
97 Hoang Van Hoan, op. cit., p. 119.
98 King Chen, op. cit., p. 49.
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French, told the Surete that he had met Phan Dang Luu in Vinh towards the end o f 1940.
Luu sent him to Hanoi to restore contact between Annam and the Tonkin party structure. At 
the end o f December 1940, Bui San received a letter telling him to send two delegates to 
attend a congress. He made the trip to Cao Bang at the end o f January 1941 with Ho Xuan 
L uu." According to the police statements o f the two communists from Annam, the meeting 
which they attended was held near Longzhou; this could have been a way o f putting the 
Surete off the track, but according to other statements which the Surete received, the plenum 
was definitely held outside o f Vietnam. An informer code-named ‘Ursule’ reported to the 
Tonkin police that the meeting was held in a two-story hut, built on a mountainside four or 
five kilometres from Trinh Tay (Jingxi) in Guangxi. The CC met on the first floor, while the 
Tonkin Regional Committee met on the ground-floor level. The two meetings were held 
simultaneously, with Nguyen Ai Quoc attending the CC meeting in the morning and the 
Regional meeting in the afternoon. 100
The discussions at the Eighth Plenum have been recorded by the Vietnamese party to 
demonstrate Nguyen Ai Quoc’s foresight.101 Whether or not he actually predicted the 
German invasion of Russia, which would come on 22 June, is unknown. What he did 
accomplish, however, is the integration of the ICP into the united front with the GMD and 
the nationalist Vietnamese parties represented on the Chinese border. Bui San told the 
French that a cadre called Phong (identified as Quoc) presided over the CC meeting, while 
‘M anh’ (identified as Hoang Quoc Viet) served as secretary. ‘Xuyen’ or Dang Xuan Khu, 
(Truong Chinh), reported on affairs in Thai Binh and Ha Dong provinces. Dang Xuan Khu 
would be confirmed as General Secretary o f the ICP at this meeting. When 'Phong' spoke on 
behalf of the Overseas Party, he criticized the work in the interior of Vietnam. ‘He said that 
at the present moment, it was necessary to appeal to the entire population without making 
any class distinctions’. He recommended that the party appeal to the nationalist sentiments 
o f the Vietnamese. They must encourage patriotic feelings and encourage people to read 
about the history of Vietnam. For organizational purposes the meeting decided to establish a 
‘Vietnam Salvation Association’. When questioned about the strength o f the world 
communist movement, ‘Phong’ told the delegates that ‘the Party did not plan to take power 
in any country immediately, but to inspire a world-wide revolutionary movement.’ ‘For this 
purpose,’ he said, ‘we must wait for the end o f the European war and the weakening o f the 
imperialist countries, because while the warring sides are killing each other, in Russia there
99 AOM, SPCE 369, Note Conf., n. 3392-C, Surete Annam, 5 June 1941.
100 AOM, SPCE 369, Gougal a colonies, Vichy, n. 4061 a 4067, Hanoi 28 July, 1941. report of 
informer ‘Ursule’.
101 E.g. Marr, Vietnam 1945, p. 168.
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would be security to prepare the worldwide revolutionary movement.’102 This explanation, 
if  accurate, would demonstrate that Quoc was still having to explain Comintern policy in 
terms of the detente with Germany established in 1939. It does not suggest that he 
anticipated the German attack on the Soviet Union.
At the Eighth Plenum the primacy of national liberation as opposed to class struggle was 
stated without ambiguities. If the Vietnamese people did not force out the French and 
Japanese, the resolution said, they would never in 10,000 years be able to demand their 
class rights or resolve the agrarian question.103 The appeal to the Vietnamese people which 
Nguyen Ai Quoc would date 6 June 1941 was the first example o f the new face of the ICP.
It called explicitly on Vietnamese patriotism, exhorting the people to follow the examples of 
their anti-French heroes: Phan Dinh Phung, Hoang Hoa Tham and Luong Ngoc Quyen. The 
‘great work’ o f regaining independence had not yet been achieved, the letter said, because 
the propitious moment had not yet arrived, but also because the people had not yet ‘joined 
forces’. He called on the people to follow ‘the great example of the Chinese people’ and 
organize anti-French and anti-Japanese national salvation associations. After this, there 
would be only one more document using the name Nguyen Ai Quoc, another appeal to the 
Vietnamese people in August 1945. But by then the name by which his Comintern 
associates had known him would have been set aside. By that time Quoc needed to jettison 
his previous identity and its links to the Comintern. He would be presented to the world as 
Ho Chi Minh, the President of the newly independent Vietnamese state, on 2 September 
1945.
As Nguyen Ai Quoc constructed the Viet Minh coalition in Guangxi, the Comintern 
receded from the field o f vision of the Vietnamese communists. Although the Soviets 
resumed their place in the world-wide anti-fascist coalition in June 1941, they were now 
involved in a life-and-death struggle with the invading Germans which shifted their 
attention away from Asia. On 16 October 1941 the Comintern staff began to evacuate 
eastward to Ufa and Kuibyshev, as the Nazis continued their advance on Moscow. At the 
end o f that month Dimitrov wrote to Stalin to suggest that the Comintern start to operate 
under cover, using the ‘Institute for the Study o f International Problems’ as its public 
name.104 But it wasn’t until May of 1943, after Dimitrov had returned to Moscow, that the 
discussion o f dissolving the Comintern began in earnest. At a meeting held by Dimitrov,
102 AOM, SPCE 369, note conf., n. 3392-C, Surete Annam, Hue, 5 June 1941.
103 Lich Su Dang Cong San Viet Nam, I  [History o f the Vietnamese Communist Party, vol. I], Truong
Dang Cao Cap Nguyen Ai Quoc, (Hanoi: NXB Sach Giao Khoa Mac-Le-nin, 1983).
104 Marina, V.V., ‘Dnevnik G. Dimitrova’ (‘Dimitrov’s Diary’), Voprosy lstorii [Problems o f History],
7/2000, p. 44.
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Molotov and Manuilsky, it was agreed that the Comintern had outlived its usefulness and 
had become ‘an obstacle to the independent development of the communist parties’.105 
The official announcement o f dissolution appeared in Pravda, on 22 May. Although many 
o f the Comintern’s functions continued to be carried out by two ‘scientific research 
institutes’, we have no evidence that the Vietnamese communists received any guidance or 
funding from Moscow between 1941 and 1947.106
The policies set at the Eighth Plenum became the framework for the war-time activities of 
the Viet Minh. But as studies o f the Viet Minh seizure of power in August 1945 have 
shown, these policies were not evenly propagated within Vietnam; nor were they universally 
accepted by ICP members.107 In the years to come the pragmatic Ho Chi Minh, who valued 
unity above political purity, would continue to face opposition within his own party to his 
efforts to build a nationalist coalition.
105 Adibekov et al., op. cit., p. 228.
106 Adibekov et. al., op. cit., p. 232. ^
107 See David Marr, op. cit.; Pierre Brocheux, lLes senders de la revolution ’ in Saigon 1925-1945, 
(Paris: Editions Autrement, 1992); Stein Tonnesson, op. cit.
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In the Introduction I described the way in which Cold War attitudes have influenced our 
understanding o f Nguyen Ai Quoc and his efforts to develop a communist party in 
Vietnam. Although the period examined here technically falls outside the Cold War era, in 
fact one can make a case that it needs to be critically re-evaluated using the criteria for a 
‘New Cold War history’ as defined by John Lewis Gaddis.1 Much o f the earlier writing on 
Ho Chi Minh reveals the sort of political commitment which, as Gaddis puts it, ‘showed 
little of the detachment that comes from following, not reflecting, a historical epoch... \ 2 
Political commitment, personal involvement, or the use o f sources slanted towards 
propaganda has led many authors to see Nguyen Ai Quoc as an all-important national saint 
or evil genius. Not only was he the paramount leader o f North Vietnam -  he was seen as 
an influential communist from the moment he joined the FCP. Yet Quoc’s stature within 
the Comintern and Asian communism before 1945 was, as I have tried to show, less 
marked than was later supposed. He did not emerge as an influential communist on the 
world stage in 1920 or 1930, and he had a good deal o f difficulty in getting the ICP’s 
attention in 1939-40. His ascendancy in 1945 as the symbol of the Vietnamese 
independence movement was by no means an inevitable development. I would agree with 
Robert Turner that Nguyen Ai Quoc should share much of the credit for bringing Marxism- 
Leninism to Vietnam.3 But we should remember that his approaches to the Russians were 
not immediately successful. Moreover, his efforts to create a Vietnamese communist party 
with Comintern support must be understood within the context of French repression and 
the long Vietnamese search for aid from abroad. It was Lenin’s views on the obligation o f 
the western proletariat to support nationalist revolutions within colonial countries which 
persuaded Quoc to jo in  the Third International. Quoc had no romantic attachment to 
violent revolution or personal heroism. He was not a henchman of Stalin and may never 
have had a personal audience with him until 1950.
This leads to another o f Gaddis’s prescriptions for the ‘New Cold War history’: the need to 
take ideas seriously. The early Comintern theory on national and colonial questions was 
an extremely important intellectual tool for Nguyen Ai Quoc. It gave him a strong 
framework within which to combine his anti-colonialism and his desire for social justice. 
However, Leninist ideas on imperialism and colonial questions were not just an analytic
1 See John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1997), especially the final chapter, ‘The New Cold War History’.
2 Ibid., p. 282.
3 Rober Turner, Vietnamese Communism: Its Origins and Development, (Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 1975), p. 1.
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tool -  his discovery and transmission o f these ideas was an important source of his 
legitimacy within the Vietnamese communist movement. When these ideas were 
supplanted by the new analytical framework o f 1928-29, Quoc’s leadership was called into 
question. In order to gain respect and maintain their leadership, rival claimants to power 
regularly tried to show that they possessed a superior grasp o f ideology and the Comintern 
line. This line may at times have been a barely comprehensible pastiche o f ideas taken 
from Marx, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin and other pre-communist thinkers, but that 
did not lessen its importance as a means to gaining legitimacy. As Amo Mayer says, 
‘Ideology is the lifeblood o f revolution’. ‘It is tied to the need o f a [new] social group to 
project an image o f itself... ’.4 The importance o f theoretical expertise in establishing 
oneself as a leader may also have been connected to the Confucian tradition, which valued 
the ability to compose a classically orthodox text above any practical skills.
While in the West H o’s post-World W ar II efforts to project himself as a nationalist were 
met with scepticism, within the ICP his lack o f commitment to ‘proletarian communism’ 
continued to be viewed as a shortcoming. As in the period from 1931 to 1935, when first 
Tran Phu and then Ha Huy Tap called into question Quoc’s ideological credentials, there 
was renewed criticism of H o’s nationalist outlook from other party members beginning in 
1948-49. For the left-wing ICP view o f H o’s nationalist policies during the Second 
World War and his dissolution o f the party in November 1945, we can turn to Tran Ngoc 
Danh, the DRV representative in France from 1945 to 1948 (as well as a Moscow trainee 
and the younger brother o f Tran Phu). He abmptly closed the Paris representative office in 
late 1948 and fled to Prague.5 From there he sent at least two letters to Moscow. In one o f 
these he writes the following:
After the Cominform’s criticism, I am at present in total disagreement with the 
opportunist and nationalist line followed by my party since its official dissolution.
This dissolution, which goes against the will expressed several times by our comrades, 
could not have been carried out without the energetic intervention o f comrade Ho Chi 
Minh, at present President o f the DRV. The authority of comrade Ho with the 
Vietnamese people is without question very great; they consider him as the symbol of 
the anti-imperialist struggle and the main promoter of our democratic attainments.
This confidence is reinforced by the fact that the Vietnamese communists still see him 
as the former delegate o f the ECCI; or to use a Vietnamese expression, ‘He is the 
International’s man’. And the current degenerate policy was inspired by his doctrine, 
which dates from the time of the Tours Congress in 1921.6
4 Amo Mayer, The Furies, (Princeton: Princeton Univ., 2000), p. 35; he quotes Paul Ricoeur, Du Texte 
a Faction: Essais d ’hermeneutique, vol. 2, (Paris: Seuil, 1986), p. 306.
5 Hoang Van Hoan, op.cit., pp.252-3.
6 Christopher Goscha, Le Contexte asiatique de la Guerre franco-vietnamienne: Reseaux, relations, et 
economic d ’aout 1945 d mai 1954, These de doctorat, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (IVe section), 
Paris, 2000, pp. 678-9, citing Archives of Czech CP CC, collection 100/3, vol. 207.
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In another letter o f 10 January 1950 addressed to ‘Comrade Iudin’ (who after Zhdanov’s 
death had become the chief ideologist in Stalin’s retinue) Danh wrote that the ICP was 
dominated by its ‘nationalist, petty-bourgeois element’, which ‘lacked faith in the 
revolutionary force of the proletariat’. ‘The decisive, divisive element is the personality o f 
Ho Chi Minh. To have an idea, it is enough to refer to the ICP’s policy of 1941, that is to 
say at the moment when he entered the Indochinese political arena directly.’7
Nguyen Ai Quoc’s rivals -  from the original ICP faction o f 1929 to Tran Ngoc Danh -  all 
tried to show his inadequacy for leadership by pointing out his theoretical ‘mistakes’. 
According to Tran Ngoc Danh’s chronology, these mistakes began with Quoc’s adherence 
to the Theses on National and Colonial Questions, which Danh dates to 1921 but which 
seems to have become a fa it accompli by late 1920, even before the Tours Conference in 
December 1920. Quoc himself remained more in tune with, if  not committed to, the line o f 
1920-27 and enjoyed another period of being ‘ideologically correct’ from 1938-1947, when 
the Soviet-led communist movement opted for nationalist communism and a degree o f self- 
determination for individual parties. By 1949-50, though, Stalin had re-imposed his 
ideological control over most o f the world communist movement and advised the 
Vietnamese communists to turn to the victorious CCP for guidance. Yet again Quoc/Ho 
Chi Minh found his leadership being undercut by others more in tune with the current 
orthodoxy.
Ironically, in the 1990s the Vietnamese party maintained its claim to legitimacy after the 
East European communist parties had been thrust from power, by claiming to represent ‘Ho 
Chi Minh Thought’. This claim has been met with a certain amount o f cynicism, however, 
as many Vietnamese are aware that Ho Chi Minh left behind no body of theoretical 
writing. Ho Chi Minh can with more justice be seen as a consummate politician and 
skilled diplomat, who bequeathed to his country a model o f coalition building and 
compromise which any modem nation state would value.
A third Gaddis prescription for the ‘New Cold War history’ is that it be ‘multi-archival’. I 
have tried to fulfill this demand by using as much o f the documentary evidence on Quoc’s 
early political career as is currently available in the Russian and French archives. There are 
without doubt still many discoveries to be made about Quoc’s activities in this period 
from Chinese and Vietnamese archives, which may eventually become more accessible to
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researchers. Still-classified documents in Russia and France, as well as in Britain and the 
US may also add to our knowledge o f Nguyen Ai Quoc. But I hope that my research has 
demonstrated the value o f the Comintern sources, in particular for the light they shed on the 
important influence which political changes in Russia exerted on the different stages of 
Quoc’s activity.
Documentary evidence in both Moscow and France shows that the Comintern was far 
from being the efficient tool for spreading communist power which Cold W ar political 
science and history would have had us believe. There can be little doubt, however, that the 
Comintern in its day played a major role in fomenting or encouraging communism in 
Vietnam. It provided Quoc and his comrades with a methodology and financial support for 
the training o f propagandists and organizers; it gave them an analysis to make sense o f 
their predicament at the hands o f the French. Even though its advice and intervention were 
not always accepted, during its existence it remained the ultimate arbiter o f internal 
political quarrels, which helped the communist party to remain more-or-less unified. It 
also provided sanctuary in Moscow for communist trainees, who were able to rebuild the 
ICP on their return to Vietnam in the early 1930s. Even Quoc’s unwelcome sojourn in 
Moscow from 1934 to 1938 kept him alive to fight another day. But to view Nguyen Ai 
Quoc and the ICP as purely the creations o f the Comintern would be an egregious 
distortion. They existed simultaneously within many spheres -  traditional Vietnamese 
society, the French empire, the Nanyang and a world community which in the 1920s and 
1930s was already being shrunk by modem communications, travel and economic 
interdependence. It was Nguyen Ai Quoc’s ability to move between these different realms 
which finally secured his place as the most successful leader o f the independence straggle.
7 Goscha, op. cit., p. 680, citing doc. 89357/425, letter received 14 April 1950 in Moscow, Archives of 
the CP USSR.
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